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In a 1979 Sinister Wisdom interview about the first years of the Lesbian Herstory 
Archive, lesbian archivists Joan Nestle and Deborah Edel credit each “older woman, 
launching herself into the lesbian world, and finding it,” for the archive’s existence. In 
undertaking the great pleasure of thanking those who have made this dissertation 
possible, it seems an appropriate place to begin to thank those women who came out and 
came into lesbianism before I did – to thank them for having launched themselves into 
the lesbian world, for having found it, and for having created it anew again and again. It 
is a world that has become my home in a deeply personal and, now, intellectual sense.  
I have also found a home for this work in the Political Science department at the 
University of Minnesota – a home whose members I now count not only as trusted 
advisors and mentors but also endless sources of support, encouragement, and energy. 
My advisor, Nancy Luxon, has been so generous with her time and energy that her office 
now feels like a second home. It is impossible to imagine this project without her 
rigorous engagement in it, her refusal to allow me to sidestep difficult questions, and her 
patience with me as I “muddled through” a task of this enormity. I owe her an enormous, 
and likely unrepayable, debt. In a significant and quite literal sense, this project could not 
exist without Joan Tronto’s career-long efforts to create a space in which feminist and 
lesbian ideas could be heard as political theory. On a more personal level, this project is 
indebted to those qualities that define her mentorship: care, discernment, and a clarity of 
thought that, without fail, reminds those in her orbit of those things that are really 
important about politics and political thinking. Tracey Deutsch, since the first seminar I 
took with her in 2014, has continually reminded me to think less narrowly about the 
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contours of my own discipline and training, and to remember that telling a history well is 
a powerful way to act in the world. Joe Soss has been a vocal and enthusiastic supporter 
of this work from the beginning, and it is undoubtedly stronger for the courses that I took 
with him early in my graduate career, where I first encountered the thorny issues of 
method, difference, and hierarchy that have shaped this work.  
As lesbian feminists constantly reminded us, no intellectual work can flourish in 
the halls of the academy alone; work that remains attuned to the challenges and 
possibilities of working with, for, and amongst others requires loving relationships to 
sustain it. I am lucky enough to have built such relationships in Minneapolis, my home of 
six years. Amy “Amisoun” Fairgrieve, Zoë Rodine, Jenna Dreier, and Kristina Popiel, 
Rachel Mattson, and John, Candice, and Emma Greenwood have not only been 
seemingly boundless sources of love, but have also been fierce protectors and keen 
interlocutors for these six years. David Lemke, Matt Dreier, Craig Harper, David 
Andrews, Yon Ji Sol, Jennifer Jodell, Misha Hadar, and Britt van Paepeghem have taught 
me to understand that the labor of friendship, and the bridge of graduate school, can bring 
people together in unexpectedly lovely ways. My cohort members – in particular, Elif 
Kalaycioglu, Tracey Blasenheim, Avi Muñoz, and Shai Gortler – have not only shaped 
my understanding of what it means to be “in conversation” with others, but have also 
given me the very real hope (uncommon in the academy) that the future of the discipline 
is bright. Sam Duling, Samarjit Ghosh, Garrett Johnson, Baruchi Malewich, Emily 
Mitamura, Farrah Tek, Charmaine Chua, Chase Hobbs-Morgan, David Temin, Adam 
Dahl, Zein Murib, Robert Nichols, Bryan Nakayama have all, at various times and in 
various ways, taught me something fundamental about politics and about being a 
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colleague. Finally, it is worth mentioning that this departmental home could not exist 
without the apparently tireless labor and truly incredible patience of our department staff: 
Jessie Eastman, Alexis Cuttance, Tia Phan, and Sara Flannery.  
 Minneapolis has not been my only home, and I am lucky to have had the support 
of many friends and colleagues outside the university. Ellen Bastoni, Cara Bastoni, Jessie 
Strasbaugh, Corey Florindi, Connor Goldsmith, Amanda Shubert, Martina McLennan, 
Cayla McNally, Sarah Sheplock, and Steve Jones were my earliest support systems; I’ve 
since been lucky enough to add to that list Ashley Vernot, Tori Heath, Megan Freiman, 
Eli Freiman, and Tara Dewan-Czarnecki (along with David, Mina, and Jonah). 
Intellectually, this project has been shaped by various members of Political Theory, 
including Lawrie Balfour, Lida Maxwell, Kathy Ferguson, Elizabeth Wingrove, Nina 
Hagel, Michaele Ferguson, Lorna Bracewell, Stephen Engel, and Delia Popescu, whose 
comments on drafts and presentations of this work have made it all the stronger.  
 It would not have been possible to do the work of this dissertation without the 
financial support of the University of Minnesota Graduate School, the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Minnesota, and the Mellon Foundation. The 
Department of Political Science, from the beginning of my time there, has made it 
possible not only to complete a dissertation, but to complete the one that I wanted and 
needed to write. The Mellon-funded Sawyer Seminar at the University of Minnesota 
provided me with a fellowship during the 2018-2019 academic year which, in addition to 
offering me the opportunity to be a part of a truly revelatory set of conversations, allowed 
me time to conduct my archival research. And the University of Minnesota Graduate 
School provided me with a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship during 2019-2020 that made 
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it possible to complete the work of thinking and writing. Finally, staff at the Beinecke 
Library at Yale University, the Feminist Theory Archive at Brown University, and the 
Lesbian Herstory Archive in Brooklyn, NY have made much of this work possible, not 
only because they possess the know-how to guide a doctoral candidate in her first 
fumbling visits to the archive, but also because they have done the invaluable work of 
preserving and maintaining the important collections at the center of this project. 
 No home is complete without family. In addition to my chosen family, I am so 
fortunate to have had the support of my parents, Hannah Stewart-Gambino and Jack 
Gambino, throughout this process. Words cannot express the power of having been raised 
by two people whose dedication to teaching and research – and to the impact that these 
activities can have on each one of us and on the world – made it possible to imagine 
myself as “Dr. Gambino.” My sister, Madeline Gambino, has been from her first 
moments a keen observer of the world, a force to be reckoned with, and a loyal friend to 
those around her. My grandmothers, Patricia Gambino and Caroline Stewart, have – 
though sometimes I think they have questioned the sanity of the academy – proven that 
pride in and care for one’s loved ones can overcome even the most obvious differences. 
The newest members of my family, Spencer Philpot, Steve and Kathy McCarthy, Kelly 
Anne McCarthy, and Justin McCarthy, have made my life all the richer since I met them.  
 Finally, if these acknowledgements attest to the care, labor, and energy that it 
takes to sustain a humbling catalog of homes, then it is impossible to imagine – truly – 
my life without the one that Katie McCarthy has built with me. Katie has launched 
herself into the world with me, and what we have found is that, together, we can create 







Abstract: This dissertation reconstructs the political theorizing of lesbian feminists 
ranging from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. It argues, in contrast to the popular 
“wave narrative” of feminist theory, that theirs was a uniquely intersectional and 
coalitional politics; moreover, it suggests that the wave metaphor both covers over and 
forecloses many of the intersectional and coalitional insights that lesbian feminists 
developed during this period. Since the early 1990s, queer theorists have raised serious 
concerns about lesbian feminism, arguing that its central assumptions are essentialist, 
exclusionary, and homogenizing. In contrast to this commonplace reading of lesbian 
feminism, however, I argue that lesbian feminism was neither essentialist nor 
exclusionary; in fact, lesbian feminists promoted a political praxis grounded in 
confronting and repairing the harms of racism and inequality within their movement.  
 
I develop my argument in three parts. First, I show that not only is the widespread view 
of lesbian politics as reactionary and undemocratic largely inaccurate, but that queer 
theorists’ central argument – that queer theory is a more exemplary approach to 
intersectional politics – paradoxically erases and reduces the contributions of lesbians of 
color, even as it claims them as antecedents. Second, I reconstruct the diverse political 
claims made by lesbian feminists by turning to archives often overlooked by political 
theorists, such as the magazine Sinister Wisdom. I show that the practice of racial 
responsibility developed in the pages of Sinister Wisdom by lesbian feminists such as 
Cherríe Moraga, Audre Lorde, Maria Lugones, Adrienne Rich, and Monique Wittig, 
among others, offers valuable insights for theorists grappling with how to imagine more 
radical and accountable coalitions. Finally, I argue that while the political challenges 
posed by lesbians have historically been considered less sophisticated than queer theories, 
the lesbian conception of accountability is a point of contact with contemporary theories 
of grounded responsibility that contest central concepts of political theory such as the 
social contract. I conclude by arguing that by challenging these central concepts and by 
advocating for a politics of grounded responsibility, lesbian feminism offers a promising 
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Lesbian Feminism Beyond ‘The Waves’ 
 
Some ideas are not really new but 
keep having to be affirmed from the 
ground up, over and over.  
- Adrienne Rich1 
 
 
The scene at the Second Sex: 30 Years Later conference was chaotic. It was 
September 27, 1979 – the third full day of activities at the conference, which brought 
nearly 1,000 feminist academics and activists to New York University’s campus to 
debate the future of feminist theory. According to Carol Anne Douglas, who covered the 
event for the magazine off our backs, the event was billed as the most comprehensive 
reevaluation of feminist theory to date: “Speakers would include,” she wrote in oob, 
“academics, radical feminists, lesbian feminists (although the word “lesbian” was not 
mentioned in the program), socialist feminists, and feminists I am not sure how to 
describe.”2 Frictions, of course, were to be expected. “The express purpose of the 
conference,” as Jessica Benjamin, one of the conference’s organizers, would later put it, 
“was to make sure that we included as many groups as possible and had an open 
discussion of all differences” – and these differences were sure to yield some 
disagreements.3  But no one seemed to anticipate what would happen in the conference’s 
final hours: a deep, divisive explosion over the wounds of racism and homophobia within 
feminism.  
 
1 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New 
York: Norton, 1986 [1976]), xv.  
2 Carole Anne Douglas, “2nd Sex Thirty Years Later: Feminist Theory Conference,” off 
our backs, (December 1979): 4. From the Wittig Papers, Beinecke Library at Yale.  
3 Jessica Benjamin, “Letter to Lester Olson,” in Philosophy & Rhetoric, 33(3) 2000; 289.  
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The explosion, according to the conference participants, was precipitated by 
Audre Lorde’s speech “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.”4 
In the open mike session following her speech, which was the last programmed event of 
the day, issues of internal racism and homophobia which had simmered just below the 
surface for three days finally erupted. According to Douglas, once Lorde finished her 
speech, attendees jumped to the microphone:  
One woman said she thought this conference lagged behind the movement 
as a whole in dealing with Black women because it took place in academia.  
Another woman said, “We lesbians have helped you women with analysis, 
put on conferences, worked on abortion, rape, child abuse, etc. When are you 
going to do something for us? …  
A member of the planning committee said she was a bit disturbed at all of 
the criticisms of the planning. “We have planned for a whole year. We know it 
has problems. But have you ever been at a conference where hundreds of women 
have discussed heterosexuality and lesbianism the way we have? I’d like to do the 
same with race.”  
Jessica Benjamin said that it was past time to end the conference. Should 
we cut off speaking at the mike? The audience, tired of the lack of time for 
discussion, screamed, “No!” […]5  
 
In the face of these vociferous complaints, the conference organizers were both frustrated 
and baffled: “Despite the fact that we had organized the conference to address differences 
among women,” Benjamin writes, “the audience largely consisted of many women ready 
to protest that their group had been excluded.”6 What had begun as a comprehensive 
attempt to cover “what is and isn’t being done in feminist theory at the moment”7 quickly 
began to simmer with unspoken frustrations – frustrations which boiled over, according 
 
4 The full text of the speech appeared in the same oob issue in which Douglas’ 
assessment of the conference was printed. Five years later, it was also anthologized in 
Lorde’s collection of essays Sister Outsider (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1984), 110-113.  
5 Douglas, “2nd Sex,” 26.  
6 Benjamin, “Letter,” 287.  
7 Douglas, “2nd Sex,” 26.  
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to Benjamin, in the explosion of “a discourse that was brand new to all of us: that of 
identity politics.”8 
Contemporary readers might sense the resentment in Benjamin’s statement, which 
she penned in 2000 in defense of her work on the conference. By invoking the phrase 
“identity politics” to describe her frustration with the unexpected protests over racism and 
homophobia, she evokes a trope that contemporary feminist and queer theorists have all 
but worn out: the sense that the 1980s were a time of division and resentment – impasse, 
really – over the lived differences between women. Indeed, leveling criticisms at 1980s 
“identity politics” are, by now, second nature for feminist and queer theorists. Under this 
common framing, the 1980s were to be a period in which resentments over feminism’s 
exclusivity, internal policing, and growing acrimony were bubbling over, only to be left 
unresolved, unheard, and unaltered. Indeed, scenes like the open mike evoke what Alice 
Echols famously coined the “eruption of difference;” such frames, in turn, provide 
contemporary theorists with seemingly airtight evidence that the 1980s were a time of 
fracture and fatigue.9 In fact, in what follows, I will suggest that whether one criticizes 
“identity” by recourse to the language of différance,10 wounded attachments,11 
 
8 Benjamin, “Letter to Lester Olson,” 289.  
9 Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).  
10 This term, of course, is Derrida’s, though in feminist theoretical circles it has most 
extensively been deployed by Gayatri Spivak to claim that “the constitution of the subject 
in life is the place of the différend.” “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Colonial Discourse and 
Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader,” ed. Williams and Chrisman. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993); 97.  
11 Coined by Wendy Brown in States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), “wounded attachments” refers to identity’s 
“impulse to inscribe in the law and in other political registers its historical and present 
pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power to make itself,” 66.  
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performativity,12 or “the incoherent dispensation,”13 the phrase invokes the flawed and 
ultimately unsuccessful ways that feminists during the 1980s proposed to deal with 
differences between women. At the same time, contemporary theorists suggest, these 
purported flaws of 1980s feminisms evidence the urgent need to attend to intra-group 
power and privilege – a need that they figure as ground zero for the methodological 
innovations of 1990s “third wave” queer theory. If scenes such as the open mike session 
ushered in a decade of intractable hand-wringing over identity, queer theorists suppose, 
then transcending the failures of the 1980s must require relinquishing the attachments – 
and, with them, the failures – of the period.  
Benjamin’s assessment of the Second Sex: Thirty Years Later conference is far 
from the first dismissal of scenes like the one following Lorde’s “Master’s Tools” speech. 
What’s peculiar, however, is the degree to which criticisms of ‘identity politics’ have 
come to be associated with lesbian feminism in particular. Most critiques of the period 
begin, for example, by invoking Alice Echols’ condemnation of “cultural feminism” in 
her 1989 book Daring to be Bad. Cultural feminism, for Echols, was the strand of 
feminist practice, fueled by the “gay/straight split,” which “turned [feminism’s] attention 
away from opposing male supremacy to creating a female counterculture… [In cultural 
feminism], the focus became one of personal rather than social transformation.”14 As 
 
12 The notion of performativity first appears in Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2010 [1990]), and is given further 
treatment in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” The Lesbian and Gay Studies 
Reader, ed. Abelove, Barale, and Halperin. (New York: Routledge, 1993); 307-320.  
13 Eve Sedgwick uses this phrase to denote the fundamental paradox between 
universalizing and minoritizing discourses inherent in making identity claims. The 
Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).  
14 Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad, 5.  
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Verta Taylor and Leila Rupp would later point out, Echols’ condemnation of cultural 
feminists for recasting politics “completely in terms of their lifestyle”15 is strongly 
associated with lesbian politics – “Although lesbian voices are among those raised in 
condemnation of cultural feminism,” they write, “the boundary in common usage 
between cultural feminism and lesbian feminism is highly permeable, if it exists at all.”16 
Similarly, Victoria Hesford has more recently argued that the “feminist-as-lesbian” has  
tended to be the figure through which generalized perceptions of second-wave 
feminism have been organized as memory in the academy and in queer and 
feminist subcultures… she often stands for the perceived essentialism of second-
wave feminism and for the limits of its cross-class and cross-race alliances.17 
 
For Echols, and for a generation of scholars following her landmark text, a lesbian thus 
emblematizes the enervating – the failed – dimensions of radical feminism. When 
theorists and historians describe the 1980s as a time of fracture and fatigue, then, much of 
the blame tends to rest on lesbians for having relied on “cultural” understandings of 
feminism: because so-called “cultural feminists” – lesbians – were obsessed with 
elevating a gynocentric culture, they are responsible for enabling a problematic 
attachment to “identity” against which feminism in the 1990s had to assert itself.18  
 
15 Ibid., 5.  
16 Verta Taylor and Leila J. Rupp, “Women’s Cultural and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A 
Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism,” in Signs 19(1), 1993; 33-34.  
17 Victoria Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2013), 15.  
18 Indeed, criticisms of “cultural” feminists were deployed to justify all sorts of 
theoretical, historical, and political interventions in the 1990s. As I will suggest below, 
the purported failures of “cultural feminists” – that is, lesbian feminists – have been used 
to motivate various turns toward the poststructuralism of Derrida, toward the philosophy 
of Hannah Arendt, towards “queer” understandings of intersectionality and identity, and 
other ostensibly “third wave” theoretical paradigms.  
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In addition to making a strong claim about the weakness of lesbian “lifestyle” 
claims at the expense of radical feminism’s more political dimensions, implicit in the 
moniker “cultural feminism” are the charges of feminism’s “deadly sins:” essentialism, 
reactionary conservatism, and an anti-democratic tendency to privilege one (white, 
middle class, cisgender) standpoint over all others. In her reflections on her own 
experience in a lesbian separatist community, Kathy Rudy, for instance, argues that 
lesbian feminist politics is a fundamentally essentialist endeavor. While Rudy takes issue 
with Echols’ claim that cultural feminism hastened the demise of feminist politics, she 
does accept the notion that lesbianism, at its core, was inherently identitarian. Rudy 
claims that while essentialism as an ideology “was, for many of us for a very long time, a 
very viable politic,”19 its flaws were also apparent from the beginning:  
Class, race, regional, or religious issues and struggles were forced into secondary 
positions or overlooked entirely. We [lesbians] began policing ourselves in order 
to guarantee that our members were faithful to the principle of putting women 
first.20  
 
Because lesbians spent considerable time and energy “policing” their own internal unity, 
Rudy argues that critiques of exclusivity by lesbians of color outside the relatively 
homogenous white lesbian community set a process of fracture – what Echols called the 
“eruption of difference” – in motion:  
As white, middle class lesbian feminists read [lesbian of color] works, we began 
to realize that the things we thought of as essential to womanness – and upon 
which lesbian feminist politics had been built – largely described white, middle 
class women.21   
 
 
19 Kathy Rudy, “Radical Feminism, Lesbian Separatism, and Queer Theory,” Feminist 
Studies 27(1), 2001; 200.  
20 Ibid., 200.  
21 Ibid., 201.  
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For Rudy, finally, this fracture made it possible to sort lesbian feminists into groups: 
those who cared about race, class, religion, gender identity, and so on (those, in her 
telling, who would eventually turn to the more inclusive “third wave” of queer theory) 
and those whose commitment to essentialism overrode these concerns. Difference, she 
writes, “directly clashed with the central tenet of radical feminism… A posture of 
openness to all was difficult to take up on a community built on exclusionary politics.”22 
Reflecting on the charges leveled at lesbianism by Echols and Rudy, it is not difficult to 
see how the contemporary charge that lesbian politics are irrevocably bound up in 
“identity politics” has gained traction.  
In contrast to this commonplace narrative, in what follows I will argue that 
however much accounts like Benjamin’s, Echols’, and Rudy’s seem to tell a transparent 
historical story about feminist theory’s unfolding from radical politics to fracture, and 
from fracture to “identity politics,” this narrative about identity, essentialism, and 
uncritical gynocentrism do not tell the whole story of the lesbian feminist 1980s. Making 
this case, I’ll argue, requires that feminist historians and theorists return to scenes like the 
open mike session at the Second Sex: Thirty Years later conference to ask not about the 
failures that they portend, but the promises they held. It would require that feminists set 
aside frameworks that insist on the insufficiency of lesbian feminist thinking to ask how – 
and why – we have written the real substance of these scenes out of our histories and our 
politics. In this dissertation, I will suggest that doing so reveals fundamentally different 
political challenges and resources than those associated with “identity” politics.  
 
22 Ibid., 205.  
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In returning to scenes like the Second Sex: Thirty Years Later conference and 
many other similar scenes throughout the 1980s, I will argue that the common 
interpretation of this era of lesbian theorizing as primarily concerned with an essentialist, 
exclusionary identity is an egregious oversimplification of the period. While depictions of 
identity politicking in the 1980s often lead theorists and historians to seek new ways of 
conceptualizing individuals, relations of power, and political futures – new ways that 
would later come to be exemplified by “queer” theory – Douglas’ depiction of the Second 
Sex: Thirty Years Later conference, however inadvertently, highlights a different reality. 
A second glance at the conversation following Lorde’s “Master’s Tools” speech reveals 
how deeply entangled claims about the status of lesbian and Black identities within 
feminist circles were. That the grievances of Black (and) lesbian feminists could be 
articulated as analogous and overlapping in the open mike session reveals that, on the eve 
of the 1980s, Black (and) lesbian women felt themselves to be vulnerable to erasure, 
invisibility, or exclusion in interlocking ways – vulnerable, indeed, in ways that could be 
co-articulated in the terms of “identity” that Lorde’s speech (and many other texts across 
racial, classed, and sexual differences in the 1980s) laid out. If The Second Sex: Thirty 
Years Later conference offers a window into a more racially and sexually dynamic 1980s 
feminism than is often depicted in contemporary academic work, misreadings of 1980s 
“identity politics” appear all the more egregious as one’s picture of the decade becomes 
fuller. In fact, a brief glance at the landmark feminist works of the 1980s reveal that the 
outcry over Lorde’s “Master’s Tools” was far from fractious; in fact, it emerges from a 
profoundly generative era of thinking about the intersections between Black (and) lesbian 
lives.  
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Instead of taking for granted the notion that “the eruption of difference” ushered 
in the problematic discourse of identity politics, then, I suggest in this work that feminist 
historians and theorists ought to pursue how and why these vulnerabilities were co-
articulated. For example, I will argue that the political ideas and resources that Black 
(and) lesbian feminists developed exceed and decenter the critiques of “identity” that 
have characterized their resentful presence in contemporary theory. Just as importantly, 
this dissertation will show that lesbian political thinkers of the 1980s resisted 
incorporation into the narratives of identity, fracture, and wounded attachments that 
underpin “third wave” queer critique today. Finally, I will outline the political resources 
that these resistances offer for a more robust intersectional politics in the contemporary 
moment. 
 
Writing against the Waves  
This dissertation, at its most basic, pursues these historical and political claims by 
probing what I will argue are the deeply intersectional, coalitional, and political 
commitments of lesbian – and especially lesbian of color – feminism during the 1980s. 
On the eve of the 1980s, feminists were engaged in a dialogue about what it meant – and 
what it could mean – to speak for, with, and about other women. That this dialogue, 
represented not only by Lorde’s “Master’s Tools” remarks but also by thinkers who will 
appear throughout this work – Cherríe Moraga, Marilyn Frye, Maria Lugones, Barbara 
and Beverly Smith, Adrienne Rich, Monique Wittig, and many others – could be 
represented merely as an “eruption of difference” that ushered in the failed project of 
identity politics is a remarkable historical revision.  
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For one, the commonplace lens of “identity politics” has deeply entrenched a 
version of history that loosely follows the “wave” metaphor, in which feminist theorizing 
unfolds through a series of progressive inclusions that run parallel to a set of increasingly 
sophisticated methodological innovations. On this view, the “first wave” culminated in 
the contestation of women’s exclusion from the institutions of public life, the “second 
wave” culminated in the contestation of women of color’s exclusion from feminism itself, 
and the “third wave” culminated in the contestation of the intersectional queer’s 
exclusion from symbolic and discursive representation in both feminism and the broader 
culture. On a common reading, these waves of exclusion have pushed feminists to 
acknowledge the limitations and failures of their own frameworks, moving from a 
singular emphasis on white, middle class women to a broadened horizon that 
acknowledges the fluctuations of women’s identities across lines of race, class, sexual 
and gender identity, nationality, religion, disability, and so on. This framework, which 
understands feminism to have gradually expanded its critical aperture as feminists grasp 
and overcome their own failures over time, is neatly summarized in the first paragraph of 
Denise Riley’s Am I That Name?:  
The black abolitionist and freed slave, Sojourner Truth, spoke out at the Akron 
convention in 1851, and named her own toughness in a famous peroration against 
the notion of woman’s disqualifying frailty. She rested her case on her refrain 
‘Ain’t I a woman?’ It’s my hope to persuade readers that a new Sojourner Truth 
might well – except for the catastrophic loss of grace in the wording – issue 
another plea: ‘Ain’t I a fluctuating identity?’ For both a concentration on and a 




23 Denise Riley, Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ in History 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 1. Emphasis mine.  
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Riley’s claim that feminist theory and activism move together towards a necessarily more 
flexible, democratic, and subversive praxis – that “If the seductive fraud of ‘woman’ is 
exposed… the ground is prepared for political fights to continue, armed with clarity”24 – 
seems obvious enough. A new Sojourner Truth, armed with knowledge of the failures of 
suffragists and second wave feminists alike, would take a different, more sophisticated 
line of attack. If ‘woman’ will always exclude some potential ally in feminist struggle, 
better to embrace indeterminacy in the name of inclusion: “Not woman, but women,” 
Riley writes: “then we can get on with it.”25 
Alongside this narrative of gradual inclusion into a tenuous and unstable “feminist 
and queer” coalition are the methodological innovations that make it possible to read this 
history as a progressive account. According to Mary Hawkesworth, for example, by 
creating tools such as “gender as an analytical category” and “standpoint theory as an 
analytical tool” (two “second wave” inventions), as well as “intersectionality as a guiding 
research principle” (a “third wave” innovation), feminist and queer theorists have been 
able to “raise new questions for research, illuminate power relations masked by 
traditional methods of inquiry, and demonstrate deficiencies in dominant accounts.”26 
Marking both the “waves” and their methodological inventions as moments in a 
continuous – albeit rocky – journey towards justice and inclusion, Hawkesworth suggests 
that such accounts teach us to “consider… the potential for their further use to achieve 
the transformative goals of feminist scholarship.”27 On the one hand, as Hawkeswork’s 
 
24 Ibid., 2.  
25 Ibid., 2.  
26 Mary Hawkesworth, Feminist Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological 
Innovation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 13.  
27 Ibid., 14.  
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more recent work makes clear, these “waves” are less historical fact than a shorthand for 
organizing the complex, controversial, and contestatory history of feminist and queer 
theories. Because these debates can seem internecine, acrimonious, and abstract, 
Hawkesworth – like many, many feminist political theorists – argues that metaphors like 
the waves, while artificial, can serve the useful purpose of illuminating “a cogent account 
of the politics of knowledge, explaining how ‘facts’ can be contentions, and why 
supposedly neutral accounts of political life are seldom what they seem.”28 Hawkesworth 
is right to point out that there have been broad, overarching shifts in the evolution of 
feminist inquiry – and that illuminating these shifts can help us understand how truly 
impactful feminism’s politics of knowledge has been.  
Still, in this dissertation I will argue that telling the story of feminism’s rich, 
diverse, and complex contributions to knowledge through the heuristic of the “three 
waves” is not as benign as it may seem. In fact, it requires feminists – and, in particular, 
feminist political theorists – to take up a very peculiar historical sensibility that does 
more than simply organize and thematize various feminist contributions over time. 
Seeing lesbian feminism as an inherently flawed identitarian discourse unable to wrestle 
with questions of race and racism, for example, requires a certain historical sensibility 
that, at best, causes political theorists to see and think of lesbians of color as excluded 
outsiders rather than the central and deeply influential political thinkers that they were. 
However, this is simply not a historical reality. As the chapters that follow contend, 
lesbians of color were extraordinarily involved in lesbian feminist publishing, 
 
28 Mary Hawkesworth, Gender and Political Theory: Feminist Reckonings (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2019), 21.  
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conferences, writing, and theorizing; moreover, their provocations incited, inspired, and 
motivated many of the sea changes we now associate with the three “waves” of feminist 
theory.  
First, then, this dissertation builds on the work of a growing number of historians 
who have contested the idea that “second wave” politics were inherently flawed by their 
exclusive, or even primary, emphasis on white middle class women. This body of 
scholarship has moved significantly beyond thinking about the women’s, gay, and queer 
liberation movements as unfolding linearly as feminists gradually come to grasp and 
transcend their own limitations and failures. Instead, historians and some theorists have 
begun to focus on “the range of feminisms” and its “many founding events.”29 Thus, 
while feminist political theorists have largely used the “waves” as a kind of shorthand for 
various key concepts and frameworks for conducting feminist research, feminist 
historians have made a convincing case for thinking of feminisms, plural, as organized 
around various spatial, institutional, ideological, economic, and other nodal points,  rather 
than unfolding in a progressive temporality towards greater inclusion.30  
 
29 Linda Gordon, “The Women’s Liberation Movement,” Feminism Unfinished: A Short, 
Surprising History of the American Women’s Movement (New York: Norton, 2014), 71.  
30 Such works include, but are far from limited to, Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The 
Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: 
Knopf, 1979); Stephanie Gilmore, ed., Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on 
Second-Wave Feminism in the United States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008); 
Benita Roth, Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana, and White Feminist 
Movements in America’s Second Wave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Kimberly Springer, Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968-1980 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Annelise Orleck, Rethinking American Women’s 
Activism (New York: Routledge, 2014); Dorothy Sue Cobble, The Other Women’s 
Movement: Workplace Justice and Social Rights in Modern America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); Anne Enke, Finding the Movement: Sexuality, 
Contested Space, and Feminist Activism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Anne 
M. Valk, Radical Sisters: Second-Wave Feminism and Black Liberation in Washington 
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In an essay detailing these developments in the field of feminist history, for 
example, Sara Evans argues that it was “academy-based theorists” – not the participants 
in the various contexts of second wave feminism themselves – “who fixed the perception 
of 1970s Second Wave feminists as white, middle-class, self-interested, and anti-sex.”31 
While Evans maintains that such perceptions did identify “a real weakness in feminist 
self-representations,” they have also impoverished feminist scholarship empirically and 
politically by encouraging misconceptions about second wave feminism that erase 
women of color and retroactively homogenize the “women” in Women’s Liberation. 
Making this case more explicit, Leela Fernandes argues in No Permanent Waves that the 
homogenizing tendencies of the wave metaphor are, in practice, much more than heuristic 
trade-offs. “One of the underlying effect of the three-wave model of feminism,” she 
writes, “is the inadvertent representation of feminist thought as a teleological historical 
narrative of progress and inclusion.” She continues,  
By framing new challenges to the existing terms of feminist thought and practice 
as a new “wave,” such work is defined primarily as a move toward the increasing 
inclusion of women of color within feminism. In other words, according to this 
historical narrative, if second wave feminism was the preserve of white, middle-
class women, third wave feminism marked a new phase in which feminists of 
color and questions of race and gender were now included. The feminist wave 
model thus implicitly rests on a narrative of multicultural inclusion.32 
 
 
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008); Kelly Hanking, The Girls in the Back 
Room: Looking at the Lesbian Bar (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).  
31 Sara M. Evans, “Women’s Liberation: Seeing the Revolution Clearly,” Feminist 
Studies 41 no. 1 (2015); 141.  
32 Leela Fernandes, “Unsettling ‘Third Wave Feminism:’ Feminist Waves, 
Intersectionality, and Identity Politics in Retrospect,” No Permanent Waves: Recasting 
Histories of U.S. Feminism, ed. Nancy Hewitt (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2010), 100.  
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According to Fernandes, the heuristic model of the “three waves” reproduces, however 
inadvertently, a narrative of multicultural inclusion. The problem with this, she writes, 
isn’t just that it’s an oversimplification: what the “wave” metaphor covers over and 
obscures, she argues, is the fact that contesting a politics of “inclusion” in favor of a more 
capacious understanding of political possibilities is precisely the point of much of women 
of color feminism from the 1970s onward. Drawing on Chela Sandoval’s theory of 
“differential consciousness”33 to describe the ways that women of color feminism of the 
1970s and 80s exceeds and rejects a politics of multicultural inclusion, Ferndandes 
suggests that  
the writings and challenges that feminists of color produced did not represent a 
simplistic rejection of or progression beyond previous modes of feminist 
consciousness or practice. Rather these writings produced a distinctive form of 
consciousness that simultaneously occupied, moved between, and produced new 
spaces and sites of thought and practice.34  
 
Pointing out the irony of deploying these critiques of “inclusion” to advocate for a more 
inclusive feminism, Fernandes goes on to argue that the wave model thus “[transforms] 
feminists of color writing within the historical period of the second wave into a subject 
dislocated from their historical context.”35 Thus, for Fernandes and many other feminist 
historians, when political theorists rely on the “wave metaphor” as a way of organizing 
the broader contributions of feminist theory, they risk both erasing the political actors 
whose ideas motivate shifts in theoretical frameworks and subverting – even 
contradicting – the actual content of those ideas.  
 
33 Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2000).  
34 Fernandes, “Unsettling ‘Third Wave Feminism,’” 105.  
35 Ibid., 111.  
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 Evans and Fernandes are far from alone in identifying how the “impetus within 
interdisciplinary feminist scholarship to emphasize the creation of concepts or linguistic 
expressions that can capture [a] sense of newness and rupture” have, paradoxically, 
foreclosed the very political insights that motivate historical change. In this sense, as 
Julie Gallagher puts it, the “waves” metaphor is thus a historical construct that, by virtue 
of having been cited and recited over time, has come to overshadow and occlude the very 
historical context it is intended to illuminate. As a construct, the “waves” metaphor  
creates and reinforces exclusivity; it illuminates only certain kinds of activism 
that were engaged in by a limited set of historical actors… By reifying the 
metaphor, some scholars have consciously and others have inadvertently weighed 
in on the question of who and what deserves to be covered in the history of 
feminism, and in doing so have excluded the work and struggles of many 
women.36 
 
As Gallagher and her interlocutors point out, narratives that emphasize the relationship 
between the three waves of feminism and their methodological innovations tend to 
privilege “periods when middle-class white women were most active in the public 
sphere” and obscure “women of color, working-class women, women with disabilities, 
lesbians, and older women who engaged in activism that responded to overlapping forms 
of oppression.”37 In fact, Gallagher writes, “When these women do appear, it is generally 
for one of two reasons:”38 they are either figured as outsiders who must be included in a 
promising new feminist coalition that smooths over differences, or used to motivate 
 
36 Kathleen Laughlin, Julie Gallagher, Dorothy Sue Cobble, Eileen Boris, Premilla 
Nadasen, Stephanie Gilmore, and Leandra Zarnow, “Is it Time to Jump Ship? Historians 
Rethink the Wave Metaphor,” Feminist Formations 22, no. 1 (2010); 82-83.  
37 Ibid., 83.  
38 Ibid.  
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changes in (predominately white) academic feminism without serious engagement with 
their ideas, activities, and claims.  
Thus, the stakes of reconceptualizing 1980s lesbian feminism are more than just 
historical; they signal the extent to which the debates around so-called “identity politics” 
have not only narrowed the terms of debate in which we understand the feminist past, but 
have also displaced, erased, and covered over important resources for understanding the 
political challenges of coalition that are, today, more urgent than ever. To consider 
lesbians of color as excluded outsiders – to view them as simply crusaders from without 
contesting their exclusion –brackets their physical presence and centrality in lesbian 
feminist spaces throughout the 1980s and excises their ideas, concepts, critiques, and 
claims from our understanding of feminism itself. Paradoxically, then, in attempting to 
write a history that pays homage to the various struggles for “inclusion,” the wave 
narrative runs the risk of erasing the actual ideas of the very women whose intellectual 
presence feminists rightly seek to affirm. Revisiting lesbian feminism – and reconceiving 
of the 1980s not as a period of fracture and fatigue but of questions of responsibility and 
repair – thus does more than deepening our historical understanding of this period; it 
pushes us to raise difficult political questions about solidarity and responsibility that have 
been written out of this history and are, too often, ignored by contemporary theorists.   
 
Relinquishing Identity: (Dis)Identification and Vanishing Lesbian Politics 
 However important it may be both historically and politically, though, displacing 
the “wave” framework is more difficult than it first appears. In fact, effecting such a 
displacement on a general level would require disrupting several commonplace concepts 
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and narratives about the failures of second wave feminism, in particular, that are so 
generally accepted that they seem like natural starting points for theorists. However, 
although feminist political theorists have been largely reticent to enact such disruptions, 
the field is not without interventions into the commonplace narratives about the second 
wave. Kathi Weeks, for instance, has argued that  
the 1970s has until recently been most often remembered as something of an 
embarrassment: the time when feminists essentialized the category of woman, 
neglected race, constructed maniacally totalizing theories, and exposed 
themselves in public with their intemperate speech, overwrought emotions, and 
utopian dreams. Sometimes it is as if the whole period is now recalled within 
scare quotes; the daring and ambition of feminist thinkers and activists in the 
1970s is often recoded in the historical memory of the field as naïveté and 
failure.39 
 
Arguing, as I did above, that “this is not a mere matter of inattention” and that “the shame 
and disavowal that often characterize feminism’s own historiography suggest that a more 
active mode of forgetting is at work,”40 Weeks argues in favor of rendering the 1970s 
“untimely” – that is, of appreciating “the content of a vision that requires us to imagine 
ourselves as radically other.”41 In a similar vein, Victoria Hesford has written that 
feminist political theorists’ tendency to disavow the second wave is an effect of their 
(our) attachment to certain “rhetorical forms, metaphors, and phrases” that simplify, 
contain, and “white-out” the political possibilities of the 1970s and 80s.42 Lorna 
Bracewell, too, has argued that an affective attachment to historical “starting points” like 
the infamous 1982 Barnard Conference has obscured and erased the full range of feminist 
 
39 Kathi Weeks, “The Vanishing Dialectic: Shulamith Firestone and the Future of the 
Feminist 1970s,” South Atlantic Quarterly 114 no. 4 (2015); 735.  
40 Ibid., 735.  
41 Ibid., 751.  
42 Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation, 17.  
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engagements and preoccupations.43 As these theorists have shown, displacing the “wave” 
metaphor is more complicated than simply correcting the historical record; it requires 
confronting and actively disrupting a series of affective attachments to certain narratives, 
origins, and disavowals that have come to occupy a privileged place in feminist theory.  
Following these intuitions, in the chapters that follow I will argue that if feminist 
political theorists hope to resist the distorting effects of the “wave” metaphor, they (we) 
ought to develop alternative ways of conceptualizing the contributions, contestations, and 
controversies of the second wave beyond the narratives of failure that have dominated 
feminist theory for at least two decades. However, rather than ask after the affective 
attachments and (dis)avowals that have shaped this historiography, as many of the 
theorists above have persuasively done, this work instead moves to displace the 
problematic of “identity politics” altogether. I do so not to suggest that our lingering 
attachments to this framework aren’t incredibly powerful, but to suggest that the process 
of re-attaching to new narratives and organizing concepts will require moving, 
eventually, to new ground.   
The central argument of this work, then, is that we might better understand the 
tensions around lesbian feminism that emerged in the 1980s by thinking of it as an 
emergent public rather than as an identity category. Doing so, I will suggest, not only 
shifts the vocabulary that historians and political theorists alike typically use to describe 
feminisms past, but also shifts the very founding assumptions of feminist political theory. 
Rather than conceptualizing the object of lesbian feminism as a set of ontological and 
 
43 Lorna Bracewell, “Beyond Barnard: Liberalism, Antipornography Feminism, and the 
Sex Wars,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 42 no. 1 (2016); 23-48.  
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epistemological questions (what does it mean to be a lesbian? what are the political 
effects of speaking as a lesbian?), I will argue instead that we begin from a set of political 
questions (who do lesbians claim to speak for, about, or with? Does calling forth lesbian 
feminist audience shift the requirements or responsibilities of political engagement with 
others?). When we understand lesbian feminism as an emergent public, I will argue, new 
kinds of structures, relationships, and political challenges come into view that, despite 
being topics of considerable debate during the decade, have since come to be reduced to 
merely the discontents of “identity politics.”   
Before turning to my argument about the content of lesbian feminist publicity – a 
politics that I will argue are deeply intersectional and coalitional – let me say something 
about how criticisms of identity came to dominate contemporary frameworks for 
understanding this era. How is it, for example, that feminist and queer theorists came to a 
set of conversations about what it meant to be a lesbian, rather than asking questions 
about what it meant to exist in community with other lesbians? How do these criticisms 
mobilize a set of methodological and political interventions that now appear transparently 
progressive? What do these moves cover over by marking lesbian feminism as an identity 
rather than a public?  
Struggles over identities have tended to point theorists towards the complex 
negotiations associated with the politics of naming: that is, what does it mean to be a 
lesbian or to call oneself a lesbian? While today this question seems an intuitive place to 
begin interrogating the politics of lesbian feminism, in fact it is a distinctive product of 
queer theory’s analytical imposition on lesbian feminism; in other words, it was not until 
the 1990s that feminist and queer thinkers began thinking of lesbianism primarily as an 
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attempt to define a state of being rather than an attempt to create new kinds of public 
relationships. The question of being was most famously raised in Judith Butler’s 1993 
essay “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” which opens on Butler’s “anxiety” about 
“the ‘being’ of being homosexual.” “To write or speak as a lesbian appears a paradoxical 
appearance of this ‘I,’ she writes, because it  
is a production, usually in response to a request, to come out or write in the name 
of an identity which, once produced, sometimes functions as a politically 
efficacious phantasm. I’m not at ease with ‘lesbian theories, gay theories,’ for as 
I’ve argued elsewhere, identity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory 
regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the 
rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression.44  
 
For Butler, invoking a political scene that is occasioned by the sign “lesbian” requires an 
identification with a stable category of being, which inevitably entails the impulse to 
police boundaries and, ultimately, produces constitutive exclusions. Instead, Butler would 
advocate a politics that troubles the very activity of “being” a lesbian, calling upon the 
language of performativity to evoke a practice that “de-institutes” that identity. It is not 
that “I will not appear at political occasions under the sign of lesbian,” Butler writes, “but 
that I would like to have it permanently unclear what precisely that sign signifies…. One 
risk I take is to be recolonized by the sign under which I write, and so it is this risk that I 
seek to thematize.”45 Ultimately, Butler argues that intervening at the level of what it 
means to “be a lesbian” will be “a matter of working sexuality against identity, even 
against gender, and of letting that which cannot fully appear in any performance persist in 
its disruptive promise.”46 
 
44 Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” 308.  
45 Ibid., 308.  
46 Ibid., 318.  
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 Butler frames this intervention not only against “identity” itself, but against an 
alleged failure of lesbian feminism during the 1980s to adequately address the many 
kinds of differences that made it impossible to name or define a single, coherent group of 
“lesbians.” In so doing, she draws on a number of contemporaneous scholars who, like 
Jessica Benjamin’s post-hoc assessment of the Second Sex: Thirty Years Later 
conference, understood the 1980s to have exhausted the possibilities of identity as an 
organizing political stance. (In Identity Politics, for instance, Shane Phelan argues that if 
1970s lesbian feminism had claimed that “lesbianism was in itself a vanguard position, a 
base for truly feminist politics and consciousness,” this politics exhausted itself as lesbian 
feminists began to argue that “One’s body and its desires became a more reliable guide to 
one’s loyalties than words or public deeds.”47) In her 1999 preface to Gender Trouble, 
Butler reflects on her turn towards poststructural theory by arguing that  
Whereas many feminists in the 1980s assumed that lesbianism meets feminism in 
lesbian-feminism, Gender Trouble sought to refuse the notion that lesbian 
practice instantiates feminist theory, and set up a more troubled relation between 
the two terms. Lesbianism in this text does not represent a return to what is most 
basic about being a woman; it does not consecrate feminine ity or signal a 
gynocentric world. Lesbianism is not the erotic consummation of a set of political 
beliefs… Instead, the text asks, how do non-normative sexual practices call into 
question the stability of gender as a category of analysis?48  
 
Similarly, in “Against Proper Objects,” Butler expands her critique of “lesbian” theory 
not just to emphasize the need to address normative sexual hierarchies, but also racial and 
classed ones. “Lesbian” theory by the late 1980s had, according to Butler, developed a 
 
47 Shane Phelan, Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press,1989), 45-49. 
48 Butler, Gender Trouble, xi.  
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“construal of feminism as exclusively focused on gender.”49 This mistake – born of an 
identitarian impulse to claim mastery over the “proper object” of lesbian theory –  
not only denies the history of U.S. feminist claims for radical sexual freedom, but 
also denies the emergence of a feminism specific to women of color in the U.S. 
who have sought to complicate the feminist framework to take account of 
relations of power that help to constitute and yet exceed gender, including race 
and racialization, as well as geopolitical positionality in colonial and postcolonial 
contexts.50 
  
For Butler, then, “lesbian” theory not only insisted on a restrictive and rigid naming 
practice, but had politically excluded feminists across racial, classed, geographic, and 
other differences. Queer theory, at its best, represented for Butler a turn away from these 
conceptual and political foreclosures and instead towards a “remapping of the terms of 
debate and… a kind of intellectual trespass which values the expansive possibilities of 
such confrontations over the retreat into intellectual territory.”51  
Importantly, then, queer theorists like Butler – although they often contest the 
‘wave’ periodization on paper52 – participate deeply in the notion that lesbian feminism 
exhausted itself and that a resignification of its content was necessary. Because theorists 
like Butler define queer performative politics very much against the lesbian political 
practices of the 1980s, theorists concerned with reinterpreting lesbian feminism have 
largely followed Judith Butler in raising questions about the ‘being’ of lesbian identity 
rather than what I will argue is the publicity of lesbian feminism. In her introduction to 
 
49 Judith Butler, “Against Proper Objects,” differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 6 vol. 2 and 3 (1994); 17.  
50 Ibid., 20.  
51 Ibid., 25.  
52 Indeed, Butler’s “Against Proper Objects” presents itself as a trenchant criticism of 
progress narratives like the “wave” metaphor, even as it reinscribes the narrative of 
failure and transcendence that underpins it.  
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the tellingly-titled volume The Lesbian Postmodern, for instance, Robyn Wiegman labors 
to reconcile the ways the volume’s focus on something (someone?) named “a lesbian” 
with the ways that this figure has been “constituted as critical currency by contemporary 
academe.”53 For Wiegman, the paradox that Butler outlines – the fact that any attempt to 
define what it means to be a lesbian is complicit in a set of regulatory regimes – suggests 
a further complication. Even if one were to constantly track these moments of 
identification so as to resist them, Wiegman argues, self-avowed lesbians still risk over-
determining their own identifications by reading their own performativity as a new kind 
of “master narrative.” “Now we know that we can’t possibly know,” Wiegman writes 
about what it means to “be” a lesbian, “and in this we master the category of knowledge, 
overcoming its indeterminacy and instability.”54 For Wiegman, then, the only way to 
accept the failures of 1980s, lesbian identity is to relinquish one’s attachment to identity 
altogether. In other words, where Butler argues that lesbians might “de-institute” their 
attachment to identity by recognizing its inherent instability, Wiegman suggests that even 
this politics of performativity remains complicit in exemplary politics – an attachment to 
mastery, control, and stability – that must be relinquished:   
If I were willing to turn to modernist ground, I might rationalize this complicity 
by asserting my intention to retrieve or restore the lesbian to her rightful cultural 
and critical visibility, a project of reclamation through which the figure of the 
lesbian could be named, defined, and owned by a so-called lesbian herself. But 
can my claims for the lesbian as lesbians, for what “I” am or am supposed to be, 
deter in any way the commodifying moment through which the lesbian appears, 
bound here to one of the most egregiously overused and misconstrued theoretical 
terms circulating in Western academic discussion? Rather than freeing myself 
from the commodity aesthetic, wouldn’t my claim to know the lesbian simply 
 
53 Robyn Wiegman, “Introduction: Mapping the Lesbian Postmodern,” in The Lesbian 
Postmodern, ed. Laura Doan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2.  
54 Ibid., 13.  
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confirm my position as her most masterful consumer, a commodity myself now 
mastered by the image I take myself to be?55  
 
Refusing the regulatory dynamics that come with any attempt to “be” a lesbian, even 
performatively, then, becomes the central political task of both lesbian feminism and the 
postmodern academy; it is a politics in which the central task is to encourage “the refusal 
to jettison contradiction in favor of modernity’s quest for totality and coherence, for a 
singular and romantic tapestry, unified regardless of its many colored threads.”56  
In the same volume, Judith Roof argues in “Lesbians and Lyotard” that even the 
desire to relinquish metanarratives that Wiegman associates with “the lesbian 
postmodern” can install the risks of naming. Roof traces this danger through the example 
of Penelope Engelbrecht’s essay “’Lifting Belly is a Language:’ The Postmodern Lesbian 
Subject,” in which Engelbrecht argues that lesbian desire is, at its core, postmodern in 
nature. This move, argues Roof, represents the desire to stabilize the loss of 
metanarratives that postmodernism portends:  
For example, to prevent the postmodern from usurping the position of marginal 
challenge, one simply names it lesbian. To transform the covert gender politics of 
the postmodern, one simply appends it to a lesbian category understood to 
challenge gender binaries. To avoid the frustrating denial of the bases of identity 
politics and experiential discourse so necessary to the mustering of feminist 
institutional position, one links oneself to the postmodern critique of those 
practices as an effective identity politic.57 
 
Roof’s thus casts considerable suspicion on the attempt to resolve tensions that inhere in 
naming oneself “a lesbian.” On the one hand, as Butler and Wiegman point out, the very 
act of calling upon some stable identity to articulate one’s politics puts one in the position 
 
55 Ibid., 2.  
56 Ibid., 13.  
57 Judith Roof, “Lesbians and Lyotard,” The Lesbian Postmodern ed. Laura Doan. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 53.  
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of becoming complicit in regulating that identity. On the other hand, however, Roof 
argues that articulating “the lesbian” as a destabilizing agent – one whose very presence 
signals the loss of metanarratives – risks installing itself in “the place of controlling any 
unknowing.”58 Thus, debates over “lesbian identity” reveal an oddly paradoxical political 
maneuver: the very moment that naming “the lesbian” becomes possible, claimants must 
relinquish the name and the practices it signifies. Giving up “lesbian” as a privileged site 
of postmodern politics, for Roof, enacts a “desiring process rather than a definition of 
desire [which] may make possible a relinquishment of the urge to power that 
characterizes naming gestures.”59  
 By deploying the instability of being a lesbian to show the attachments by which 
subjects invest in exclusionary identities, these authors thus suggest that “the lesbian” 
offers only a cautionary lesson: the historical valences of “lesbian identity” in these texts, 
then, are important less for teasing out the political content or commitments of lesbian 
feminists themselves than for substantiating a broader claim about the risks of identity 
politics in general. Thus, in much post-lesbian theorizing, these lessons become 
incorporated into feminist theory in ways that completely sidestep actual lesbian 
feminists. In other words, a post-lesbian feminism would require an acceptance of the 
impossibility of identity. Thus, in Joan Scott’s recent articulation, feminism is the act of 
continually assuming and relinquishing identity; this roving desire is the only ethical and 
critical form of attachment possible. “Our agency – our desire – is critique,” Scott writes; 
 
58 Ibid., 62.  
59 Ibid., 63. Emphasis mine.  
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it is “the constant undoing of conventional wisdom, the exposure of its limits for fully 
satisfying the goals of equality… Critique, as desire, provides no map.”60   
As Hesford points out in Feeling Women’s Liberation, though, these sorts of 
histories – that is, ones that understand “lesbian” on terms that privilege lesbian 
feminism’s attachments to identity and encourage theorists to turn instead to 
poststructural demands to relinquish identity altogether – tend to fall into the same 
patterns of evacuation and erasure that the “wave” narrative reproduces. As they 
continually cite the purported debates and controversies over identity that roiled in 
lesbian feminist circles, such histories tend to efface the range of diverse arguments about 
lesbian feminism that circulated by emphasizing only their identificatory practices at the 
expense of the many other dimensions of lesbian feminist theorizing. At the same time, 
they discourage contemporary historians and theorists from revisiting the real content of 
these debates by suggesting that lesbian feminism’s greatest accomplishment was, in fact, 
its failure. Thus,  
In the desire to order and account for the movement’s rise and fall, the very real 
presence of racism, heterosexism, and classism in the movement becomes 
calcified into a unified account of the movement that tends to cement, rather than 
bring into question, the ahistorical assumptions that women’s liberation… was a 
racist and classist movement. The presence of other voices, groups, and political 
affiliations at the beginnings of the movement are elided and covered over in the 
attempt to account for the movement’s limitations and failures… What counts as 
history ultimately is not the complex, contradictory, heterogeneous mess of any 
moment or era but a story that is already familiar.61  
 
For Hesford, then, the “feminist-as-lesbian,” a figure that she distinguishes from “the 
historical specificity of lesbian feminism” is more organizing specter than historical fact. 
 
60 Joan Scott, The Fantasy of Feminist History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 
43. 
61 Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation, 11-12.  
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In organizing itself around the disavowal of identity, queer theory thus produces 
“lesbian” as a figure who represents only political failure and invites supersession;62 in 
other words, she is the figure that underpins the “wave” metaphor as an organizing 
historical narrative.  
In addition to reproducing the patterns of evacuation and erasure that shape the 
wave metaphor, then, critiques that mistake lesbian feminism for an identity tend to pre-
judge the political content of lesbian feminism before or instead of contending with its 
historical and political content. But however much these post-lesbian frameworks feel 
familiar to us today – and however intuitive their interventions into “second wave” 
politics might appear – criticisms of lesbian identity like those found in the works of 
Butler, Wiegman, and Roof rely, as titles like The Lesbian Postmodern suggest, on 
postmodern and post-structural theories that were largely external to feminist and lesbian 
feminist theory for much of the 1980s. In fact, it was Jacques Derrida – not feminists or 
lesbian feminists themselves – who warned in 1984 that Women’s Studies was poised to 
become “just another cell in the university beehive.” Cited in the now-canonical edited 
volume Women’s Studies on the Edge, Derrida continued:  
Do the women who manage these programs, do they not become, in turn, the 
guardians of the Law and do they not risk constructing an institution similar to the 
institution against which they are fighting?... It is certain that the range of work in 
women’s studies is enormous, and that there are already a considerable number of 
problems to pose, of bodies of work to study, of objects to define, and that 
women’s studies has a great future. Nevertheless, if this future is of the same type 
as that of all other departments, of all other university institutions, is this not a 
sign of failure of the principles of women’s studies?63  
 
 
62 Ibid., 15.  
63 Cited in Joan Scott, “Introduction: Feminism’s Critical Edge,” Women’s Studies on the 
Edge ed. Scott. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 1. Emphasis mine.  
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Nowhere in the edited volume does one of the contributing authors contest Derrida’s 
contention that Women’s Studies, because of its peculiar relationship to the institution of 
the academy, was even in 1984 already poised for failure. When we take “defining 
identity” as the central political and interpretive goal of feminist studies and then submit 
that goal to deconstructive methodologies, it cannot come as a surprise that the entire 
endeavor is deemed, however melancholically, an “impossibility,” an “idiom of failure,” 
a “dulling” of critical imagination.  
But why should we take Derrida’s word for it? Why should we believe, for 
example, that women’s studies in the 1970s and 80s stood poised on the precipice of 
identity politicking, ready for disciplinary containment, or doomed to failure? Derrida, of 
course, was not present at the 1979 Second Sex: Thirty Years Later conference, nor was 
he a part of the capacious debates around feminist publishing, racism and homophobia, or 
intra-group responsibility and repair that characterize the lesbian feminism I present in 
this work. However, it is his assessment of the impending failures of women’s studies 
that motivate the notion that the goal of lesbian feminism should be to critique and 
relinquish its own claims to existence. After citing Derrida in the opening lines of 
Women’s Studies on the Edge, for example, Joan Scott goes on to conclude that “to 
restore feminism’s critical edge” is to define feminism “not as the perpetuation and 
protection of orthodoxy but [as] critique.”64 “Critique,” she writes, “does not offer a map 
that leads to a guaranteed future; rather, it disturbs our settled expectations and incites us 
to explore, indeed to invent, alternate routes.”65 
 
64 Ibid., 6.  
65 Ibid., 7.  
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 If queer critiques of lesbian feminism represent an “alternate route” that self-
consciously depart from lesbian feminist conceptions of politics, this work will ask what 
the consequences of that departure have been. By raising the question of paths not taken, 
I aim not only to disarticulate “lesbian theory” from its figural position as queer theory’s 
flawed antecedent, but also to push it back into conversation with several strands of 
contemporary political theory with which I believe it has more directly in common. 
While the theories and politics of lesbians in the late 1970s and 1980s have very little in 
common with “queer” readings and politics today, they do articulate a politics that 
coincides with conversations around reparations, refusals, and intersectional solidarity-
building.  
At the same time as I will insist that contemporary theorists would do better to 
conceive of lesbian feminism as an attempt to call forth a new kind of public, however, I 
will also work to distinguish the specific form of publicity that lesbian feminists 
promoted from the ways that the “public sphere” is currently debated in contemporary 
theory. I do so not only to suggest, as many other scholars already have, that various 
“rememberings” of the feminist past – and of the lesbian feminist past, in particular – are 
bound up in discourses about the failures, co-optations, and aporia of feminism in the 
present.66 Though these imbrications are surely important, I aim instead here to discover, 
on the one hand, how the “feminist–as-lesbian” came to “[figure] the contested and 
 
66 See Katie King, Theory in its Feminist Travels: Conversations in U.S. Women’s 
Movements. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995); Joan W. Scott, ed., 
Women’s Studies on the Edge. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Clare Hemmings, 
Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011); Victoria Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013); Sara Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life. (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2017).  
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unsettled nature of the relationship between the past and present of women’s liberation,” 
and to explain how contemporary political theorists’ have failed to develop an 
“accountability toward the eventfulness of the movement as something unfinished and 
beyond the capacity of any one story or account to know or apprehend it in the present.”67 
On the other hand, however, my aims here are not only empirical; in showing that lesbian 
feminist attempts to grapple with the publicity of their own work are irreducible to 
academic feminist and queer theory’s characterizations of lesbian feminism as an attempt 
to establish an identity category, I aim to open up a space for the reconsideration of 
lesbian feminism as a political resource beyond its specter-like existence in contemporary 
theory.  
 
The Turn to Publicity  
 
 Consider again the context of the Second Sex: Thirty Years Later conference. 
Queer theorists, perhaps following Benjamin’s interpretation of the scene, might see in 
the event a conflict over deep divisions in “woman” as a shared identity. As a 
consequence, they might interpret the divisive and contested nature of the event as a 
symptom of the implicit failure of the project of lesbian identity and the need to 
relinquish identity politics altogether. In other words, when contemporary feminist and 
queer theorists begin from the assumption that lesbian feminism is inextricably engaged 
in an essentialist and exclusionary identity politics, they tend to argue as Butler, 
Wiegman, and Roof do, that “lesbian identity” must be relinquished in order to make way 
for the more capacious political activity of constant resignification. Rather than view 
 
67 Victoria Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation, 210-211.  
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such an event through this lens of failure and supersession, however, I would argue 
instead that we understand scenes like this one from the vantage point of the actual space 
of the conference room; that is, in terms of questions about who might get to hold the 
microphone, occupy a seat in the room, give a presentation, or ask a question. More 
important than questions about identity, then, are questions about the relationships of 
speech, reception, responsibility, and accountability. These questions, unlike those that 
ask what it means “to be” a woman, a lesbian, or even a feminist, are instead ones that 
raise questions about what it means to speak and theorize with and amongst others. In 
political theory, questions like these are typically associated not with a politics of identity 
but with a politics of publicity. Instead of understanding lesbian identity as something 
that must be relinquished in order to inaugurate a more inclusive and flexible politics, 
then, in this work I will insist that we think of lesbian feminism as an attempt to call forth 
a fundamentally new kind of public – a public that would transform both the relations 
between individuals within the public and the institutions and practices that sustain those 
relations. 
 The term “publicity,” of course, evokes a long tradition in political theory 
stretching from the ancient Greeks to their contemporary interpreters. Canonically, 
publicity refers not only to the sphere of political and economic institutions as it is 
distinguished from the private sphere of the household, but also to the privileged place of 
reason – and, with it, argumentation and persuasion – in politics. Publicity as a political 
concept, then, differs from the colloquial usage of “public:” while public things are often 
understood to denote spaces that are held in common (such as public parks) or ideas that 
are shared amongst various distinct individuals (as in public opinion), publicity in the 
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history of political thought denotes instead the process of advancing, contesting, 
defending, and interrogating ideas about the best way to organize political life. Aristotle, 
for instance, emphasizes the public role of persuasion in making judgments about 
political issues,68 which contemporary scholars have understood as an appeal to 
deliberative or even agonistic models of democracy.69 Likewise, Kant famously wrote 
that public reason is “the use which anyone can make of [reason] as a man of learning 
addressing the entire reading public,”70 suggesting that it is only in publicly critiquing 
and reflecting on political matters that individuals and societies reach enlightened – or 
“enlarged” – maturity.71 John Stuart Mill, like Aristotle and Kant, saw public contestation 
as an irreducible feature of political life; while individual reason is fallible, building 
collective relationships of critique and contestation might allow for sounder political 
judgments.72 More recently, even, thinkers from Michel Foucault to James Tully have 
argued that the goal of “public philosophy” is a distinct form of political thinking that 
rejects doctrinal or law-like thinking in favor of a “critical attitude;” that is, one that 
 
68 Aristotle argues that “not even the possession of the most exact scientific knowledge 
would make it easy for us in speaking to persuade some listeners on the basis of it… 
Instead, it is necessary to produce our means of persuasion and arguments (logos) out of 
common things…” The Rhetoric, trans. CDC Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2018), 12.  
69 See, for example, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos. “Politics, Speech, and the Art of 
Persuasion: Toward an Aristotelian Conception of the Public Sphere,” The Journal of 
Politics 61 no. 3 (1999); 741-757.  
70 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Political 
Writings, Second Edition, ed. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 55.  
71 As Chantal Mouffe and others point out, Kant’s conception of an “enlarged” political 
perspective stems directly from his use of publicity as a way of organizing, managing, 
and directing contestation from within an inherently plural community. Agonistics: 
Thinking the World Politically (London: Verso, 2013).   
72 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Dover, 2002).  
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“begins by questioning whether the inherited languages of description and reflection are 
adequate to the task.”73   
Thus, despite the obvious political and philosophical differences between these 
canonical thinkers, the issues and challenges that attend their emphases on “publicity” 
are, on the whole, vastly different from those that attend “identity;” in particular, they 
point not to problems of inclusion and exclusion, but instead to relationships between 
various members of “the public,” and to the forms of speech, spectatorship, and 
deliberation that sustain these relationships. By invoking this language to describe lesbian 
feminism, then, I mean to suggest that scenes like the Second Sex: Thirty Years Later 
conference have less to do with simple or straightforward exclusions than they do with 
how, and how well, the relationships of persuasion, contest, and accountability within 
feminist and lesbian feminist circles function. Viewed in this light, Lorde’s “Master’s 
Tools” is less an indictment of an exclusionary (white) feminist group than it is an appeal 
for the feminist “public” to reflect on and account for its present limitations.  
Despite a recent shift in feminist political theory towards thinking about publicity 
as a practice of freedom (to which I will return shortly), however, for many feminists 
turning to the language of publicity may nonetheless come as a surprise. Indeed, while 
many feminist historians and a handful of feminist political theorists have turned away 
from the “wave” metaphor as an organizing framework for understanding the 
 
73 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key, Volume 1: Democracy and Civic 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19. Here, the language of 
“critical attitude” that Tully uses is drawn directly from Foucault’s “What is 
Enlightenment?,” which is itself an engagement in Kant’s essay on public reason. The 
Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvére Lotringer (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007 [1997]), 97-
120. 
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movement’s history, turning towards a concept overlaid by the distinction between public 
and private seems a dubious move. As a generation of feminist scholars have pointed out, 
traditional conceptions of “publicity” as a way of life in which the “central concern… [is] 
to talk with each other” has, for much of the tradition of political thought, been 
foreclosed to women. For these feminist critics, canonical theorists of publicity have 
assumed that the stuff of argument, persuasion, and collective accounting were distinct 
and separate from “private” matters such as home life, sexuality, and care work – that is, 
“women’s” matters. Importantly, feminists have also been reticent to conclude with more 
recent theorists that women must be “included” in the traditional public sphere while the 
private realm is simply displaced and ignored.74 
Taking these criticisms of publicity seriously remains one of the first and most 
important tasks of any feminist intervention. By invoking the language of “publicity” to 
describe lesbian feminism, then, I do not mean to suggest that lesbian feminism 
reproduces or mirrors the canonical usages of the term. In fact, it was in response to just 
these criticisms of the canon of political theory that much of lesbian feminism emerged: 
instead of asking whether women can or should be included in the public sphere, the 
thinkers that populate this dissertation turn repeatedly to the question of what a politically 
transformative feminist counterpublic might look like. As I will argue below, the sort of 
counterpublic that lesbian feminists envisioned during the 1970s and 80s is distinct both 
 
74 As Susan Moller Okin points out, “justice cannot be achieved without thorough 
examination and critique of the public/domestic dichotomy;” Justice, Gender, and the 
Family. (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 111. Putting an even finer point on the matter, 
Carole Pateman once wrote that “the dichotomy between the public and the private… is, 
ultimately, what the feminist movement is about.” Carole Pateman, “Feminist Critiques 
of the Public/Private Dichotomy,” in Private and Public in Social Life, ed. Stanley Benn 
and Genrald Gaus (London: Croom Helm, 1983). 
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from traditional conceptions of the public and private spheres and from more 
contemporary appeals to inclusion in public life. Before detailing the specifics of this 
conception of a lesbian feminist counterpublic, however, let me make one more 
distinction: namely, the distinction between the lesbian feminism that appears throughout 
this work and the Arendtian conception of publicity that has occupied feminists for the 
last two decades.   
As I have suggested, feminist theorists have long held that a truly radical politics 
must reject both traditional conceptions of the public sphere and the perceived threats of 
“identity politics.” In fact, for many feminists, these two impulses are deeply connected: 
if the boundaries of the public sphere have canonically excluded women, the thinking 
goes, these exclusions have led to the misguided belief that granting special recognition 
to those excluded on the basis of identity will solve the problem. The problem with such 
an identity-based solution to the exclusions of the public sphere, however, would seem to 
be that it reifies and reproduces the excluded identity itself; identity politics, then, not 
only fails to radically transform the relationships that sustain the public sphere, but also 
reproduces precisely the kind of exclusions, fractures, and intractabilities that it seeks to 
contest. In seeking to develop a specifically feminist conception of publicity, then, 
contemporary feminist theorists have sought resources in thinkers whose work avoids 
either reifying the presumed exclusion of “women’s” issues from the public sphere, on 
the one hand, or reproducing bounded and exclusionary categories like “women” or 
“lesbians,” on the other.  
Take, for example, two essays in a major edited volume on Arendt’s work: Mary 
Dietz’s “Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt” and Bonnie Honig’s “Toward an 
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Agonistic Feminism.” Both Dietz and Honig argue that Arendt is uniquely situated to 
disrupt and enliven feminism’s own engagement with publicity. In Honig’s words,  
Arendt’s politics is a promising model for those brands of feminism that seek to 
contest (performatively and agonistically) the prevailing construction of sex and 
gender into binary and binding categories of identity, as well as the prevailing 
binary division of political space into a public and private realm.75 
 
Similarly, for Dietz, Arendt’s conception of “action” (as opposed to identity or inclusion) 
as the central concern of political life “releases” feminism from the “reaffirming strategy 
of difference feminism that posits the generic-genderic ‘woman,’ and the complicating 
strategy of diversity feminism that posits a hybridized subjectivity… as gender-race-
class-ethnicity-sexuality…”76  For Honig and Dietz, the appeal of Arendt’s thinking for 
feminism is precisely the fact that, having rejected traditional disciplinary debates and 
their discontents, she seems to move feminism outside of or beyond the impasses of the 
second wave.  
Turning with only a little trepidation to Arendt to “overcome” the problems of 
identity politics in new ways, then, feminists following Dietz and Honig have pointed out 
that the requirements of publicity – speech, persuasion, and collective accounting – are 
both less epistemologically fraught and more politically robust than debates over naming 
or “being” that characterized identity-based claims to recognition.77 On what terms, for 
 
75 Bonnie Honig, “Toward an Agonistic Feminism,” Feminist Interpretations of Hannah 
Arendt, ed. Bonnie Honig (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), 136-137.  
76 Mary Dietz, “Feminist Receptions of Hannah Arendt,” Feminist Interpretations of 
Hannah Arendt, ed. Bonnie Honig. (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), 
34-35.   
77 Citing Aristotle, who famously juxtaposed politics – the stuff of public life – and the 
home, Arendt argued in The Human Condition that  
To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through 
words and persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-
understanding, to force people by violence, to command rather than persuade, 
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example, should debate, argumentation, and “talking with each other” take place? One 
way of answering the question is to follow Arendt herself; this route, in fact, has been 
followed by a broad swath of contemporary feminists. Thinkers such as Linda Zerilli and 
Lisa Disch, for example, have situated the political task of contemporary feminism in 
Margaret Canovan’s definition of Arendtian publicity: for Arendt, writes Canovan,  
the realm of politics is a matter of people sharing a common space of appearance 
in which public concerns can emerge, and acting in the presence of one another. 
For real politics to be going on, it is not enough to have scattered private 
individuals voting separately and anonymously according to their own lights. The 
people need to be able to see and talk to one another in public: to meet in a public 
space so that public concerns will become visible to them. This means that her 
conception of the public realm is as different as possible from the common view 
according to which ‘the public’ are a mass of unassignable individuals who do not 
know one another and do not form a group. Instead, to form a public in her sense, 
people need to be united around an arena in which common affairs can appear and 
be debated.78  
 
Indeed, because Arendt’s conception of publicity is distinct from traditional 
understandings of the public sphere and emphasizes the performative, argumentative, and 
 
were prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life outside the polis, 
of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested, 
despotic powers… 
Central to Arendt’s rendering of Aristotle is the capacity for speech and persuasion: what 
marks publicity and political life is both the capacity to make arguments and the capacity 
of address. Thus, “everybody outside the polis – slaves and barbarians [and, of course, 
women] – was… deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in 
which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens 
was to talk with each other.”77 Publics, according to this definition, necessarily exceed 
debates over the status of the self; organized around the activities of speaking and 
arguing, persuading and diverging, publicity is something that takes place with other 
people who, as often as not, disagree. See The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998 [1958]), 27.  
78 Margaret Canovan, “Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm,” 
Hannah Arendt: Critical Essays, ed. Lewis P. Hichman and Sandra K. Hinchman 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1994); 194.  
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fragile accomplishments of political life, feminists concerned with thinking of feminism 
and feminist theory have tended to turn towards her writings.  
 Linda Zerilli also argues that Arendt’s turn to publicity, though not overtly allied 
to feminist goals, is a turn towards plurality and non-sovereignty in ways that reflect but 
differ from queer theory’s impulse to relinquish feminist attachments to stable identities. 
Arendtian publicity, she writes, teaches us that the excesses of debates over identity – 
debates “in which the price for attending to differences, what separates us, appears to be 
the absence of anything that relates us”79 – might be overcome by turning instead to the 
principle of publicity. The point of understanding feminism and feminist theory as a 
public endeavor, she writes, is less to emphasize the need to include women in existing 
institutions or to reclaim some kind of long-lost solidarity, but to “affirm, in a democratic 
political sense, freedom as a world-building practice based on plurality and 
nonsovereignty.”80 For Zerilli, a failure to address the public nature of feminism is a 
common thread across the “three waves” of feminism: 
To assume, as many first- and second-wave feminists did, that a shared gender 
identity is what relates women politically is flawed not only because, as third-
wave feminists claimed, differences among women matter and the very category 
of identity is suspect. It is flawed because it does not answer to the question of 
what possible relevance identity can have for feminist politics absent a space in 
which to articulate it as a political relation. Third-wave critiques, too, are mostly 
silent on how to constitute the political space in which the transformation of 
social relations, including gendered forms of subjectivity, is to occur.81  
 
Thus, to the extent that feminists have become ensnared in a set of unproductive debates 
over various ways of conceptualizing inclusion, they have failed to see that what is really 
 
79 Linda Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 20.  
80 Ibid., 20.  
81 Ibid., 20.  
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political about politics is the activity of speaking for, with, and to others. Thought in 
terms of publicity, feminist theory can become a version of what Lisa Disch has 
described as Arendtian “storytelling:” “its purpose… is not to make a descriptively 
accurate report of the world” or to “define [a] phenomenon” but, instead, to 
“[communicate] one’s own critical understanding in a way that invites discussion from 
rival perspectives.”82  
 What’s striking about the turn to Arendtian publicity, however, is that Arendt 
herself was no feminist: as Honig herself points out, Arendt was “impatient with 
feminism, dismissing it as merely another (mass) movement or ideology. She believed 
strongly that feminism’s concerns with gender identity, sexuality, and the body were 
politically inappropriate. She worried that these issues might overwhelm the public 
sphere and she herself approached them through indirection and allusion.”83 (In response 
to this dismissal of feminist concerns, Adrienne Rich famously wrote that The Human 
Condition was a “lofty and crippled book” that “embodies the tragedy of a female mind 
nourished on male ideology.”84) Still, in spite of these intense divergences between 
feminist thinkers and Arendt herself, feminist political theorists have pursued her 
thinking at the expense of feminist theorists of publicity themselves. In fact, some 
feminists have justified their use of Arendt for feminism precisely because she is not a 
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feminist. As the arguments above implicitly suggest, Arendtian feminists see her work as 
useful in its ability to step back from the intractable, acrimonious excesses and impasses 
of feminism – the “sex wars,” the “gay/straight split,” the rise of cultural feminism, and 
the resentments of identity politics. In a curious justification of Arendt’s anti-feminism, 
for instance, Honig argues that Arendt’s distaste for feminist politics might have more to 
do with second wave feminism’s failures than with an inherently anti-feminist streak in 
Arendt herself. Indeed, Honig resolves the tensions between Arendt’s “impatience” with 
feminism and contemporary feminist concerns, rather unsurprisingly, by distancing “the 
feminisms of 1995” from “those that Arendt so hastily dismissed.” While that feminism 
was essentialist, gynocentric, and dichotomizing, “the [new] feminisms of 1995 [are] 
shaped by new multicultural and postcolonial contexts.” She continues,  
recent work in feminist theory tends to focus on plural asymmetries of power, on 
how sex-gender identities are driven by race, class, nationality, ethnicity, and 
sexuality are often feminized or sexualized. Whatever Arendt might have thought 
about these developments, they enable a set of feminist engagements with 
Arendt’s work that are quite different from those of their predecessors.85  
 
Here, Honig’s defense of Arendtian publicity as a resource for allaying the impasses of 
feminist theory reveals itself as a less straightforward argument than it initially appears; 
smuggled in under the guise of moving beyond the fractures that characterize binaries 
like “second wave/third wave” or “identity/difference” is yet another version of the 
“wave” metaphor that I have suggested tends to evacuate the actual content of feminisms 
past. In Honig’s telling, while the failures of second-wave feminism motivate and justify 
the turn to Arendtian publicity, feminist theory itself needs a synthetic thinker like Arendt 
to point out and actualize its real potential.  
 
85 Honig, “Introduction,” 2.  
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Does feminist theory need an Arendt? In keeping with my emphasis on publicity 
– and its component parts speech, audience, and accountability – I would argue that one’s 
answer to the question has to do with the forms of political speech that one finds 
persuasive. Arendt and lesbian feminists both attempt to confront difficult political 
questions such as the tension between collective action and plurality; turning outward 
from feminism to analyze them may have as much to do with the presumed legitimacy of 
mainstream philosophy than it does the inherent failures of feminist thinking. I would 
not, however, be the first to make that case: consider, for example, Linda Martín Alcoff’s 
argument that the politics of “speaking for others” are embedded in a discursive context 
where certain forms of argumentation are privileged over others. The intuition that 
writing, language, and discourse are the central tasks of politics, Alcoff argues, has been 
“discovered” by many different kinds of writers, including credentialed philosophers, 
Black feminists, fiction writers and poets, and many others. However, “the discursive 
style in which some European poststructuralists have claimed that all writing is political 
marks the claim as important and likely to be true for a certain (powerful) milieu, 
whereas the style in which African American writers made the same claim marked their 
speech as dismissable in the eyes of the same milieu.”86 For Alcoff, the matter is not only 
the fact that “European poststructuralists” and “African American writers” had 
discovered the same fundamental truth. Quite the opposite: Alcoff argues that the manner 
in which this “truth” is communicated, accepted, and adopted into the “discursive 
context” of, for example, critical theory in fact comes to bear on the meaning of “the 
 
86 Linda Martín Alcoff, “Speaking for Others,” Who Can Speak? Authority and Critical 
Identity, ed. Judith Roof and Robyn Wiegman. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1995); 103.  
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truth itself.” If feminist theory needs Arendt or another philosopher to actualize its 
claims, it may not be because of feminists’ inherent essentialism; in fact, these claims 
about “need” themselves may instead be evidence of the very hierarchies of legibility, 
authority, and accountability that feminist thinkers sought to problematize. These 
hierarchies, as Alcoff suggests, not only represent the intellectual choices we make as 
scholars, but in fact affect the very nature of the “truths” we uncover.  
 Thus, like the queer thinkers who have turned to post-structural thinkers like 
Derrida to understand the relationship between feminism and the academy, the turn to 
Arendt to describe feminist publicity oddly evacuates the very real conversations around 
these issues that feminists did have throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As generative as 
these engagements with philosophy have been, I have suggested that their (perhaps 
unconscious) reliance on the “wave” metaphor has produced an asymmetrical 
relationship between the lesbian feminists that populate these pages – thinkers such as 
Lorde, Moraga, Rich, Wittig, and many others – and the philosophers whose work moves 
“beyond” feminists’ own limitations. As Alcoff’s understanding of the issue makes clear, 
when theorists attempt to synthesize issues of feminist publicity by turning to writings by 
philosophers and theorists external to feminist spaces, they risk not only covering over 
the history of those ideas, but in fact implicitly reinforcing hierarchies of legibility that 
make certain claims to publicity (for example, those articulated in philosophical 
language) over others (those, perhaps, written by everyday lesbian feminists in the pages 




On Politics, Method, and the Archive  
Feminist political theorists and historians need not settle for accounts that proceed 
as if feminism needs an external framework to be politically useful. Audre Lorde’s 
“Master’s Tools,” for example, is and should be considered a discussion of precisely 
“how to constitute the political space in which the transformation of social relations, 
including gendered forms of subjectivity, is to occur,” as Zerilli calls for. Similarly, the 
open mike session following her provocations suggests that Lorde’s is an attempt, like 
Disch’s “storytellers,” to communicate “one’s own critical understanding in a way that 
invites discussion from rival perspectives.” In keeping with this intuition, in this work I 
will situate the insights of lesbian feminists like Lorde in the contemporaneous 
conversations, debates, and disputes – such as those over race and racism, betrayal and 
repair, identity and self-determination – that shaped them.  
Tracking these debates in contemporaneous archives so as to make clear the 
political and conceptual resources of lesbian feminism, though, presents a methodological 
conundrum. Because lesbian feminist ideas have been largely dismissed as inadequate by 
political theorists (even feminist ones), their material presence in the feminist archive has 
been gradually but consistently excised, and replaced with narratives about their 
philosophical essentialism and their dependency on exclusionary concepts like 
experience. However, as difficult as it is to think through the politics of lesbian feminism 
without retroactive reference to these post-hoc “third wave” critiques, traces of their 
presence have not been altogether lost. In this work, then, I attempt to reconstruct an 
archive of lesbian feminism by turning to these traces. Throughout this work, I locate 
them in the discursive spaces – magazines, journals, presses, and conferences – in which 
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lesbian feminists developed their political thinking together. Moreover, I make the case 
that interpreting lesbian feminist politics through the lens of their own archive 
significantly changes the resources one can find in this era of political writing. 
In reconstructing a lesbian feminist archive that does not superimpose the 
assumptions of the “wave” metaphor on this period of political thinking, then, I have 
turned to several sources that have allowed me to understand lesbian feminism as an 
intellectual and political community in its own right. First, two physical archives – the 
Lesbian Herstory Archive in Brooklyn, NY and the Feminist Theory Archive at Brown 
University’s Pembroke Center – have aided me in the important work of contextualizing 
the work of well-known lesbian feminist authors and texts. These archives have provided 
invaluable insight into the kinds of relationships between and among authors that bring 
lesbian feminist publicity to life. Rather than documenting only what was being said by 
amassing the intellectual products of the period, as academic anthologies tend to do, these 
archives have preserved the documents – letters, announcements, conference 
proceedings, funding proposals, and calls for papers – that reveal the networks and 
relationships out of which lesbian feminists produced their work.  
However much these archives provide much of the important historical context 
that brings this era of political theorizing to life, however, many problems with the 
archive remain. In particular, as theorists of the archive have long pointed out, archives – 
even feminist ones – are far from neutral repositories of information. For Foucault, for 
example, the archive operates according to an often overlooked relation of authority; it 
represents overlapping relations of authority and subordination that determine which 
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histories can be told and in what way.87 Thus, it is not enough to recognize that the 
archive is an incomplete space. One must recognize that the archive’s absences and 
erasures are no accident; they are the products of distinct, lived relations of authority that, 
together, make up the “law of what can be said.”88 While some historians have suggested 
that researchers might manage the power relations that shape “what can be said” by 
hewing closely to a set of replicable research methods,89 feminist and queer historians 
and theorists have pushed these concerns about the ethical limitations of the archive into 
the fore and have developed, in response, alternative methodological approaches that 
expand, challenge, and trouble our conception of an archive itself. One such approach 
employed by many scholars of queer history is the turn “from a focus on ‘effective’ 
history to a focus on ‘affective history.’”90  
 
87 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 
trans. Smith. (New York: Pantheon, 1982). If Foucault theorized the archive as a set of 
overlapping relations of authority, deconstructionist scholars such as Derrida and Spivak 
have argued that it is impossible to represent the past in a neutral way. Foucault’s 
conception of the archive as a form of discursive “law” is often discussed in tandem with 
Derrida’s now-classic essay “Archive Fever.” For Derrida, like Foucault, the archive is a 
space not only to preserve the past, but to almost ritualistically categorize and index its 
contents in a process of what he calls “consignation.” 
88 If Foucault theorized the archive as a set of overlapping relations of authority, 
deconstructionist scholars such as Derrida and Spivak have argued that it is impossible to 
represent the past in a neutral way. Foucault’s conception of the archive as a form of 
discursive “law” is often discussed in tandem with Derrida’s now-classic essay “Archive 
Fever.” For Derrida, like Foucault, the archive is a space not only to preserve the past, but 
to almost ritualistically categorize and index its contents in a process of what he calls 
“consignation.” 
89 See, for example, Katherine E. Tirabassi, “Journeying into the Archives: The 
Pragmatics of Archival Research,” in Working in the Archives: Practical Research 
Methods for Rhetoric and Composition, ed. Ramsey, Sharer, L’Eplattenier, and 
Mastrangelo. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010), 169-180.  
90 Heather Love, Feeling Backwards: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 31.  
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Affective history, according to its proponents, rejects orientations to the archive 
based in technique, in managing the shortcomings of the archival record through 
pragmatic research methods. Instead, it seeks an alternative archive altogether that its 
proponents claim better reflects the ineffable nature of the past. Such an approach, argues 
David Halperin in his now-famous affective intervention, “[trains us] to recognize 
conventions of feeling as well as conventions of behavior and to interpret the intricate 
texture of personal life as an artifact… of a complex and arbitrary constellation of 
cultural processes.”91 By reconstructing a queer history that cannot be classified, 
enclosed, or codified because it is felt rather than produced, these scholars contend we 
might better understand the excesses and erasures of queer culture over time as complex 
relations of authority. In so doing, scholars such as Heather Love and Ann Cvetkovich 
argue that we might better attend to the ambivalent ethical responsibility research have to 
the past; as Love puts it, “we cannot help wanting to save the figures from the past, but 
this mission is doomed to fail… In part, this is because the queer past is even more 
remote, more deeply marked by power’s claw; and in part because this rescue is an 
emotional rescue, and in that sense, we are sure to botch it.”92 
While the affective turn convincingly pushes researchers away from concerns 
about technique and instead towards a researcher’s ethical responsibility to uncovering 
the relations of power that shape historical inquiry, I would suggest that they remain 
insufficient as an approach to the archive, primarily because they prioritize an abstract, 
highly theorized conception of power and subordination at the expense of their lived 
 
91 David Halperin, “Is there a History of Sexuality?” The Lesbian and Gay Studies 
Reader, ed. Abelove, Barale, and Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993); 426.  
92 Love, Feeling Backwards, 51.  
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dimensions. Affective interventions rest on the assumption that evidentiary claims based 
in archival work are altogether suspect, especially when they purport to explain or 
interpret the experience of marginalized or oppressed groups. As Joan Scott famously 
claimed in her essay “The Evidence of Experience,” for example, an overreliance on the 
archive as the site of “evidence” has turned history into a “foundationalist” discipline that 
cannot but undercut any researcher’s potential ethical commitment to the past:  
When the evidence offered [by historians] is the evidence of “experience,” the 
claim for referentiality is further buttressed – what could be truer, after all, than a 
subject’s own account of what he or she has lived through? It is precisely this 
kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point 
of explanation – as a foundation on which analysis is based – that weakens the 
critical thrust of histories of difference. By remaining within the epistemological 
frame of orthodox history, these studies lose the possibility of examining those 
assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of difference in the first 
place.93  
 
Scott thus maintains that historians’ very grounding in the archive – and their unthinking 
trust in the evidence they find there – leads to a widespread overrealiance on 
“techniques” of interpretation rather than a more widespread questioning of the terms of 
difference, marginality, and injustice. However, while Scott maintains that scholars 
should instead shift their focus to a “literary” reading of the past – an argument often 
cited as a precursor to affective histories like Cvetkovich’s and Love’s – turning away 
from basic evidentiary claims like those made from the site of the archive tend to 
evacuate the actual people who experience, resist, and subvert relations of authority and 
subordination. As Clare Hemmings has convincingly written, the move to anti-
foundationalist inquiry popular in contemporary queer theory has tended to erase the 
 
93 Joan Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. 
Abelove, Barale, and Halperin. (New York: Routledge, 1993); 399.  
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actual lesbian and black women who pushed for greater scholarly attention to difference, 
marginality, and the categories of social inquiry in the first place. It would seem that the 
affective turn, then, in rejecting evidentiary claims altogether, both reduces the site of the 
archive and prioritizes the activity of abstract theorizing over the activities of everyday 
political actors. An approach that privileges theorists over those they claim to represent, I 
think, can hardly be called an adequately ethical response to the relations of authority and 
subordination that shape historical inquiry.  
In my effort to reconstruct an era of political theorizing that is already freighted 
with assumptions and misconceptions by the very theorists who have problematized the 
archive, then, I have turned to an unusual alternative archive to help me re-center the 
diverse views, debates, and writers that shaped lesbian feminism in its own moment; in 
particular, I have turned to the pages of the lesbian feminist magazine Sinister Wisdom 
(SW) as an alternative kind of archive. SW, I argue, represents an effort by lesbian 
feminists themselves to document the various overlapping and dynamic debates that 
occurred in lesbian feminism during the period between 1976 (the year in which SW 
published its first issue) and the present. While SW is far from the only lesbian feminist 
magazine (The Ladder, for example, circulated from 1955-1970; Conditions from 1976-
1990; Quest: A Feminist Quarterly from 1970-1985), its scope was arguably the most 
capacious. Included in its pages are not only poems, stories, essays, and visual art by 
lesbian feminist creators, but also a remarkable degree of reflection and self-assessment 
on the part of the editors and contributors. To name just a few examples of this 
commitment to self-reflecting on the state of lesbian feminism itself, in just the first four 
years of its existence Sinister Wisdom’s editors published the full proceedings of 
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conference panels on lesbian feminism,94 several interviews with the founders and editors 
of lesbian feminist presses on publishing as an out lesbian,95 a survey on the challenges 
and implications of lesbian separatism,96 a set of members’ reflections on 
contemporaneous texts like Conditions: Five (The Black Women’s Issue), Adrienne 
Rich’s Of Woman Born, Monique Wittig and Sande Zeig’s Lesbian Peoples: Material for 
a Dictionary, and regular letter-to-the-editor features which made space for and, often, 
responded directly to, controversial debates on issues like race and racism, separatism, 
aesthetics, and political strategy.  
In what follows, I will argue that this alternative kind of archive – one that 
emerges from the process of contemporaneous self-reflection rather than post-hoc 
selection or affective interpretation – provides more than just deeper historical context for 
lesbian feminists; instead, it invites contemporary feminist scholars to shift our 
interpretations the very meaning of landmark texts, thinkers, and ideas of the period. Here 
is just one example of how reading lesbian feminism through such an alternative archive 
as SW challenges our commonplace assumptions about this era of feminist thought. Most 
readers of Audre Lorde, an undeniably central figure in lesbian feminist circles, 
encounter her prose work through the anthology Sister Outsider.97 Reading Lorde 
through the lens of an anthology, while it is a way to bring out the resonances across her 
own work, separates out Lorde’s writings from her relationships to other lesbian 
 
94 “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” Sinister Wisdom 6 (1978); 
4-17.  
95 “Politics of Publishing,” Sinister Wisdom 2 (1976); 92-131; “Publishers and Printers: 
Interviews” and “Alternatives to Print,” Sinister Wisdom 13 (1980); 71-106.  
96 Jan Clausen, “The Politics of Publishing,” Sinister Wisdom 2 (1976); 95-116.  
97 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde (Berkeley: 
Crossing Press, 1984).  
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feminists in ways that make it possible to forget how deeply she remained in conversation 
with these other thinkers throughout her life. By contrast, by tracing Lorde’s various 
engagements in an archive like Sinister Wisdom, which printed many of her works in 
conversations with others rather than as discrete works, reveals a different story. Her 
essay “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” for example, was 
originally a presentation given at a panel titled “Lesbians and Literature” at the 1977 
MLA convention. Far from having emerged from Lorde’s status as a political outsider 
contesting an identitarian and essentialist movement, Lorde gave the talk alongside 
papers by Julia Penelope Stanley, Mary Daly, Judith McDaniel, and Adrienne Rich – all 
white lesbians who nonetheless attempt to grapple with the interlocking realities of 
racism, homophobia, and sexism that thinkers like Lorde pushed them to recognize.98  
This fact is far more important that simply bearing a tidbit of historical detail. For 
one, the printed proceedings of the talk in Issue 6 of SW (published in 1978) point out 
that not only was the talk part of a larger series on Black (and) lesbian issues at the 1977 
MLA convention, but it also sprang from the organizers’ engagements with previous 
conference panels, including one in which Barbara Smith presented her explosive essay 
“Toward a Black Feminist Criticism” and another on lesbian writing that had included 
 
98 In her comments, for example, Adrienne Rich writes that “I believe that we must 
recognize and reclaim an anti-racist female tradition, closely entwined though not 
identical with feminist tradition. This history has been erased, both by Black and white-
Leftist documenters of the Black movement, for whom the only “leaders” (with the token 
exception of Angela Davis) are men… But the mutual history of Black and white women 
in this country is a realm so painful and resonant that it has barely been touched by 
writers either of political ‘science’ or of imaginative literature. Yet until that silence is 
broken, that history revealed, we will all be struggling in a state of deprivation and 
ignorance.” Sinister Wisdom 6 (1978); 19.  
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Lorde and Rich as well as June Jordan99 and Honor Moore.100 Additionally – and perhaps 
more importantly for understanding the trajectory and substance of Lorde’s own work – 
reading the proceedings of the MLA panel reveal that it was there that Lorde would have 
first encountered the argumentation of Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology, which was not in print 
until the following year, and which Lorde famously contested in her 1978 “Open 
Letter.”101 To recognize that Lorde and Daly were in direct conversation with one another 
(as well as with a much wider network of diverse lesbian feminists) and that they were 
reading and discussing each other’s work, then, is to reveal a different reality than the one 
contemporary feminist theorists imagine when they encounter Lorde’s work in an 
anthology. Read in the context of this archive, Lorde’s work is less an indictment of an 
exclusionary and essentialist group of white lesbians – or a precursor to the more 
sophisticated “third wave” of queer theory – than it is an embedded and interested 
attempt to hold lesbian feminists like Daly accountable to the various members of their 
public. “The fact that we are here and that I speak now these words,” Lorde argued at the 
conference, was not an indictment but an appeal to coalition: it was “an attempt to break 
that silence and bridge some of those differences between us, for it is not difference 
which immobilizes us, but silence.”102 
 
99 Jordan was a Black, bisexual poet and the author of many volumes of poetry, including 
Things That I Do in the Dark: Selected Poetry, 1954-1977 (New York: Random House, 
1977).  
100 At the time of the MLA conference, Moore was the author of the play Mourning 
Pictures, which was later performed around the country and on Broadway. (New York: 
Random House, 1997).  
101 Audre Lorde, “Open Letter to Mary Daly,” Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeces  
102 Audre Lorde, “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” Sinister 
Wisdom 6 (1978); 15. See also Sister Outsider, 44.  
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If one challenge of reconstructing lesbian feminism as a form of publicity is a 
methodological one, then, a second, related challenge of reconstructing a lesbian feminist 
politics that does not rely on frameworks like the “wave” metaphor is a political-
conceptual one. While the ideas that emerged from debates and disputes within lesbian 
feminism sometimes bear resemblance to the post-structural, postmodern, or queer 
theories that claim them as antecedents, I will suggest that they were not primarily 
conceived or developed in relation to these discourses. Instead, I will suggest that these 
debates emerged as lesbian feminists debated the strategies best suited for a coalitional 
politics, and as they engaged in concrete projects to establish the internal institutions and 
conditions necessary to promote coalition-building as a distinctive form of publicity. In 
order to resist the constant risk of evacuating the actual content of this distinctive political 
praxis – a risk that I have suggested has yet to be fully appreciated, even by feminist 
historians and theorists who share my concerns – this work attempts to prioritize the rich 
conceptual content that shaped lesbian feminists’ own sense of publicity over the 
presumed limitations and failures that we, too often, impose onto this period.  
Indeed, the dream of a lesbian feminist public that I argue characterizes much of 
lesbian political writing in the 1980s sees publicity in terms of the challenges of 
coalition. When we see lesbian feminism as a form of publicity with its own internal 
institutional and relational requirements, we can ask all sorts of as-yet unexamined 
questions about relationships within the group: when someone speaks “as a lesbian,” who 
are they speaking to or about? What audience do they expect will respond to their claims? 
Who has the authority to speak for the group, and whose responsibility is it to listen? 
When members of the group are confronted with differences or conflicts, whose 
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responsibility is it to account for these differences? In a word, what happens when 
feminist political theorists begin thinking of lesbian feminism as a form of publicity 
rather than as an appeal to identity, a commitment to essentialism, or a dependency on 
freighted lenses like experience? None of these questions are quite captured by the wave 
narrative which, however inadvertently, reinforces the notion that lesbian feminists (and 
in particular lesbian feminists of color) were somehow less important – or that their ideas 
somehow less valuable – than new ways of thinking about power. Where identity thinking 
sees an “eruption of difference” set in motion by the claims of excluded others, a public, 
coalitional framework sees ongoing relationships of inequality that exist in real, lived 
institutional contexts. Although these questions, as I will suggest, are the central concerns 
of feminist theorizing during the 1980s and beyond, their presence – and their importance 
as distinctly political questions – is constantly at risk of falling out of view. By bringing 
lesbian feminist approaches to these questions back into view on their own terms, this 
work will make the case that these approaches are not only qualitatively different from 
those informed by conceptualizations of publicity put forth by non-feminist political 
theorists, but also that a specifically lesbian feminist conception of coalition as a distinct 
form of publicity is, today, as urgently needed as ever. In the work that follows, then, I 
will argue that thinking of lesbian feminism as a form of publicity transposes these 
commonplace assumptions about identity, essentialism, and experience to questions, 
instead, about coalition, accountability, and repair. The relentless effort to keep the latter 
questions in view is not only a key historical feature of lesbian feminism, but is a positive 
contribution to the conceptual resources of the field of political theory.  
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Chapter Outline  
This dissertation unfolds in three main parts. First, I will make the case for 
thinking of lesbian feminism as a form of publicity, suggesting that the widespread view 
of lesbian politics as reactionary and undemocratic is largely inaccurate. In Chapter 1, “A 
More Thorough Resistance?” I argue that, while much has been made of queer theory’s 
engagement in post-structural theories of the subject, these arguments are as much 
engagements with the central claims of intersectional, Black, and Third World feminisms 
as they are responses to the work of poststructuralist philosophers. Indeed, situating queer 
theory in relation to intersectional feminism reveals how deeply and radically queer 
theory breaks from the political intuitions that animated lesbian feminists (and especially 
lesbian of color feminists). Where the watchword of the 1980s was “coalition” – a 
political intuition born of an awareness of the challenges of publicity – queer theorists 
have instead come to think of their adoption of intersectionality as an exemplary political 
stance, and of queerness itself as standing in for all marginalized positions. Unlike 
intersectional theorists’ emphasis on politics as coalition, I argue, queer theorists see 
themselves as engaged in an exemplary politics of critique.  
I work to tease out the difference between a coalitional and a critical politics by 
offering a close textual and historical reading of Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born. In 
particular, I contrast Rich’s commitment to acknowledging and accounting for her own 
racial biases (especially in the 1986 reprint of the text), on the one hand, to the dubious 
argument, often made in contemporary queer theory, that queer theory performs 
intersectionality better than intersectional theorists themselves. I argue that while queer 
theorists have argued that the intersectional limitations of second wave texts like Rich’s 
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evidence the need for queer theory to move beyond a merely coalitional politics, Rich’s 
preface to the second edition of the text reflects her ongoing commitment to taking 
seriously the substantive criticisms and interventions of lesbian feminists of color who 
challenged her throughout her career. It is this sort of commitment to coalitional thinking, 
I argue, that characterized much of lesbian feminism during the 1980s. Moreover, though, 
I conclude the chapter by suggesting that an accountability-based approach to coalition-
building is as badly needed in today’s queer politics as it was in the 1980s.  
In Chapter 2, “The Loving Public,” I turn to how conceiving of lesbian feminism 
as an attempt to call forth a new kind of public changes our understanding both of the 
political commitments of lesbians themselves and of the kinds of debates that 
characterized the 1980s. First, I argue that lesbian feminism is related to, but importantly 
distinct from, existing concepts of the “public sphere,” “counterpublics,” and “publicity.” 
I argue that political theorists of the “public sphere” have long suggested that a defining 
feature of public life is the tendency to substitute the views, interests, and desires of a 
particular group for those of ‘the’ public in general. However, this risk of publicity has 
fallen out of view in mainstream political theory, becoming eclipsed by concerns about 
the normative requirements of deliberation, about the terms on which the marginalized 
should be included into the public sphere, and about the requirements of consensus-
building. By contrast, I argue, lesbian feminists were uniquely attuned to the constant risk 
of substituting one perspective (for example, white women’s) for concerns of ‘the’ 
public, which should instead be conceptualized in terms of the asymmetrical, cross-
cutting, and complex relationships between women with diverse perspectives and 
viewpoints. Highlighting this persistent failure in political theory to account for power in 
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debates over the public sphere, I suggest, alerts us to the political risks that lesbian 
feminists faced as they sought to inaugurate a new public; in particular, the risk of 
foreclosing negotiation between those most authorized to speak for ‘the’ public and those 
whose voices are marginalized. Far from representing the essentialist, reactionary, and 
exclusionary identity politics that “third wave” historicizations have imposed on it, many 
lesbian feminists saw their work as open-ended, process-oriented, and deeply coalitional.  
Second, then, I reconstruct the diverse political claims made by lesbian writers 
and activists by turning to lesbian political archives often overlooked by political 
theorists, such as the magazine Sinister Wisdom. If Chapter 2 makes the case for thinking 
of lesbian feminism as a public organized around leaving open the possibility for 
contestation, Chapter 3, “Politics as Sinister Wisdom,” takes up the question of how 
contestation shaped the substance of lesbian feminist political relationships. In particular, 
I argue that understanding lesbian feminism as a distinct kind of counterpublic challenges 
the idea that this was an era of essentialism. Quite the opposite: within the emergent 
lesbian feminist counterpublic of the 1980s, new forms of political responsibilities 
emerged as lesbians of color began to call white lesbians to account for the ongoing 
issues of race and racism. Within institutionalized spaces of contestation like the pages of 
Sinister Wisdom, a specific concept of relational repair emerged as the central political 
responsibility of any member of the lesbian feminist public. This process of repair 
unfolds in three steps, in which lesbian feminists first call upon the promise of reciprocal 
accountability implicit in coalitional politics, outline a breach in this promise, usually as 
a result of implicit or explicit racial inequalities, and, finally, call (white) lesbian 
feminists to account for and repair these breaches in their ongoing coalition work.  
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In Chapter 4, “Lesbian Existence: Seeing from the Oppressed Point of View,” I 
turn to the life and work of Monique Wittig. Although Wittig occupies a rather fraught 
position in relation to the lesbian feminism of Americans like Lorde, Moraga, Lugones, 
and Rich, her work is incredibly useful in thematizing the basic requirements of 
reparative coalition work. In this chapter, then, I use Wittig to elaborate what it looks like 
to “see from the oppressed point of view” in order to inaugurate the process of repair. 
While some have interpreted Wittig’s work as akin to standpoint theories that depend on 
a problematic conception of “experience,” I argue that a closer reading of Wittig’s 
historical and intellectual context belies this interpretation. Instead, Wittig engages 
lesbian feminism as a public; that is, she seeks to incite others to resist collapsing the 
diverse viewpoints and arguments that make up lesbian politics into reductive statements 
about ‘the’ lesbian feminist public. Wittig’s central contribution to lesbian feminism, I 
argue, is her development of the term “lesbian existence,” a term she borrows from the 
work of Adrienne Rich. I suggest that we read Wittig’s emphasis on the impossibility of 
lesbians existence historically, politically, and discursively as the impossibility of 
articulating lesbians as political subjects in their own right. In other words, Wittig 
diagnoses in lesbian struggles a reduction of the critical options available to theorists and 
political actors alike. In response, Wittig pushes us to recognize how this reduction 
insidiously seeps into feminist thinking and presents yet another challenge to the kinds of 
coalitional responsibility and repair that are central to lesbian feminist publicity.  
Finally, I argue that while the political challenges posed by lesbians have 
historically been considered less sophisticated than queer theories, the lesbian conception 
of accountability is a point of contact with contemporary theories of grounded 
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responsibility. In Chapter 5, “’Our Reality is the Fictional:’ Wittig, Lorde, and the 
Lesbian Body Politic,” I put Wittig’s work back into conversation with Audre Lorde in 
order to show that they share a utopian vision of the kinds of transformations that might 
take place if the project of “loving other women” were to become conditions of political 
life. I theorize Wittig and Lorde as “vanishing mediators;” that is as figures that are 
continually cited as having motivated a historical change, even as the political substance 
of their work is excised from the present. Both Wittig and Lorde pose a problem for 
queer theory, I argue, because they seem at once to signal a methodological affinity with 
post-structuralism while hewing strongly to “outdated” concepts such as identity, 
recognition, and the speaking subject. For many queer theorists, then, Wittig and Lorde 
are, quite simply, imperfect antecedents – vanishing mediators – subject to correction and 
supersession by queer theorists themselves. 
I argue that we should resist the urge to do allow thinkers like Wittig and Lorde – 
and, indeed, lesbian feminists more generally – to remain vanishing mediators, and that 
we should instead understand them as identifying a very particular kind of injustice 
distinct from queer theory. For both writers, the harms of racism and homophobia tend 
not only to be the direct effects of inequality, like exclusion from full citizenship or 
economic oppression. While these may very well be at work, Wittig and Lorde identify 
an additional dimension of oppression: the presence of structured patterns of 
misrecognition that make it impossible to call the social body to account. Their work, 
then, represents more than an attachment to the stability of agents and subjects: the goal 
is to create a kind of public in which marginalized people are no longer required to 
translate themselves in order to be heard by the powerful and can, instead, be heard in 
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their own terms. For these writers, then, we might say that the capacity to speak in their 
own terms is a condition of the coalitional public they want to inaugurate. I close the 
chapter by making the case that these concerns bear striking resemblance to the 
transformative political projects of Indigenous decolonization and racial reparations in 
the U.S., suggesting contemporary avenues for lesbian feminist coalition-building. I 
conclude this work by expanding briefly on the politically transformative dimensions of 
lesbian feminism and by reflecting on intersectional and coalitional directions for lesbian 
feminist conceptions of accountability and repair in the present moment.  
 
“When a people transform a world that is never parochial; it is the 
other world that must question its ways. Our concept of an archives 
must be different; we are different. But difference is not 




















103 Joan Nestle and Jim Monahan, “Conversation about Gay and Lesbian Archives,” The 
Gay Insurgent (1978). 
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Chapter 1 
“A More Thorough Resistance”? 
Coalition, Critique, and the Intersectional Promise of Queer Theory 
 
With whom do you believe your lot is cast? 
      From where does your strength come?  
 
      I think somehow, somewhere  
      every poem of mine must repeat those 
questions 
 
      which are not the same.  




When Gayle Rubin wrote in 1984 that “the time has come to think about sex,”105 
she inaugurated a distinctive relationship between the academic study of sexuality and a 
political commitment to democratic redress. Today, Rubin’s is a view that is increasingly 
taken for granted among queer theorists: written in response to anti-pornography 
feminists who Rubin argued “[recreated] a very conservative sexual morality” and had 
“claimed to speak for all feminism,” the essay makes the now-familiar claim that to 
commit to the study of sexuality is to oppose to any and all “hierarchical [systems] of 
sexual value.”106 If anti-pornography feminism had begun making undemocratic, 
normative judgments about “good” and “bad” sex, she reasons, then resisting the ways 
that certain practices are policed by conservative discourses might open up space for non-
normative sexual subjects – especially those constrained by racial, classed, geographic, or 
 
104 From the poem “Sources,” in Your Native Land, Your Life: Poems (New York: 
Norton, 1986), 6. 
105 Rubin, Gayle, ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,’ 
in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, ed. Carole S. Vance (Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 267.   
106 Ibid., 279.  
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other sexualized norms – to contest the terms of their marginalization. For Rubin, a more 
democratic sexual politics – a “theoretical as well as sexual pluralism”107 – was thus to be 
a thoroughly anti-normative one: it was a politics that promised nothing less than to undo 
the compulsory, or normative, categories in which the left defined collective political 
action.  
Since ‘Thinking Sex’ appeared, analyses like Rubin’s – arguments that critique 
undemocratic discourses that marginalize non-normative subjects – have increasingly 
become a starting point rather than a conclusion for queer theorists.108 In this chapter, I 
seek to re-contextualize this theoretical move, arguing that queer theorists’ emphasis on 
anti-normativity as the central site of political struggle is a response to and a reflection of 
the analytic and political contributions of intersectional theorists, whose ideas emerged 
from the lesbian feminist movement in the 1980s. The term, rooted in the political claims 
of Black, lesbian, and Third World feminists in the US, denotes the idea that the 
overlapping forces of racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of inequality are “greater 
than the sum of their parts.”109 Broadly conceived, it identifies “the instantiations of 
marginalization that [operate] within institutionalized discourses and that [legitimize] 
existing power relations” and reveals “how discourses of resistance (e.g. feminism and 
antiracism) could themselves function as sites that [produce and legitimize] 
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marginalization.”110 Although many theorists have conceived of intersectionality and 
queer theory as fundamentally “autonomous” political projects,111 I will argue in the 
following pages that, in fact, the key premises of intersectional thinking have both 
historically motivated and conceptually legitimized the central claims of queer theorizing. 
At its core, for example, intersectionality helps to explain what Rubin calls “normative 
discourses” – namely, the process by which closed categories like “good” and “bad” sex 
enable conservative practices that marginalize certain subjects. It also points to the fact 
that marginalization can take place within purportedly liberatory groups like radical 
feminism, and insists that academics and activists alike attend to these complex internal 
relationships. To take an anti-normative stance like Rubin’s, is, at best, to open oneself to 
the insights of intersectionality; it is to notice how racial, sexual, classed, and other 
inequalities within feminist discourse enable the marginalization of certain subjects 
deemed “deviant,” and to consciously resist these premises.  
Yet if claims like Rubin’s – and, as I shall argue below, calls for anti-normative 
politics in queer theory more generally – depend on intersectional thinking, why is it that 
so many intersectional feminists rooted in Black (and) lesbian feminism remain skeptical 
of queer theory? From Cathy Cohen, who argues that queer theory has left intact many of 
the “ways in which power informs and constitutes privileged and marginalized 
subjects,”112 to Barbara Smith, who wrote that “today’s ‘queer’ politicos seem to operate 
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in a historical and ideological vacuum,”113 some of the most vocal critics of queer politics 
have been the architects of the very intuition from which queer theory takes its cue. In 
what follows, I argue that this apparent contradiction has to do with the ways that queer 
theory has drifted away from the key political dimension of intersectional thinking, even 
as it commits itself to the interpretive lessons intersectionality has offered to critical 
theorists. 
This chapter’s key claim – that revisiting the history of lesbian feminism reveals a 
more capacious and directly political understanding of intersectionality than the one on 
offer by queer theorists – is a response to critiques of queer anti-normativity from 
intersectional scholars like Cohen and Smith, as well as to a growing suspicion about the 
inherently democratic promise of anti-normativity from queer theorists themselves. In a 
recent special edition of the journal differences, for instance, editors Robyn Wiegman and 
Elizabeth Wilson mark a new agenda for queer theory, arguing that queer theory can and 
should “proceed without a primary commitment to antinormativity.”114 If, as I shall argue 
below, queer theory’s commitment to anti-normativity has emerged from its fraught 
engagement with intersectionality and its eschewal of lesbian feminism, then Wiegman 
and Wilson’s provocation points to questions that are broader still: how might we 
(re)evaluate queer theory’s response to the intersectional lessons of lesbian feminism in 
the 1980s? Does queer theory deliver on the intersectional promise that it extends? And 
 
113 Smith, Barbara, “Queer Politics: Where’s the Revolution?” The Nation 257, vol. 1 
(July 5, 1993): 13.  
114 Wiegman, Robyn and Elizabeth A. Wilson, “Introduction: Anti-Normativity’s Queer 
Conventions,” in differences 26, vol. 1 (2015): 1.   
 65 
finally, if it does not, upon what resources might a renewed queer commitment to 
intersectional thinking in the twenty-first century draw?   
 I will probe these questions in three parts. First, I argue for an expanded 
conception of “intersectionality” to include work that is typically glossed as Black, Third 
World, and lesbian feminism. Doing so reveals the deep entanglements between 
intersectionality’s key claims about intra-group marginalization, on the one hand, and the 
broader field of critical theory, on the other. This expanded conception of 
intersectionality, I argue, reveals that it emerges from the sine qua non of critical theory: 
the insight that power is organized recursively. By this, I mean that critical theorists, 
broadly speaking, share the insight that hierarchies both produce and police the very 
marginal subjects they take as their premises. More than just a temporal process wherein 
oppressive logics like colonialism or racism appear over time as “reverberations with a 
difference,” 115 I argue that recursivity describes a concrete “relation of ruling” 116 which 
must produce the very marginal subjects whose punishment, in turn, legitimizes various 
exercises of power.117 For intersectional theorists such as Barbara Smith, Cathy Cohen, 
Hortense Spillers, bell hooks, and others, power operates by generating marginal subjects 
– for example, Black women – who must be disciplined in order to retroactively 
legitimize the (white) nuclear family. Because this recursive process is often left 
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uninterrogated, intersectional scholars have argued that these marginal positions 
doggedly persist even in purportedly emancipatory projects, such as in feminist critiques 
of the nuclear family.   
In part two, I argue that queer theorists have used the central insights of 
intersectionality to motivate and legitimize their own critical interventions in two ways. 
First, queer theorists have suggested that intersectionality evidences the need for new 
ways of contesting power by drawing attention to the recursive production of 
marginalized – or non-normative – subjects. Second, drawing on the intersectional 
argument that recursive power can be at work within purportedly emancipatory 
movements, queer theorists have sought to broaden intersectionality’s political claims to 
develop a “more thorough” resistance to marginality: queerness, they argue, is an 
exemplary resistance to being “resubordinated to a unity that caricatures, demeans, and 
domesticates difference.”118 However, this conception of marginality as an exemplary site 
of democratic resistance strains against the coalitional bent of intersectionality. Thus, 
despite the fact that responding to the recursive insight of intersectionality was, and 
remains, a motivating impulse in queer theory, the field has largely tended to view power 
as working in decontextualized, abstract, or metatheoretical ways. As a result, queer 
theory has largely departed from intersectional focus on coalition work, instead 
reconceiving of democratic redress in terms of anti-normative critique.  
Finally, I argue that queer theory’s tendency to privilege democracy-as-critique 
over democracy-as-coalition has displaced a key site of intersectional coalition-building: 
the nuclear family. In particular, I suggest that in addition to paradoxically claiming 
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intersectionality even as they purport to transcend or supersede it, queer theorists’ 
attempts to incorporate intersectional insights have also cased feminists and queer 
theorists alike to eschew, minimize, or otherwise ignore the deep entanglements between 
intersectional thinking and lesbian feminism. In order to make this case, I turn to the 
work of Adrienne Rich to show how (white) lesbian feminism is more deeply connected 
to the insights of intersectional thinking than is queer theory, even as it sometimes fails to 
live up to its coalitional promise. Attention to second wave theorizations of the family 
such as those found in Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born and “Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” reveals a distinctive paradox for anti-normative 
theorists responding to intersectional scholarship. On the one hand, Rich certainly falls 
victim to what many intersectional scholars might call “cultural” or “white” feminism, 
often presuming that white women’s experiences of family life are the model on which an 
analysis of all women’s oppression should be built. On the other, however, Rich 
presumes neither that women are exemplary democratic subjects nor that revolutionizing 
the family can begin and end with the activity of critiquing normative gender roles. In 
this way, her analysis shares several key insights with the case for intersectional 
scholarship, even as it fails to produce a fully realized analysis of intersectional power. 
Such a paradox, which highlights the ambivalent nature of coalitional responsibility, 
reveals the ongoing importance of intersectional coalition work as a democratic resource.   
 
Intersectionality and the Insight of Recursive Power 
Before directly engaging the relationship between intersectionality and queer 
theory that animates my argument, let me say something about how I am using the term 
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“intersectionality” itself. While the term first appears in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 1989 
article “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,”119 my aim is to situate the 
concept in a much broader conversation in the field of critical theory that includes, 
among other things, earlier debates in Black feminism. Indeed, while Crenshaw is often 
credited with having “exposed” the problems of racial and sexual marginalization within 
feminist politics,120 she was hardly the first to notice that many political frameworks tend 
to produce marginal subjects whose experiences and political claims are silenced, 
misrecognized, or discredited. Crenshaw opens “Demarginalizing” by invoking All the 
Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us are Brave;121 throughout the 
piece, she develops her insights with reference to works by bell hooks, Barbara and 
Beverly Smith, Gloria Hull, Paula Giddings, and other Black feminists active throughout 
the 1980s. Thus, although contemporary proponents of intersectionality argue that the 
term circulates in contexts that exceed the project of Black feminism,122 in the pages that 
follow, I will refer to “intersectionality” to denote an understanding of the term as 
situated in the Black feminist politics of the 1980s – one that locates the concept in a set 
of historical debates over intra-group power and that highlights its conceptual 
entanglements to prominent Black feminist arguments.123 I do so not to displace 
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Crenshaw’s important work, but to capture some of the dynamic resonances it has with 
the widespread analysis of intra-group power that proliferated throughout the 1980s. As I 
will argue in the following sections, it is this broader conversation that both motivated 
and legitimized queer theory’s central theoretical moves.   
The notion of intersectionality as I understand it, then, is an intervention into a 
series of longstanding debates over how theorists and political actors should best 
understand relations of power, domination, and marginalization. Although intersectional 
theorists have developed an approach to understanding power that differs in important 
ways from other theories in the Marxist, Foulcaultian, or queer traditions, it is 
conceptually and politically related to this broader family of scholarship, which I am here 
calling critical theory. As its practitioners often note, critical theory is best understood 
genealogically, which is to say that it does not represent some unitary way of 
understanding the world, but is rather “fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien 
forms.”124 What unites its practitioners, then, is something of a “family resemblance:” the 
common intuition that power, wherever it emerges, is neither as natural nor as 
straightforward as it appears. Whether understood through the optic of money (Marx), 
morals (Nietzsche), symptoms (Freud), ideology (Althusser), or disciplining institutions 
(Foucault), the circulation of power is understood in critical theory to generate the very 
marginal subjects that it disciplines. For critical theorists, analyzing power thus means 
looking past its alibis, and training the eye, instead, on how dominant classed, racial, or 
gendered hierarchies generate the very relations of ruling they presume.  
 
124 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. 
Rabinow (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 78.  
 70 
An emphasis on this self-referential dynamic – the recursivity of power – cuts 
across the several dimensions of critical scholarship with which this article engages. The 
recursivity of power, for instance, was Marx’s key insight in The German Ideology: for 
Marx, the definitive mark of a “ruling class” is its capacity to generate the very social 
relations that legitimize and reproduce its dominance. Marx argues that although the 
“ideas of the ruling class” reflect only a limited point of view, the dominant classes 
retroactively install them as governing categories by speaking transparently for “the 
people.” To understand power, then, one must resist the ruse: the critical theorist, argues 
Marx, need not “look for a category, but [must remain] constantly on the real ground of 
history… not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history.”125 For Marx, 
however, to notice that power produces invested categories of ruling is not simply to 
reverse the causal relationship between relations of power and their legitimizing 
discourses – it is not to argue, for instance, simply that practices exist prior to discourses. 
Rather, it is to notice the how hierarchies central to a form of ruling co-constitute 
normative and institutional exercises of power. In The German Ideology as elsewhere, for 
instance, Marx shows that capitalist hierarchies generated new relations of ruling through 
money and private property, which in turn become new units of political control. To 
understand power as recursive is thus to grasp the self-referential relationship between 
existing hierarchies and the relations of ruling they generate. 
Recursive theory, at its best, points to the need for highly contextual analyses of 
power – those that not only theorize about power in the abstract, but which emphasize the 
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ways that power is self-referentially legitimized and deployed in concrete institutional, 
political, or economic contexts to marginalize certain subjects. Indeed, if Marx developed 
his insight in the context of the 19th century factory, theorists from a variety of political 
and intellectual positions have advanced recursive accounts of power in other 
paradigmatic contexts, including the prison, the colony, and – most importantly for my 
purposes here – the family. Foucault, for example, describes just such a recursive 
function of power as it emerged in the bourgeois family; indeed, his primary project is to 
redirect critical energy away from a conception of the family as a “repressive” institution 
towards one that interprets the family as site of recursive power. A repressive 
interpretation of power, Foucault writes, would hold that “The legitimate and procreative 
couple… imposed itself as model, enforced the norm, safeguarded the truth, and reserved 
the right to speak while retaining the principle of secrecy.”126 For Foucault, interpreting 
the family as a repressive site in securing power relations fails to understand how sexual 
hierarchies generate various notions of normative sexuality in order to govern or 
discipline them. It is no accident of history, Foucault insists, that alongside the 
consolidation of the bourgeois family there emerged “a whole perverse outbreak… of the 
sexual instinct.”127 Rather, he writes that the “implantation of perversions is an 
instrument effect” of the regulation of sexual hierarchies, a “proliferation of sexualities 
through the extension of power; an optimization of the power to which each of these local 
sexualities gave a surface of intervention.”128 In other words, it is in the contextual 
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interaction between existing hierarchies (for example, sexual hierarchies), legitimizing or 
normative discourses (medicine, psychiatry, the police), and disciplining institutions (the 
heterosexual family) in which specific relations of ruling emerge. In short, Foucault 
argues that the conjugal family is a nodal site which not only produces “deviant” sexual 
subjects, but also enables a proliferation of institutions to manage and discipline a wide 
array of sexual activities.  
Like Foucault, intersectional theorists analyzing the heterosexual family have 
emphasized its recursive dimensions. Consider, for example, Hortense Spillers’ 
invocation of the name “Sapphire” to denote Black women’s marginality in the powerful 
opening sentences of ‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe:’ “I describe a locus of confounded 
identities,” she writes, “a meeting ground of investments and privations in the national 
treasury of rhetorical wealth. My country needs me, and if I were not here, I would have 
to be invented.”129 Spillers’ point, of course, is that common conceptions of Black women 
in popular culture, political ideology, and institutionalized public policy have been 
recursively invented and governed. Throughout, Spillers details the ways in which sexual 
hierarchies, in the specific context of American enslavement, generated “Sapphire” – the 
“mocking double” of Black women – in order to legitimize the economic and political 
supremacy of the white nuclear family, on the one hand, and to justify the brutal 
treatment of Black women under slavery, on the other. Put simply, the emergence of new, 
sexualized institutions of white supremacy depended on – emerged in recursive relation 
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with – disciplinary practices designed to brutalize and degrade marginalized Black 
women.  
Spillers’ work – and, in particular, her conception of the family as an institution 
that invents the “Black woman” only to “ungender” and discipline her – is only one 
example of this kind of argument in intersectionality. bell hooks, for example, shows in 
excruciating detail how the racial marginalization is imprinted on the family structure, 
both generating racist myths about Black women and, simultaneously, deploying these 
discourses to elevate the “legitimate” white family.130 Similarly, other intersectional 
scholars have shown how “Black womanhood” is simultaneously invented and punished 
through discourses about the family in order to legitimize new relationships of racial 
control. As Cathy Cohen points out,  
it was not the promotion of marriage or heterosexuality per se that served as the 
standard or motivation of most slave societies. Instead, marriage and 
heterosexuality, as viewed through the lenses of profit and domination, and the 
ideology of white supremacy, were reconfigured to justify the exploitation and 
regulation of black bodies, even those presumably engaged in heterosexual 
behavior…131 
 
As Cohen elaborates, it is not just the productive dimension of power – its ability to 
generate post-hoc legitimizing grounds for hierarchical subject-positions – that is at stake 
in understanding the raced and gendered dimensions of the family. These presumed 
grounds, in turn, generate new relations of ruling that systematically marginalize certain 
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groups, legitimizing the “underprotection and overpolicing” of women of color.132 
Importantly, if hooks, Cohen, and others detail how the heterosexual family became a 
political institution designed to both manage emergent discourses about normative 
(white) sexuality and surveil non-normative (Black) sexuality, they also maintain that 
these meanings were co-articulated through highly contextual institutional mechanisms of 
control such as miscegenation laws, housing and employment codes, policing, and 
welfare reform.   
 
Recursivity and the Conditions of Democracy  
I spend so much time emphasizing critical theory’s use of recursivity as a shared 
analytic insight across theories of power because, as I will argue for the remainder of this 
article, it is the ground on which critical theorists’ claims about democratic politics are 
built. Indeed, if the insight of recursivity is the backdrop against which a critical family 
resemblance has emerged, its political importance should be understood in the larger 
context of critical theory’s distinctive claims about democratic transformation. Unlike 
liberal or multicultural claims to democracy, which emphasize a broadening of the 
existing norms and institutions to include more voices, critical claims to democracy hold 
that because hierarchies generate the very relations of rule that reproduce them, 
expanding these relations to ‘include’ the voices of the oppressed can do little more than 
misrecognize calls for redress.133 Drawing on the insight of recursivity, critical theorists 
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argue that the very premises of politics are often symptoms of hierarchical relationships, 
and that a more democratic politics – one that can redress a wider set of claims about 
injustice – would be one that refuses to participate in any discourse that produces and 
polices marginalized, or non-normative, subjects. Such a democratic politics premised in 
recursive thinking would require a foundational shift in the very relations of ruling that 
constrain political imagination.  
Intersectional thinking, in particular, illuminates the ways in which Black women 
are recursively produced and policed as marginalized subjects, and calls for the end of 
any “relation of ruling” – such as the white nuclear family – that participates in this 
recursive process. One consequence of this way of thinking has been to notice how these 
discourses have been inadvertently picked up, deployed, and reinforced by purportedly 
emancipatory movements that fail to adequately grasp the recursivity of power. 
Crenshaw, for instance, points out not only that Black women are marginalized by 
recursive forms of power that both produce and police them, but also that feminist and 
antiracist organizations have inadequately grasped this problem as a recursive one, thus 
re-marginalizing women of color in their struggles against gendered and racial violences. 
Crenshaw describes this failure as one that inadequately apprehends “how the production 
of images of women of color and the contestations over those images tend to ignore the 
intersectional interests of women of color;” an adequate political response, then, must 
therefore at minimum grasp both how recursive power produces Black women as 
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marginal subjects and refuse any discursive framework that participates in the production 
and denigration of these marginal figures.134 
In other words, any shift in the relations of ruling that marginalize Black women 
can only be considered democratic when the new forms of political engagement they 
generate actively work against the re-subordination of this marginalized group. This 
refusal, for intersectional theorists, must be a polyvalent one: intersectional scholarship 
points to a variety of contexts in which Black women have been re-inscribed in 
hierarchical relations, including in the racial and sexual division of labor (Spillers), in 
legal discourses concerning domestic violence and discrimination (Crenshaw), in 
movement politics that privilege white women’s voices over Black women’s (hooks), in 
geographies of racial segregation (Collins), and in the public policies that surveil Black 
women’s sexual practices (Cohen) – just to name a few. Because intersectional thinkers 
hold that no particular site of power is definitive but rather interacts with existing 
hierarchies in highly contextual ways, these thinkers also argue that theorists cannot 
“define” power in the abstract, nor can they predict how power might emerge to 
resubordinate the marginalized in the future. To make a transformative politics 
democratic, then, theorists and political actors alike must remain vigilant about the sites 
and contexts in which re-subordination might occur, including in the very forms of 
political engagement they propose.  
Thinking back to Gayle Rubin’s “Thinking Sex,” clear resonances between the 
democratic ambitions of queer anti-normative and intersectional scholarship are apparent. 
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Rubin, like intersectional scholars, insists both that sexuality is “constituted in society 
and history” and that sexual hierarchies produce marginalized sexual identities and 
mechanisms of sexual control. For Rubin, marginal sexual subjects – fetishists, 
sadomasochists, homosexuals, and trans people, to name a few – are invented as 
legitimizing grounds for distinguishing between good and bad sex and as justifications 
for new forms of sexual surveillance and control; in this way, they are analogous to other 
marginal figures like “Sapphire” in Spillers’ analysis of the family. Moreover, we might 
read Rubin’s invocation of “benign sexual variation” as an attempt to capture something 
of intersectionality’s emphasis on the refusal to re-marginalize the most vulnerable: “One 
need not like or perform a particular sex act in order to recognize that someone else will,” 
Rubin writes, “and that this difference does not indicate a lack of good taste, mental 
health, or intelligence in either party.”135 In short, Rubin seems to echo the intersectional 
notion that it is the recognition of the irreducible multiplicity of marginalities that makes 
possible a more democratic sexual politics.  
Rubin, of course, is not the only scholar of sexual politics to draw from the 
insights of intersectional thinking. In fact, locating intersectionality genealogically within 
the broader context of critical theory reveals that the rethinking of “Gay and Lesbian” 
studies – a rethinking that would result in the emergence of queer theory136 – took its cue 
from many of the intersectional insights about recursive power and intra-group 
marginalization noted above. Steven Seidman, for instance, wrote in his contribution to 
Fear of a Queer Planet that  
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…postmodern strains in gay thinking and politics have their immediate social 
origin in recent developments in the gay culture. In the reaction by people of 
color, third-world-identified gays, poor and working class gays, and sex rebels to 
the ethnic/essentialist model of identity and community that achieved dominance 
in the lesbian and gay cultures of the 1970s, I locate the social basis for a [queer] 
rethinking of identity and politics.137  
 
Here, Seidman points out that the “eruption of difference”138 within lesbian and gay 
movements in the 1980s – and, with it, the growing awareness that these movements 
participate in the recursive discourses that produce and police marginalized subjects – 
both motivates and justifies queer theoretical interventions. And Seidman is hardly alone 
in making this case. Shane Phelan, too, locates her turn towards postmodern theories of 
the subject in the claims of the Combahee River Collective. Phelan writes that “the 
refusal to subsume one movement into another” – a refusal that for her animates both the 
Combahee statement and subsequent turns towards “queer” thinking – “offered greater 
possibilities for common action than an imperialist agenda resting on a binary opposition 
[between lesbians and straight women].”139 Teresa de Lauretis, in her introduction to the 
special issue of differences in which the words “queer theory” first appear, argues that it 
is in its commitment to making possible the multiple, overlapping, and as-yet unseen 
differences between and among women that “queer” departs from “lesbian and gay 
studies.” “’Queer Theory,’ she writes, “was arrived at in the effort to avoid all these fine 
[racial, gendered] distinctions in our discursive protocols, not to adhere to any one of the 
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given terms, not to assume their ideological liabilities, but instead to both transgress and 
transcend them – or at the very least problematize them.”140 Indeed, even contemporary 
queer theorists situate and justify their interventions by appealing to the language of 
intersectionality: as C. Heike Schotten puts it, queer projects appeal as often to Cathy 
Cohen’s “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens” to elaborate their resistances to re-
subordination as they do to Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, Eve Sedgwick’s 
Epistemology of the Closet, or Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner’s “Sex in Public.”141  
What’s curious, however, is that in citing the work of intersectional theorists as 
having motivated queer theoretical interventions, queer theorists increasingly tend to do 
so by marking out the supposed failures of both “gay and lesbian studies” and 
intersectionality as transformative, liberatory, or “world-making” projects. Kevin Duong, 
for instance, argues that while intersectionality attempts to combat “many feminists’ past 
and present tendency to reduce to a singular, privileged rubric the multiplicity of an 
individuals’ identity, such as privileging gender at the expense of racial identity,”142 
intersectional thinking has largely failed to live up to these promises by remaining 
attached to a politics of visibility and a too-stable conception of group identity. By 
contrast, Duong suggests that queer theory takes up intersectionality’s recursive analysis 
and carries it further: “One of queer theory’s lessons for intersectional research,” he 
writes, is its insistence that “if we feminists want to respond adequately to the political 
problems that our intersectional research seeks to overcome, then we need to go beyond 
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the paradigms hitherto employed.”143 While intersectional frames open up the possibility 
of conceiving of a politics that refuses the re-subordination of marginal subjects, he 
seems to suggest, they need queer theory to embody and carry out this politics. In making 
this case, Duong shares a perspective with many other prominent queer theorists, 
including Jasbir Puar, who argues that intersectionality remains trapped in the logic of 
identity,144 and Schotten, who suggests that where intersectional frameworks point 
towards a continual awareness of the co-constitution of different axes of oppression, 
queer frameworks thematize and exemplify this vigilance. Queer theory, in other words, 
not only tells us something about the modes of power in which queer subjects are 
produced and policed (as in the recursive account of power I gave above), but also 
exceeds and transcends intersectionality by serving the more exemplary purpose of 
“[queering] the revolutionary project itself.”145  
If queer theorists’ main claim to democratic politics rests on the claim that anti-
normativity does intersectional thinking better than intersectionality itself, however, it is 
striking that intersectional theorists, in large part, have been highly critical of this move. 
Cathy Cohen and Barbara Smith have argued that radical queer theory has largely failed 
to promote solidarity amongst marginalized people. Here, for example, is Barbara Smith 
in The Nation: 
Unlike the early lesbian and gay movement… today’s “queer” politicos seem to 
operate in a historical and ideological vacuum. “Queer” activists focus on “queer” 
issues, and racism, sexual oppression and economic exploitation do not qualify, 
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despite the fact that the majority of “queers” are people of color, female or 
working class.”146    
 
If queer theory is an engagement with the insights of intersectionality – namely, that 
transforming the grounds of politics must occur in ways that do not re-subordinate the 
most marginalized – why have intersectional theorists been so vocally critical of queer 
theory’s political vision? I would argue that what distinguishes intersectional theorists’ 
emphasis on coalition from the more general project of political transformation that 
underwrites much of critical theory – indeed, the distinction on which the rest of this 
article will turn – is intersectional theorists’ insistence that critiquing recursive 
dimensions of power from a marginal position is not coterminous with a coalitional 
political practice.  
Indeed, intersectional thinkers have often argued that democratic politics do not 
emerge easily from an abstract commitment to marginality; they have not – indeed, 
cannot – occur seamlessly from a recognition of collective marginal subjects such as the 
proletariat, the woman, the colonized, or even the queer. They hold that no theoretical 
framework – even an intersectional one – will inevitably lead to more democratic politics. 
Smith argues, for example, that the dangers of queer theory lie in conflating one’s 
marginal position in relation to power with a conscious political commitment to coalition 
work:  
homosexuality embodies an innately radical critique of the traditional nuclear 
family, whose political function has been to constrict the sexual expression and 
gender roles of all of its members, especially women, lesbians, and gays. Being in 
structural opposition to the status quo because of one’s identity, however, is quite 
different from being consciously and actively opposed to the status quo because 
one is a radical and understands how the system works.147 
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Cohen, too, argues that engaging in intersectional theory that identifies the complexities 
of recursive power should lead critical theorists to be wary of claims that conflate 
marginality with a shared political commitment:  
in recognizing the distinct history of oppression lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered people have confronted and challenged, I am not willing to 
embrace every queer as my marginalized political ally. In the same way, I do not 
assume that shared racial, gender, and/or class position or identity guarantees or 
produces similar political commitments.148  
 
To the extent that critical theory identifies the recursive dimensions of power – that is, the 
ways in which it functions by producing and policing marginalized subjects – Cohen 
argues that various marginalized people might share structural positions in relation to 
power. But while understanding the shared marginality of such positions is the condition 
for a politics of coalition, Cohen also argues that democratic coalitions will need to 
remain vigilant in order not to conflate the structural location of marginalized subjects 
with a liberatory politics par excellence. Translating the contextual insights of recursivity 
into politics instead requires the ability to realize, as Bernice Johnson Reagon puts it, that 
“everybody ain’t your company,” but that engaging in democratic struggle can 
nonetheless “teach you how to cross cultures and not kill yourself.”149  
I want to suggest, following thinkers like Smith and Cohen, that the apparent 
distance between queer theory’s intersectional motivations and its actual anti-normative 
politics emerges in its practitioners’ conflation of queer people’s structural position in 
relation to recursive power – a feature of critique – with the political practice of coalition-
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building. This conflation has effected a radical decontextualization of the insight of 
recursivity, such that queer politics appears as an exemplary democratic praxis rather than 
a situated political practice within particular relations of ruling. This decontextualization 
strains against intersectionality’s two main insights about democratic politics: that power 
recursively produces and punishes certain marginalized subjects in specific institutional 
settings, on the one hand, and that these subjects are nevertheless not guaranteed to be 
liberatory figures, on the other.  
 
“A More Thorough Resistance”  
Let me proceed by way of an example. In her 1998 essay “Merely Cultural,” 
Judith Butler succinctly spells out her defense of queer politics through an extended 
reading of feminist engagements with the family.150 At the outset, Butler shares in what I 
have argued is critical theorists’ commitment to a recursive analysis of power, focusing 
on how gender hierarchies simultaneously produce and marginalize certain non-
normative subjects. Citing feminist arguments during the 1970s and 80s, Butler argues 
that the family is a political site in which sexual hierarchies work together to generate 
both a normative discourse – compulsory heterosexuality – and a set of institutional 
practices – “a specific operation of the sexual and gendered distribution of legal and 
economic entitlements.”151 For Butler, as for the critical theorists above, heterosexuality 
and the entitlements it entails are generated by a need to retroactively legitimize the 
family as a concrete relation of ruling. In other words, Butler’s view is that the family is, 
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ultimately, a recursive institution: its hierarchical dimensions are only reproduced to the 
extent that it generates “heterosexual persons, fit for entry into the family as social 
form.”152  
 At the same time as the family produces a concrete set of relations of ruling, 
Butler argues, it also must produce a series of marginal subject positions that are not fit 
for entry into the family – those who, by definition, will occupy marginal positions in the 
social order secured by the normative family. Again, like Spillers’ “Sapphire” and 
Rubin’s fetishists, these marginal subjects are what give the lie to the family’s 
legitimizing grounds, and therefore open up the possibility of radically altering the 
exclusionary terrain in which sexual politics has been circumscribed. Thus, understanding 
the family as a site of sexual hierarchy – the political task she assigns to queer theory – 
reveals that the family, a “specific arrangement of kin,” is “historically contingent and, in 
principle, transformable.”153 In short, the transformative promise of queer theory is its 
ability “to argue that what qualifies as a person and a sex will be radically altered.”154  
 Thus far, Butler’s argument about how queers “confound” the self-referential 
relationship between the norms and practices of the nuclear family echoes the call for 
coalitional practices central to intersectional theories. However, Butler’s essay deploys 
this critique to make a broader point still. The essay, in addition to analyzing the nuclear 
family as a recursive institution, is an attempt to parry criticisms of queer politics for 
occupying a “merely cultural” space and for offering an analysis of power that is 
irreducibly distinct from economic or material concerns. Writing against such criticisms 
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of queer politics, Butler seeks to defend the importance of queer marginality by arguing 
that the marginal position of queers “[confirms] the place of sexual regulation as a mode 
of producing the subject”155 – an argument that is less about the highly contextual 
operation of power than it is about defending queer marginalization as a paradigmatic 
site of political struggle.  
The importance of this distinction, though it emerges in defense of the worthy 
cause of including queer struggles in the agenda of critical theory, should not be 
underestimated. In defending the importance of redressing queer marginality, Butler 
diverges dramatically from the coalitional claims of intersectional theory, however much 
her preceding analysis of the family has echoed its critique of recursive power. In 
Butler’s essay, the figure of the queer, as that which confounds the recursive 
naturalization of the family, not only gives the lie to a particular hierarchy that restricts 
sexuality in the historically specific configuration of the family. Here, it becomes 
synecdoche for the process by which power in general marginalizes non-normative 
subjects under the false sign of unity. For Butler, the queer is not only a marginalized 
subject whose subordination takes place in the localized context of the family, but 
represents a broader “refusal to become resubordinated to a unity that caricatures, 
demeans, and domesticates difference.”156 If the queer confounds the family by refusing 
to be “fit for entry into the normative family,” it is this refusal that for Butler “becomes 
the basis for a more expansive and dynamic political impulse.”157 Indeed, she writes, “this 
resistance to ‘unity’” – the lesson of the queer – “carries with it the cipher of democratic 
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promise on the Left.”158 At the same time that Butler invokes the intersectional insight 
that marginality marks the convergence of recursive power and the possibility of radical 
contestation, an important shift has occurred: rather than advocating a coalitional 
practice, Butler has transformed the marginal figure “queer” into an exemplary 
democratic agent.   
Thus, although queer theory emerges from the insight that critiquing recursive 
marginality is central to political struggle, queer theorists like Butler have tended to 
conflate intersectionality’s mode of critique with its political praxis by slipping from a 
specific site in which relations of ruling are generated – the family – to making the claim 
that the marginalized figure at its center – the queer – represents the democratic promise 
of the Left. From this angle, Butler’s democratic politics strain deeply against the insights 
of intersectionality. Whereas Smith, for example, explicitly cautions against conflating 
one’s structural relation to power with one’s commitment to democratic coalition-
building, Butler does not acknowledge a distinction between the critique of “what must 
be cut out from a concept of unity in order for it to gain the appearance of necessity and 
coherence” and the queer’s political “refusal to become resubordinated.”159 For Butler, 
queer politics are thus less embedded in a coalitional practice than they are in a politics of 
critique.  
Butler’s “Merely Cultural” is hardly the only text within queer theory that 
illustrates the slippage between democracy-as-coalition and democracy-as-critique. 
Michael Warner, for example, similarly elides the critique of specific form of queer 
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marginality and a commitment to a democratic politics of anti-subordination in his widely 
cited introduction to Fear of a Queer Planet. In it, he argues that “because the logic of 
the sexual order is so deeply embedded by now in an indescribably wide range of social 
institutions,” queer struggles “may be read in almost any document of our culture means 
that we are only beginning to have an idea of how widespread those institutions and 
accounts are.160 Like Butler, Warner describes the ways in which sexual hierarchy 
generates certain relations of ruling that become embedded in discursive and institutional 
practices. Also like Butler, however, Warner continues to argue that because sexual 
regulation underwrites the symbolic order, contesting the norms that reproduce this order 
can reasonably stand in for a democratic resistance to subordination in “an indescribably 
wide range of social institutions.” Warner continues: 
Every person who comes to a queer self-understanding knows in one way or 
another that her stigmatization is intricated with gender, with the family, with 
notions of individual freedom, the state, public speech, consumption and desire, 
nature and culture, maturation, reproductive politics, racial and national fantasy, 
class identity, truth and trust, censorship, intimate life and social display, terror 
and violence, health care, and deep cultural norms about the bearing of the 
body.161  
 
To be “queer,” then, is to be in opposition to any and all of these potential sites of power, 
a move which is understood to be democratic because it symbolizes the refusal to be 
resubordinated by new forms of power. Such an opening of the possible sites of critique 
carries the promise of contesting power wherever it appears: for Warner, queer 
antinormativity thus represents “a more thorough resistance to regimes of the normal.”162  
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In seeking to incorporate the lessons of intersectionality, queer theorists have 
paradoxically claimed to supersede intersectional theorists’ key political insight: for 
Butler and Warner, as for more contemporary thinkers like Duong and Schotten, queer 
theory’s ambition is to become a more thorough praxis than frameworks, like 
intersectionality, which take only contextual sites of power as their object and offer only 
coalitional promises. The queer – the exemplary figure produced and policed by recursive 
power – becomes the paradigmatic figure of democratic politics by superseding the 
challenges of coalitional work. José Esteban Muñoz, for instance, writes that a queer 
democratic praxis should exceed the apparently identity-invested practices of coalition-
building. Coalitions, for Muñoz, require a form of undemocratic thinking that require 
marginalized subjects to invest in rarefied and discrete identities. In contrast, because 
they refuse marginalization in general as opposed to “merely” coalitional sites of 
“identification/counter-identification,” the more fluid disidentificatory practices of queers 
of color might furnish “the blueprint for minoritarian counterpublic spheres.”163 Pausing 
on this final claim, then, the “more thorough resistance” that queer theorists have 
advocated appears to fold back on itself: while it emerges from and engages with 
intersectional thinking, queer theory has come to make the counterintuitive claim that 
queer politics represents an exemplary form of resistance that contains the emancipatory 
aspirations of all sorts of recursively marginalized subjects: “In this view,” for example, 
“’queer’ is merely [the] structural, catchall designation” containing “black and 
indigenous folks, the disabled, and queer youths of color.” Queer politics, rather than a 
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localized, contextual, or coalitional struggle, stands in for a liberatory “solidarity with 
people and knowledge from below.”164   
“Second Wave” Feminism and the Task of Coalition 
Set against the apparently more modest and identitarian goal of coalition-building, 
queer theorists clearly see their task not only as promoting a situated politics of anti-
subordination, but a refusal of the dynamics of marginalization in ways that are motivated 
by intersectional thinking – even as they claim to exceed and transcend intersectionality 
itself. But while these two conceptions of political engagement both emerge from the 
impulse to understand how hierarchies produce and marginalize certain subjects, on the 
one hand, and to inaugurate a political praxis that resists reproducing such 
marginalizations, on the other, conceiving of democratic transformation in terms of 
coalition is fundamentally distinct from thinking it in terms of the critique of normative 
identity. If intersectional scholars have criticized anti-normative queer theory for its 
politics, then, I want to suggest that it is because they have conflated the task of coalition 
with the task of critique. Collins, for example, has pointed out that there is a danger in 
assuming that writing “from the margins” (either as Black women or as queer subjects) 
can rise to the level of an exemplary political stance.165 Cohen, too, suggests that 
“deviance” is conceptually and politically distinct from “defiance:” “[O]pening up… new 
counter normative space is not enough,” she writes; “Organizations, networks, and 
groups have to be mobilized that will engage those making deviant decisions in a 
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sustained discussion about opposition, agency, and norms… Consciousness must be 
raised as processes and institutions of regulation are exposed.”166 
It is in the spirit of recovering something of the project of transforming the family 
as a site of coalitional contestation that I turn, finally, to the “second wave” author 
Adrienne Rich. Such a move may surprise. I do so not to argue that Rich altogether 
exemplifies the task of understanding the family as a site of coalitional possibility, but 
because she shares surprisingly fundamental insights about the family as a nodal site of 
recursive power with intersectional theorists, and because her trajectory as a writer and 
theorist throughout the 1980s highlights the requirements of the coalitional project in 
which she and her intersectional interlocutors engage. In this way, reading her work from 
within the family of “recursive” critical theory – indicative as it is of much of what has 
been dismissed as second-wave, cultural feminist theorizing – suggests a kind of 
coalitional accountability that queer theorists would do well to reconsider.  
Works like Rich’s represent, for many contemporary theorists, a form of “second 
wave” thinking in which the category “woman” is taken to be the fundamental experience 
of oppression. Queer theorists, for example, point to passages like this one, from the first 
chapter of Of Woman Born to argue that hers is a form of “cultural feminism” against 
which both intersectional and queer theorists stake their claims:  
Motherhood – unmentioned in the histories of conquest and serfdom, wars and 
treaties, exploration and imperialism – has a history, it has an ideology, it is more 
fundamental than tribalism or nationalism. My individual, seemingly private pains 
as a mother, the individual, seemingly private pains of the mothers around me and 
before me, whatever our class or color, the regulation of women’s reproductive 
power by men in every totalitarian system and every socialist revolution, the legal 
and technical control by men of contraception, fertility, abortion, obstetrics, 
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gynecology, and extrauterine reproductive experiments – all are essential to the 
patriarchal system, as is the negative or suspect status of women who are not 
mothers.167  
 
Here, Rich seems to conflate her own experiences of motherhood as a white woman with 
those across time, space, class, race, and other kinds of differences. Rich’s critics – for 
example, Alice Echols, who derided Rich for “[turning feminism’s] attention away from 
opposing male supremacy to creating a female counterculture”168 – suggest that because 
Rich does not adequately interrogate the central categories “woman” or “mother” for its 
racial, classed, or sexual differences, she engages in precisely the kind of marginalizing 
identity politics that queer theory would later imagine as its primary foe. Indeed, along 
with texts like Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology and Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will, Of 
Woman Born has been criticized for its lack of engagement with difference, for its 
reduction of race and racism to a derivative of sexist oppression, for its nearly exclusive 
emphasis on heterosexuality as the location of patriarchal norms – in short, for its 
insistence that a “woman-only space…where patriarchy was evaded rather than 
engaged”169 would “bring far more essential change to human society” than any other 
form of resistance or revolution.170 And Echols is not alone. Feminists such as Linda 
Alcoff associate Rich’s recursive theory with cultural feminism, the “ideology of a 
female nature or female essence reappropriated by feminists themselves in an effort to 
revalidate undervalued female attributes.”171 Indeed, Alcoff voices a suspicion about 
 
167 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. (New 
York: Norton, 1986 [1976]), 34.   
168 Echols, Daring to be Bad, 5.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid., 285.  
171 Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory,” Signs 13 vol. 3 (1988): 408.  
 92 
Rich’s analysis of motherhood that is, today, taken to be a starting point by queer 
theorists: that it would be “difficult to render the views of Rich… into a coherent whole 
without supplying a missing premise that there is an innate female essence”172 and that 
“the cultural feminist championing of a redefined ‘womanhood’ cannot provide a useful 
long-range program for a feminist movement and, in fact, places obstacles in the way of 
developing one.”173 In short, these critics of Rich believe that hers is precisely the kind of 
feminism that the intersectional interventions of the 1980s were aimed at discrediting.  
Understanding her work in this way, contemporary critical scholars have sought 
ways to move beyond ostensibly limited critiques like Rich’s. However, these suspicions 
of Rich’s work have largely ignored other contemporaneous accounts by thinkers like 
Elizabeth Spelman, who employed the concept “white solipsism,” a term Rich coined, to 
“[ask] us to reflect on the culturally assigned differences between having a Black or a 
white body, as well as on the differences between having the body of a woman or of a 
man.”174 Indeed, recalling Rich as a thinker more complexly situated in relation to Black, 
Third World, and intersectional feminisms raises several questions about the ways that 
queer theorists have proposed to supersede “second wave” feminism and intersectional 
theory. If, as I shall suggest below, Rich in fact shares key insights with both critical and 
intersectional theorists, queer theorists’ “beyonding” comes at the price of a political 
analysis of the ways that the family differently marginalizes lesbians, women of color, 
and other “deviant” groups. Moreover, it is intersectional theorists’ willingness to engage 
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thinkers like Rich as collaborators and thinkers that has earned them the charge of having 
remained attached to an identitarian politics. Duong, for example, argues that although 
intersectional theorists’ entanglements with second wave feminism may have had 
“political purchase… for feminists in the past,”175 queer theory can “teach” 
intersectionality how to move beyond the “enormous mistake [of] attempting to study and 
identify queers and their claimed worlds as things that can be identified.”176 However, the 
assumption that the coalitional engagement between intersectional theorists and second 
wave feminists is less political than queer “world-making” is, as I have suggested, an 
unwarranted reduction of the intersectional argument itself. Thus, when queer theorists 
presume to move beyond a text like Of Woman Born – especially when they do so in the 
name of doing intersectionality better than intersectional thinkers themselves – they also 
sacrifice the opportunity to engage in the very coalitional work that intersectional 
theorists put at the heart of democratic politics.177  
Although Rich turns her attention to a wide variety of marginalized subjects 
across her works, it is her treatment of lesbians as a specific marginalized group that is 
one of her most enduring legacies. Indeed, it is her turn to what she calls the “lesbian 
continuum” – the commitment to a “primary intensity between and among women, 
including the sharing of a rich inner life, the bonding against male tyranny, the giving and 
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receiving of practical and political support”178 – that Echols, among others, interprets as a 
commitment to “personal rather than social transformation.”179 However, a closer reading 
of the text and its relationship to Rich’s other works reveals a much different reality: in 
fact, Rich was engaged in precisely the kind of situated, recursive analysis of the family 
that motivated intersectional theorists during the 1980s. Although her work ought not be 
considered an exemplary approach to resisting marginalization, I would suggest that in 
contrast to the depiction of her work on offer by her critics, Rich continually refuses to 
conflate the marginal position of “the lesbian” with other concrete relationships produced 
by nuclear family.  
Let us begin again from the basic premise that, like many forms of domination, 
sexism operates first and foremost by generating the very normative discourses and 
institutional practices – that is, the relations of rule – that it presumes. Like many other 
critical theorists, Rich wishes to resist the ruse. She does so by drawing on the same 
insight that Marxist, Foucaultian, intersectional, and queer theorists do: by exploring the 
recursive dimensions of power. For Rich, this power begins with the facts of biological 
reproduction: although it is women who must bear children, Rich maintains from the 
outset that “motherhood,” with all its ideological and cultural implications, is neither a 
biological nor an obvious fact. Instead, she suggests, motherhood is one manifestation of 
a specific relation of rule: heterosexual nuclear families – with “mothers” at their center – 
are legitimized only through the production and policing of various kinds of marginalized 
subjects. “The institution of motherhood,” she writes, “is not identical with bearing and 
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caring for children, any more than the institution of heterosexuality is identical with 
intimacy and sexual love.”180 Instead,  
Both create the prescriptions and the conditions in which choices are made or 
blocked; they are not “reality” but they have shaped the circumstances of our 
lives… The experience of maternity and the experience of sexuality have both 
been channeled to serve male interests; behavior which threatens the institutions, 
such as illegitimacy, abortion, lesbianism, is considered deviant or criminal.181  
 
Thus, like other analyses of the family, Rich argues that its specific relation of rule 
functions by producing marginal subjects – women who seek abortions, lesbians, 
illegitimate children – whose very existence and subsequent punishment serves to 
legitimize and valorize a specific arrangement of reproductive and sexual relations. In 
other words, the procreative family, for Rich, is not a repressive institution that enforces 
preexisting hierarchies, but a recursive one that generates the very marginal subjects that 
it presumes. 
In “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” Rich uses this analysis 
of the family to make a set of claims about lesbians as specifically produced and policed 
as marginal subjects in relation to the family. The idea that “most women are innately 
heterosexual” (and therefore “fit for entry” into the family unit as actual or potential 
mothers), she writes, is less a refusal of women’s “essential” nature as women-identified 
than it is a political imposition, by means both subtle and violent, that marginalizes 
certain women and punishes them in the name of legitimizing the family unit. The 
assumption of heterosexuality, she writes, “remains a tenable assumption…” 
partly because to acknowledge that for women heterosexuality may not be a 
‘preference’ at all but something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized, 
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propagandized, and maintained by force, is an immense step to take if you 
consider yourself freely and ‘innately’ heterosexual…182 
 
For Rich, however, to acknowledge the ways that heterosexuality is “imposed, managed, 
organized, propagandized, and maintained by force” is not simply to argue that women 
are more naturally fit for some undifferentiated cultural lesbianism. Rather, it is to open 
up the possibility of imagining new ways of relating to one another, of acknowledging 
the difficult work of consciousness-raising, defiance, and coalition-building that would 
need to be done to relate differently to motherhood, sexuality, and one another:  
To take the step of questioning heterosexuality as a ‘preference’ or a ‘choice’ for 
women – and to do the intellectual and emotional work that follows – will call for 
a special quality of courage in heterosexually identified feminists but I think the 
rewards will be great: a freeing-up of thinking, the exploring of new paths, the 
shattering of another great silence, new clarity in personal relationships.183 
 
The “intellectual and emotional work” that Rich describes entails, as she puts it later in 
the essay, a recognition that although “’lesbian existence’ is potentially liberating for all 
women,” it is also “work that must assuredly move beyond the limits of white and 
middle-class Western women’s studies to examine women’s lives, work, and groupings 
within every racial, ethnical, and political structure.”184  
Elsewhere, Rich more explicitly acknowledges that identifying a specific form of 
marginality does not – and cannot – easily translate into a transformational coalitional 
politics. In her 1986 introduction to Of Woman Born, for instance, Rich reflects on the 
charges of “cultural feminism” that were levied against her:   
I have felt recently that the late 1960s Women’s Liberation thesis that ‘the 
personal is political’… has been overlaid by a New Age blur of the personal-for-
its-own-sake, as if ‘the personal is good’ has become the corollary and the thesis 
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forgotten […] The question of what do we want beyond a ‘safe space’ is crucial to 
the differences between the individualistic telling with no place to go and a 
collective movement to empower women.185  
 
Here, Rich (who cites Audre Lorde in this passage) shares in the intersectional intuition 
that coalition is distinct from critique; there are, she argues, crucial differences between 
the telling of marginalization and the “collective movement to empower women” – 
between “deviance” and “defiance.” Like Smith and Cohen, who argue that political 
movements must resist the temptation to conflate a recursively marginalized subject’s 
structural relation to power (deviance) and a liberatory politics par excellence (defiance), 
Rich suggests throughout her 1986 introduction that the dangers of conflating the two 
moments are many.  
On the one hand, Rich argues, conflating deviance and defiance can cause a 
movement to collapse a structural analysis of power into the narrowing of a radical 
political agenda into a single-issue campaign. In the Women’s movement, for example, 
Rich argues that the recursive analysis of power has opened up the possibility of 
developing  
a collective movement which is antipatriarchal, which places the highest value on 
the development of human beings, on economic justice, on respect for racial, 
cultural, sexual, and ethnic diversity, on providing the material conditions for 
children to flower into responsible and creative women and men, and on the 
redirection and eventual extirpation of the propensity for violence.186  
 
At the same time, however, this movement is constantly at risk of becoming, instead, one 
that is “narrowly concerned with pregnancy and birth” but does not “ask questions and 
demand answers about the lives of children, the priorities of government.”187 Such a 
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movement, she argues, would be “a movement in which individual families rely on 
consumerism and educational privilege to supply their own children with good nutrition, 
schooling, health care;” it would be one which “can, while perceiving itself as 
progressive or alternative, exist only as a minor contradiction within a society most of 
whose children grow up in poverty and which places its highest priority on the 
technology of war.”188 For Rich, though, it’s not only that a movement that conflates 
deviance with defiance fails to make the radical change it promises; it also risks actually 
exacerbating the problem. “To the extent that the alternative-childbirth movement has 
focused on birth as a single issue,” she writes, “it has been a reform easily subsumed into 
a new idealism of the family. Its feminist origins have been dimmed along with its 
potential challenge to the economics and practices of medicalized childbirth and to the 
separation of motherhood and sexuality.”189  
 To be sure, Rich’s work in Of Woman Born is certainly inspired by so-called 
“second wave” classics such as Shulamith Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex. Like Firestone, 
who argues that the feminist revolution would entail a “seizure of the means of 
reproduction,”190 Rich argues in the 1976 edition of Of Woman Born that the 
“repossession of women of our bodies will bring far more essential change to human 
society than the seizing of the means of production by workers.”191 Also like Firestone, 
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Rich seems to assume throughout the text that “patriarchy” is an overarching structure 
that denotes the “cross-cultural, global domination of women by men,” a domination that 
exists “at the core of all power-relationships” and undergirds the whole “sexual 
understructure of social and political forms.”192 However, as much as Rich’s work is 
inspired by and situated within these kinds of “second-wave” influences, she is clearly 
just as much – and, by the 1980s, even more so – influenced by the same Black, Third 
World, and lesbian feminists who developed the intersectional intuition that animates 
queer theory. In her 1986 introduction, for example she writes that “I would not end this 
book today, as I did in 1976,” by arguing that women’s “repossession” of their bodies 
would be a more fundamental change than class revolution:  
If indeed the free exercise of sexual and procreative choice will catalyze 
enormous social transformations (and I believe this), I also believe that this can 
only happen hand in hand with, neither before nor after, other claims which 
women and certain men have been denied for centuries: the claim to personhood; 
the claim to share justly in the products of our labor, not to be used merely as an 
instrument, a role, a womb, a pair of hands or a back or a set of fingers; to 
participate fully in the decisions of our workplace, our community; to speak for 
ourselves, in our own right.193 
 
Rich’s engagement with “other claims [of] women and certain men” is far from 
superficial. More importantly, I want to suggest, her work bears more resemblance to the 
coalitional claims of intersectional theorists than do the queer theories that were inspired 
by the purported failures of “second wave” and “cultural feminist” perspectives. In the 
years between Of Woman Born’s first printing and the 1986 second edition, Rich engaged 
deeply with the critiques and arguments of Black and Third World feminists. In a 1978 
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essay later reprinted in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence,194 Rich situates her engagement in 
race and racism within feminism as a response to Barbara Smith’s “Toward a Black 
Feminist Criticism,” the Combahee River Collective statement, Pat Robinson’s “A 
Historical and Critical Essay for Black Women in the Cities,” and Toni Cade Bambara’s 
The Black Woman. The conversations, provocations, and challenges raised in these works 
and others affected Rich deeply, and, by 1986, she had committed herself not to the task 
of superseding or “correcting” the flaws of second wave feminism, but of holding herself 
responsible for the limitations and shortcomings of her own thinking.  
In a 1979 interview with Audre Lorde printed first in Signs and later reprinted in 
Sister Outsider, for instance, Lorde pushes Rich to engage more deeply in the different 
ways that race affects women as mothers, workers, lesbians, and political organizers. In 
it, Lorde neither suggests that Black feminists should move “beyond” frameworks like 
Rich’s nor offers Rich an apology for holding her accountable for the shortcomings in her 
thinking. “I wish we could explore this more,” Rich states, “about you and me, but also in 
general… the differences in alternatives or choices we are offered as Black and white 
women.”195 Responding, Lorde both chastises Rich and holds her accountable for failing 
to recognize how “the entrapments and the weapons used to neutralize us are not the 
same:” 
Adrienne, in my journals I have a lot of pieces of conversations that I’m having 
with you in my head. I’ll be having a conversation with you and I’ll put it in my 
journal because stereotypically or symbolically these conversations occur in a 
 
194 An earlier version of the essay was delivered as a talk at the MLA conference as part 
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space of Black woman/white woman where it’s beyond Adrienne and Audre, 
almost as if we’re two voices […] I’ve never forgotten the impatience in your 
voice that time on the telephone, when you said, ‘It’s not enough to say that you 
intuit it.’ Do you remember? I will never forget that. Even at the same time that I 
understood what you meant, I felt a total wipeout of my modus, my way of 
perceiving and formulating.196   
 
Responding, Rich is forced to acknowledge that  
I’ve had great resistance to some of your perceptions. They can be very painful to 
me. Perceptions about what goes on between us, what goes on between Black and 
white people, what goes on between black and white women. So, it’s not that I 
can just accept your perceptions unblinkingly. Some of them are very hard for me. 
But I don’t want to deny them. I know I can’t afford to […] What I can’t afford 
either is to wipe out your perceptions or to pretend I understand you when I don’t. 
And then, if it’s a question of racism – and I don’t mean just the overt violence 
out there but also all the differences in our ways of seeing – there’s always the 
question: ‘How do I use this? What do I do about it?’197  
 
The question Lorde raises, then, is not whether a more intersectional feminism must 
move beyond Rich, but the extent to which she might be held accountable for the 
foundations and effects of her theorizing. Likewise, however, for Rich, recognizing the 
irreducibility of her marginal position as a lesbian to the experience of race and racism – 
a recognition that would “wipe out your perceptions or… pretend I understand you when 
I don’t” – is an essential first step towards remaking these relationships in coalition.  
By 1981, Rich had published an essay in Sinister Wisdom, which she was then 
editing, inspired by her engagement with Barbara Smith’s “Towards a Black Feminist 
Criticism.”198 In it, Rich argues that “we must recognize and reclaim an anti-racist female 
tradition, closely entwined though not identical with feminist tradition;”199 such an anti-
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racist stance, she argues, would insist that “Hetero-feminism is still not a feminism in its 
wholeness, any more than a feminism engages in passive racism is worthy of the 
name.”200 In other words, Rich is asking what responsibility a Black (and) lesbian 
feminist coalition has to attending to the specific, contextual marginalizations of Black 
women and lesbians without presuming that any one resistance “contains” or exemplifies 
any other. “In her Conditions article, Barbara Smith says that she would like ‘to 
encourage in white women a sane accountability to all the women who live and write on 
this soil,’” Rich writes:   
Speaking as a white Lesbian/feminist, I would add that for this accountability to 
be truly sane, it cannot be nourished by guilt, nor by ‘correct politics’ nor by the 
false consciousness born of powerless responsibility; nor can it be felt as an 
accountability to some shadowy ‘other,’ the Black Woman, the myth. It cannot, 
above all, be founded in ignorance.201  
 
In responding to the claims of the same Black and Third World feminists from which 
both intersectional and queer theorists take their cue, then, Rich points less to the need to 
exemplify difference in her bearing as a lesbian feminist. Instead, her work points to the 
need to hold women differently marginalized and punished by the same forces – such as 
the nuclear family – responsible for forging new relationships with one another.  
While Rich’s is not an explicitly intersectional feminism – and while some of the 
criticisms of her work are certainly valid – it is also more than merely a “second wave” or 
“cultural” feminism in the common sense of those terms. By turning to the example of 
so-called “second wave” analyses like Rich’s, I mean to reopen conversation about the 
political ambitions of the intersectional project: What does it mean to think, act, or resist 
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in coalition? Beneath this question lie deeper, more profound questions about the ways in 
which queer theory has taken up the insights of intersectionality. In suggesting, in ways 
both implicit and explicit, that queer theory is a more thorough resistance than 
intersectionality, queer thinkers run the risk not only of decontextualizing the relations of 
ruling, such as the white nuclear family, in which marginal subjects are produced. Just as 
importantly, in arguing that the queer’s paradigmatic marginality is a cipher for all other 
forms of recursive marginalization, queer theorists have paradoxically homogenized the 
tensions between the political lessons on offer by Rich and her intersectional interlocutors 
by claiming that “queer” represents all recursively marginalized subjects at once.  
 Coalition-building, instead, requires that no single critique of recursive power 
stands in for the difficult process of building coalitions – and holding one another 
responsible – across a range of highly contextual, and often conflicting and contradictory, 
sites of struggle. The example of Adrienne Rich, then, is an important one in this context 
– one which I would suggest points to a more demanding democratic practice than queer 
theorists have often imagined. What might it look like to act in coalition with those who, 
like Rich, are committed to the political contestation of recursive hierarchies, even as 
they must constantly contest their own tendencies to reproduce marginalization and 
account for their own failures to do so? The lessons of intersectional coalition-building 
suggest the need for a politics of accountability that would simultaneously share in her 
opposition to structural power even as it holds her responsible, as Lorde and other women 
of color feminists did, for the ways that she has failed to refuse to resubordinate others. It 
would echo Cathy Cohen, who argues that a “reconceptualization of the politics of 
marginal groups allows us not only to privilege the specific experience of distinct 
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communities, but also to search for those interconnected sites of resistance from which 
we can wage broader political struggles… And it is in these complicated and 
contradictory spaces that the liberatory and left politics that so many of us work for is 
located.”202 Such a politics would also echo the Combahee River Collective statement, 
which holds that allies need not perfectly embody anti-subordination politics in order to 
be held accountable to them.203 
 
Conclusion 
These questions about the relationship between democracy-as-coalition and 
democracy-as-critique are vitally important in a context in which it has become 
increasingly difficult to think these two modes of politics together. As queer 
organizations struggle to parse difficult and intractable questions about internal 
hierarchies – between, for example, cisgender lesbians and transwomen204 or between 
white queers, queers of color, and queers of the global south205 – questions about whether 
queer anti-normativity has actually produced a more democratic politics have only 
become more urgent and uncertain. In such a context, I think, it is worth returning to the 
lessons of intersectional coalition-building, which have been a persistent refrain in queer 
politics since its emergence.  
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I want to suggest that making a claim about the exemplary nature of discursive 
power participates, paradoxically and perhaps unconsciously, in the notion that certain 
exercises of power are “more fundamental” than others. At best, this is a spurious 
assumption. At worst, as Rich and intersectional theorists alike warn us, it can actually 
enable the persistence of institutional power as we fail to notice the ways in which some 
institutions stay profoundly the same even as marginalizing discourses about them shift 
and change. In this vein, queers and queer theorists should remember the extent to which 
the anti-normative claim has been, historically, deeply imbricated with the promulgation 
of so-called “family values.” Indeed, it was Gayle Rubin who wrote in “Thinking Sex” 
that rapidly changing normative discourses about sex and sexuality rapidly often occur in 
conjunction with legal and political battles seeking to shore up the institutional legitimacy 
of the family. In this sense, the family and its “values” are a nodal point in which 
normative discourses about sexuality (Rubin’s “hierarchical system of sexual value”206) 
coincide with attempts to strengthen the institution of the family through state sanctioned 
reproductive practices, the extension of marriage rights, and the legal codification of 
gendered violence and hierarchy. Because of the novelty of different domains that 
feminists and queer theorists explore, readers tend to be captivated by new arguments 
without realizing that making these moves has failed to deal with the intersection of 
norms in persistent nodes, like the family, in which power accumulates. 
 What’s worse, however, is that conflating antinormative thinking with the very 
possibility of democratic transformation puts critical theorists in the position of making 
judgments about what – or who – counts as “exemplary” agents in relation to the 
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interlocking sites and logics of power. In arguing that queer theory exceeds and 
transcends intersectional thinking – even as it emerges from and engages in intersectional 
lessons – queer theorists have run the risk of making judgments that render all recursively 
marginalized subjects as “queer” subjects. The apparent need for ultimately impossible 
judgments about whether Black, Indigenous, and other marginalized women are really 
“queer” figures, for example, bespeaks the paradoxically undemocratic features of a 
critical theory that has conflated the general political refusal to re-subordinate the 
marginalized with the specific institutions of domination in which the marginalized are 
produced and policed. Although anti-normative critique is intended to avoid such 
political challenges by insisting on a radical contingency, anti-normative theorists have 
paradoxically put themselves in the position of deciding which sites, subjects, and 
dimensions of power are appropriate targets for political critique and praxis, and which 
ones are simply particular instantiations of “queer” marginality. It is time, I think, to 
reopen the question of intersectional coalition: from what multiplicitous sites would we 
need to think in order to understand the scope of power?   
Queer critical theorists concerned with a reinvigorated critical and political praxis 
should, I argue, return to interrogating contextual sites of recursive power – like the 
nuclear family – in which power may well function in ways that are irreducibly to 
normativity, but that are nevertheless persistent sites of continued marginalization and 
punishment. This task, I would argue, will prove to be neither as clear-cut nor as seamless 
as queer theorists have often hoped. It will, instead, recall Bernice Johnson Reagon’s 
warning about coalition: sometimes we will have to work with people who “ain’t our 
people” – perhaps, even, with thinkers like Adrienne Rich – in order to think and act 
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coalitionally. Engaging in Rich’s fraught legacy provides a good example of what this 
kind of coalitional work might look like; while her analysis remains irreducibly 
imbricated in a white point of view that fails to take adequate account of racism and other 
privileges, she nonetheless shares the key goal of ending hierarchical relations of ruling. 
The task of coalition, then, may not be to move beyond thinkers like Rich, but to hold 
those whose politics they have influenced accountable for working against the re-
subordination of their political allies. Feminist, queer, and critical theorists have long 
known that claiming one’s critical perspective to be exemplary is a grave danger; 
multiplying our perspectives on power will thus continue to be a responsibility required 
by and for political engagement. “The responsibility is twofold,” writes an author in the 
lesbian publication Sinister Wisdom in 1985: “not to silence others, and not to let 
ourselves be silenced. Neither is easy.”207 This is the lesson that underwrote both 
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Chapter 2 
The Loving Public: 
Separation, Transformation, and Political Speech in Lesbian Feminist Theorizing 
 
 
 In March 1976, members of the Society for Women and Philosophy (SWIP) met 
to discuss an editorial policy for a new journal pitched to and for “women philosophers.” 
The prospect of an academic journal written, edited, and read by women philosophers 
was, as many of its contributors at the time noted, both novelty and artifact. On the one 
hand, an academic journal dealing with “feminist philosophy” had never before been 
proposed, and the purpose of creating one was obscure – so much so that one of the 
contributors to its proposal, Vicki Levine, wrote to her fellow co-contributor Jackie 
Thomason that “My main question [about the proposal] has to do with… the fact that I 
don’t know what’s involved in the ‘area of philosophy and feminism.’”208 On the other 
hand, however, the advent of “a journal of our own”209  could come only after the vast 
proliferation of feminist newsletters, magazines, pamphlets, and other media during the 
1970s had made it possible to think of feminism as a philosophical endeavor. In her 
comments on a draft of the journal’s policies, for example, Sarah Hoagland wonders 
aloud if the new journal will “be topic oriented like Quest or Heresies,” whether it will 
“encourage theoretical works in non-philosophicese like Sinister Wisdom… and 
Chrysalis,” or whether it will “put out calls for papers in the National Women’s Studies 
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Association Newsletter or Matrices.”210 Defining “feminist philosophy,” it seemed, 
would be no simple task. Indeed, its writers presented the proposed draft in March ‘76 
alongside a summary of the vast debates over the scope, politics, and audience of the 
journal that had wracked the burgeoning editorial board for a half a year. By the time of 
the meeting, these debates remained utterly unresolved.  
Although the resulting journal, now known as Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy, would not appear in print until 1982,211 it was at this first editorial meeting at 
the American Philosophical Association in 1976 that the tensions inherent in the project 
of feminist publishing landed with a thud in the academy. Indeed, the meeting centered 
around the relationship between the goals of feminist audiences, institutions, and concepts 
and those of the academy: To what audiences, for example, would the new journal write? 
Was feminist philosophy primarily for an academic philosophical audience, or a 
grassroots political one? Should feminist philosophy seek alternative venues – for 
example, presses outside of academic institutions or explicitly feminist presses – in order 
to reach these audiences? What was the relationship between feminist philosophy and the 
traditional disciplinary values that underpinned the academy as a reading and writing 
community? One SWIP member’s notes from the meeting reveal, for instance, the 
circularity – and, at times, the sheer confusion – of the debate over these questions. While 
the original draft proposed that “the journal will contain [at least] an article in the area of 
feminist philosophy,” the member crossed out this entire statement, replacing it with “the 
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journal will be comprised of philosophical articles.” This, too, was later struck from the 
draft, and the member replaced “philosophical articles” with “articles in the area of 
feminist [philosophy].”212 The issue, it seems, were unresolved (and perhaps 
unresolvable) tensions between feminism’s role in the academic institution (and its 
relations to “traditional” disciplines such as philosophy), its political commitments to 
“the development of feminist visionary imagination/creation,”213 and the distinct 
audiences that these two roles address. In a word, even as feminist theory was becoming 
more public, issues over the terms of its publication were becoming ever-more fraught.  
That same year, two non-academic feminist magazines published their own high-
profile debates about the tensions in publishing for feminist audiences, and about the 
capacity of feminist presses to radically transform political life. In Summer 1976, June 
Arnold published “Feminist Presses & Feminist Politics” in Quest: A Feminist Quarterly, 
a magazine printed by the feminist Diana Press and edited by Charlotte Bunch. In it, 
Arnold argued provocatively that while feminist work had begun gaining a foothold in 
the popular presses, the feminist movement required an “independent women’s 
communications network.” No feminist movement published in the “finishing press” (the 
male-owned popular presses so called “because it is our movement they intend to 
finish”), Arnold argued, would survive the assimilation.214 By fall 1976, Sinister Wisdom 
also published a wide-ranging debate on the politics of feminist publishing, this time in 
the form of a survey report collated by Jan Clausen in the magazine’s second issue. 
 
212 Draft of “Editorial Proposal,” 1976. Series One, SWIP files. Pembroke Center for 
Research and Teaching on Women, Brown University.   
213 Letter, Sarah Hoagland, 1978. Series One, SWIP files.  
214 June Arnold, “Feminist Presses and Feminist Politics,” Quest 3 vol. 1 (Summer 1976): 
18.  
 111 
Citing “several controversies involving publishing decisions [that] arose within the 
lesbian community,” including “the proposed publication of a second lesbian issue of 
Margins, the review of little magazines and small press books,” Clausen writes that her 
desire to explore the politics of publishing arose from “the fact that a publishing decision 
affecting a large number of women has been made on the basis of what appeared to be a 
minority’s political convictions.”215 Like the members of SWIP, the contributors to 
Sinister Wisdom’s debate over publication seem closely attuned to the ways in which the 
institutions, norms, and methods of disseminating feminist writing could shape, strain, 
and call forth different kinds of feminist audiences.  
In this chapter, I argue that although the issues of feminist institutions, audiences, 
and publication that arose in the SWIP editorial meeting, as well as in the pages of Quest 
and Sinister Wisdom, went (and, to a large degree, remain) unresolved, the tensions that 
they illuminated in 1976 are crucial for understanding the ways that lesbian feminism has 
been misrecognized by academic feminists since the early 1980s. As I argued in my 
introduction and in Chapter 1, queer theorists have retroactively imposed an 
interpretation of lesbian feminism that mistakenly identifies it as an attempt to establish a 
stable identity category (“lesbian”), to police the boundaries of that category, and to 
exclude those whose practices or politics “trouble” the stability of the category lesbian. In 
this chapter, however, I want to take this analysis a step further: not only has this 
interpretation been imposed onto lesbian feminism of the 1980s, it in fact misrecognizes 
the political claims that lesbian feminists sought to make during the period. Lesbian 
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feminism, I argue in the pages that follow, was not an attempt to develop a stable 
category of existence – indeed, as I show below, discussions about what it meant to “be” 
a lesbian were considered politically toxic during much of the 1980s. Such conversations, 
which developed only as theorists began to yoke lesbianism to the methodology of 
poststructuralism in the late 1980s, are thus largely at odds with the actual political 
discourse of the 1980s.  
How, then, should feminist political theorists understand the political discourse of 
1980s lesbian feminism? In what follows, I suggest that rather than reading lesbian 
feminism as an attempt to create a stable identity category, we ought to understand 
lesbian feminists as attempting to call forth a new public. This way of thinking about 
lesbian feminism not only echoes recent historical scholarship that situates the women’s 
movement in terms of its place-making capacities rather than in terms of its ideology,216 
but also calls attention to the defining political challenge of lesbian feminism: its attempts 
to call forth a political audience that was both racially diverse from the start and 
committed to negotiating the interlocking structures of oppression that circulate in public 
life.217 Calling forth this new public, for many lesbian feminists at the time, would 
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require a radical rethinking of the relationships between knowledge production, 
institutions of publication, and political audiences in ways that might make it possible to 
sustain a coalitional politics across differences. At the same time, however, thinking of 
lesbian feminism as a form of publicity calls attention to the risks and disjunctures that 
inhere in remaking these relationships at every turn; because lesbian feminists sought to 
make space for – rather than resolve – racial, classed, and other perspectival differences, 
their political thinking highlight the challenges and tensions that arise when coalitions 
attempt to move from theoretical diagnosis to institution-building, and from institution-
building to coalitional praxis. As I will argue below, lesbian feminists were often 
uniquely attuned to the ways that even the most utopian emergent publics risk collapsing 
into longstanding relations of power by smoothing over these disjunctive moments.  
In the pages that follow, I trace the various ways that lesbian feminists, both in 
and out of the academy, articulated the political tasks and responsibilities of a new 
lesbian feminist public, emphasizing in particular the ways that these tasks and 
responsibilities seek – and sometimes fail – to keep relationships of power in view at all 
times. First, I offer a reading of the politics of publicity in mainstream political theory in 
order to suggest that although questions about the persistence of power within public life 
are continually raised in political theory, they too often recede from view in favor of 
questions about the various roles of deliberation, reason, and judgment in politics. 
Highlighting this persistent failure in political theory to account for power in debates over 
the public sphere, I suggest, alerts us to the political risks that lesbian feminists faced as 
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they sought to inaugurate a new public; in particular, the risk of foreclosing negotiation 
between those most authorized to speak for ‘the’ public and those whose voices are 
marginalized.  
Next, I read a popular debate about the role of “loving” women in lesbian 
feminism from the early 1980s against these more traditional interpretations of “the 
public sphere.” Many queer and feminist theorists have understood lesbian feminist 
appeals to love as precursors to what some call the “affective turn” – that is, while they 
don’t follow thinkers like Arendt in viewing love as “worldless” and therefore 
apolitical,218 they tend to view lesbian feminists’ emphasis on love as a way of mapping 
“the sensate knowledge of women whose experiences were the product of distinct 
historical trajectories.”219 By contrast, I suggest that the lesbian feminist conception of 
loving women bears far more resemblance to what we traditionally theorize as attempts 
to call forth a “counterpublic” than feminist and queer theorists have imagined. In fact, 
the debate over loving other women identifies several responsibilities to others that are 
fundamentally missing in existing conceptions of the public sphere, and would therefore 
require practitioners to attend to institutional contexts, knowledges, and audiences that 
have traditionally been marginalized.  
In part two, then, I suggest that although this deeply political conception of love 
provided lesbian feminists with a theoretical diagnosis that makes space for coalitional 
negotiation over racial (and other) hierarchies within their emergent public, translating 
 
218 In The Human Condition, Arendt writes that “love, in distinction from friendship, is 
killed, or rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed in public.” The Human 
Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998 [1958]), 51.  
219 Victoria Hesford, Feeling Women’s Liberation, 130. 
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this diagnosis into a set of lesbian feminist institutions proved a more difficult challenge 
than many expected. During late 1970s and early 1980s, lesbian feminists fiercely 
debated how the concrete roles of writing, publication, and audience might differently 
enable a “loving public” to come into being, to varied effect. Using two conversations in 
the 1976 issues of Quest and Sinister Wisdom on the tasks of feminist publishing, I 
demonstrate that even writers committed to the idea of a loving counterpublic fell victim 
to papering over the hierarchies of legibility that arise when certain audiences claim to 
speak for the public. When theorists – even lesbian feminist ones – ignore these 
challenges, they risk not only failing to transform existing relations of power, but also 
foreclosing the very coalitional praxis that lesbian feminism hopes to sustain. However, 
in calling attention to this risk, some lesbian feminist writers, such as those found in the 
pages of Sinister Wisdom, gesture towards a coalitional practice of interpersonal 
responsibility and negotiation that must, at all times, ground institution-building in 
emergent publics.  
Finally, I show that the disjunctures involved in moving from theoretical 
diagnosis to institution-building, and from institution-building to coalitional praxis are 
exacerbated in the context of the academy, where the pressures of publication are 
different from the issues of publicity and audience with which lesbian feminists in the 70s 
and 80s grappled. Using the start-up documents of the journal Hypatia, I argue that we 
can see a shift towards needing to “resolve” tensions between the lesbian and feminist 
writing community, on the one hand, and the channels for recognition that are available 
to them, on the other. If discussions of “loving” cannot be read as attempts to establish a 
stable identity category, then, we also should not read the lesbian feminist counterpublic 
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as a stable, uncontested concept across the 1980s. Indeed, I show throughout this chapter 
that, on the one hand, the notion of a single lesbian feminist “counterpublic” premised on 
the idea of loving faced considerable conceptual, institutional, and political challenges 
throughout its existence as an organizing concept. On the other hand, however, I 
demonstrate that lesbian feminists tended to view these challenges as a way of 
strengthening, not threatening, the coalitional possibilities of the new audience they 
hoped to call forth.  
 
Public Things: Authors, Institutions, Audiences  
At its most basic, this chapter will argue that revisiting controversies over the 
politics lesbian feminist publishing reveals the limitations of queer theorists’ framework 
for understanding their historical relationship to lesbian feminism and illuminates some 
of the ways that lesbian feminists sought to encourage coalitional practices in their 
writing communities. Lesbian feminism, as I argued in my introduction and in Chapter 1, 
is typically criticized and rejected by contemporary queer theorists on the grounds that it 
relies on an essentialist identity claim and enforces a static conception of what it means to 
be a lesbian. There, I argued that queer theorists have argued that discussions about 
“being” involve an inherently conservative politics of naming, whereby any attempt to 
apply the name “lesbian” to a stable referent inevitably polices and excludes. However, in 
this chapter I will argue that this is the wrong way to think about the group “lesbian 
feminists;” instead, I want to suggest that we should think of lesbian feminism as a 
diffuse attempt to establish a new kind of public.  
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As Michael Warner has argued, publics are defined not by some shared identity 
but by their distinctive forms of address and structures of legibility. Unlike identity 
groups, which “select strangers by criteria of territory or identity or belief or some other 
test of members,”220 a public must be called forth in a complex interplay between authors, 
institutions, and audiences. A public, Warner writes, “might be real and efficacious, but 
its reality lies in [its] reflexivity by which an addressable object [say, “lesbians”] is 
conjured into being in order to enable the very discourse that gives it existence.”221 In 
other words, where an identity category is (wrongly) presumed to exist prior to its 
naming, a public is called into being through a complex interplay between political 
discourses, institutions of dissemination, and anticipated audiences. It may seem artificial 
to insist on this distinction – after all, as Iris Young points out, social groups, too, do not 
exist in some concrete form separate from the relations they conjure in and through 
address.222 But I draw this distinction to argue that, by and large, queer theorists – and 
political theorists more broadly – have failed to apprehend lesbian feminism as calling 
forth a distinctive kind of public.  
Equally, however, this distinction is useful for understanding the ways that 
lesbian feminism brings political resources into view that are largely missed in 
contemporary debates over difference, publicity, and radical social change. For example, 
much of the debate over the politics of publicity in political theory centers around 
questions about how – or whether – to stabilize the inevitable differences, disagreements, 
 
220 Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics. (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 75.  
221 Ibid., 67.  
222 Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Political Resource,” Democracy and Inclusion. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 82-121.  
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and dissonances between individual subjects in a democratic public.223 As I will show 
below, however, there is much more to the politics of publicity than the “fact” of 
plurality. In particular, I will suggest that it has been exceedingly difficult for political 
theorists to train their attention on the structural relations of power that inhere in public 
life. Although issues of power – who speaks for whom, which potential audiences are 
addressed and which are marginalized, how institutions and structures amplify or 
foreclose certain kinds of contestation or coalitional praxis – constantly circulate just 
below the surface of many theoretical accounts of publicity, these issues tend to recede 
from view when theorists interpret them as problems of plurality or difference. Thus, in 
addition to correcting the misperception that lesbian feminism is best conceptualized in 
an “identity” framework, I will make the case that lesbian feminists were, more than 
many mainstream political theorists, exceedingly attuned to relations of power that inhere 
in “publics and counterpublics.”  
Before documenting how lesbian feminists in the 1980s conceptualized the 
challenges of power that inhere in publicity, then, let me spend a little time rehearsing 
how debates over publicity have typically unfolded. What follows is less the usual 
concerns of publicity as they have developed in the field of political theory than it is an 
account of some of the forgotten lessons about publicity that have continually been 
 
223 This debate largely takes place by proxy. On the one hand, thinkers invested in 
“reconstructing” the normative principles that underlie democratic difference tend to turn 
to Habermas’ theory of communicative action; on the other, those concerned with the 
instabilities an unexpected effects of political communication tend to employ Hannah 
Arendt’s thesis that plurality is the defining feature of modernity. This proxy-debate has 
led to the idea that a comprehensive approach to the politics of publicity is coterminous 
with a reconciliation between Habermas and Arendt on the nature of the public sphere. 
See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).  
 119 
marginalized in the discipline. In particular, I am here interested in the ways that 
disciplinary debates over the public sphere have marginalized and misrecognized not 
only some of the most difficult political questions about the ways that publics organize 
the messy and unstable relationships between audiences, institutions, and political 
practices, but also the ways that lesbian feminist accounts of publicity have uniquely 
brought these challenges to light.  
According to Jürgen Habermas, who is widely credited with having 
conceptualized “the public sphere,” publicity in modern bourgeois society is a thing apart 
from other forms of political representation.224 Unlike forms of representation that claim 
a kind of mastery over the object being represented (as in, for example, the clergy’s claim 
to literally represent the authority of God), the public sphere is a way of calling forth a 
certain kind of critical audience for politics.225 Quite unlike the kind of mastery entailed 
in naming, representing, or directly ruling, in Habermas’ account the public sphere is a 
medium for speaking to, about, and for others. For Habermas, the public sphere emerged 
in the modern bourgeois context out of a need to differently address political audiences; 
namely, the emergence of a “reading public” which increasingly leveraged its attention 
and criticism to make claims on political authorities. Because of the constant circulation 
of commodities and news in the bourgeois period, political authority could not be 
 
224 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Boston: The MIT Press, 
1991 [1962]).  
225 Unlike Greek or Feudal conceptions of publicity, Habermas argues, the bourgeois 
public sphere depended on the rise of constant “traffic” in both commodities and news. 
Although it would take many years for the traffic in new to become the stuff of public 
concern, Habermas argues that the rise of a reading public would ultimately yield “a 
public sphere whose decisive mark was the published word.” Structural Transformation, 
16.  
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articulated as natural, direct, and unassailable; instead, political authority began to be cast 
loose, subject to “a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, 
readied themselves to compel public authority to legitimate itself before public 
opinion.”226 In this new form of political life, subjects are transformed into political 
audiences that are called forth as active participants in their relationship to authority.  
If Habermas’ story sounds familiar, it is because certain parts of his account of the 
relationship between capitalism, reading, and the public sphere have become foundational 
in the field of political theory. However, I want to call attention at this point to a little-
remembered lesson from Structural Transformation; namely, Habermas’ emphasis on the 
tension between the multiplicity of social and political positions during the rise of 
publicity and the idea of the public sphere. According to Habermas, on the one hand, the 
bourgeois public sphere was built on a rejection of domination or direct forms of power. 
Thus,  
The bourgeois were private persons; as such they did not ‘rule.’ Their power 
claims against the public authority were thus not directed against the 
concentration of powers of command that ought to be ‘divided;’ instead, they 
undercut the principle on which existing rule was based. The principle of control 
that the bourgeois public opposed to the latter – namely, publicity – was intended 
to change domination as such.227  
 
However, in reality, Habermas writes that the bourgeois rejection of “domination as 
such” depended on the fusing of the particular role of property holders with the general 
notion of “the” public. While the emergence of the public sphere went hand in hand with 
the emergence of a reading public and the notion of criticism, the very idea of “a” public 
 
226 Ibid., 25-26.  
227 Ibid., 28.  
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relies on the substitution of the voices, criticisms, and opinions of a particular subset of 
individuals who come to stand in for the whole:  
The authorities addressed their promulgations to ‘the’ public, that is, in principle 
to all subjects. Usually they did not reach the ‘common man’ in this way, but at 
best the ‘educated classes.’ Along with the apparatus of the modern state, a new 
stratum of ‘bourgeois’ people arose which occupied a central position within the 
‘public.’228  
 
Thus, “The fully developed bourgeois public sphere,” Habermas writes, “was based on 
the fictitious identity of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came 
together to form a public: the role of property owners and the role of human beings pure 
and simple.”229 The public sphere, then, is not only a specific historical relationship 
between critical audiences, institutions of dissemination, and political authorities, 
although it certainly plays this important role. Habermas’ is a very specific lesson about 
the nature – and, indeed, the dangers – of speaking about the public sphere at all: when 
we discuss the historical or ideal relationships between audiences, institutions, and 
authority, we must always the abiding relations of power that inhere singular, 
undifferentiated claims about ‘the’ public.  
This, of course, is not the standard reading of Habermas, which centers not on the 
themes of power and hierarchy but on issues of reason,230 deliberation, 231 and democratic 
 
228 Ibid., 22-23.  
229 Ibid., 56.  
230 In Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that 
reasoned deliberation can mitigate some of the problems of inequality that are 
exacerbated by mere “rhetoric.” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 134-136.  
231 Simone Chambers, for example, credits Habermas with having elaborated deliberation 
as a public good; Habermas, she writes, “links moral philosophy to everyday 
communicative practices.” Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of 
Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12.   
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legitimacy.232 Neither is it the commonplace way of thinking about the potential of 
publicity to incite new world-making practices.233 However, the implicit lessons of 
Structural Transformation - lessons about the risks of papering over the relations and 
hierarchies that exist within “the” public at the expense of marginalized voices – have not 
gone without considerable attention in recent decades, even as they have tended to 
continually recede from view.234 As Nancy Fraser reminds her readers, Habermas’ 
project is to examine “the rise and decline of a historically specific and limited form of 
the public sphere”235 that he describes as “a category of bourgeois society.” Following 
this intuition, Fraser argues that the notion of the “public sphere” is a kind of official 
story about the relationship of accountability that exists between modern individuals and 
their government, and that this story is meant to smooth over the frictions between the 
 
232 See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy,” in which she writes that publicity is “a necessary condition for attaining 
legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision making processes in a polity” 
and that “the institutions of this polity [must be] so arranged that what is considered the 
common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted 
rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals.” Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princton 
University Press, 1996), 69.  
233 As I argued in the introduction, most contemporary political theorists approach the 
issue of “publicity” through the lens of Hannah Arendt, arguing that her account of 
persuasion and world-making ought to ground our understanding of publicity. See, for 
example, Linda Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011).  
234 Most notable among theorists seeking to amplify the dimensions of Habermas’ work 
that deal directly with power is Iris Marion Young. In Inclusion and Democracy, for 
example, she engages the work of both Habermas and Nancy Fraser to make the case that 
“Those committed to democratic processes should reject political theories and practices 
[that] impose a unity on the public sphere that usually excludes or disadvantages some 
voices or perspectives. Democratic process ought to encourage an enable the organizing 
of multiple and contending discourses, forms of expression, and debates.” (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 172.  
235 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy,” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 58.  
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ideals of equality and self-governance, on the one hand, and the persistence of political 
authority, on the other. In this official story, publicity is the means by which discourse 
binds publics to certain political expectations, forms of address, and channels of 
participation over others. If Habermas notices that, historically, the public sphere has 
appealed to a particular audience – educated, bourgeois men – Fraser’s work on the 
public sphere makes the secondary claim that a “post-bourgeois rethinking” of the public 
sphere would need to take into account a fuller array of audiences, institutions, and forms 
of knowledge that constitute other possible publics, both those existing and those yet to 
be called into being.  
If one version of the public sphere – the “official” public sphere underwritten by 
the social contract – is but one of many competing “publics” in the modern age, then 
what are we to make of the fact that its anticipated audience, forms of address, and means 
of participation still dominate our political life today? Is it possible to repair or remake 
the public sphere in ways that shift the forms of political activity and association 
available to all members the public? For Fraser, the key to recognizing the limits of the 
official public sphere lies in acknowledging the irreducibly plural and contestatory nature 
of publicity itself: Habermas, she writes, “fails to examine other, nonliberal, non-
bourgeois, competing public spheres.”236 Citing a range of historians focusing on the 
public activities of women and people of color, Fraser continues,  
[These studies show] that, even in the absence of formal political incorporation 
through suffrage, there were a variety of ways of accessing public life and a 
multiplicity of public arenas. Thus, the view that women were excluded from the 
public sphere turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased 
notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim 
to be the public. In fact, the historiography of Ryan and others demonstrates that 
 
236 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 60-61.  
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the bourgeois public was never the public… there were competing publics from 
the start.”237 
 
If Fraser is correct – that the notion of the public sphere is a way to ideologically obscure 
a more diverse array of political audiences – then she recommends that those concerned 
with “participatory parity” look for the kinds of “arrangements that permit contestation 
among a plurality of competing publics,”238 paying special attention to the “protocols of 
persuasion” that inhere across different “subaltern counterpublics.”239 Doing so, she 
argues, “would allow us to theorize the range of possible relations among such publics, 
thereby expanding our capacity to envision democratic possibilities beyond the limits of 
actually existing democracy.”240   
 What’s curious about Fraser’s argument is that although her early engagement 
with Habermas highlights how the official public sphere enables “powerful informal 
pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated groups both in 
everyday life contexts and in official public spheres,” she does not pursue this issue as a 
matter of injustice in her later works. Like Habermas, Fraser declines to imagine what it 
might mean to differently organize the institutions or discourses of “actually existing 
democracy,” and instead turns to matters of inclusion and incorporation, arguing that 
provincializing “the public sphere” will lead to new ways of formulating common 
 
237 Ibid., 61. As Young notes, theoretical work published since Fraser’s landmark essay 
has advanced our knowledge of what such “subaltern counterpublics” might look like 
considerably. See, for example, Michael C. Dawson, “A Black Counterpublic? Economic 
Earthquakes, Racial Agenda(s), and Black Politics,” Public Culture 7 (1994), 195-223; 
Maria Pia Lara, Moral Textures: Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998).  
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meaning within a universal democratic context. Fraser, like Habermas, thus allows the 
issue of power in the public sphere to recede in favor of a normative model based on 
redistribution and recognition.241  
If Fraser, like Habermas, allows us to “[leave] aside the plebian public sphere as a 
variant that in a sense was suppressed in the historical process,”242 scholars in fields 
outside of mainstream political theory have attempted to keep the relations of power that 
inhere in ‘the’ public sphere in view.243 While queer theorists, for example, largely agree 
with Fraser that a more robust conception of “the public sphere” ought to acknowledge 
the existence of multiple publics, they emphasize the constraints on these publics that 
render certain public idioms and forms of address legible while repressing, policing, and 
excluding others. This process requires us to understand the relationship between the 
forms of address that accompany the creation of publics and the institutions of that 
disseminate and publicize ideas. “Publics,” writes Warner, “[lack] any institutional 
being;”244 they are conjured in language and thereby require, at least in theory, only the 
“active uptake” of discourses through the attention of individuals. However, such “active 
uptake” cannot happen on its own – discourses need institutions of circulation such as 
presses, markets, conferences, media, and other means of circulation. Moreover, argues 
 
241 See Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 
‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review (1995); 68-98.  
242 Habermas, Structural Transformation, xviii.  
243 One exceptional example is Arlette Farge’s Subversive Words: Public Opinion in 
Eighteenth-century France, trans. Rosemary Morris (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1995 [1992]). The book gives an alternative account of the formation of 
public opinion – not from the perspective of the educated bourgeois with which 
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Warner, while all manner of publics and counterpublics may exist simultaneously in any 
given political context, as Fraser suggests, the available institutions of circulation have 
incredible control over the ability of writers to actually constitute publics in practice. As 
Warner explains,  
although the premise of self-organizing discourse is necessary to the peculiar 
cultural artifact that we call a public, it is contradicted both by the material limits 
– means of production and distribution, the physical textual objects, social 
conditions of access – and by internal ones, including the need to presuppose 
forms of intelligibility already in place, as well as the social closure entailed by 
any selection of genre, idiolect, style, address, and so on.245 
 
Warner here points to two conditions of publicity: the existence of material (I will argue 
institutional) means of production and distribution, and discursive norms of legibility and 
closure. Like Fraser, he argues that the notion of the “official” public emerged through a 
unique historical process, whereby the discursive norms of bourgeois publicity were 
strengthened and bolstered by the material means of distributing and disseminating these 
ideas. However, unlike Fraser, who suggests that by opening democratic debate to a 
plurality of different protocols of persuasion, Warner argues that such a pluralization will 
not be so easy. Indeed, he writes, once certain forms of publicity become entangled with 
the dominant means of distribution and associated with politics as such, other ways of 
addressing audiences become profoundly less legible and persuasive: hence, “the 
dimensions of language singled out in the ideology of rational-critical discussion acquire 
prestige and power. Publics more overtly oriented in their self-understandings to the 
poetic-expressive dimensions of language… lack the power to transpose themselves to 
the generality of the state.”246 According to Warner, then, the ideology that makes it 
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possible for bourgeois publicity to stand in for the public sphere is not a matter of 
plurality, but of power: “Some publics,” he writes, “are more likely than others to stand 
in for the public, to frame their address as the universal discussion of the people.”247  
 The political task, then, is not just to promote multiple “subaltern counterpublics,” 
but to enable a practice of disruption that attempts to transform the possibilities of 
“relating to strangers” on terms other than those demanded by the state. “As it happens,” 
Warner writes, “an understanding of queerness has been developing in recent decades 
that is suited to just this necessity. A culture is developing in which intimate relations and 
the sexual body can in fact be understood as projects for transformation among 
strangers.”248 The queer counterpublic that Warner describes – one in which “embodied 
sociability, affect, and play have a more defining role than they do in the opinion-
transposing frame of rational-critical dialogue”249 – is meant not only to participate in the 
process of democratic meaning-making, as Fraser recommends, but is more deeply 
transformative:  
Dominant publics are by definition those that can take their discourse pragmatics 
and their lifeworlds for granted, misrecognizing the indefinite scope of their 
expansive address as universality or normalcy. Counterpublics are spaces of 
circulation in which it is hoped that the poesis of scene making will be 
transformative, not replicative merely.250 
 
For Warner, then, certain counterpublics promote the possibility of relating to others on 
new, unexpected terms, and are thereby particularly well-suited to disrupt the 
coterminous relationship between dominant discourses and the presumption of unity.  
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Along with his co-author Lauren Berlant, Warner argues in ‘Sex in Public,’ for 
instance, that sexuality – and, in particular, queer sexuality – is the grounds on which to 
trouble the usual discursive modes in which certain audiences become synonymous with 
“the” public sphere. By calling upon the deviant, monstrous, messy, and otherwise queer 
activities that make up sexual counterpublics, Berlant and Warner argue that such 
activities  
intended non-heteronormative worlds because they refused to pretend that privacy 
was their ground; because they were forms of sociability that delinked money and 
family from the scene of the good life; because they made sex the consequence of 
public mediations and collective self-activity in a way that made for unpredicted 
pleasures; because, in turn, they attempted to make a context of support for their 
practices; because their pleasures were not purchased by a redemptive pastoralism 
of sex or by mandatory amnesia about failure, shame, and aversion.”251  
 
By revealing the discursive terms that make up the practices of “the” public sphere 
(privacy, individuality, money, family) as merely ideological, Berlant and Warner thus 
argue that queer sexualities signal new ways of being that have, until now, remained 
marginal, subaltern, unrealized. For Berlant and Warner, “queer commentary has been 
animated by a sense of belonging to a discourse world that only partly exists yet.”252 
They go on to argue in “What can Queer Theory Teach us About X?” that the work of 
calling such a “discourse world” into being  
aspires to create publics, publics that can afford sex and intimacy in sustained, 
unchastening ways; publics that can comprehend their own differences of 
privilege and struggle; publics whose abstract spaces can also be lived in, 
remembered, hoped for… Queer publics make available different understandings 
of membership at different times, and membership in them is more a matter of 
aspiration than it is the expression of an identity or a history.253  
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Note here how the “aspiration” of queer publicity is explicitly contrasted with “the 
expression of an identity or a history.” Berlant and Warner thus suggest that the politics 
of calling forth queer publics, by virtue of being more dynamic spaces of difference and 
contestation, are at odds with a more brittle politics of calling upon pre-existing 
identities, shared histories, and oppositional frames.   
In short, then, political theorists have continually attempted to frame questions of 
publicity in terms of the relation between the official story of the public sphere and its 
“counterpublics” – that is, in terms of the relations of power by which certain potential 
audiences can presume that theirs is a universal audience, and of the various marginal 
audiences counterpublics might call forth instead. For queer theorists like Warner, 
conceptualizing these counterpublics as part of a pluralistic project tends to ignore the 
power of legibility, a power that inheres in the coterminous relationship between 
dominant ideas and the means of their dissemination. For queer theorists, then, 
counterpublics involve not only an effort to persuade, but to transform; not only to make 
claims on authority, but to disrupt and subvert the way authority is distributed in the first 
place. However, as my reading of Warner and Berlant’s ‘Sex in Public” suggests, queer 
theorists have tended to make their claims about disruption through and against their 
presumption that, until queer sexuality, no form of publicity has harnessed the capacity 
for such a transformative approach to public life. In the sections that follow, then, I will 
argue both that this presumption is inaccurate, and that it unnecessarily limits our 
capacity for imagining the ways in which the very discursive and material 
transformations that queer theorists advocate might occur.  
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Love in Public  
Indeed, however much queer theorists insist that queer publics exceed 1980s 
lesbian feminism by raising the issue of publicity rather than identity, their basic claims – 
that lesbian feminists were primarily concerned with defining, once and for all, what it 
means to “be” a lesbian – cut against the grain of lesbian feminist writing at the time. Far 
from emphasizing the challenges associated with naming or the presumption of unity, 
many of the most prominent works of the 1980s evoke much different political 
challenges –  namely, the challenges associated with precisely the same the relations of 
power between political speech, institutions, and audiences with which thinkers like 
Berlant and Warner are concerned – that inhere in publicity.  
Like queer theory, the most fundamental animating impulse of lesbian feminism 
is the desire to approach these questions with a sense that the “official” public is not the 
only possible way to call forth political audiences, and that the institutions that secure the 
official public are not the only possible means of connecting strangers within a public to 
one another. Like Berlant and Warner’s emphasis on developing practices of publicity 
that promote new ways of “belonging to discourse world[s] that only partly [exist],” 
lesbian feminism rejects as ideological the form of public address secured by the “sexual 
contract;” moreover, they do so in order to reclaim the political, institutional, and 
discursive possibilities of publicity for those whose presence in public life has historically 
been erased. Lesbian feminism, viewed in this context, is not at all an attachment to 
mastery through naming which much must be relinquished in the name of critical desire. 
Quite the opposite: as I will suggest below, lesbian feminists imagined the sort of 
disruption and transformation of the “official” public sphere in ways that, at times, 
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exceed the exclusive focus on public sexuality that animates queer theory. Lesbian 
feminist politics as publicity moves, instead, towards a concern for the kinds of 
institutions, audiences, and hierarchies that inhere in “loving” – that is, in the practice of 
speaking for, to, and with others. 
Consider, for example, a text that looms particularly large in queer theorists’ 
depictions of lesbian feminism as a conservative attempt to install and police a stable 
identity category: Marilyn Frye’s (in)famous essay “Some Reflections on Separatism and 
Power.” The essay, which appeared first in Sinister Wisdom’s sixth issue in 1978, later 
appeared Frye’s 1983 volume The Politics of Reality. In both contexts, debate over Frye’s 
conception of lesbian separatism does not occur as part of a discussion about “being” a 
lesbian, however much theorists in the 1990s have imposed this interpretation of her 
texts. In the preface to the collection, for instance, Frye writes that the primary goal of the 
essays is to consider her own situatedness in a set of feminist audiences, including the 
academic audience of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) and the wider 
lesbian feminist audience of Sinister Wisdom contributors and readers. “In most cases,” 
Frye writes of the audiences that informed the essays in The Politics of Reality,  
the audience I imagined as I wrote was that provided by the Society for Women in 
Philosophy, usually the Midwestern Division. The women of that Society are a 
wonderful audience: attentive and excitable; critical; aesthetically sensitive, 
philosophically sophisticated, and politically conscious; supportive, angry, 
stubborn, loving and logical. What more could a writer ask?254  
 
Immediately, Frye answers the (not-so-rhetorical) question. What more could a writer ask 
than a sensitive academic audience? “Publication, love and money, of course.” She goes 
 
254 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. (New York: 
Crossing Press, 1983); viii.  
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on to argue that beyond SWIP, she saw her audience as contributors and readers of 
Sinister Wisdom: indeed, the existence of Sinister Wisdom was not only a publication, but 
a specific kind of public – one that “cheerfully published what was too feminist (not to 
mention too lesbian) for philosophy journals and too philosophical for lesbian feminist 
journals” and that therefore “was vital to me, for it meant that whatever I was working on 
could be published. I am indebted to these women for their hearing me into speech.”255 
For Frye, the activity of writing – as a feminist or otherwise – requires an audience, a set 
of institutions to disseminate ideas, and a fluency in a shared political discourse: in short, 
it is a form of publicity.   
 In “Some Reflections on Separatism and Power,” then, Frye turns to the question 
of why separatism, the notion that feminist (and particularly lesbian feminist) women 
might knowingly and willingly exclude men as an essential part of their audience, is “so 
basic and so sinister, so exciting and so repellent.”256 For the first half of  “Reflections,” 
Frye argues that part of the problem with separatism is that hierarchies between men and 
women require constant male access to women’s bodies, labor, emotional energy, and so 
on. Thus, to physically “separate” from men entails denying them the access on which 
their “parasitism” is premised. For Frye, this dimension of separation is, to be sure, a 
profound threat to what she calls “patriarchal loyalists.” However, in the less-cited (and 
less well-understood) second half of the essay, Frye turns to a different question much 
more aligned with the questions of audience, publicity, and writing that animate this 
 
255 Ibid., viii.  
256 Marilyn Frye, “Some Reflections on Separatism and Power,” The Politics of Reality: 
Essays in Feminist Theory. (New York: Crossing Press, 1983), 96. See also, Sinister 
Wisdom 6, 1978; 31.  
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chapter. Might separatism, in establishing an audience of women who are intentionally 
“unintelligible” to men, provide lesbian feminists a means to deny men another kind of 
access, this time to the “semantic authority” to define lesbian relationships and the 
politics they incite? Might lesbian feminists, in a word, constitute themselves as a 
transformative counterpublic? In an extended footnote, Frye writes that physical 
separation – the creation of a new kind of audience – is a means to a more important end; 
namely, the “new being and meaning which are being created now by lesbianfeminists 
[sic]… the semantic authority [which we], collectively, can and do define with effect.”257  
For Frye, it becomes clear, the question of separation is not about escaping from 
men or living an “alternative lifestyle,” as critics of separatism have often assumed. 
Rather, separatism for Frye is about creating the conditions in which a radically new kind 
of audience might be called forth. Like the queer audience whose sexual practices 
transgress the norms of the “official” public sphere in Berlant and Warner’s work, Frye’s 
imagined audience must be practically distinct from the current institutions and 
discourses that shape political life in order to create space for new meanings and 
relationships to emerge. “Women generally are not the people who do the defining,” she 
writes,  
and we cannot from our isolation and powerlessness simply commence saying 
different things than others say and make it stick. There is a humpty dumpty 
problem in that. But we are able to arrogate definition to ourselves when we re-
pattern access. Assuming control of access, we draw new boundaries and create 
new roles and relationships. This, though it causes some strain, puzzlement and 
hostility, is to a fair extent within the scope of individuals and small gangs, as 
outright verbal redefinition is not, at least in the first instance.258 
 
 
257 Ibid., SW, 37; Politics of Reality, 105.  
258 SW, 38; Politics of Reality, 106. Emphasis mine.  
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We might notice, then, how different the question of separatism in this essay appears 
from the standard criticism of lesbian separatism as a way to discursively control an 
identity category, police its boundaries, and exclude certain women from its ranks. Here, 
separatism is an explicit attempt to call forth a radically new kind of audience by creating 
space for a new political infrastructure, and to claim a form of self-determination over the 
written and spoken word that marks the refusal to be understood on terms other than 
one’s own.  
Moreover, however, Frye’s conception of publicity is just as attuned to the 
constant need to attend to relations of power that inhere in publics – that is, to the risk 
that a particular potential audience may come to stand in for ‘the’ public – as is Berlant 
and Warner’s queer sexual counterpublics. For many contemporary theorists, perhaps, 
Frye’s emphasis on separatism as a way to transgress “official” public norms feels more 
brittle, traditional, or normative than the more obviously fluid emphasis on queer “sex in 
public.” To be sure, the notion of a lesbian feminist counterpublic has, at no point, been 
invulnerable from important critiques of the internal relations of power that it might reify. 
However, unlike much of mainstream political theory which has continually allowed 
questions of power to recede from view, the constant vulnerability to leaving power intact 
is precisely the political question of publicity for lesbian feminists.  
In fact, deep, difficult conversations about these risks of power within 
counterpublics like lesbian feminism took place throughout the 1980s, particularly 
around the issue of racism and racial marginalization within lesbian separatist 
communities. One such exchange over the constant risk of power took unfolded in a tense 
debate in the pages of Sinister Wisdom, in which readers responded to an Adrienne Rich 
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essay on whether separatism can overcome the invisible racial assumptions that underlie 
many separatist communities.259 On the one hand, Rich (who, as I suggested in Chapter 1, 
spent much of the 1980s attempting to respond to the challenges to lesbian feminism laid 
out by women of color and in conversation with thinkers like Audre Lorde) clearly lays 
out the risks of reifying racist hierarchies within lesbian separatist communities: after 
citing the Combahee River Collective’s statement against separatism,260 she writes 
Some questions that come to mind:  
For many white women, as Vicki Gabriner notes, there is a horrible after-
taste to the 1960s – having to do with the leftist cult of masculinity and violence 
and its usage of women in the name of ‘sexual liberation’ – which is instantly 
evoked by the mention of ‘coalition politics.’ This may have nothing to do with 
biological determinism. If the white lesbian/feminist chooses not to work in 
coalitions with men, does she also become unable to grasp the different choices of 
the woman of color, under white racism, to maintain survival connections with 
her racial community of origin – males included? Can the complexity and courage 
of each position be honored, its radicalism understood?  
Does lesbian separatist politics imply a stereotype, a conformity which 
has no use for difference and which is, therefore, stereotypically racist?261 
 
Here, Rich is pointing to the real necessity of confronting question of power that I have 
suggested risks receding from view: can a counterpublic call a new audience into being 
without reducing ‘the’ public to a single point of view?    
 
259 Adrienne Rich, “Notes for a Magazine: What Does Separatism Mean?” Sinister 
Wisdom 18, (1982): 83-91. 
260 The full citation reads: “Although we are feminists and lesbians, we feel solidarity 
with progressive Black men, and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women 
who are separatists demand. Our situation as Black people necessitates that we have 
solidarity around the fact of race, which white women of course do not need to have with 
white men, unless it is their negative solidarity as racial oppressors… As Black women 
we find any type of biological determinism a particularly dangerous and reactionary basis 
upon which to build a politic. We must also question whether lesbian separatism is an 
adequate and progressive political analysis and strategy, even for those who practice it, 
since it so completely denies any but the sexual sources of women’s oppression, negating 
the facts of class and race,” cited in Rich, “Notes for a Magazine,” 87.  
261 Ibid., 87. Emphasis mine.  
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Two issues later, apparently in response to the strong and varied responses to her 
essay, SW co-editors Rich and Michelle Cliff published two back-to-back responses to 
the piece on separatism. Barbara Smith (whose words in the Combahee River Statement 
animated Rich’s questions) responded by arguing that, in reality, lesbian feminism had 
not adequately staved off the risks that Rich identified – they had failed, in particular, to 
grapple with the ways that physical separations can be enabled by and allied with racial 
segregation: “As a nonseparatist woman of color and an activist feminist and Lesbian,” 
she writes,  
my criticisms of separatism have come from experiencing action or nonaction, 
from observing how separatists actually have functioned politically in the world. I 
agree that words and beliefs can influence what we do, but the words are not as 
significant as the practice they encourage and inspire. Many women of color, 
including myself, who are strong feminists have observed how a Lesbian 
separatist stance has led to an isolated, single-issued understanding and practice of 
politics, which ignores the range of oppressions that women experience. No 
amount of developing definitions will change what Lesbian separatism has come 
to mean in practice, although altered practice could very well change the 
connotation of the term “Lesbian separatist.”262 
 
While Frye’s account of separatism emphasizes the seizure of the institutions and 
relationships through which political discourse circulates so as to call forth a new kind of 
public, Smith here argues that in practice separatism has often functioned in the reverse. 
She notes, with considerable disappointment, that separatism has often meant deciding on 
the range of acceptable meanings of separatism in advance, thereby foreclosing the 
possibility of radically altered social relationships. In effect, Smith argues, separatism had 
fallen victim to the same risks associated with power in ‘the’ official public sphere.  
 
262 Barbara Smith, “Response: February 3, 1982,” Sinister Wisdom 20 (1982): 100-101.  
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As if to prove Smith’s point by decidedly failing to understand the implications of 
the new kind of audience Frye advocates, another SW reader responds to Rich’s essay 
with the following charge:  
Why are we, in most communities in the u.s., expected to compromise our 
Separatist principles and work on co-ed events and campaigns, by Lesbians who 
would never dream of compromising their humanist principles to work on 
Lesbian-only or wimmin-only projects? It's time for non-Separatist Lesbians to 
start explaining yourselves. What does it mean to not be a Separatist in "our" 
movement? What is your strategy for the defeat of patriarchy over the long haul? 
What is the goal of your struggle? Can you honor the choice of Separatist wimmin 
of color not to work with men? Is it racist not to be a Separatist; not to withdraw 
your support from patriarchy, not to fight for an anti-racist Lesbian-identified 
culture?263  
 
Perhaps it is in response to such dramatically reductive reactions on the part of some 
lesbian separatists that makes it possible for queer writers like Eve Sedgwick to associate 
lesbian separatism with “minoritizing” definitions of sexuality that promote the 
“’essentialist,’ third-sex, civil rights models” that she takes to task.264 In fact, there is a 
good deal of truth to the idea that separatism never accomplished the kind of radical 
transformation in the relationships between author-writers, audiences, and institutions 
that Frye and Rich imagined in the late 1970s, and that, as Smith suggests, lesbian 
separatism was never an automatic solution to the problems that plague the traditional 
public sphere. However, I would insist that despite the political failures of physical 
separatism (as well as its failures to definitively settle other challenges that I return to 
below), something far more interesting than the policing of a conservative identity 
 
263 Sidney Spinster, “Response,” Sinister Wisdom 18, (1982): 105.  
264 Eve Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990); 88. Tellingly, Sedgwick presents this spurious association in the form of a 
schematic table, in which she displays the essentialist disposition of separatism as one 
half of “the impasse of gender definition” out of which queer theorists will have to find 
their way. (90)  
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category is at work in calls for a reclamation of the institutions and audiences that make 
up the feminist public.   
Indeed, while Frye’s essay on separatism is today far and away her most 
remembered work, its political and conceptual implications can really only be understood 
fully in relation to her work on what existing in such a transformative public would 
entail. In the essay “In and Out of Harm’s Way,” for instance, Frye argues that the point 
of considering separation is decidedly not to understand some essential state of “being” a 
woman or to police or punish women who are not separatists, however much some 
separatists might try to push separatist thought in this direction.265 In fact, these reductive, 
policing activities are precisely what Frye criticizes as “seeing with an arrogant eye,” 
meaning that they participate in establishing “an imagined community of ultimate 
harmony and perfect agreement that we dare to think it possible to make meaning.”266 
This sort of “arrogant perception,” Frye notes, is precisely the kind of meaning-making 
that underpins the “official” public sphere – it is the kind of perception which allows the 
bourgeois public to “see with arrogant eyes which organize everything seen with 
reference to themselves and their own interests” and to “[coerce] the objects of his 
 
265 Indeed, today some “lesbian feminist” groups such as “Get the L Out,” which staged a 
protest against “lesbian erasure” at the London Pride parade in 2018, promote deeply 
essentialist and inherently exclusionary ideas in the name of lesbian separatism. Angela 
C. Wild, a leader of the group, has argued, citing Adrienne Rich as inspiration, that “We 
need to maintain the unequivocal rights of women to have our segregated spaces on the 
basis of our sex, not ‘gender identity’ […] Lesbians are attracted to other women on the 
basis of their sex, not their ‘gender identity,’ yet men claiming to be Lesbians insist we 
accept them as sexual partners on the basis of their ‘gender identity.’ It is this new 
definition of ‘Lesbian’ that we reject.” See Meghan Murphy. “Interview: Angela C. Wild 
of #GetTheLOut on Pride in London and Lesbian Erasure,” Feminist Current, July 17, 
2019. https://www.feministcurrent.com/2018/07/17/interview-angela-c-wild-getthelout-
pride-london-lesbian-erasure/ 
266 Frye, The Politics of Reality; 81. 
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perception into satisfying the conditions his perception imposes.”267 However, Frye – like 
Rich and Smith above – also suggests that lesbian feminism, like the official public 
sphere, is susceptible to this kind of arrogant imposition of a single point of view. In a 
word, “arrogant perception” is precisely what allows an audience to imagine itself as the 
public; this form of perception, then, is politically toxic for those, like lesbian feminists, 
seeking to transform the hierarchies which systematically marginalize and erase certain 
audiences. Frye argues that not only does this kind of politics fail to bring about the 
radical self-determination she sees as the central task of separatism, but that it in fact 
“brings us into an arrogance of our own, for we make it a prerequisite for our 
construction of meaning that other women be what we need them to be to constitute the 
harmonious community of agreement we require.”268 Put simply, separatism for Frye 
represents a politics explicitly opposed to the dynamics of policing and identity closure 
with which it is normally associated.  
Instead of “seeing with an arrogant eye,” then, Frye argues that lesbian feminism 
is a way of calling forth a qualitatively different kind of public – a public opposed in 
principle and in practice to precisely the kind of arrogating policing that, at present, 
defines the official public sphere. This new public, Frye writes, would be premised on 
seeing others with whom one is in association with a “loving eye.” “We who would love 
women,” she writes, “who would change ourselves and change the world so that it is 
possible to love women well, we need to imagine the possibilities for what women might 
be if we lived lives free of the material and perceptual forces which subordinate women 
 
267 Ibid., 67.  
268 Ibid., 81.  
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to men.”269 In short, by refusing to participate in the institutions, norms, and discourses 
that promote “arrogant” publics, lesbian feminists might call forth a new way of relating 
to one another altogether. Frye’s “loving” public requires, in her view, an understanding 
of one’s place in the relations (racial and otherwise) that make up the public without 
overdetermining them:  
The loving eye is one that pays a certain sort of attention…What is required is 
that one know what are one’s interests, desires and loathings, one’s projects, 
hungers, fears and wishes, and that one know what is and what is not determined 
by these. In particular, it is a matter of being able to tell one’s own interests from 
those of others and of knowing where one’s self leaves off and another begins…. 
Some of us are taught we can have everything, some are taught we can have 
nothing. Either way we will acquire a great wanting… [Seeing with the loving 
eye] is a discipline of knowing and owning the wanting: identifying it, claiming it, 
knowing its scope, and through all this, knowing its distance from the truth.270 
 
Lesbian feminism thus requires understanding that loving is a process, a negotiation, in 
order to make a radical break from the kinds of political relationships that make up the 
contemporary world. For Frye, this kind of love becomes possible only when feminists 
create new public institutions, audiences, and discourses – that is, when they inaugurate a 
qualitatively and materially new kind of public life.  
 The idea of a “loving” public may today appear strange or sentimental in relation 
to queer theory’s emphasis on non-normative sexualities (“tweaking, thwacking, 
thumping, sliming, and rubbing,” as Berlant and Warner put it) as the foundation of a 
new public practice. Indeed, Michael Warner argues in The Trouble with Normal that, 
especially in queer politics, love stifles the directly political implications of sexual 
 
269 Ibid., 76.  
270 Ibid., 75.  
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transgression in its turn away from conflict and persuasion: The “notion of pure love, like 
so much else in contemporary U.S. politics,” he writes,  
is an image of sentimental privacy. Love, it says, is beyond criticism and beyond 
the judgments of the law. Where law adjudicates conflict and competing claims, 
love speaks an inner truth, in a space where there is no conflict, no politics… I 
would argue that any politics based on such a sentimental rhetoric of privacy is 
not only a false idealization of love and coupling, it is an increasingly powerful 
way of distracting citizens from the real, conflicted, and unequal conditions 
governing their lives, and that it serves to reinforce the privilege of those who 
already find it easiest to imagine their lives as private.271 
 
For Warner’s co-author Lauren Berlant, another thinker whose influence has profoundly 
shaped the way that we read arguments about “love” today, while love isn’t apolitical it is 
too ethically and politically ambivalent to serve as a way to separate “good love 
(narcissism) from good love (openness to transformation)” or to “imagine a social and 
affectual world organized by processes of being-with and not profiting-from.”272 Rather, 
she writes, love is   
one of the few situations where we desire to have patience for what isn’t working, 
and affective binding that allows us to iron things out, or to be elastic, or to try a 
new incoherence. This is the main upside of making love a properly political 
concept, it seems to me. A form of affective solidarity that admits the irrationality 
of the principled attachment.273 
 
To the extent that frameworks like Warner’s and Berlant’s have shaped our view of 
lesbian feminist conceptions of love, then, it is impossible to see the ways that this 
concept circulated across magazines, journals, and conversations as a direct rebuke to the 
kinds of power relationships that inhere in public life.  
 
271 Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 100.  
272 Lauren Berlant, “A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten 
Pages,” Cultural Anthropology 26 vol. 4 (2011): 684.  
273 Ibid., 685-686.  
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But if “love” strikes us today as too apolitical or, at best, too affectively 
ambivalent to serve as a foundation for a new kind of public life, it would not have 
appeared so in the 1980s. Indeed, debates about the radical possibilities of “loving” 
publics – and the kinds of institutional and discursive changes they would require – were 
extraordinarily common in the period, particularly in dealing with issues of difference 
and hierarchy within the burgeoning lesbian feminist public. In her response to Frye’s 
conception of what such a “loving eye” would entail, for example, Maria Lugones 
highlights the idea that women – even lesbians – can be “arrogant perceivers,” who fail to 
cast a loving eye towards other women, particularly “across racial and cultural 
boundaries.”274 For Lugones, part of what it means to be marginalized is being obligated 
to speak to audiences that refuse to see with a loving eye. In their hostility, such 
audiences – whether they are made up of men, white lesbians, or straight women of color 
– prevent the open-ended negotiations about how to transform persistent relations of 
power that loving publics require to come into being. Lugones argues that “one of the 
aspects of this failure… is a complex failure of love in the failure to identify with another 
woman, the failure to see oneself in other women who are quite different from 
oneself.”275 At the same time, she suggests that in seeking institutions and discourses in 
which such failures would be worked through, it becomes possible to imagine that  
I am incomplete and unreal without other women. I am profoundly dependent on 
others without having to be their subordinate, their slave, their servant…We are 
fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being understood and without 
this understanding we are not intelligible, we do not make sense, we are not solid, 
 
274 Maria Lugones, “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” Hypatia 
2.2 (1987): 5.  
275 Ibid., 7.  
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visible, integrated; we are lacking. So traveling to each other’s ‘worlds’ would 
enable us to be through loving each other.276 
 
In a word, Lugones writes, despite the challenges of calling forth audiences in which 
loving – and not arrogance – is the condition of engagement, such is the goal of lesbian 
feminism which “is purposefully and healthily still up in the air, in the process of 
becoming.”277 It is not enough for lesbian feminists to claim that their love is 
transgressive and therefore transformative: “Love has to be rethought,” she writes, “made 
anew.”278 
 Lugones is by no means alone in taking up the possibility of developing loving 
relationships to characterize the political goals of lesbian feminism. In her preface to This 
Bridge Called my Back, for example, Cherríe Moraga writes that the book itself is a form 
of faith in such loving relationships – not “some lazy faith, where we resign ourselves to 
the tragic splittings in our lives with an upward turn of the hands or a vicious beating of 
our breasts, [but a] believing that we have the power to actually transform our experience, 
change our lives, save our lives.”279 The strategies of lesbian feminism, Moraga writes, 
are the strategies of the loving eye: they inhere in “how we measure and weigh what is to 
be said and when, what is to be done and how, and to whom and to whom and to whom, 
daily deciding/risking who it is we can call an ally, call a friend.”280 Later in the volume, 
Barbara Smith writes that an anti-racist lesbian feminism would require attention to “who 
you can laugh with, who you can cry with and who you can share meals with and whose 
 
276 Ibid., 8.  
277 Ibid., 10.  
278 Ibid., 7. Emphasis mine.  
279 Cherríe Moraga, “Preface,” This Bridge Called My Back, ed. Anzaldúa and Moraga. 
(New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983 [1981]), xviii.  
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face you can touch.”281 For Audre Lorde, too, the “loving” public is one that is neither 
unified nor fragmented, but is rather creative, contradictory, transformative, and ever-
vigilant about the risks of power involved in calling new publics into being: defining the 
political uses of “the erotic” not in terms of disruptive sex, but as “the power which 
comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person,” Lorde argues that this 
sharing – one might say love – “forms a bridge between the sharers which can be the 
basis for understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens the threat 
of their difference.”282 Like Frye’s and Lugones’ insistence that only a loving eye can 
transform relations defined by arrogance, Lorde argues that the erotic is deeply 
transformative: “Only now,” she writes in her essay “Uses of the Erotic,” 
I find more and more women-identified women brave enough to risk sharing the 
erotic’s electrical charge without having to look away, and without distorting the 
enormously powerful and creative nature of that exchange. Recognizing the 
power of the erotic within our lives can give us the energy to pursue genuine 
change within our world, rather than merely settling for a shift of characters in the 
same weary drama.283  
 
In the end, then, the conception of a new lesbian feminist audience that proliferated 
during the 1980s is deeply tied to the principle “of loving other women” as one 
undertakes the process of speaking for, about, and with others, but which also seeks to 
keep the persistent threat of power –the risk that an audience can come to define itself as 
the public – in view. Where mainstream political theorists have tended to allow this 
political challenge to recede from view, then, lesbian feminists have expended 
considerable energy trying to center this political problem and to separate from the 
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institutions that allow us to ignore, minimize, or misrecognize it. As Lugones puts it, 
despite the very real challenges of loving across racial divides, in calling forth an 
audience capable of and committed to keeping the challenge of loving relations in view, 
lesbian feminism “[suggests] disloyalty to arrogant perceivers, including the arrogant 
perceiver in ourselves, and to their constructions of women.”284  
 
“Does it Brush Before Bedtime?” The Dilemmas of Feminist Publishing  
To the extent that queer theorists have misrecognized lesbian feminism as an 
attempt to name an identity category rather than to call forth a new kind of public, then, I 
am suggesting that this misrecognition has meant that they largely fail to acknowledge 
the complex and deeply political concerns that shaped the feminist 1980s. In particular, 
by characterizing lesbian feminism as merely an attempt to police an identity category, 
queer theorists (and political theorists more generally) fail to understand the degree to 
which questions about separatism and love between women animated lesbian feminists’ 
“disloyalty” not only to mainstream forms of affect, but also to the political institutions of 
the official public sphere. As I argued in the section above, lesbian feminists organized 
their disloyalty not around the dynamics of sex and sexuality, as Berlant and Warner 
suggest, but around the principle of loving – that is, around the difficult negotiations 
required when one speaks to, for, and with others. The dynamics of loving relationships 
as an attempt to call forth a new kind of public are undoubtedly irreducible to the politics 
of naming that the queer theorists impose on this era. Instead, as I have been suggesting, 
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the responsibilities entailed in a loving public require close attention to risks of power 
that inhere in constituting a new public. It is only in considering how lesbian feminists 
sought to center and take on these risks that we can understand the political complexity of 
an idea like separatism.  
However, in sketching the contours of emergent notions such as the loving public, 
by no means do I want to suggest that matters of publicity were easily solved by simply 
reconceptualizing the terms on which members of this counterpublic ought to relate. In 
this section, then, I return to a different set of challenges to “the loving public” – namely, 
the challenges that arise when lesbian feminists attempted to translate concepts like the 
loving public into practical public-building institution such as presses, publishers, and 
journals. Here, I focus in particular on discussions of feminist publication in Quest and 
Sinister Wisdom to demonstrate that lesbian feminists share a concern with the practical 
challenges with which they were faced as they attempted to practice disloyalty to 
institutions and discourses that make up the “official” public sphere. I turn to these 
discussions to show that however much theoretical notions like “the loving public” relied 
on an understanding of disloyalty or separation from the mainstream institutions of 
publicity, deep and abiding ambiguities about how lesbians ought to move away from 
these institutions remained at the forefront of conversation throughout the period.  
 In 1976 – two years before Marilyn Frye published her writing on separatism in 
Sinister Wisdom –  June Arnold published her essay “Feminist Presses & Feminist 
Politics” in Quest. Arnold, who co-founded the lesbian feminist press Daughters in 1971, 
was deeply involved in the on-the-ground debates over feminist publicity; in fact, her 
essay, which was written “with the help and criticism” of such prominent lesbian 
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feminists as Wendy Cadden,285 Judy Grahn,286 Parke Bowman,287 Casey Czarnik288 and 
Colletta Reid,289 received considerable attention in the lesbian feminist writing 
community for the clear distinctions she drew between being complicit the institutions of 
the “official” public sphere and the task of material separation on the part of the emergent 
lesbian feminist counterpublic. Importantly, however, Arnold sees the tasks of “feminist 
presses and feminist politics” as coterminous; in short, she sees the task of separating 
entirely from the “male press” as essential to shifting the terms of public meaning-
making and to creating new kinds of political relationships. However, as the spirited 
debate over separatism in the work of Frye, Rich, Smith, and Lugones might suggest, 
translating the transformative goals of a separatist public into institutions that would 
promote coalition-building would not be as easy as Arnold hoped.  
The essay opens with Arnold celebrating the fact that the feminist 
“communications network has grown both up and out. There are now more than a 
hundred and fifty feminist presses or journals in over thirty states,” she writes:  
Including women’s book stores, we have created a circle of media control with 
every link covered: a woman writes an article or book, a woman typesets it, a 
woman illustrates and lays it out, a woman prints it, a woman’s journal reviews it, 
 
285 Wendy Cadden was Judy Grahn’s partner and an active member in the lesbian 
feminist organizations in the Bay Area during the 1970s. Together with Grahn, Cadden 
was a founding member of the group Gay Women’s Liberation.  
286 Judy Grahn is the author of many important texts and poems in lesbian feminism, 
including the 1969 manifesto “Lesbians as Women.”  
287 Parke Bowman was June Arnold’s long-time partner and co-founder of Diana Press.  
288 Czarnik was another co-editor of Diana Press, along with Arnold, Bowman, and 
Charlotte Bunch.  
289 Reid is the author of “Coming Out in the Women’s Movement,” an essay that details 
how the experience of coming out as both a lesbian and a feminist radicalized her 
understanding of basic social institutions such as child care, heterosexuality, and 
‘women’s work.’ Lesbianism and the Women’s Movement, ed. Nancy Myron and 
Charlotte Bunch (Baltimore: Diana Press, 1975).  
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a woman’s bookstore sells it, and women read it – from Canada to Mexico and 
coast to coast.290 
 
For Arnold, creating “a circle of media control” that rejects the institutions that underpin 
mainstream publicity – as she puts it, “[seizing] control of communications” – is “the first 
thing any revolutionary group does when taking over a government.”291 Material 
separation from the institutions that sustain the mainstream reading public, according to 
Arnold, is important for two reasons. First, it shifts the material dependencies that women 
writers experience in relation to the press – for example, she writes, the existence of a 
women’s “communications network” means that women no longer depend on male 
presses to gain access to existing audiences, financial compensation, and even the status 
of being considered “legitimate writers.” Second, however, Arnold insists that the very 
existence of feminist political consciousness relies in important ways on its distance from 
the demands of mainstream meaning-making:   
There are women who don’t understand what it was like to write a novel or a 
poem or an essay and know, even before you began, that you had to pre-program 
your mind to work from male values (if you weren’t already programmed by life) 
or you might as well save your pencil for the grocery list. If you were very clever 
and managed to include your voice inside their language and get published, you 
were misreviewed by male papers and your work soon went out of print for 
economic (political) reasons. The words of earlier feminists were lost because 
they were the property of male publishers who easily avoided reprinting them.292 
 
Arnold, just like Frye, thus insists that “separatism” is less an attempt to define and police 
a certain understanding of the category “lesbian,” and instead calls attention to the fact 
that “the finishing press has big stake (survival) in keeping middle-class values around.” 
To promote lesbian feminist values such as those entailed in the loving public, then, 
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lesbians “should check carefully to see just what values are being reinforced by the 
women who achieve the finishers’ status.”293 Arnold argues, for example, that the 
finishers’ presses demand that authors articulate political ideas in terms that fit easily into 
existing frameworks and formulas. “In contrast,” she continues, 
a simple, unvalidated, dust-jacketless volume by an unknown name, on a subject 
not always immediately clear (because it is not yesterday’s idea), in language 
which reaches out to explore new territory, puts the burden on the reviewer to 
decide by herself what the book is about, what it is trying to say.294  
 
 In other words, like Frye, Arnold suggests here that feminist presses provide lesbians 
with more than an “alternative” infrastructure for disseminating these ideas. Rather, they 
promote a form of political consciousness that sees political speech with a loving eye; 
they require the reading public to consider the choices, arguments, rhetorical techniques, 
and experiences that make up a piece of writing, and to engage it with a kind of openness 
to unfamiliarity that the loving public advocates. For Arnold, then, calling forth a new 
counterpublic will require feminists to commit to an array of new institutions that 
promote and accommodate radically new discursive forms. Women’s presses, she writes, 
“are in fact the real presses, the press of the future” because “through them, the art and 
politics of the future are being brought to flower.”295  
What Arnold is suggesting, then, is one version of the kind of counterpublic that I 
have argued was central to lesbian feminist theory and practice throughout the 1980s. 
Such counterpublics emerge when new writing practices and institutions make it possible 
to imagine a new reading public and, with it, new forms of consciousness and political 
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activity. While Arnold shares much with theorists of the loving public, though, we might 
pause to note at this point how strongly she seeks to make seamless these disjunctive 
moments of political disloyalty to mainstream discourses and institutions. As the debate 
between these thinkers reminds us, it is not always so easy to move from a political 
diagnosis – “arrogant perception,” for instance – to political disloyalty, and from 
disloyalty to institution-building, without losing sight of the relations of power that 
remain at work. Thus, while Arnold shares a commitment to seeing political speech with 
a loving eye, unlike Frye, Smith, Lugones, and other theorists of the loving public she 
pays little attention to the ongoing risks of conflating any particular audience with the 
lesbian feminist public – that is, the question of power that I have suggested is the key 
political question of publicity.   
By the end of the short essay, Arnold’s conclusions only underline the dangers of 
smoothing over the difficult disjunctures involved in inaugurating a new counterpublic. 
She argues, for example, that if the lesbian feminist counterpublic requires the 
transformation of the most basic institutional and discursive hierarchies that work to 
marginalize lesbian writers, such institutional separation is the only way to ensure the 
survival of the movement and to enact the radical changes in publicity that lesbian 
feminism puts at the center of its practice. Whereas “the first feminist movement… 
allowed their movement to be controlled by the [male] finishing press, who showered 
them with glitter and then dropped them, leaving the impression that the issue they had 
raised was now settled,” she writes,   
It is vital that we maintain control over our future, that we spend the energy of our 
imaginations and criticisms building feminist institutions that women will gain 
from both in money and skills. As soon as we understand our own interests, the 
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women’s independent communications network can be made strong, deep, and 
positively permanent.296  
 
Separation, then, is for Arnold not a matter of debate or negotiation, of open-ended 
coalition-building or consciousness-raising; it is a matter of control, permanence, and 
strength.  
Arnold’s perspective, however, is by no means the only viewpoint on publication 
in the 1970s, and, importantly, the article’s notoriety at the time attests to the many 
lesbian feminists who contested the coterminous and stable relationship between 
diagnosis, institution-building, and coalition that she endorses. Indeed, only a few months 
later (and partially in response to Arnold’s essay), Sinister Wisdom published the results 
of a survey conducted by Jan Clausen on the topic of separatism and feminist publishing. 
While Sinister Wisdom’s report is far less polemical both in its form and in the politics it 
advocates – it gives voice to a number of disagreements, tensions, and contradictions in 
what separatism means for each writer – it shares Arnold’s commitment to creating a 
kind of lesbian feminist counterpublic. In her introduction to the piece, for example, 
Clausen writes that “My basic assumption is that a writer’s decisions about how to make 
her work available to an audience are in some measure political decisions – whether or 
not she acknowledges the fact.”297 Implicit in Clausen’s framing of the survey, 
throughout, is the ambiguity of bearing responsibility to “the lesbian writing 
community,” which she understands, like Frye and Arnold, in both institutional and 
discursive terms. While she writes that “the” lesbian writing community is undeniably 
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plural, “using these phrases [implies] that we as lesbians and especially as lesbian writers 
are aware of each other – influenced by each other’s opinions, art, politics. This 
interaction has its positive and negative aspects, but at the very least we have to recognize 
that we’re stuck with each other.”298 In other words, Clausen accepts as a starting point 
that lesbian feminism is a kind of public with a particular set of underlying knowledges, 
audiences, and institutions that differ from mainstream public life. Yet this assumption, 
for Clausen and her interlocutors, would not be enough to call forth a loving public: the 
assumption that a lesbian feminist counterpublic can and should exist, she writes, “was 
shared by a great majority of the women who answered the questionnaire.” However, 
“ideas about how to proceed from there varied considerably.”299  
What Clausen seems to have learned in the process of conducting her survey on 
lesbian feminist publishing, then, is that while lesbians are “influenced by each other’s 
opinions, art, politics” – indeed, although “we’re stuck with one another” – one cannot 
presume that there is any single method of achieving a lasting, radical counterpublic. 
Quite unlike Arnold’s insistence that a more loving public depends wholly on 
“controlling” a set of radically separate meaning-making institutions, both Clausen and 
her survey respondents chafe deeply at the idea that “the lesbian writing community 
should act in any way to encourage or discourage [particular] publishing decisions on the 
part of its members.”300 Indeed, “this turned out to be the most emotionally charged of all 
the questions,” Clausen writes: “Julia Stanley's, ‘No. I believe that coercion is wrong, no 
matter who engages in it!’ was typical. Some were incredulous that I'd even suggested the 
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possibility--which surprised me, given that such actions…have been taken by individuals 
and groups within the community in the recent past.”301 Indeed, Audre Lorde’s response 
to the proposal is indicative of the general reaction. “I don’t understand this question,” 
Lorde writes: “It sounds like censorship and I know you must be talking about something 
else. Please particularize or clarify. I disagree, let’s kill her?”302 
For these writers, the coterminous relationship between writer-authors, 
institutions, and audiences appears to reinforce, not transform, the “arrogant perception” 
that underpins the “official” public sphere. If such perception has caused lesbians to be 
marginalized and erased from the “official” public, why should lesbian feminists expect 
that such marginalizations and erasures would not occur in the lesbian feminist public? 
Rather than insisting on a coterminous relationship between writer-authors, institutions, 
and audiences, then, the writers in Sinister Wisdom largely conclude that “the women’s 
presses cannot be our final goal, our ultimate solution – [though] they are absolutely 
necessary to us.”303 Instead, they gesture towards a process of negotiation that neither 
presumes total control over public institutions nor dictates the terms of engagement for 
members of the public. In the end, Clausen concludes, “That far-flung, heterogeneous 
grouping I have designated ‘lesbian writing community,’” – and which I have been 
arguing constitutes a counterpublic –  
is never going to agree on a single political philosophy, strategy, or code of 
conduct. Nevertheless, it is important for us to talk about where we’re headed, 
because the general tendency of what we do together is going to be more 
important than the actions of single individuals. For many of us, the women’s 
presses have literally made possible our art, or movement, our lives. They 
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represent a sort of vast collective accomplishment on the part of large numbers of 
women who have never shared a unified political vision.304 
 
Rather than rely on any single institutional arrangement to promote the loving public that 
lesbian feminists desire, then, the authors represented in Sinister Wisdom collectively 
conclude that loving requires a more open-ended negotiation about institutions, one 
attentive to the different needs, views, and voices that inhere in an audience. In other 
words, as Judith McDaniel put it, for the lesbian feminists in Sinister Wisdom, building a 
new counterpublic would require each lesbian writer to remain “very definitely 
responsible to her community – which doesn’t mean she will always only publish within 
that community, but is accountable for her decision to those peers who are supporting her 
in her work.”305  
In promoting a loving public, the Sinister Wisdom survey encourages a 
dramatically different kind of politics; it is one that emphasizes process over definition, 
one that privileges speaking for and with others over demanding certain forms of speech, 
one that emphasizes the composition of a political audience over controlling the terms of 
their engagement. As Nancy Luxon reminds us, conceptualizing political activity as an 
attempt to “compose the event” rather than as an authoritative attempt to “control” 
subjects and audiences is one important effect of the turn away from debates over the 
redeemability of the “official” public and instead towards emergent, “frame-breaking” 
publics. Such a turn in politics, she writes, “would seem to direct attention away from 
efforts to control events and outcomes,” as an arrogant perceiver might, “and toward their 
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instabilities – instabilities that might be sites for interpretive agency.”306 As I have been 
suggesting, the “loving public” is one that explicitly privileges the interpretive agency – 
speaking to and with others – that composition allows, even as it must remain ever-
vigilant about the ways in which particular forms of persuasion, such as attempts to 
control access to and participation in certain institutions, “[conceal] the conventions that 
make them believable.”307 Indeed, the loving public is one that by definition strains 
against the idea that transformative counterpublics can ever emerge by defining a 
coterminous relationship between writer-authors, institutions, and audiences. In 
highlighting the ambiguities that inhere in building a loving public, then, these writers 
differently caution against the dangers of arrogant perception: as Audre Lorde put it in 
SW 18,  
We – and by we I mean any group of two or more likeminded individuals of 
whom I happen to be one – we must beware of the fatal tendency to strangle 
anyone who chooses to expand our definitions of ourselves beyond ourselves. 
What is a lesbian?  
  A lesbian feminist?  
  The lesbian writing community?  
  The lesbian press?  
is it black white poor rich middle class working class scholarly academic 
anti-intellectual funky racist or demure? Does it brush before bedtime?308  
 
 
“The Meeting of Alliances:” Hypatia, 1976-1985  
 
 So far, I have suggested that lesbian feminists involved in this debate about 
feminist publishing theorized their political responsibilities in terms of transforming 
publicity by promoting a “loving” public. Thinkers like Frye and Lugones, for example, 
 
306 Nancy Luxon, Crisis of Authority: Politics, Trust, and Truth-Telling in Freud and 
Foucault. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 273. 
307 Ibid.  
308 Ibid., 110.  
 156 
argued that the failure to love “across worlds” is a failure to acknowledge the ways that 
the institutions of public life have historically marginalized and excluded by arrogating 
legitimacy to certain audiences and ways of speaking over others. At the same time, 
however, they imagine a more robust conception of a loving public in order to call for a 
new set of relationships and responsibilities – in short, for a new kind of public 
altogether. Nevertheless, the kind of face-to-face politics that such a public would require 
remained unresolved into the 1980s. As is apparent in the debates in Quest and Sinister 
Wisdom, for example, while each of the authors may have agreed with Lugones that “love 
has to be rethought, made anew,” they remained deeply ambivalent about what this 
would mean in the practical sense. Should feminists develop altogether new institutions? 
Ought they alter old ones? Was it necessary to persuade men and straight women to 
participate in this new lesbian feminist public? If so, how might this political task best be 
accomplished? These unresolved questions about what kind of public feminism should 
be, I will argue in this section, account for the torturously long and uncertain process by 
which the first journal of “feminist philosophy” came into being. At the same time, they 
attest to the idea that the members of the loving public must, if they hoped to grapple 
lovingly with the different audiences, institutional contexts, and forms of address that 
make up lesbian feminism, work through the challenges of articulation in radically 
different kinds of political contexts.  
 It is in the context of these fundamental ambiguities that I turn, finally, to the 
debate over the feminist journal Hypatia. Hypatia, unlike Quest and Sinister Wisdom, is 
undoubtedly academic; the controversies and debates surrounding its emergence, then, 
reveal that the ambiguities about the extent to which lesbian feminists must separate from 
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or alter existing institutions, knowledges, and audiences – from the ‘official’ public 
sphere itself – were only exacerbated in the context of the academy. Unlike the debates 
over the public sphere which had animated lesbian feminist authors like Frye, Lugones, 
Moraga, Smith, and Lorde, questions about the publicity of academic feminism tended to 
displace, obscure, and muddle the political link between the institutions that underpin 
public life and the new kinds of audiences they would call forth. Instead, as these 
ambiguities began to be articulated in both political and academic contexts, further 
tensions in what it meant to build a “loving” public emerged. On the one hand, the efforts 
of those trying to articulate the commitments of a loving lesbian feminist public within 
academic institutions had the paradoxical effect of shifting the focus on publication, 
distribution, and audience onto the terrain of academic discipline-building. In so doing, 
these discourses diverged from the longer tradition of conceptualizing lesbian feminism 
as a robust and transformative counterpublic. On the other hand, another strain of 
thinking within this context hews much more closely to the conceptual and political 
terrain laid out by theorists of the loving public, and emphasizes the challenges of 
articulating theory as a task of speaking for, with, and about others. 
 Whatever Hypatia has become in the four decades since its inception, the 
contours of “feminist philosophy” were, in the late 1970s, incredibly unclear. When 
members of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) met to discuss the proposal for 
a new journal on feminist philosophy, for example, they also collected and circulated a 
document outlining SWIP members’ various suggestions, concerns, and apprehensions 
about the shape of the new journal. The document, which was collected by Iris Marion 
Young, outlines both “arguments for [and against] restricting the journal to women 
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authors” and “arguments for [and against] restricting the journal to articles of feminist 
topics.” These topics, of course, are deeply intertwined with the questions of separation 
that had occupied lesbian feminist writers in the pages of Quest and Sinister Wisdom: 
could feminist theory call forth an audience that would sustain it? Would dependency on 
the institutions of the “official” public sphere dilute or subvert feminist politics? Would 
dictating these terms reinscribe the kind of “arrogant perception” that has, up to now, 
characterized the public sphere?  
 Indeed, on the issue of separation – whether the journal should be restricted to 
women authors and feminist topics – SWIP members were even more divided than were 
the contributors to Quest and Sinister Wisdom. While on the one hand many of its 
members agreed that “women have less free access to ‘standard’ avenues of publication 
than men,” on the other hand, some viewed separating materially from “finishing” 
presses would “lessen women’s chances to publish in other places” and that “quality of 
work submitted would either be, or be deemed to be, low, since the best women would 
want their work to reach a wider audience and would have it accepted in ‘standard’ 
journals.”309 One SWIP member responded to the arguments for and against a journal of 
feminist philosophy in a lengthy letter to the editorial group, arguing that while “at the 
moment…the Journal should not restrict its authors by sex,” it “should restrict its papers 
to ones on philosophical feminism (which I won’t try to define, although this would have 
to be done if such a policy were adopted).”310 For this member, while lesbian feminism 
had already done the difficult work of building an audience outside of the academy, 
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concerns about the viability of a feminist audience within the academy were paramount.  
“In itself,” she writes,  
the fact that we had an all-female authorship would only attract a small readership 
to the Journal – at best all women philosophers (who as we all know are a small 
group) and a few sympathetic males. Other potential readers may well be turned 
away by such a policy, since it’s a psychological fact we must recognize (and are 
trying to combat) that most men and many women tend to take the intellectual 
efforts of women less seriously.311 
 
In other words, feminists inside of the academy had a different problem of audience than 
lesbian feminists grappled with more generally. While lesbian feminists writ large were 
seeking to call forth a transformative counterpublic – that is, a disloyal audience 
organized around new principles and responsibilities – feminists in the academy had to 
grapple with the additional fact of their disciplinary audiences in order to ensure their 
survival. For the SWIP member arguing against separation from the academic 
institutions, then, this meant recognizing  
the fact that women authors with really outstanding work would probably choose 
to send them to high-prestige standard journals such as the Journal of Philosophy 
rather than to us, unless they had an extreme ideological commitment to SWIP 
and a willingness to disregard their personal and career interests in being 
published in such fora.312 
 
Indeed, the member writes, the goals of disloyal audiences that lesbian feminists had 
promoted in the late 1970s and early 1980s strained deeply against the needs of 
academics. For her, a journal on feminist philosophy satisfied an entirely different set of 
needs than did the broader feminist public. In the academy,   
(1) Women need publications in order to get and retain jobs, and such a journal 
will make it easily for them to compile a bibliography… (2) Women are 
prevented, through prejudice and longstanding socialization effects, from 
engaging in standard professional activities, and therefore lack the practice 
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which makes one good at them… (3) One wants to publish articles so as to 
gain a broad hearing for one’s ideas, thus promoting the truth and having an 
impact on ongoing philosophical investigation, as well as benefiting from any 
resulting criticism the article elicits…. (4) Women must demonstrate to the 
philosophical world that they can indeed do well.313 
 
Put differently, academic feminists had fundamentally different kinds of attachments to 
traditional audiences than did the disloyal audience of lesbian feminists; insofar as they 
needed to speak to and with philosophers of all stripes in order to achieve academic 
milestones like tenure, they would need to be able to square lesbian feminism’s aim to 
build an explicitly disloyal audience with academic feminism’s aim for inclusion in the 
academy.  
In addition to articulating a distinctive set of attachments to traditional institutions 
of publicity, the SWIP member’s emphasis on harnessing existing audiences such as 
“philosophers” during the negotiations over Hypatia’s birth similarly shifted the group’s 
understanding of the purpose of a feminist counterpublic. Whereas thinkers like Frye and 
Lugones emphasized the loving public’s disloyalty to existing political institutions and 
relationships, and whereas the authors in Sinister Wisdom described the lesbian feminist 
counterpublic as a forum for ongoing and transformative negotiation, the SWIP 
member’s memo stresses instead the need for feminists to gain access to and inclusion in 
the existing academic public:   
…one of the chief goals of most women philosophers in organizing women’s 
groups is to change the structure of the current philosophical world so that 
philosophers who happen to be women may take part as they wish in the activities 
of that world without having to surmount sexist prejudices which prevent them 
from having the same opportunities with respect to jobs, fellowships, 
publications, etc., as men do. That is, they want to do philosophy in much the way 
that men do, and therefore want to change the structure of the establishment 
which prevents them from doing so. I do not believe it is in the interests of this 
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group of women philosophers to secede from the presently male-dominated 
philosophical world, e.g., by establishing a journal of their own which publishes 
only women authors.314  
 
Here, the SWIP member insists that the mechanisms of publication are not a means 
towards transforming the public along new forms of association and responsibility; 
instead, they are instruments by which feminists might gain access, legibility, and status 
within the existing institutions. Similarly, arguments against “restricting the journal to 
articles on feminist topics” included, for example, the impression that “It would interfere 
with the goal of getting feminist topics accepted as serious philosophical topics, and 
feminist philosophy as a serious way of doing philosophy.”315 In short, we might 
associate this form of publicity with Nancy Fraser’s emphasis on incorporating “subaltern 
counterpublics” into a pluralized public sphere.  
 Although Hypatia editors attempted to resolve the notion of integrating 
transformative feminist publics with the existing institutional demands of the academy, 
these ambiguities proved difficult to overcome. However, while some members of the 
editorial board viewed these challenges as evidence that academic feminism was, in fact, 
a fundamentally distinct endeavor than the creation of a disloyal counterpublic, others 
were not so quick to dismiss these challenges of audience as mere impasses. Like the 
debates over race that erupted in conversations over separatism, these challenges of 
distinctive audiences with different relations to the loving public proved, for some, to be 
a source of strength rather than weakness. Reflecting back on the early years of defining 
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Hypatia’s foray into publicity, for example, editorial board member Jackie Thomason 
wrote  
In establishing the board and the journal we ran into the same issues and 
contradictions in a new guise. What would be the criteria for selection? Would we 
make any attempt to represent areas of philosophy? Of feminist thought? Would 
we try for some sort of racial balance? Should we ensure Lesbian representation? 
Should there be student board members? What did “representation” mean? 
Simply that we included groups in our search or actively sought them out? Or 
dedicated a position? Did we want to ask for the support of established women 
academic philosophers? What role, if any, would men have on the journal? Could 
they be on the board? Could they submit or review papers?316 
 
Ultimately, Thomason writes, these issues boiled down to one key contradiction: how 
could feminists square “the formal organization needed to publish” with a political 
commitment to a transformative, “loving” public? Was it impossible to hope for 
“maintaining autonomy while obtaining funding, the meeting of alliances with 
universities and publishers and corporations?” Ultimately, she concludes, the challenges 
that these frictions in audience and publicity introduce to feminist theory are neither 
incompatible nor threatening to the very process of calling forth a loving public that had 
animated lesbian feminism for a decade. In fact, they simply underline the need to remain 
deeply engaged in the practice of “seeing with a loving eye,” of speaking to and with 
others:  
I wondered then, and still do, whether it is even possible to use the printed word 
to do all the things we wanted. We knew I think that there were serious 
contradictions in creating a journal that was both substantial and academic and 
that would allow us the freedom of process that we wanted, no needed. Now this 
contradiction seems so vivid, and to be just another manifestation of the 
contradictions with which women must live, for now, if they are going to do 
anything new in the context of the existing social/political/economic structures. 
That’s probably [why] we were going at it at the time over separatism and arguing 
about equality etc – so many of which have turned into substantial contributions 
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to social and philosophical thought… With, of course, none of the issues truly 
resolved, or resoluble. Because it is process… 
 
Thomason’s understanding of the relationships that inhere in publics, then, represent a 
second, distinct line of reasoning from the SWIP member’s concerns about legibility and 
access. Rather than asking how lesbian feminism can become included more fully into 
the institutions and discourses of the academy, Thomason here argues that the tensions 
that lesbian feminism confronts in the academy only deepens our understanding of how 
the process of “loving” must be practiced; it requires a deeper grappling with the 
challenges that such inclusion might present to the broader, more transformative goals of 
lesbian feminist publicity.  
 
Conclusion 
 Given the circumstances of Hypatia’s birth – and the lessons its founders hoped to 
draw from the experience – perhaps it should not have come as such a shock that the 
same journal, in 2017, was home to one of the most hotly contested controversies in 
recent academic feminist history. After publishing an article comparing what the author 
calls “transracialism” to trans* identities, the editors of Hypatia received an open letter 
with 830 signatories arguing, most powerfully, that the article  
fails to seek out and sufficiently engage with scholarly work by those who are 
most vulnerable to the intersection of racial and gender oppressions (women of 
color) in its discussion of ‘transracialism’ […] [Moreover,] these failures do harm 
to the communities who might expect better from Hypatia. It is difficult to 
imagine that this article could have been endorsed by referees working in critical 
race theory and trans theory, which are the two areas of specialization that should 
have been most relevant to the review process. A message has been sent, to 
authors and readers alike, that white cis scholars may engage in speculative 
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discussion of these themes without broad and sustained engagement with those 
theorists whose lives are most directly affected by transphobia and racism.317  
 
The dangers of failing to understand the challenges of a feminist public, it seems, are still 
very much present: as the writers of the open letter remind us, feminist scholarship 
continues to require sustained, careful, and coalition-oriented engagement with the 
relations of power that remain present even in the institutions, discourses, and writing 
practices of counterpublics. What the founders of Hypatia during the 1980s remind us, 
however, is the fact that the process of negotiating relations of power and difficult 
coalitional praxes was, in fact, the point all along.  
Testament to the success of the notion of a transformative, open-ended “loving 
public” over one that appeals to control over the public sphere appears, for example, in 
Hypatia’s first issue, published as a “piggyback” issue in Women’s Studies International 
Forum in 1983. In it, Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman published their essay “Have 
We Got a Theory for You!” in which they argued that  
talking about one’s life, telling one’s story, in the company of those doing the 
same… is constitutive of the feminist method. And so the demand that the 
woman’s voice be heard and attended to has been made for a variety of reasons: 
not just so as to greatly increase the chances that true accounts of women’s lives 
will be given, but also because the articulation of experience (in myriad ways) is 
among the hallmarks of a self-determining individual or community.318 
 
The variety of experiences that inhere in the lesbian feminist audience – experiences of 
race and racism, for example, that will appear in the next chapter – require, for Lugones 
 
317 “Open Letter to Hypatia,” 
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1efp9C0MHch_6Kfgtlm0PZ76nirWtcEsqWHcvgidl2m
U/viewform?ts=59066d20&edit_requested=true 
318 Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist 
Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for ‘The Woman’s Voice,” The Women’s 
Studies International Forum 6.6 (1983): 574.  
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and Spelman, “requires that you make a real space for our articulating, interpreting, 
theorizing and reflecting about the connections among them – a real space must be a non-
coerced space – and/or that you follow us into our world out of friendship.”319 They 
require, in the end, a vigilance against arrogant perception, whether it appears in the guise 
of existing public institutions, within lesbian feminist frameworks, or within the 
academy. Members of the loving public, Lugones and Spelman write, ask themselves:  
When we speak, write, and publish our theories, to whom do we think we are 
accountable? Are the concerns we have in being accountable to ‘the profession’ at 
odds with the concerns we have in being accountable to those about whom we 
theorize? Do commitments to ‘the profession,’ method, getting something 
published, getting tenure, lead us to talk and act in ways at odds with what we 
ourselves (let alone others) would regard as ordinary, decent behavior? To what 
extent do we presuppose that really understanding another person or culture 
requires our behaving in ways that are disrespectful, even violent? That is, to what 
extent do we presuppose that getting and/or publishing require disregarding the 
wishes of others, lying to them, wresting information from them against their 
wills? Why and how do we think theorizing about others provides understanding 
of them? Is there any sense in which theorizing about others is a short-cut for 
understanding them?320 
 
These questions, I would argue, are undeniably the underlying questions of a loving 
public, and were animated by various debates over institutions, norms, and needs that 
various lesbian feminists would encounter as they tried to call forth their counterpublic in 
their writing, publishing, and academic work. They are questions that require difficult 
confrontations with the inability to legislate, from the beginning, about the institutions 
that will be required to call forth just audiences; that require even more difficult 
conversations with others about the terms in which those audiences will be addressed; 
finally, they require the “recognition that you do not have the authority of knowledge 
 
319 Ibid., 576.  
320 Ibid., 580.  
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[and] coming to the task without ready-made theories to frame our lives.”321 As Lugones 
and Spelman put it, the loving public is, in the end, neither a definitive set of institutions 
or relations, but rather “a striving to understand what it is that our voices are saying.” 
Only by remaining engaged in the complex negotiations about how existing institutions, 
discourses, and audiences affect one another can a transformative public, organized not 
around arrogance, but around love, emerge. Only then, they write, “can we engage in a 
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Politics as Sinister Wisdom: 
Reparation and Responsibility in the Lesbian Feminist Counterpublic  
 
“The passage is through – not over, not by, 
not around, but through.”  




On July 8, 2018, a group of 10 self-identified lesbian activists disrupted the 
London Pride Parade by laying across the parade path, holding banners reading “Lesbian 
= Female Homosexual,” “Lesbian, Not Queer,” and “Transactivism Erases Lesbians.” 
Almost immediately, parade participants, members of the press, and an audience of 
international queers responded by decrying the protesters’ position, arguing that it 
represented a deeply trans-phobic, exclusionary approach to politics. The episode reached 
viral-level notoriety within days, with queer activists calling for resignations of London’s 
Pride organizers and the small group of activists accusing their critics of employing the 
term “TERF” (the shorthand for “trans-exclusionary radical feminist”) as hate speech. 
Although neither side appears willing to back down, hundreds of think-pieces, thousands 
of tweets, and several published academic articles later a rather uneasy consensus 
(uneasy, that is, for the intense acrimony that remains around the issue) has emerged in 
the broader community: not all lesbians are transphobic.323 
 
323 See, for example, the social media response to the London Pride protestors, who have 
responded to calls to “Get the L Out” with an alternative campaign - #LWithTheT – 
designed to promote solidarity in the “LGBT” community. See Lottie L’Amour. 
“Lesbians Join the Fight Against TERFs in a Social Media Campaign After UK Pride 
was Hijacked,” Them (July 9, 2018): https://www.them.us/story/lesbians-join-the-fight-
against-terfs.  
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Obviously, this conclusion, on a literal level, is true. Still, the episode illuminates 
familiar political battle lines: namely, an intense, acrimonious fight over what we now 
often call “identity politics.”324 In particular, the episode raises questions about whether 
feminists and queers ought to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ essentialist identities.325 What does it 
mean to claim the identity “lesbian” vs. the identity “queer”? For many, what’s at stake in 
choosing one or the other identification is the extent to which one believes that members 
of a group – say, ‘lesbians’ – must share some essential similarity – a certain biological 
sex, maybe, or a preference for certain kinds of sexual practices. As one might expect, 
defining an identity category this way will inevitably exclude and subordinate some 
people, perhaps because they are biologically different or because they prefer different 
 
324 Although ‘identity politics’ is, as I noted in my introduction, largely seen as a 
dangerous and exclusive political orientation, it is no less debated – and hotly contested – 
today than it was in the 1990s. While some scholars, for instance, have been engaged in 
the process of “reclaiming” identity – see, for example, Paula M. Goya and Michael 
Hames-Garcia, ed., Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of 
Postmodernism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) – others have chosen to 
try to trouble the term – for example, Kwame Anthony Apphiah, “The Politics of 
Identity,” Daedelus 135 vol. 4 (2006): 15-22. Still others have tried simply to trace the 
movement of debate over the term, tracking the ways that this phrase differently evokes 
political possibility and foreclosure over time, ex. Nancy Whittier, “Identity Politics, 
Consciousness-Raising, and Visibility Politics,” The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Women’s 
Social Movement Activism, ed. Holly McCammon, Verta Taylor, Jo Reger, and Rachel L. 
Einwohner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 376-397.  
325 Critiques of “essentialism” in feminist theory are just as widespread and controversial 
as those of “identity politics.” See Charlotte Witt, “What is Gender Essentialism?” 
Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self, ed. 
Charlotte Witt. (New York: Springer, 2011), 11-26. As Susan Hekman points out, 
debates over essentialism and anti-essentialism have motivated some of the most 
important trends and transformations in feminist theory, especially since the 1990s. The 
Feminine Subject (London: Polity, 2014). Below, I trace how debates over “essentialism” 
emerged in feminist theory, and how they tended to displace different kinds of questions 
about responsibility and repair.  
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kinds of sexual practices.326 But as the slogan “Lesbian, Not Queer” suggests, “queer” is 
viewed as an inherently more inclusive, anti-essentialist identity than lesbian.327 
Claiming a queer identity means that we don’t have to assume that members share a 
particular set of traits; rather, membership in queer identity signals a commitment to 
transgressing – and subverting – all sorts of hierarchies across lines of class, race, gender 
identity, (dis)ability, and so on. What is at issue in the stark contrast between lesbian and 
queer identities, then, is what seems to be a core question: to what degree are we willing 
to identify ourselves in ways that, by definition, exclude some by presuming an essential 
sameness?  
As many scholars of trans* politics have pointed out, scenes like the London 
Pride protest draw upon a long history of transphobic essentialism on the part of some 
lesbians and lesbian feminists.328 However, as I have argued throughout this work, when 
such scenes emerge as political heuristics – that is, as flashpoints for a more complicated 
historical and political legacy – they also tend to reduce complicated and urgent questions 
 
326 This, for example, is the thesis of Gayle Rubin’s foundational “Thinking Sex: Notes 
for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” Pleasure and Danger, ed. Carole 
Vance (New York: Routledge, 1984).  
327 As Diana Fuss points out, strong undercurrents of essentialism in “lesbian” theory – 
especially in contrast to gay male theorizing, which more easily embraced Foucault’s 
anti-foundationalist theory of sexuality – have contributed historically to this perception. 
At the same time, however, Fuss, writing in 1989, recognizes that these undercurrents 
also existed in order to insist upon certain political connections to feminism and the 
women’s movement, and to resist a full incorporation of lesbian theory into ‘gay studies.’ 
Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1989).  
328 As Talia Bettcher and Ann Garry point out in their introduction to a special issue of 
Hypatia entitled “Transgender Studies and Feminism,” the rift between trans* activists 
and lesbian feminists occurred as early as 1973, when Beth Elliot, a trans-woman, was 
expelled from the lesbian organization Daughters of Bilitis on the charge of being “an 
opportunist, an infiltrator, and a destroyer – with the mentality of a rapist.” (This 
accusation is cited as coming from Robin Morgan). Hypatia 24 vol. 3 (2009); 2.  
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of responsibility, power, and coalition-building to more simplistic questions about 
whether one is for or against ‘retrograde’ identities and ‘exclusive’ organizing 
strategies.329 At the same time, as these questions are posed as simple choices between 
good and evil, past and present, or inclusion and exclusion, what gets left behind is the 
crucial historical and political contexts in which concepts like ‘essentialism’ and 
‘identity’ emerged as political heuristics. Paradoxically, then, as I argued in my 
introduction and in Chapter 1, these overdetermined choices tend to obscure the actual 
claims of the marginalized – such as lesbians of color and transwomen – by reducing 
their specific demands to catchall claims to inclusivity.330  
Most disturbingly, however, this phenomenon – the reduction of complex 
questions about intra-group marginalization, responsibility, and repair to mere questions 
of right and wrong – is far from new; in fact, as I will argue in this chapter, the inability 
of many feminist and queer theorists to think beyond issues of trans* inclusion and, 
instead, towards issues of intra-group power and responsibility rhyme with the fate of 
 
329 Zein Murib points out that the seemingly coherent interest group “GLBT” was far 
from obvious to its various constituents, even in the late 1990s. Murib writes that 
“interest group coalitions” like GLBT “are shaped by political circumstances, influence 
the boundaries of political identities for members, and reproduce inequalities.” 
“Rethinking GLBT as a Political Category,” LGBT Politics: A Critical Reader, ed. Marla 
Brettschneider, Susan Burgess, and Christine Keating (New York: New York University 
Press, 2017), 16.  
330 As Susan Stryker puts it in her introduction to The Transgender Studies Reader, ed. 
Susan Stryker and Stephen Wittle, transgender studies cannot be conceptualized merely 
as an “add on” to be included in the LGBTQ+ coalition. Rather, transgender studies – and 
a trans* historiography – ought to enable “a critique of the conditions that cause 
transgender phenomena to stand out in the first place, and that allow gender normativity 
to disappear into the unanalyzed, ambient background. Ultimately, it is not just 
transgender phenomena per se that are of interest, but rather the manner in which these 
phenomena reveal the operations of systems and institutions that simultaneously produce 
various possibilities of viable personhood, and eliminate others.” (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 3.  
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earlier debates over women of color feminism during the 1980s. Although lesbians of 
color pushed, with considerable success, for a framing of lesbian feminism as a relational 
and reflexive political praxis, this historical legacy is hardly remembered by queer 
theorists as they try to disentangle a ‘progressive’ queer theory from its ‘reactionary’ 
lesbian feminist past. For example, while the term ‘essentialism’ is circulating once again 
in the pages of academic queer theory to denounce the ways that groups like lesbian 
feminists police and exclude “different” political subjects like transwomen, most theorists 
of an earlier generation would have associated the term with the thesis of several 
landmark texts from the late 1980s such as Elizabeth Spelman’s Inessential Woman: 
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. Born of her engagement not with 
transwomen but with feminists of color, Spelman frames the problem of essentialism as 
the fundamental “paradox at the heart of feminism:”  
Any attempt to talk about all women in terms of something we have in common 
undermines attempts to talk about the differences among us, and vice versa. Is it 
possible to give the things women have in common their full significance without 
thereby implying that the differences among us are less important? How can we 
describe those things that differentiate women without eclipsing what we share in 
common?331  
 
For Spelman, essentialism is something both seemingly necessary – “a coherent feminist 
politics seems to require a singleness of voice and purpose”332 – and politically, ethically, 
and philosophically dangerous. Like current calls to rethink the category ‘queer’ as an 
achievement of political coalition-building rather than a “pre-political fact rooted in 
biological similarities,” Spelman’s insistence that essentialism threatens our ability to 
 
331 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 3.  
332 Ibid., 161.  
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observe, analyze, and repair differences among women – a lesson she credits lesbian 
feminist thinkers like Maria Lugones for having taught her333 – rhymes deeply with the 
concerns of contemporary queer theorists, who insist that we must attend to “inequalities 
produced within groups as well as between them.”334  
 If the problem of essentialism is nothing new to feminists – and, as I will argue in 
what follows, to lesbian feminists in particular – why is it that queer theorists tend to 
proceed as if lesbian feminists have had nothing to say about intra-group power and 
privilege, coalition-building, or political repair? As I have suggested throughout this 
work, when contemporary theorists look at political groups like “lesbian feminists,” they 
typically start from the assumption that this group problematically represents some 
attempt to enforce a “pre-political,” or essentialist, identity. However, as I argued in 
Chapter 2, this way of thinking historically about the political goals of lesbian feminism 
during the 1980s is both inaccurate and reductive; instead, we ought to think of lesbian 
feminism as an attempt to call forth a new kind of public. The word “public,” unlike 
identity, doesn’t immediately make us think of identities, essentialist or otherwise; 
instead, it makes us think of questions such as: when we speak to and for a public, who 
do we imagine as our audience? Who is most likely to be heard and persuaded by that 
audience, and why? What kinds of responsibilities do the privileged members of a public 
have towards those whose voices are marginalized? In short, I argued that thinking of a 
group as a potential “public” alerts us to the kinds of structural, intra-group inequalities 
 
333 Spelman offers special thanks to Lugones in her acknowledgments, noting that 
Inessential Woman is a “working out of some of the problems Maria and I have discussed 
and written about together in recent years.” (Some of this writing – in particular, “Have 
We Got A Theory for You!” is cited in the previous chapter). Inessential Woman, xii.  
334 Murib, “Rethinking GLBT as a Political Category,” 30. 
 173 
and the processes of dialogue, critique, and accounting that must accompany coalition-
building. Another way of parsing the questions raised by publicity, then, would be to say 
that they demand a relational approach rather than a substantive, or essentialist, one. In 
other words, thinking in terms of publics – and the complex dynamics of speaking for, 
with, and to others that they entail – allows us to move away from precisely the 
intractable political problems, such as essentialism, that queer theorists argue inhere in 
‘identity politics.’  
In this chapter, then, I want to put these largely forgotten relational lessons of 
lesbian feminism to work; that is, I want to better understand how the resources of a 
‘loving public’ differently enable negotiations about issues of internal hierarchies, 
coalition-building, and responsibility for intersectional problems such as intra-group 
racism and transphobia. In what follows, I build on my argument from Chapter 2 by 
suggesting that when we understand lesbian feminism as an attempt to build a new kind 
of public, it becomes apparent that lesbian feminists of the 1980s never actually framed 
their politics in terms of exclusion or essentialism; rather, they practiced a uniquely 
relational political praxis. In fact, lesbian feminism included a diverse array of women – 
Black, Chicana, and Indigenous women, working class and poor women, writers, 
activists, and academics – from the start. So, as tempting as it is to understand lesbians as 
inherently essentialist (especially because some lesbian groups like #GetTheLOut play 
into this view today), understanding their politics as a form of publicity must shift our 
focus away from problems of essentialism and exclusion and instead towards intra-group 
relationships fraught with power and privilege.  
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Lesbian feminists, in sharp contrast to the way we think of them today, were once 
very serious about how such intra-group privileges threatened their political 
communities, and advocated for practices of accountability and repair that offer rich 
political resources as contemporary theorists approach these kinds of political challenges 
today. Returning to this way of thinking, then, recaptures the real challenges of 
intersectional work, in which remaining attentive at all times to how the existence of 
power within a group creates problems that can’t be so easily solved by inclusion or by 
simply ‘calling out’ those with ostensibly retrograde or exclusive politics.335 Because 
most queer theorists take intersectionality as a starting point rather than a conclusion, as I 
argued in Chapter 1, looking back at the relational lessons of lesbian feminism teaches us 
something that these contemporary theorists often forget: intersectionality is not only 
about including people different from us, but about learning how to be in dialogue with 
them; it is about being willing to accept the responsibility to change the structures in 
which we exist. That these resources far exceed the problems of ‘identity’ and 
‘essentialism’ are clear; moreover, though, I will conclude this chapter by suggesting that 
they offer several important reminders as contemporary queer theorists and actors 
negotiate new and persistent hierarchies, such as those emerging between cisgender 
lesbians and transwomen.  
 
335 Many observers of “callout culture” in spaces like college campuses, for example, 
have also noted that the impulse to make snap decisions that signal one’s allegiances tend 
to oversimplify and paper over complex issues of hierarchy, trust, and accountability. 
See, for example, Conor Friedersdorf, “The Destructiveness of Call-Out Culture on 




Such an effort to reconstruct the political valences of lesbianism may surprise 
many. Given its fraught contemporary resonances, as well as the purportedly more 
expansive possibilities offered by queer politics, why attempt to rehabilitate lesbian 
politics at all? In what follows, I argue that recovering the relational valences of 
lesbianism is, on the one hand, an important historical task: it highlights and clarifies the 
role of lesbian feminist writers, activists, and scholars in developing the very democratic 
ethos that is now associated primarily with 90s-era queer theory. In locating the roots of 
this relational ethics in lesbian feminist works of the 1970s and 1980s, I aim to remind 
historians and political theorists alike of an embedded, participatory history that is too 
often papered over by more abstract claims about the emergence of queer theory. On the 
other hand, however, it is also a political task. For those concerned with the persistence of 
exclusions and hierarchies within the queer community, lesbian writers’ efforts to 
develop a reparative praxis that acknowledges its own internal hierarchies may serve as 
important reminders of the challenges that arise – and the democratic possibilities that 
emerge – when experiences of inequality exceed the analytical frameworks available to 
us for interpreting and resolving them. The lessons that lesbian feminists in the following 
pages learned from engaging in politics together are neither simple nor clear-cut. There is 
no inherently right way to resolve these relationships (though there is certainly a wrong 
way, as the transphobic London protestors demonstrate); there are only complex 
entanglements embedded in relationships of authority and subordination. The lesbians in 
the following pages largely understood this: although they engage in deep disagreements 
about the nature of theory, institutions, and organizing strategy, they consistently attempt 
to trouble easy dyads between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect,’ or ‘past’ and ‘future’ politics.  
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 Seeing Lesbian Politics Relationally  
 
Let me begin to probe these questions by pointing out something of a historical 
oddity: that contemporary feminist and queer theorists use the term ‘identity politics’ to 
designate an essentialist politics is, in itself, a profound historical event. In addition to 
Spelman’s, many political theorists might associate the critique of essentialist identity 
politics with Wendy Brown’s States of Injury, in which she locates ‘identity politics’ as a 
turn away from postmodernism and, with it, from politics altogether.336 Such a turn, she 
argues, “may ultimately be coterminous with a wariness about politics, when politics is 
grasped as a terrain of struggle without fixed or metaphysical referents and a terrain of 
power’s irreducible and pervasive presence in human affairs.”337 In contrast to politics, 
here conceived as an openness – or at least an acceptance – of the unsettled and unsettling 
nature of struggle, Brown figures ‘identity’ as an attempt to foreclose or stabilize political 
struggle in advance. Thus, while investments in identity may not begin with the intention 
of essentialism, their affective attachment to foundations and their hesitation to unsettle 
the known has deeply normative, or essentialist, effects. However much it feels intuitive 
and familiar, though, Brown’s definition of identity politics as an anti-politics is a 
stunning reversal of the term as it was used by most lesbian feminists from the late 1970s 
onward.  
 
336 Uses of Brown’s definition of identity politics appear widely in feminist and queer 
scholarship; however, they have also gained a wider circulation in popular presses, 
journals, and Leftist magazines. Below, I discuss Susan Bickford’s characterization of 
how Brown’s thesis has circulated in these contexts.  
337 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 37.  
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Indeed, even a brief glance at the usage of the term ‘identity politics’ from the late 
1970s to the late 1980s reveals that Brown’s is far from how that vast majority of its 
earlier advocates would have understood the term. As a concept, ‘identity politics’ 
emerged first, of course, in the pages of the Combahee River Collective Statement, and 
its usage in that landmark document couldn’t be farther from Brown’s. In stark contrast 
to Brown’s popular characterization of identity as an ant-politics, for example, Keeanga-
Yamahtta Taylor points out about the use of ‘identity politics’ in the CRC statement, the 
term was used to call attention to two deeply political ideas. First, she writes, where 
thinkers writing since Brown have argued that ‘identity’ tends to foreclose participation 
on the part of the most marginalized, the CRC argued quite the opposite:  
oppression on the basis of identity – whether it was racial, gender, class, or sexual 
orientation identity – was a source of political radicalization. Black women were 
not radicalizing over abstract issues of doctrine; they were radicalizing because of 
the ways that their multiple identities opened them up to overlapping oppression 
and exploitation… In other words, Black women’s oppression made them more 
open to the possibilities of radical politics and activism.338  
 
In other words, identity, as conceptualized by the CRC, serves as an important invitation 
or incitement into politics, especially when it’s used as a way to mobilize those who have 
been subordinated or marginalized in traditional political structures. Second, where 
Brown and others argue that identity is often mobilized to turn away from the 
contestatory nature of political engagment, Taylor points out that the CRC understood 
that identity can unsettle just as much as it defines:  
‘identity politics’ was not just about who you were; it was also about what you 
could do to confront the oppression you were facing… Identity politics became a 
 
338 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee 
River Collective (Chicago: Haymarket, 2017), 8. Emphasis mine.  
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way that those suffering that oppression could become politically active to 
confront it.339  
 
Thus, in Taylor’s telling, ‘identity politics’ is less the antithesis of publicity than it is a 
way of calling upon and mobilizing the very marginalized subjects who make up the 
potential audience of a radically transformative counterpublic.  
 Taylor’s account of the CRC as a deeply political practice – and its clear tensions 
with the characterization of identity found in works like Brown’s – resonates with several 
theorists who, while not altogether recuperating identity politics, have questioned the 
close association between “identity” and “essentialism.” In her tellingly titled (or, as she 
puts it, “ungainly”) essay “Anti-Anti-Identity Politics,” for example, Susan Bickford 
argues that while thinkers like Brown340 “criticize the production of a resentful self 
focused on redress of its (incurable) injuries and desirous of unity, stability, and the 
(unachievable) exclusion of difference,”341 this characterization of feminist politics as 
primarily concerned with a fear of politics unnecessarily brackets important complexities 
of feminist thinking. Citing lesbians of color like Cherríe Moraga, Gloria Anzaldúa, and 
Audre Lorde to make her case, Bickford argues that a prominent (lesbian) feminist 
tradition conceptualizes identity “as something created, constructed in this specific 
world, and in the presence of complex others – and largely through words (speech and 
writing).”342 Again, in strong contrast to those who would cast lesbian feminism as 
 
339 Ibid., 9.  
340 In the essay, Bickford also elaborates the positions of other “anti-identity” thinkers, 
such as Todd Gitlin, Sheldon Wolin, and Judith Butler.  
341 Susan Bickford, “Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: Feminism, Democracy, and the 
Complexities of Citizenship,” Hypatia 12 no. 4 (1997): 116 
342 Ibid., 122.  
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problematically essentialist, exclusionary, and retrograde, Bickford’s elaboration of 
identity puts these theories in the context of publicity, coalition-building, and dialogue.  
What accounts for this disjuncture? Why has it been so difficult for theorists, 
writing in the wake of the queer 1990s, to recognize the “embodiedness and 
embeddedness of identity, not simply as constraints or necessary conditions, but as the 
materials with which we create”343? In this section, I will argue that feminist and queer 
theorists have largely have come to see ‘identity’ as something inherently essentialist and 
anti-political – something ‘lesbians’ and not ‘queers’ engage in – only by allowing the 
deeply relational understanding of identity that predominated during the 1980s to recede 
from view. Although ‘relational thinking’ is popular across a wide variety of academic 
disciplines,344 I argue below that its usage in lesbian feminism differs from many of these 
disciplines. Whereas lesbian feminists – and particularly lesbian feminists of color – 
construed the relationships between and among women as an invitation into scenes of 
political engagement, as Taylor and Bickford urge us to recognize, this insight is 
oftentimes misconstrued as a dryer, more mundane methodological maxim.345 The 
 
343 Bickford, “Anti-Anti-Identity Politics,” 122.  
344 Relational thinking, for example, is strongly associated with several prominent strands 
of critical theory, including psychoanalysis and Marxism, and is understood as an 
established methodology in traditional disciplines such as sociology, where it is 
associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  
345 For example, while The Ashgate Companion to Queer Theory, ed. Noreen Giffney and 
Michael O’Rourke, notes “relationality” as one of four main methodological pillars of 
queer theory – the others are identity, discourse, and normativity – it tends to foreground 
relations not between queers themselves, but between practices of queer world-making 
and the researchers, writers, and theorists engaging them. “The erotics of thinking, 
speaking, writing, listening and reading,” editor Noreen Giffney writes in the 
Introduction, “is a chief concern for those of us who engage in an intensely personal and 
self-reflexive relationship with the discourses we (en)counter and (re)produce.” (New 
York: Routledge, 2016 [2009]), 9.  
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slippage from thinking of relationality in a political register to a methodological one is far 
from inconsequential; indeed, as I will argue in what follows, it is this slippage that 
makes it possible to categorize lesbian politics as inherently essentialist, especially when 
compared to the seemingly more capacious category ‘queer.’ Doing so, however, causes 
readers to sidestep or miss altogether the ways in which lesbians, a deeply heterogeneous 
group defined as much for their internal inequalities as for their essentialist commitment 
to “sisterhood,” put both relational politics at the center not just of their theories but of 
their political praxis. Finally, I suggest here that thinking of relationality in political terms 
is essential for adequately understanding attempts by lesbians of color to call white 
lesbian feminists to account for racial inequalities within the movement.  
While relationality has become a common methodological framework in critical 
theory, then, I draw my conception of relationality as it appears in lesbian politics from 
the work of Iris Marion Young, who herself was deeply involved in the feminist and 
lesbian feminist contexts that have animated my narrative thus far.346 According to 
Young, the alternative to a relational approach is a substantive, or essentialist, one. An 
essentialist understanding of groups “both denies the similarities that many group 
members have with those not considered in the group, and denies the many shadings and 
differentiations within the group.”347 In other words, thinking of a social group as an 
aggregation of individuals who share some inherent identity – like “lesbianism,” for 
example – presumes both that every lesbian relates to every non-lesbian in the same way, 
 
346 As I noted in Chapter 2, for instance, Young was responsible for collecting feedback 
and criticisms of the Hypatia proposal from SWIP members in the late 1970s. She was 
also a careful reader of many of the thinkers whose work populates this chapter.  
347 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 89.  
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on the one hand, and that every lesbian relates to lesbianism itself in the same way, on the 
other. An essentialist interpretation of the group “lesbians,” then, would require that the 
identity marker itself is understood as an inherent, unified, and fundamentally similar 
attribute that each individual in the group somehow “possesses.” Such a view, argues 
Young, will inevitably meet with the now-familiar charges leveled at “identity politics” – 
namely, that they reify identity categories by denying differences in the ways that 
members of a group experience that identity.  
In contrast, Young argues that observers of groups should think of them through a 
relational lens. According to Young, a relational lens differs from an essentialist one in 
two main ways. First, where essentialist thinking defines a group by “some set of 
attributes its members share,” relational thinking emphasizes “the relations in which they 
stand to others.”348 In other words, where an essentialist view of “lesbians” might see (or 
create) a common set of sexual, cultural, or political practices across all members of the 
group, a relational one would instead emphasize the fact that this group is defined less by 
the things that members actually share than by their relative marginalization in relation to 
heterosexual people. For Young, then, such an approach reveals that groups cannot be 
understood as discrete entities; relationality, she argues “does not designate clear 
conceptual and practical borders that distinguish all members of one group decisively 
from members of others.”349 Rather, lesbians are cross-cut by racial and classed 
differences, among others, that cause them to relate in a variety of ways to men, 
heterosexual people, children, nuclear families, and many other “non-lesbian” groups. 
 
348 Ibid., 90.  
349 Ibid., 90-91.  
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“Conceiving of group differentiation as a function of relation, comparison, and 
interaction, then,” Young writes, “allows for overlap, interspersal, and interdependence 
among groups and their members.”350 Second, and relatedly, thinking of groups through a 
relational lens allows one to see that groups are, in fact, incredibly heterogeneous and 
often characterized by internal relations of power. Lesbians, for instance, do not all relate 
– and have never related – to sex or to politics in the same way. Indeed, because of the 
ways that these complex relationships come to bear on their relative power, some 
members are subordinated or marginalized even within the group. A relational lens thus 
impels us to resist seeing a group like lesbian feminists as a “thing,” but rather as a set of 
relationships that helps us to look for inequalities between and among members of the 
group. Indeed, as I’ve argued throughout, it is precisely this relational approach that 
allows us to conceive of lesbian feminists not as an identity, but as a heterogeneous 
public cross-cut by internal relations of power. Because thinking of a group raises 
questions of internal hierarchies, it points us towards negotiations over responsibility and 
repair.  
Although I will argue below that queer scholars have mischaracterized the 
relational dimensions of lesbian politics, it is not because they are unused to working 
with a relational framework altogether. Indeed, it has been easy for queer theorists to 
interpret the lessons of relationality as matters of method because they do have something 
to do with how we conceptualize groups and identities on a relatively abstract register. 
But in attempting to systematize relationality as a methodological imperative, they have 
 
350 Ibid., 90.  
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tended to evade and misapprehend the relational political work that was central to lesbian 
feminist praxis for much of its history.  
Let me proceed by way of an example. In a piece on “lesbian autobiographies” of 
the 1970s, for instance, Biddy Martin critiques lesbian writing prior to the late 1980s – 
here Martin cites “confessional” writing about personal experience, precisely the kind of 
writing found in the early pages of Sinister Wisdom – and argues that such writing 
exemplifies Young’s definition of substantive or essentialist theory. Echoing Young’s 
definition of essentialist lenses, for instance, Martin writes that much of early lesbian 
writing “[suggests] that there is something coherently different about lesbians’ lives vis-
à-vis other lives and that there is something coherently the same about all lesbians.”351 
Like theorists who see identity politics as somehow opposed to politics, Martin claims 
that lesbians’ inability to confront or resolve differences between themselves leads them 
to homogenize accounts of their own experiences. In so doing, she argues, lesbian 
narratives tend both to produce the very category that they purport to explain and also 
foreclose politics – that is, contestation over differences amongst members who might 
understand or embody their identities differently.  
Like Butler, Martin goes on to argue that, because attempts to describe a 
characteristically ‘lesbian’ experience – whether that experience is indexed through 
coming out, a common set of sexual experiences, or something else – are inherently 
normative and exclusionary, all attempts to discuss the political content of lesbian 
feminism have these exclusionary effects. While anthologies of lesbian writing in the 
 
351 Biddy Martin, “Lesbian Identity and Autobiographical Difference[s]” The Lesbian 
and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Abelove, Barale, and Halperin. (New York: Routledge, 
1993), 275.  
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period attempted to acknowledge differences in individual lesbians’ coming out 
experiences, she writes, they are undercut by the desire to incorporate them into a 
coherent conception of “lesbian feminists” as a group:  
[D]ifferences, for example, of race, class, or sexuality, are finally rendered 
noncontradictory by virtue of their (re)presentation as differences between 
individuals, reducible to questions of identity within the unifying context of 
feminism. What remains unexamined are the systemic institutional relationships 
between those differences, relationships that exceed the boundaries of the lesbian 
community, the women’s movement, or particular individuals, and in which 
apparently bounded communities and individuals are deeply implicated.352   
 
On its face, Martin’s claim is thus that taking the lessons of relationality seriously should 
give us pause when we are confronted with attempts to incorporate a wide variety of 
experiences into the “unifying context of feminism.” A relational framework, on this 
view, is what reveals “lesbian writing” to be an essentialist practice.  
Operating on the premise that lesbian writing prior to 1985 sought to minimize or 
resolve differences between lesbians, Martin then argues that this very essentialism is 
what caused lesbianism to “[lose] its potential as a position from which to read against 
the grain of narratives of normal life course, and [become] simply the affirmation of 
something separated out and defined as ‘lesbian.’”353 The problem with lesbian writing, 
then, would seem to be that it has incorrectly taken itself to be a bounded category which, 
in turn, reproduces and reifies inequalities between and among differently situated 
lesbians. In response, Martin suggests that scholars might follow queer thinkers (here, 
she cites Foucault and de Lauretis) into the territory of troubling the categories of 
“experience” and “identity” “on their own grounds.” Like many since, Martin chooses to 
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take on this task by asking how lesbians of color challenged “lesbianism’s” essentialism. 
Turning especially to Cherríe Moraga’s work in This Bridge Called My Back, Martin 
argues that lesbians of color contested the very category of lesbianism:  
Conceived [in This Bridge Called My Back] as women’s love for other women 
and for ourselves as women, lesbianism is politicized less as an identity than as a 
desire that transgresses the boundaries imposed by structures of race, class, 
ethnicity, nationality; a provocation to take responsibility for them out of the 
desire for different kinds of connections. Lesbianism, for Moraga, for example, is 
about connection but not about a total or automatic identification; it marks a 
desire for more complex realities, for relationships filled with struggle and risk as 
well as pleasure and comfort.354  
 
Because it identifies lesbianism as a methodologically incorrect category, Martin thus 
suggests that Moraga’s is a deeply relational praxis, one in which “’Sisterhood’ with 
other women of color… is achieved, not assumed; it is based on affinities and shared but 
not identical histories.”355  
I would agree with Martin that Moraga’s – and, in a more general sense, lesbian 
of color writing throughout the 1980s – is a deeply relational kind of political praxis. This 
relational paradigm, however, appears in Martin’s text less as a way to expand the range 
of possible meanings of “lesbian feminist” or to politicize the term in ways that calls its 
internal relations of accountability into question, as I will argue Moraga’s text seeks to 
do. Rather, Martin interprets Moraga as contesting the inherent methodological 
essentialism of the category itself. In this way, Martin’s shifts the terrain of relationality; 
where it began as an incitement into politics – a way to understand identity “as something 
created, constructed in this specific world, and in the presence of complex others,” as 
Bickford puts it – in Martin’s telling, relationality motivates queer theory’s attempt to 
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liberate lesbian theory from its presumed methodological limitations. Understanding the 
presence of lesbians of color not in terms of their relationship to white lesbians but as 
disruptive of the category “lesbians” altogether, Martin writes that 
lesbianism ceases to be an identity with predictable contents... It remains a 
position from which to speak, to organize, to act politically, but it ceases to be the 
exclusive and continuous ground of identity or politics. Indeed, it works to 
unsettle rather than to consolidate the boundaries around identity, not to dissolve 
them altogether but to open them to the fluidities and heterogeneities that make 
their renegotiation possible.356  
 
In other words, ‘relationality’ for Martin is less a way of tracing the specific, contextual 
sites of hierarchy that inhere in relations between white lesbians and lesbians of color 
than it is a way of superseding the difficult work of coalition-building in the name of 
methodological exemplarity.  
 
Martin’s argument that queer theory liberates lesbian feminism from its own 
methodological weakness is an echo of what I argued in Chapter 1 was a more general 
impulse in queer theory to borrow the insights of intersectional (lesbian) theorists only to 
claim that queer methodologies exceed the limits of intersectional ones. In this sense, for 
example, Judith Butler’s more general claim about the category ‘women’ in Feminists 
Theorize the Political: “Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity 
to speak as for women,” she writes; however,   
any effort to give universal or specific content to the category of women, 
presuming that the guarantee of solidarity is required in advance, will necessarily 
produce factionalization, and that ‘identity’ as a point of departure can never hold 
as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement. Identity categories are 
never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary.357  
 
356 Ibid., 289.  
357 Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 
‘Postmodernism,’” Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott 
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Like Martin, Butler presumes that using certain methodological categories – ‘lesbian,’ 
say, or ‘women’ – not only signal an embedded commitment to understanding the 
specific processes, relationships, and subjects that are produced by hierarchy, but also 
smuggle in a set of normative boundaries that foreclose politics altogether. Butler goes on 
to argue, however, that “This is not to say that the term ‘women’ ought not to be used, or 
that we ought to announce the death of the category.” Rather,  
if feminism presupposes that ‘women’ designates an undesignatable field of 
differences, one that cannot be totalized or summarized by a descriptive identity 
category, then the very term becomes a site of permanent openness and 
resignifiability. I would argue that the rifts among women over the content of the 
term ought to be safeguarded and prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought to 
be affirmed as the ungrounded ground of feminist theory. To deconstruct the 
subject of feminism is not, then, to censure its usage, but, on the contrary, to 
release the term into a future of multiple significations, to emancipate it from the 
maternal or racialist ontologies to which it has be restricted, and to give it play as 
a site where unanticipated meanings might come to bear.358 
In both passages by Martin and Butler, “essentialism” is transposed from Young’s usage 
of the term to designate a wrongful empirical and political claim – that relationships of 
inequality do not exist in lesbian communities – to the relatively abstract claim about the 
“illusory coherence and inclusiveness of the positions from which [one] is taught to see 
and to speak.”359 Both passages, then, neatly synthesize the nearly imperceptible shift 
from thinking of relationality in political terms – as a set of relationships that inhere 
within lived practices and institutions – to thinking of it solely in methodological terms – 
as a way of liberating theory from the constraints of thinking about collectivity from 
within relationships of inequality. In this sense, then, Martin’s argument about the 
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purported essentialism of lesbian narratives is a version of the more general argument 
about the methodological exemplarity of queer theory that I elaborated in Chapter 1.  
What are the effects of such a shift? First, as I argued in my introduction, shifting 
from a version of relationality that seeks to understand a heterogeneous public cross-cut 
by relations of inequality to one that seeks to transcend ‘problematic’ categories has 
caused theorists to conclude that lesbianism is a form of identification that must always 
be relinquished. Second, as I argued in Chapter 1, the move to relinquish and transcend 
all ‘problematic’ methodological categories has had the paradoxical effect of evacuating 
the actual political claims – such as coalition-building – that political actors like lesbian 
feminists make possible. In arguing that lesbian autobiographies produced and 
reproduced a monolithic, essentialized identity that was only exposed as such by lesbians 
of color, Martin ignores (or evades) several important details about these critiques. For 
one, the very texts that she cites as central to the relational revolution – in particular, 
Moraga and Anzaldúa’s This Bridge Called my Back and Audre Lorde’s “Open Letter to 
Mary Daly,” both addressed below – were written by women deeply involved in the 
larger lesbian-feminist writing community. All three women were frequent contributors 
to Sinister Wisdom, for example: Audre Lorde’s poems “The Old Days” 360 and “Meet”361 
are the lead pieces in Sinister Wisdom’s second and third issues, published in 1976 and 
‘77, and many of her poems and essays appear in SW throughout the 1980s; Anzaldúa 
and Moraga both sat on the editorial board of SW throughout the 1980s. Characterizing 
 
360 In the poem, Lorde writes powerfully that “Every one wants to know / how it was in 
the old days.” Audre Lorde, “The Old Days,” Sinister Wisdom 2 (Fall 1976): 4.  
361 “Meet” opens with the famous line “Woman when we met on the solstice / high over 
halfway between your world and mine.” Sinister Wisdom 3 (Spring 1977): 4.  
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them as challenging the essentialism of a predominately white, middle class group from 
without reduces the centrality of their longstanding contributions to the lesbian feminist 
political and literary communities. Rather than viewing them as critiquing lesbian 
feminism from outside of a group defined by its homogeneity, we might instead take 
Young’s cue and conceive of the group “lesbian feminists” as defined by complex racial 
relationships from the start. On this view, Chicana, black, and indigenous lesbians did not 
offer the fatal blow to a methodologically flawed – and thereby politically exclusive – 
group; they were part of an ongoing negotiation between white lesbians and lesbians of 
color over how (or if) the group would take responsibility for its internal racial 
inequalities.  
I share Martin’s concerns about any lesbian politics that refuses to acknowledge 
or call to account for inequalities inherent in the movement. Nevertheless, such attempts 
to understand these inequalities as ways to liberate a queer politics from the difficult 
coalitional questions detailed in lesbian narratives, rather than as a process of political 
negotiation over the responsibility to address inequality, ignore what is arguably Young’s 
most basic and important argument about the dangers of essentialism. For Young, entire 
groups themselves are never essentializable; even in groups that may wish for internal 
unity and coherence (as some white lesbians undoubtedly did), in reality relationships of 
inequality between members doggedly persist.362 We cannot rightfully claim that the 
 
362 In fact, Young goes so far as to say that “Social relationships, institutions, and 
structures are prior to individual subjects, both temporally and ontologically.” However, 
this is not to say that groups are created in monolithic or simplistic ways. Citing her 
article “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective,” Intersecting 
Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), for instance, she writes that groups constituted in and through 
society are, at all times, internally relational: “the gender position of being a woman does 
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group “lesbians” was ever a coherent, bounded, or homogenous group, regardless of 
whether some members sought to enact such unity. While we might critique the ways in 
which conceptual categories like “identity” tend to an aspirational homogeneity, we 
haven’t truly taken the lessons of relationality to heart until we learn to see that these 
differences are symptoms of larger patterns of inequality between and amongst members 
positioned differently within the group. Moreover, in reading lesbian feminism of the 
1980s as uniformly resistant to confronting these relationships, analyses like Martin’s 
tend to inadvertently reduce what was, in fact, a complex set of negotiations over the very 
meaning of “lesbianism” to a single, overdetermined ideological position. Ironically, 
then, even as texts like Martin’s advance a relational framework in their methodologies, 
they reduce the actual practices of groups like lesbians to rarefied entities.  
Following Young’s appeal to a more politically relational frame, then, I would 
argue that rather than dismissing the lesbian politics of the 1970s through the early 90s as 
an essentially undemocratic identity that was challenged from without, we might instead 
ask how conflicts over authority between and among differently positioned lesbians 
inflected their political claims as a group. Doing so, I think, would have several important 
consequences. First, it would direct attention away from the inherent essentialism of the 
category of identity and train it once again on the hierarchical, complex, and polyvalent 
relationships that inhere between and among lesbian feminists. These relationships are 
not only material ones – they also exemplify what Margaret Urban Walker has described 
 
not itself imply sharing social attributes and identity with all those others called women. 
Instead, ‘women’ is the name of a series in with some individuals find themselves 
positioned by virtue of norms of enforced heterosexuality and the sexual division of 
labor.” Inclusion and Democracy, 100.  
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as “relationships of accountability.” According to Walker, such relationships are ones 
which “[consist] in suffering the demands of others on us to render accounts of our 
conduct and, where our conduct is unexcused, accepting responsibility and in turn 
enjoying the standing to make similar claims upon others.”363 Walker argues that what is 
at stake in matters of injustice – matters such as the issue of racism or transphobia in 
lesbian feminism – “is whether those wronged possess the standing to call to account 
those who have wronged them or to bear responsibility for the repair of the wrongs they 
have suffered.”364 This is precisely the kind of relationality that one finds in the pages of 
Sinister Wisdom. Unlike queer theorists, who have interpreted the inexhaustibility of 
difference in lesbian/queer relationships as evidence of “a field of intractable, highly 
structured discursive incoherence at a crucial node of social organization” and who have 
argued, following Eve Sedgwick, that “the more promising [political?] project would 
seem to be a study of the incoherent dispensation itself,”365 the lesbian politics I present 
here understand difference as an imperative to recognize, and to call to account, unequal 
moral standings.    
My point is not that white lesbians have always accepted or welcomed the kinds 
of politics that marginalized lesbians like Moraga have advanced; they certainly have 
not.366 Rather, when we fail to acknowledge that “lesbian feminism” has always been a 
 
363 Margaret Urban Walker, “Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations,” in 
Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, ed. Mackenzie, Rogers, 
and Dodds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 119.  
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365 Eve Sedgwick, “Epistemology of the Closet,” The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, 
90.  
366 As I argued in Chapter 2, for instance, some readers of Sinister Wisdom balked at 
claims made by writers like Adrienne Rich and Barbara Smith about the persistence and 
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group defined by its complex, often unresolved negotiations over real relations of 
authority and subordination, we also fail to see how differently situated lesbians have 
long attempted to create a kind of space, together, wherein every member would possess 
the moral standing to call others to account. The lesbian politics of relationality that I 
outline below may not “overcome” problems of racism, classism, or transphobia by 
recognizing that identity is inherently incoherent. But they do represent a way of 
grappling with these relations of authority and subordination as they are lived and 
experienced – in other words, as they register politically. More than that, though, they 
represent a process by which groups might foster relationships in which all members of 
the group, though they act from within real inequalities, “possess a certain moral status as 
full participants in reciprocal accountability relations.”367  
 
Moral Vulnerability and Repair in Sinister Wisdom  
 
 So far, I have argued that understanding lesbian politics as the inherently 
“essentialist” cousin of queer theory transposes the lessons of relationality from a 
political to a methodological register. In the process of this transposition, I have 
suggested, queer theorists have tended to mischaracterize the practices and processes that 
existed within and among lesbian communities for negotiating relationships of authority 
and subordination. This is not an abstract claim; serious attention to the extensive 
archives of lesbian political work reveal that conversations about how to establish 
practices that would promote such forms of accountability were important to lesbian 
 
prevalence of racism in lesbian feminism, arguing that these attempts to call attention to 
the persistence of power in lesbian feminism constituted a kind of reverse racism.  
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political thinking from the late 1970s onward. In this section, then, I focus on two 
conversations, each taking place in the pages of Sinister Wisdom between the years 1980 
and 1985, to argue that the forms of relational accountability discussed above were 
central to its contributors’ sense of theory-making. What I mean by this is not that 
lesbians have seamlessly or collectively understood, from the get-go, how to build 
coalitions that avoid internal relations of power between and amongst their members. 
Rather, I mean that these contributors are participants in a process by which they seek to 
engage one another as “full participants in reciprocal accountability relations.” This 
process, I argue, entails three key elements. First, it must begin with the expectation of 
reciprocal accountability. Second, it entails an expression of moral vulnerability – the 
sense that the expectation of reciprocal accountability has been breached or betrayed. 
Finally, it entails an effort to repair, not resolve or transcend, these unequal relationships.  
 
Conversation One: Barbara and Beverly Smith, Sinister Wisdom 18, 1981 
 In June, 1980, Beverly and Barbara Smith sat down “across the kitchen table,” as 
the piece later became known, with Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa for an 
interview. The piece, which is best known for its appearance in This Bridge Called My 
Back in 1981, also appeared in Sinister Wisdom’s 18th issue the same year. In her preface 
to the first edition to This Bridge, Moraga wrote that the motivation for the book – surely 
shared across the contributors, including the Smith sisters – was living through “the 
deepest political tragedy I have experienced… how with such grace, such blind faith, 
[the] commitment to women in the feminist movement grew to be exclusive and 
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reactionary.”368 At a glance, Moraga’s This Bridge preface seems to resonate with Kathy 
Rudy’s claim that “We [lesbians] began policing ourselves in order to guarantee that our 
members were faithful to the principle of putting women first,” and that such policing 
meant that issues of racial inequality were never raised – or were effectively silenced – 
within early lesbian politics.369 However, a closer reading of Moraga’s stated political 
motivations reveals a different context for her sense of tragedy. Rather than insisting that 
her Third World feminism emerges from a different source entirely and generates a 
fundamentally incompatible kind of politics, as Rudy and Martin might suggest, Moraga 
instead insists that her goal is to think from within the very premise of lesbian politics at 
that time: that women could forge new, mutually accountable relationships with one 
another. “I had nearly forgotten why I was so driven to work on this anthology,” she 
writes; “I had nearly forgotten that I wanted/needed to deal with racism because I 
couldn’t stand being separated from other women. Because I took my lesbianism that 
seriously.”370  
Throughout the preface, Moraga strongly emphasizes the promise of 
acknowledging the lived dimensions of relationships between women – for example, the 
emotional relationships that inhere in shared experiences, or the physical and spiritual 
relationships it is possible to build between women positioned differently in the world. 
But she also notes the deeply unresolved dangers of such relationships – for example, in 
her running metaphor of the geographical relationships between the differently raced 
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spaces of Boston – by noting that attempts at reciprocal accountability are tinged with the 
possibility of persistent, unacknowledged, “underground” inequalities. For Moraga, 
“lesbianism” itself is what links the promise and the risk of creating relationships 
between women. “I am a lesbian,” she writes; “I want a movement that helps me make 
some sense of the trip from Watertown to Roxbury, from white to black. I love women 
the entire way, beyond a doubt… Lesbianism is supposed to be about connection.”371 
If lesbian relationships, for Moraga, are of a double quality in that they both 
promise connection and contain the “potential betrayal, rejection, and failure that lives 
throughout the first and last gesture of connection,”372 then Moraga’s piece and many of 
the other contributions to This Bridge explore the harms caused when such attempts to 
forge truly reciprocal relationships fail. In other words, it explores what happens to 
individuals and to groups when mutual accountability between and among its members is 
not achieved. Such harms are what Walker describes as symptoms of a particular form of 
inequality she names “moral vulnerability.” For Walker, while most social relationships 
depend on a sense of reciprocity – that is, on the “assumption that we possess a certain 
moral status as full participants in reciprocal accountability relations,”373 moral 
vulnerability occurs when these relationships break down, become asymmetrical, or are 
betrayed by one of the parties. As she puts it,  
All of us who see ourselves as possessing this status anticipate that we are rightly 
able to call others to account even as we ourselves are rightly liable to be called to 
account by others. The vulnerability in question is the potential for being exposed 
to the insult and additional injury, when we perceive ourselves wronged, of 
 
371 Ibid., xiv.  
372 Ibid., xviii.  
373 Walker, “Moral Vulnerability,” 112.  
 196 
having our standing to call others to account denied, dismissed, or ignored in 
ways that call our very status as full participants into question.374 
 
If Moraga envisions This Bridge as a first step towards acknowledging injustices born of 
relations of power and authority internal to lesbianism, then we might reinterpret her 
claims of injury less as critiques by an excluded “other” than as the invocation of a 
relationship of moral vulnerability from within these relations. From this angle of vision, 
Third World feminism is, then, an attempt to address the asymmetrical relationships that 
“call our very status as full participants into question” – not so much to overcome these 
harms as to call their perpetrators to account, to help her “make sense of the trip from 
Watertown to Roxbury.”  
 Viewed in this context, This Bridge Called My Back is the attempt among lesbians 
of color to define “that deep place of knowledge” – to name a relationship of moral 
vulnerability from within the lesbian feminist movement. The choice to publish central 
pieces of that effort in Sinister Wisdom, then, would appear to be an attempt, as Moraga 
put it, to “call my white sisters on this;” that is, to invite white women to recognize and 
account for their contributions to that moral vulnerability.375 Beverly and Barbara Smith’s 
conversation in Sinister Wisdom 18 speaks particularly well to this task. The sisters, who 
were two of the three contributing members of the Combahee River Collective, spend 
considerable time recounting everyday experiences that, together, give a name to the 
“grinding” injury that comes with not only being harmed, but also with having one’s 
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peers fail to acknowledge or accept those harms as credible. Speaking about a variety of 
issues ranging from lesbian separatism to homophobia in the black community, the 
Smiths both critique lesbian feminism as a site of moral vulnerability and hold out hope 
for its ability to establish a set of reparative practices that might build from, if not 
attenuate, its inequalities.  
A prominent theme of the interview, for example, is the tragedy of having 
abandoned one’s community for a new one promising reciprocal accountability, only to 
have that expectation go unacknowledged and, at times, actively dismissed. On the one 
hand, the sisters describe the extent to which they feel that “everyone who has our 
identity” (that is, black lesbians) “has to sacrifice” connections to the black community. 
As Beverly put it in the interview, not only “is… there is so much about Black identity 
that doesn’t get called into practice” in the women’s movement,  
It makes me think about how I live my life because there are so many parts of our 
Black identity that we no longer get a chance to exercise… I would just like to 
mention July 4th which happened a few days ago and watching the Black family 
who lives in the house behind mine as I have for the last four years and just 
having this feeling of longing like, you know, I’ll never be in that situation. A few 
days later, I was talking to this white woman I know about that and she said, 
“Well, do you really want to be sitting out there with those men?” And I said, No. 
But the thing is that it’s the whole thing. The whole damn thing!”376  
 
Yet while Beverly expresses the act of leaving behind the cultural forms of one’s 
childhood as a difficult but at times necessary step for feminists, she is also clearly 
pointing out how difficult it is to exist in a movement in which the pain of that act is not 
recognized or understood by one’s peers. The white woman in her anecdote, for example, 
has no context in which to understand how Beverly Smith, a black lesbian feminist, might 
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long for the kinds of celebrations of belonging that place someone in the black 
community. Worse, however, is the inability to name this sense of tragedy from within a 
movement that has no process for acknowledging and repairing these harms. Shortly after 
discussing the injury of having left one’s community for feminism, for instance, Beverly 
continues, “Some separatists believe that although women are racist […], when we get 
rid of men, sexism and racism will end too. I think that this is one of the most racist 
aspects of it because it does not recognize the racism that women, including lesbians, 
have.”377 In other words, not only have black lesbians suffered a kind of injury by having 
left behind specific modes of belonging and experiencing racism, but this injury is 
compounded by the dismissal of these claims by the very people with whom they have 
been promised reciprocal relationships. Like Moraga, Beverly’s expression of injury is 
rooted in the fact that, despite the promise of reciprocal accountability in lesbian politics, 
these relationships carry the ongoing risk of failure. Moral vulnerability, as in Moraga’s 
preface to This Bridge, appears as a failure of white lesbians to “have a lot of 
comprehension about what Black life is all about in this country, period.”378 
Both Barbara and Beverly insist, then, that acknowledging the “class differences 
we experience on this kind of basic level which ‘high level’ analysis and rhetoric don’t 
get to”379 must be a priority for any lesbian feminism that hopes to live up to its own 
relational promise. Ultimately, however, for both Barbara and Beverly the task at hand is 
to repair the relationships between white and black women; to critically evaluate “who 
you can laugh with, who you can cry with and who you can share meals with and whose 
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face you can touch.”380 “There are bunches of white women,” they add, “for whom these 
things that I’ve mentioned are unknown experiences with women of color;”381 this is, I 
would argue, precisely the asymmetry that has created a condition of moral vulnerability 
for lesbians of color. Crucially, however, rather than advocating for the abandonment of 
lesbian politics in favor of some fundamentally new praxis, the Smith sisters argue that 
they see the main task of lesbians as acknowledging and repairing the relationships of 
mutual accountability that lesbianism promises – not presuming to transcend issues of 
inequality between women altogether. Repairing these relationships, the sisters insist, 
would be truly radical precisely because the task of repairing relations of moral 
vulnerability is so seldom undertaken. As Barbara put it,  
I read in a women’s newspaper an article by a woman speaking on behalf of 
lesbian separatists. She claimed that separatists are more radical than other 
feminists. What I really feel is radical is trying to make coalitions with people 
who are different from you. I feel it is radical to be dealing with race and sex and 
class and sexual identity all at one time. I think that is really radical because it has 
never been done before…382 
 
After acknowledging that such a “coalition politics” would neither overcome nor ignore 
inequalities between and among differently positioned lesbians, the sisters point out that 
these inequalities serve as the occasion for reflection on accountability. As Beverly puts 
it,  
The way I see it, the function that Third World women play in the movement is 
that we’re the people who throw the ball a certain distance and then the white 
women run to that point to pick it up. I feel we are constantly challenging white 
women, usually on the issues of racism but not always. We are always 
challenging women to go further, to be more realistic… Third World women are 
not in actual leadership positions in the women’s movement in terms of policy 
making, etc. But we certainly have the vision. We are in the position to challenge 
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the feminist movement as it stands to date and not out of any theoretical 
commitment. Our analysis of race and class oppression and our commitment to 
really dealing with those issues, including homophobia, is something we know we 
have to struggle with to insure our survival.383  
 
Like Moraga, then, the Smith sisters argue that what is at stake in acknowledging racism 
within the lesbian movement is the very possibility of accounting for the lived 
inequalities between and among women. While they argue that the process of accounting 
is a potentially dangerous one, it is also necessary. Their perspective on lesbian political 
praxis, then, echoes Bernice Johnson Reagon, who succinctly expresses the dual promise 
and risk of coalition politics: “Coalition can kill people; however, it is not by nature 
fatal.”384  
 
Conversation Two: Elly Bulkin on White Lesbian Racism, Sinister Wisdom 13, 1980  
Moral vulnerability, I have suggested, is occasioned by the expectation of 
reciprocity; that is, it is what happens when relations of reciprocal accountability fail. The 
lesbian context, precisely because it promised a deeply relational political praxis, could 
become the scene of these critiques of its failures for lesbians of color. In the context of 
Sinister Wisdom, then, pieces like “Across the Kitchen Table” attempt to name these 
failures, to contextualize them in a specific set of hierarchical relationships, and to define 
when and how these practices of mutual accountability break down. Of course, though, it 
is one thing for lesbians of color to write, share, and critique from a position of moral 
vulnerability, and another altogether for the privileged within a movement to 
acknowledge and account for the conditions of that vulnerability and to establish 
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processes by which they can repair relationships of accountability. Indeed, questions 
about whether white lesbians, collectively, could or would account for these inequalities 
are at the heart of concerns about lesbian essentialism.  
 Throughout Sinister Wisdom’s run, white lesbians have debated over how to come 
to terms with claims about moral vulnerability put forth by writers of color like Moraga, 
Anzaldúa, the Smith sisters, and other frequent contributors such as Beth Brant, Audre 
Lorde, and Michelle Cliff. Yet while practices such as drawing attention to the racial 
identities of editors and contributors, publishing special issues on indigeneity and 
racism,385 and frequently publishing and reviewing important works of Third World 
lesbian feminism were all central to Sinister Wisdom’s mission, these practices could not 
capture the kind of accountability that the Smiths demand in “Across the Kitchen Table.” 
Indeed, although the editorial note in the first issue of SW in 1976 included a discussion 
of racism, the unequal moral standing implicit in the discussions above remained. “A 
central part of our vision has been to exorcise the unconscious and therefore most deadly 
forms of racism in the feminist movement,” then-editor Harriet Desmoines writes, 
But here we are with Issue I, birthed white as the day is long. Meridel Leseur said 
this about a white woman and an Indian woman: “The two women had lived a 
parallel life curiously knowing each other, but the Indian was the knower. 
Something in the white woman willed not to know… willed to evade the final 
knowing.” And so it is with white lesbians.386   
 
As so many pieces by lesbians of color had argued, Desmoines suggests that problems of 
racism in Sinister Wisdom are a kind of double harm – first, as the harm of racism itself, 
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and second, as the willful refusal to acknowledge or recognize these harms by one’s so-
called sisters.  
By 1980, however, white contributors to SW began taking seriously the claims 
about moral vulnerability that pepper lesbian of color writing, attempting to acknowledge 
that white women’s willingness “to evade the final knowing” was something for which 
they needed to take responsibility. The first major piece reflecting on the responsibilities 
of white women to account for race and racism in Sinister Wisdom appears in its 
thirteenth issue. Elly Bulkin’s piece, entitled “Racism and Writing: Some Implications 
for White Lesbian Critics” is an attempt by a Jewish lesbian, concerned with the claims 
of moral vulnerability expressed in pieces like those mentioned above, to examine what it 
would take to repair – not transcend – the relations of accountability that have been 
damaged by moral vulnerability.387 Bulkin’s is an argument, in a word, about the moral 
standing of lesbians of color to impel white women to reflect on the responsibilities they 
bear for harms like those described in This Bridge. In this sense, then, her reflections 
constitute a process by which she seeks to make “more precise sense of… what is at stake 
in redress.”388 
In her piece, Bulkin describes a process by which reflection on homophobia 
serves as an occasion for reflection on racism. Here, homophobia is neither an analogy to, 
nor a pass for, racism; it is an occasion to acknowledge the unresolved hierarchies of 
authority that exist within lesbian communities, a practice that she argues is essential for 
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repairing those contexts in which the lesbian promise of reciprocal accountability has 
failed. In one example, Bulkin describes having “called out” straight women presenters at 
the widely-attended Second Sex at 30 conference for having ignored issues of 
homophobia within the women’s movement, but also having failed to call out their 
racism. The presenters, she writes, “just spoke as if all women writers – with the 
exception of Alice Walker – were both heterosexual and white.” They had discussed 
Adrienne Rich, “but not as a lesbian; Alice Walker was praised, but seen only within the 
context of a white women’s literary tradition.” Bulkin describes her reaction as follows:  
After some discussion, I objected to the heterosexism of the presentations and met 
first with embarrassed silence and then with the assurance that, of course, they 
were all well aware of lesbian writing – it just didn’t happen to receive attention 
in these particular papers. Going home on the subway, I realized that I could well 
have objected to the white solipsism of the presentations and didn’t – caught as I 
was in the immediacy of my anger at my own oppression. The following day, 
given a chance to speak at an open mike, I made the connections I had failed to 
make the day before.389 
 
For Bulkin, the fact that homophobia and racism are so closely intertwined presents an 
opportunity to reflect on how they produce complex patterns of inequality that come to 
bear on what one does or does not notice, the kinds of accountability one demands or 
accepts, and what happens when the expectation of accountability fails. “I mention [the 
Second Sex conference],” she writes, “as neither mea culpa nor simple success story, but 
as a way of beginning to look at the dynamics and socializing factors that interfere with 
our confronting racism, both in ourselves and in other white women. For I assume that 
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I/we do not have to be non-racist in order to be anti-racist. For me this has been a crucial 
realization.”390  
 After noting how her own “solipsism” had prevented her from speaking out about 
issues of race and racism for too long, Bulkin turns to consider what it would look like to 
start to repair relations in which reciprocal accountability has failed. For Bulkin, the 
process of repair requires two crucial recognitions. First, repair means taking account of 
the many ways that race and racism have been actively excluded from one’s frame for 
understanding oppression. In her article, for instance, Bulkin describes several such 
instances in which she was taught to ignore – at times, to willfully dismiss – her own 
entanglement in racism. She recalls, first, how her grandmother “[referred] to Black 
people as “schwartzes,” dropping a word of Yiddish into a stream of English sentences 
and thereby impressing on me… that “they” (and, by extension, other people of color) 
were so alien to my white world that their very existence could not be acknowledged in 
my own language.”391 Later, in the mid-50s, she writes that her parents “[spoke] with the 
simple superiority of Northern liberals about civil rights for Black people in the South… 
For them, racism was floating around someplace out there… and if I only believed in the 
equality of all people, I would be forever safe from the corrosion in my grandmother’s 
message.”392 For Bulkin, the anecdotes suggest more than an excuse for not having 
recognized racism; they represent her own entanglement in, and willingness to, ignore 
internal relations of moral vulnerability within feminism. Recognizing that one is not 
only confronted by “difference,” but is rather shaped from within hierarchies of 
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acceptability, she argues, is necessary for her to be able to hear claims of moral 
vulnerability as such.  
Second, and relatedly, Bulkin defines the reparative process as one that 
acknowledges that “anti-racist” is different from “non-racist.” What this means, 
practically, is that accountability can occur in situations where inequality is still present, 
and that a group need not solve relations of moral accountability to begin to repair them. 
On the one hand, Bulkin suggests that a process a repair must refuse to accept the idea 
that these inequalities can be solved at the level of analysis:  
The concept of racism itself is often intellectualized by white feminists … It is 
possible to make obeisance to the abstract existence of racism, even to work 
politically on issues of immediate concern to black and Third World women, such 
as sterilization abuse, out of an intellectual right-mindedness which actually 
distances us from the point where black and white women have to begin 
together.393  
 
White lesbians cannot, she suggests here, absolve themselves of racist legacies by 
reconceptualizing racism as problems of “difference” that one is either for or against. 
Neither can white lesbians “defer” problems of racism by “[waiting] for the never-never-
day when we will be blameless enough to speak.”394Although white lesbians like Bulkin 
are irrevocably entangled and invested in the kinds of hierarchies that lesbians of color 
critique, Bulkin argues that deferring the problem will only further entrench white 
women’s unwillingness to recognize moral vulnerabilities. Rather than assume that one 
must be “non-racist” – to be absolved of all guilt – to confront issues of racism, then, 
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Bulkin suggests that lesbians recognize that “the issue… is not to belabor this reality, but 
to explore what can, in fact, still be done in spite of it.”395 
 Bulkin’s approach to redress – her insistence that it emphasize relations of 
acceptability rather than straightforward exclusions, as well as her claim that white 
lesbians’ accountability will remain partial and imbricated in relations of inequality – 
may seem dissatisfying to those used to queer theory’s more concise methodological 
move. For Bulkin, at issue in instances of moral repair is decidedly not to recognize that 
the category of identity is inherently fractured, or to insist that fundamentally different 
experiences of sexuality ought to call into question or transcend the promises and 
practices lesbianism themselves. Rather, her attempt to take account of white lesbians’ 
contributions to relations of moral vulnerability evokes Walker’s discussion of 
reparations. For Walker, “Once moral vulnerability is recognized as the underlying issue 
in redressing wrongs,” we must attend to those harms only in ways that “track the 
contours of the kind and extent of moral vulnerability that is at issue.”396 In other words, 
there is no conceptually correct way to address moral vulnerabilities; there are only 
practices that, as Bulkin puts it, “[invest] with inescapable concreteness the concept of 
racism… [practices which spring] from that synthesis of reflection and feeling, personal 
struggle and critical thinking, which is at the core of the feminist process.”397 Like 
Walker, who argues that while “with respect to the future, reparations can only at best set 
an example and make a promise or a commitment based on what is achieved in the 
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present instance,”398 Bulkin suggests that repairing racial inequalities in the lesbian 
movement will not require a final solution, but an open-ended commitment to re-
establishing relations of accountability that have been breached or betrayed. The 
responsibility, she writes, must be to address “the most basic of questions: What will we 
undertake?”399  
This final point not only illuminates the process by which white lesbians can be 
called to account for their contributions to moral vulnerability, but also suggests that the 
way forward, for those committed to a relational political praxis, is uncertain and fragile. 
It underscores, for example, Audre Lorde’s final statement in her “Open Letter to Mary 
Daly:”  
The history of white women who are unable to hear Black women’s words, to 
maintain dialogue with us, is long and discouraging. But for me to assume that 
you will not hear me represents not only history, perhaps, but an old pattern of 
relating, sometimes protective and sometimes dysfunctional, which we, as women 
shaping our future, are in the process of shattering and passing beyond, I hope.”400   
 
What does it mean to engage in the process of “shaping our future,” of entering into the 
“process of shattering and passing beyond”? For Bulkin and Lorde, I would argue, the 
process must be one of reciprocal accountability – a promise both radical and fragile, and 
one fraught with difficult decisions about how to move forward together. Those 
committed to a lesbian politics of relationality must bear in mind, they seem to suggest, 
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questions like the ones raised by Adrienne Rich in SW 18: “What makes us believe these 
decisions can be simple, and who wants us to over-simplify them?”401  
 
Lesbian Avengers on the Ground 
 
If Sinister Wisdom demonstrates that lesbian politics was both deeply relational 
(in the sense that it encompassed not only “differences” between women but relationships 
of inequality within the movement) and reflexive (in the sense that it sought to establish 
practices in which injured members could call others to account for their actions and 
erasures), then it is clearly inaccurate to describe lesbian politics as inherently 
“essentialist.” However, although “lesbian politics” have gone out of style, the lessons 
found in lesbian archives like Sinister Wisdom continue to be associated primarily, if not 
exclusively, with a queer theory and politics most associate with the early 1990s. In this 
section, then, I further complicate queer theory’s exclusive claim on relational and 
reflexive politics by showing that the more grounded meaning of relationality I explored 
in the sections above were, in fact, strong influences in 90s-era queer politics.  
As a group, the Lesbian Avengers have often been understood as participants in 
the queer wave of the 1990s alongside groups like ACTUp and Queer Nation. Because 
they are known best for an aggressive style of public politics that transgresses traditional 
protest tactics (their actions are best known for their spectacle-like quality, often 
including fire-eating, topless demonstrations, and purposeful skirting of permit laws), 
many queer theorists have argued that the group promoted a style of politics that 
transgressed categories of experience in ways that echo Biddy Martin’s reading of This 
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Bridge Called My Back.402 Yet while the Avengers certainly brought a 1990s panache to 
their organizing, I argue here that many of their underlying political commitments reflect 
precisely the concern for uneven relations of accountability that had developed in earlier 
lesbian theory. To make this case, I turn now to the Lesbian Avengers Civil Rights 
Organizing Project (LACROP), an effort the Avengers began in the fall of 1993 to repeal 
local discrimination ordinances. According to the Lesbian Avengers’ Organizing 
Handbook, “the idea was for LACROP to focus on national mobilization against the 
onslaught of statewide anti-lesbian and –gay initiatives promoted by the Christian Right.” 
“At that point,” the handbook reads, “we all knew that we were after the magical sight of 
powerful, out dykes fighting back; we just weren’t sure what that meant logistically. So 
we picked up the phone and started calling around to find out.”403 The Lesbian Avengers, 
in documenting their experiences of organizing “against the Right,” detail several key 
lessons that reflect their deep engagement with the relational politics of the earlier lesbian 
community.  
First, the LACROP project emerged on the premise that it was possible to build 
reciprocal relationships of accountability, despite having to grapple with distinct forms of 
power, authority, and inequality within the movement. LACROP began, for instance, in 
direct response to what its members saw as aggressive attempts to curb to political and 
strategic participation of rural, non-elite lesbian and gays. “As we gathered information 
from dykes in each state facing the possibility of a ballot initiative that campaign year,” 
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their handbook reads, “it became clear that in each case there was one unified state-wide 
campaign which had almost all the money and resources available in that state.” They 
continue,  
These state-wide campaigns often shared a mainstream political vision which did 
not include or even permit any other kinds of organizing. We found that there 
were plenty of dykes wanting to do out, visible grassroots organizing, but they 
had no support. Many saw their only options as (1) to do work within the tightly 
controlled framework of the mainstream campaigns (one state-wide campaign 
actually required volunteers to sign agreements about what they would and 
wouldn’t say and do during the campaign), or (2) to try to work on their own 
without the benefit of any of the resources, money, research materials, skills, and 
support systems that were provided by national mainstream lesbian and gay 
individuals and organizations.404 
 
For the Lesbian Avengers, the vast power differentials between elite – and mainstream – 
LGBT organizations and the rural, relatively powerless people for whom they were 
ostensibly organizing, meant that  
These dykes, who wanted to fight the initiatives without giving up their political 
style or independence, were under siege twice: once by the Christian Right, which 
deliberately chose to target regions where queers were isolated and had relatively 
small support systems, and again by the mainstream campaigns, which wanted to 
control the strategy for everyone and were not willing to share what scarce 
resources there were.405 
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The Lesbian Avengers, like many involved in lesbian politics before them, were deeply 
skeptical of the idea that a successful coalition could be built on the premise of a party 
line – a line which would be defined by an elite group of “mainstream” actors asking 
marginalized group members to remain on the sidelines. Just as feminists had insisted 
that subsuming “sex oppression” under class analysis was a form of sexism, just as 
lesbians had insisted that issues facing lesbian women were distinct from “the 
patriarchy,” and just as lesbians of color had insisted that any lesbianism premised only 
on white women’s leadership would be a failure, the Lesbian Avengers recognized that 
such a hierarchical organization would, ultimately, be an unviable politics.  
 With this recognition of the dangers of non-relational political movements in 
mind, the Lesbian Avengers set out to “offer long-term, day-to-day support that would 
allow us to work with local activists, and would create an atmosphere of mutual learning 
and political growth for the duration of the campaign and beyond.”406 Conceptually, the 
Avengers note that this grassroots approach to organizing must emphasize localized work 
across a variety of perspectives, positions, and approaches: “campaigns can and have 
been won,” they write, “by lots of different lesbians doing lots of different things with 
lots of different messages.” However, they strongly emphasize the need to attend to the 
potential inequalities that will result from a geographically diffuse and resource 
imbalanced movement like LACROP. Because the “Christian Right,” they argue, “targets 
low-income communities, rural areas, and communities of color,” the LACROP’s 
“ethical and political perspective” instead emphasizes the responsibility to attend to the 
inequalities that inhere within the group:  
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Many traditional campaign groups… have virtually ignored low-income and rural 
regions and communities of color based on the assumption that these communities 
are not valuable voting blocks, they’re too small, too dispersed, too homophobic, 
or they’re probably not registered or willing to register to vote, anyway. Dykes 
and fags who live in these areas are ignored […] As we wrote in our 1994 “Out 
Against the Right” Manifesto, “We will not accept superficial legal rights for 
some lesbians and gay men at the expense of real human rights for all of us.” 
Butch, femme, and androgynous dykes, lesbians and gay men of color, drag 
queens, lesbian and gay youth, transsexuals, people with AIDS, lesbians and gays 
with disabilities, and rural lesbians and gay men will not be sacrificed in the name 
of “campaign strategy.”407 
 
By emphasizing localized, grass-roots organizing and a shared responsibility to attend to 
a wide range of existing inequalities within the movement, the Lesbian Avengers thus 
extend the promise of reciprocal accountability that characterized earlier lesbian politics.  
However, LACROP members, particularly in the Idaho “No on One” campaign, 
were particularly susceptible to claims of moral vulnerability made by local organizers. 
Like the contributors to Sinister Wisdom, LACROP organizers soon learned that the 
promise of reciprocal accountability comes with the risk that these relations will fail. 
While the Avengers themselves collected and curated a number of letters attesting to their 
unbridled success (a typical response reads “I’m finally sitting down to write this long 
overdue thank you […] A thank you for teaching us how to be Lesbian Avengers, to 
organize, to get wild… and a thank you for being you are and helping to create a 
supportive environment in which we could all grow and truly be who we are”408), a good 
deal of evidence also attests to the fragility of the relations of accountability the Avengers 
sought to establish. Despite the Avengers’ best efforts to ensure that their relational 
praxis could keep them accountable for the internal hierarchies their organizing would 
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elicit, these relations were not always truly reciprocal as promised. “I know you wouldn’t 
want people to have the mistaken impression that the Avengers came to North Idaho and 
single-handedly defeated the Idaho Citizens Alliance,” one open letter to the Lesbian 
Avengers reads,  
but when you use titles like “Avengers Defeat the Christian Right in Rural Idaho” 
and write that “county returns on Proposition 1 indicate that LACROP’s strategy 
worked,” people might get the wrong idea. It would be helpful to mention that 
there had been an 18-month campaign against radical right propaganda that had 
taken place before the Avengers ever arrived in the area: led for the most part by 
the Latah/Nez Perce Voices for Human Rights, a coalition of gays and straights 
organized in early 1993.409  
 
Another letter, also published in the newspaper Diversity in 1995, names more explicitly 
a relationship of moral vulnerability by describing the “shame,” “anger,” and “fear” the 
Avengers elicited in her:  
The Avengers have haloed themselves with an aura of arrogance. They imply it 
was their efforts that made the difference in a very close vote and of course it was 
their “recruit” campaign that increased gay participation. Who is to say what 
worked and what didn’t?  
 
What I do know is that many of their activities offend and embarrass me. I feel 
shame when I hear stories of women licking each others’ faces and baring their 
breasts at a local airport as a high salute to departing Avengers. I feel anger 
whenever I see a shirt sloganed with “we recruit” since it undermines others’ 
attempts to correct a stereotypical myth. I feel fear when they recruit people into 
making public statements with little regard for the consequences. It is so easy to 
become intoxicated for the moment without considering the hangover they will 
awaken to tomorrow.  
 
At a recent meeting I listened to a father who lost his job following his son’s 
appearance at a town meeting the Avengers co-sponsored. While the Avengers 
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A third writer suggests, quite pointedly, that “if the Lesbian Avengers want to do 
something really radical, and engage in true anarchy, they embark on an intensive 
journey of self-examination. There’s an action that would benefit us all.”411 If the Lesbian 
Avengers had promised a praxis built on relations of reciprocal accountability, many of 
their co-organizers argued passionately about the breaches of this promise – that is, the 
moral vulnerability – that they experienced during the actual campaign.  
Finally, the experience in Idaho caused the New York Lesbian Avengers group to 
develop a process for accounting for these kinds of claims in their organizing. While they 
do not find a way to resolve or overcome these inequalities, they emphasize the extent to 
which it is necessary to actively confront them. Their efforts echo Bulkin’s attempts to 
establish a process whereby the group examines the criteria of acceptability that govern 
their collective decisions. In a reflective piece on the relative value of polling research, 
for instance, the Avengers note that 
… we do not believe in constructing a single message based on poll results. The 
‘single-message’ mentality inhibits our diverse communities and individuals from 
defining our own roles in the movement, based on what matters to us as lesbian 
and gay people under attack. The single most important factor in these campaigns 
is our community – mobilizing it, defending it, strengthening it. By community we 
do not mean one unified, single-voiced, monolithic mass. Nor do we mean a pool 
of volunteers waiting to be plucked out and sent to lick postage stamps for the 
people who determine the message. We mean widely diverse lesbian and gay 
people with different histories, priorities, and political strategies. So prioritizing 
the community during the campaign does not mean sacrificing individual and 
group differences for the “good of the whole” and conforming to the so-called 
scientific message. It means ensuring that everyone is given full opportunity and 
encouragement to express what the campaign means to them. And this always, 
necessarily, no matter what, means a multiplicity of messages. People will say 
they can do both – they can’t.412  
 
 
411 Ibid.  
412 Ibid.  
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For the Avengers, the lessons of politics are not to discover the “right” side, but to think 
relationally about the forms of power and authority that inhere in any political effort. In 
the end, the lessons that the Lesbian Avengers learned in Idaho were not so different from 
Adrienne Rich’s conclusion in the earlier context of Sinister Wisdom – that the questions, 
at bottom are ““What makes us believe these decisions can be simple, and who wants us 
to over-simplify them?”  
 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have suggested that although lesbianism is often seen as 
essentially essentialist, especially in relation to queer theory, quite a different picture 
emerges when we take seriously the ways that uneven, often contested relations between 
and among lesbian feminists played into the group’s political praxis. First, I have argued 
that the figure of “the essentialist lesbian” in queer theory is less a political or historical 
reality than an effect of queer theorists’ transposition of the political lessons of 
relationality into a methodological register. Second, in contrast to queer theory’s 
transposition of the lessons of relationality into problems of “incorrect” categories, I have 
argued that lesbian feminists involved in communities like Sinister Wisdom sought to 
understand how relations of inequality produced what I have argued are best described as 
moral vulnerabilities. Documenting how lesbians of color named and developed their 
understanding of relations of moral vulnerability from within the lesbian movement, I 
have argued, throws the promise of reciprocal accountability in lesbian feminism into 
stark relief against their characterization as “essentialist” within queer theory. Equally, 
understanding inequalities within lesbian politics as failures of accountability also shows 
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how both white lesbians and lesbians of color sought to inaugurate an uncertain and 
fragile practice of moral repair that exceeds our contemporary understandings of 
politically “correct” methods and frameworks for dealing with difference. Finally, I have 
argued that when we understand lesbian politics to have contributed a distinctive 
relational political praxis, we can start to observe important continuities between 
“lesbian” and “queer” political goals. The Lesbian Avengers’ LACROP organizing 
project is but one example of how the ostensibly queer departure from lesbian 
essentialism in fact drew on lesbian political lessons even as queer theorists disavowed 
and homogenized them.   
To return to the example with which I opened this chapter, then, how might 
seeing lesbianism relationally help us to make sense of an event like the London Pride 
parade, in which the ongoing antagonism between ‘lesbians’ and ‘queers’ appears like 
some kind of war between right and wrong ways of thinking politically? First, thinking of 
lesbianism on relational terms should alter the ways that we perceive these groups 
themselves. As Young would point out, no group is “essentialist” in reality, precisely 
because relations of authority and subordination, of privilege and marginality, exist in all 
groups. We should be skeptical, then, of any symbolic political scene that asks us to 
judge whether we are “for” or “against” an essentialist vision of the world, and we should 
be equally skeptical of the notion that the solution to inequalities is a more sophisticated 
methodological frame that “accounts for” difference. What is needed, I would argue, is 
neither a more charitable reading of the TERFs in the name of “hearing both sides,” nor 
is it an out-of-hand rejection of “lesbianism” as a potential site of coalitional struggle. 
Rather than simply cancel TERFs out of an abstract commitment to “difference,” then, 
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lesbian feminists of the 1980s would offer a more robust critique of the London protesters 
and a coalitional path forward, if feminists and queers are willing to take it. If any group 
is making a claim of moral vulnerability and a demand for repair, it is the trans* activists 
who, like lesbians of color in the 1980s, articulate a kind of breach of the promise of 
reciprocity that a feminist or queer counterpublic promises. And it is the TERFs who, in 
the name of an egregiously inaccurate version of the history of lesbian feminism, have 
attempted to “Get the L Out,” thereby refusing engagement, reciprocal or otherwise, with 
trans* people. Such a situation need not be a matter of giving up on the LGBTQ coalition 
altogether; rather, like the negotiations over race that I describe above, it ought to be seen 
as an invitation into an open-ended process of accounting and repairing that is the real 
end of coalition-building.   
Second, just as defining the unequal relationships within the lesbian feminist 
community as instances of moral vulnerability recasts the harms suffered by lesbians of 
color as breeches of accountability rather than exclusions, viewing this community in 
relational terms also transfigures our understanding of the ways in which lesbians sought 
to approach redress. This is an important lesson for both feminist and queer politics 
today, because understanding relationality as the central political lesson of lesbianism 
must necessarily alter how we approach difficult questions of inclusion and difference in 
groups like the “LGBTQ movement.” While it is tempting to cast one’s politics in the 
terms of moral authority – of “correct” articulations of solidarity and progressivism – a 
relational view will necessarily, and, I think, productively, trouble this impulse. Relations 
and hierarchies are not things anyone concerned with social justice can be “for” or 
“against;” rather, we can only ask how, and how well, people imbricated in these 
 218 
hierarchies respond to them, whether they are able to name them, to accept responsibility 
for them, and to work together to repair them.  
 These lessons, however, have largely been forgotten in an era in which complex, 
highly abstract theories about constitutive “difference” and “exclusion” have made it 
clear that it is politically naïve, at best, and simply incorrect, at worse, to think or act in 
from a political commitment to reciprocal accountability. Such aims, we are told, betray 
our perverse desire for policing identity, for “wounded attachments,” for “constitutive 
exclusions.” However, as the relational account I have reconstructed here indicates, 
practice of reciprocal accountability are in fact well-equipped to help us build more 
robust solidarities with one another without effacing the real conditions of inequality in 
which these relations will be built. More than this, though, it points to a more 
fundamental political reality: that the conditions of inequality that make the harms of 
moral vulnerability possible will not disappear because we have a “more thorough” 
conceptual apparatus for understanding how differences inhere in categories. Instead, we 
must take these relationships as a condition for – and an invitation into – relational 













Seeing from the ‘Oppressed Point of View’  
 
Besides, domination is denied; there is no 
slavery of women, there is difference. To 
which I will answer with this statement 
made by a Rumanian peasant at a public 
meeting in 1848: ‘Why do the gentlemen 
say it was not slavery, for we know it to 
have been slavery, this sorrow that we have 
sorrowed.’ Yes, we know it, and this science 
of oppression cannot be taken away from us. 
- Monique Wittig413 
Introduction 
 
At the beginning of this dissertation, I suggested that reconstructing lesbian 
feminism during the 1980s as a distinct form of publicity can teach feminist academics 
important lessons about what it would take to build more intersectional coalitions in the 
present. Throughout this work, I have argued that in order to recognize these resources, 
we must stop thinking in terms of “third wave” assumptions about this period. Such a 
move would include displacing narratives about lesbian feminists’ identitarian, 
exclusionary, and essentialist commitments. Instead, I have maintained that we approach 
lesbian feminism by thinking intersectionally – that is, by asking ourselves: Who do we 
imagine as our audience when we speak? To whom are our theories and political 
frameworks accountable? Intersectionality, that is, requires that we remind ourselves that 
making space for marginalized voices isn’t just about getting coalition right, but is about 
committing to repairing the trust that hierarchies and asymmetries jeopardize. 
 
413 Monique Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1992), 31.  
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In the preceding chapters, then, I argued that lesbian feminism, far from 
occupying the essentialist, reactionary, and exclusionary identity politics that “third 
wave” historicizations have imposed on it, was in fact an open-ended, process-oriented, 
and deeply coalitional project. Further, although I’ve been arguing that lesbian feminism 
was an effort to build a public, the goal was not to reproduce just any kind of public; it 
was to be something radically new – a public organized around the principle of listening 
and accounting, of repairing and working through. In the chapter that follows, then, I will 
turn more explicitly to a concept that has constantly vexed contemporary scholars about 
lesbian feminists’ appeals to these political activities: the category of ‘experience.’ On 
the face of it, the appeal to listening, accounting, and repairing made by lesbian feminists 
seems to rest explicitly and more than a little problematically on the uneasy terrain of 
‘experience.’ Because the activities of listening, accounting, and repairing have to do 
with accepting the inherent validity of the claims made by the marginalized, and with 
allowing such claims to transform the way we assess and articulate political claims in the 
first place, they seem to many to recall a set of largely discredited debates over what is 
now called “feminist standpoint theory.” Standpoint theories, as Nancy Hartsock put it in 
one of her early essays on the subject, at best “leads us to respect experience and 
differences, to respect people enough to believe that they are in the best possible position 
to make their own revolution.”414 At worst, however, critics of standpoint theory have 
argued that the uncritical relationship between lived experiences, standpoints, and radical 
politics that these theories portray risks reproducing the very categories that oppress 
 
414 Nancy Hartsock, “Fundamental Feminism: Prospect and Perspective,” Building 
Feminist Theory, ed. Charlotte Bunch (New York: Longman, 1981); 40.  
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women and dangerously restricting the spectrum of what “counts” as women’s 
experiences as women.415  
Indeed, as critiques of feminist standpoint theory gained steam in the academy, it 
was lesbian feminists’ apparent overreliance on experience – along with the related 
charges of essentialism and exclusion – that fueled “third wave” rejections of lesbian 
feminism.416 In this chapter, however, I argue not only that lesbian feminists understood 
the distinctive challenges of experience as a political concept, but also that they actively 
sought to establish their intersectional and coalitional politics on a different terrain. 
Rather than establishing experience as a radical form of feminist epistemology, as 
theorists like Hartsock did, or resignifying experiences by developing theories of 
performativity and embodiment as queer theorists would later advocate, lesbian feminists 
grappled with the political challenges of experience by relentlessly interrogating the ways 
that certain experiences are systematically foreclosed as political matters – in short, of the 
danger of mistaking a certain perspective for the interests and desires of the public that I 
outlined in Chapter 2.  
I make this case by turning to a surprising figure in lesbian feminism during this 
period: Monique Wittig. Indeed, Wittig cuts an imposing figure in the history that I am 
telling in this work, not least because she has been claimed as a sort of untimely 
 
415 Joan Scott’s now-classic critique of experience, for example, emphasizes how 
experience has become something of a “foundation” for ostensibly non-foundationalist 
historians. I return to Scott’s argument about experience below. "The Evidence of 
Experience," Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (Summer, 1991): 773-797. 
416 Biddy Martin’s critique of “coming out” narratives from Chapter 3, for example, relies 
on just such a rejection of experience. “Lesbian Identity and Autobiographical 
Difference[s]” The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Abelove, Barale, and Halperin. 
(New York: Routledge, 1993); 274-293.  
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predecessor to queer theory’s rejection of essentialism and overreliance on lived 
experience altogether. In particular, Wittig’s understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality 
as products of the material relationship between language and social hierarchy is lauded 
by queer theorists for having displaced the intractable debates over “experience” that had 
plagued feminist assessments of standpoint. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 
5, even as Wittig’s political thinking has been taken up by a wide range of queer theorists 
to substantiate their claims to anti-essentialism, many queer theorists have simultaneously 
gone to great lengths to distinguish themselves from Wittig as a lesbian theorist. Diane 
Crowder, for example, has traced the shape of Wittig’s strange shadow on feminist and 
queer theory by arguing that, on the one hand, it is widely accepted among queer theorists 
that “Wittig was at least fifteen years ahead of what would become queer theory” – that, 
in rejecting the gender binary as a political given and thereby displacing the stale debates 
over “standpoint,” she is a kind of “prophet.”417 At the same time, Crowder argues, 
because Wittig cannot be easily excised from her lesbian feminist context, queer theorists 
have nonetheless worked to distance themselves from her in dubious ways: “[In] order to 
differentiate themselves from Wittig and others who had already elaborated a radically 
anti-essentialist theory of sex, gender, and sexuality,” Crowder provocatively suggests, 
 
417 Diane Griffin Crowder, “From the Straight Mind to Queer Theory: Implications for 
Political Movement,” GLQ 13 no. 4 (2007): 490. Indeed, as Crowder notes, many early 
influential queer theorists cited Wittig as inspiration, if not ally. See, for example, Judith 
Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (New York: Routledge, 
1993); Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: 
Routledge, 1990); Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference 
(New York: Routledge, 1989); Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New 
York: New York University Press, 1997); Teresa de Lauretis, “Upping the Anti in 
Feminist Theory,” in Conflicts in Feminism, ed. Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller 
(New York: Routledge, 1990): 255-270.  
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“some representatives of queer theory felt obliged to denounce Wittig’s redefinition of 
lesbianism as itself essentialist.” She continues,  
But a closer look at what Wittig has written shows that her ‘definition’ of the 
lesbian bears no substantive resemblance to the creature posited by certain critics 
who see it as “naively” conceived or as a “third gender” that somehow 
miraculously escapes the reality of obligatory heterosexuality. That so many 
female queer theorists impugn this one idea suggests, for me, a rift between their 
acceptance of many of Wittig’s ideas and their rejection, or misunderstanding, of 
the materialist foundation upon which those ideas rest.418  
 
Following Crowder, I want to suggest that queer theorists’ positioning of Wittig as a kind 
of untimely precursor to queer theory – as a prophet rather than a political thinker in her 
own right – radically dislocates her from the 1980s, from the materialist feminism she 
produced, and from the scene of lesbian feminism altogether. As I have argued 
throughout this work, such moves to memorialize lesbian feminist thinkers as prophets 
even as they are dislocated from their political context is not only historically suspect, but 
also evacuates the political resources of lesbian feminism from the present.  
If Wittig displaced the debate over “standpoint” that had grown stale by the mid-
1980s, then, I will argue that it is not because she was a queer prophet heralding a turn 
away from experience and towards a politics of resignification. Nor, I will argue, was this 
displacement the result of her rejection of the tenets of lesbian feminism during the 1980s 
more generally. Instead, I will argue that Wittig drew upon the activities of publicity that 
were central to lesbian feminism – listening, accounting, and repairing – to theorize more 
explicitly the risks of mistaking one’s marginality as an exemplary political stance. I will 
argue, following Wittig, that it is true that an attention to lived experience and standpoint 
alone will not suffice for an intersectional and coalitional feminist politics. But I will also 
 
418 Crowder, “From the Straight Mind to Queer Theory,” 490-491.  
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argue that Wittig, like many of her lesbian feminist contemporaries, understood this. In 
fact, Wittig reminds us that lived experiences carry political weight not because they 
represent a kind of irrefutable evidence, or because they reveal something fundamentally 
distinctive about a feminist standpoint – or queer exemplarity – within gendered 
hierarchies. Rather, they matter politically because they remind us of the extent to which 
demands for accountability are so often reduced to bland claims about difference; 
because they testify to the extent to which we, because shaped by these reductions, are 
willing to accept the rules of the game; because they point to the difficulty of creating 
institutional and political change armed with ‘mere’ experiences. They might point us, as 
Sara Ahmed has suggested they should, to the ways that efforts to expose experiences of 
abuse can paradoxically breed silence.419 They might alert us, in short, to what I call in 
this chapter the systemic political constraints on the existence of certain kinds of political 
experiences and subjects. Wittig reminds us, then, that the coalitional practices that I have 
argued throughout this dissertation were central to lesbian feminism during the 1980s – 
the practices of listening, accounting, repair – are not epistemological problems, as they 
are often depicted, but political ones.  
Confronting these problems in politically effective ways, I argue in this chapter, 
cannot be accomplished through attention to experience alone. But neither will it be 
accomplished by critiquing experience and turning, as the theorists in Chapter 1 did, to a 
more exemplary methodological approach. Instead, I suggest here that Wittig’s work 
 
419 Ahmed, who has resigned from her post at Goldsmiths University, has recently begun 
independently writing on institutional abuse in the academy “in dedication to those who 
have experiences they would complain about but cannot complain because of their 
experiences.” See “Complaint as Diversity Work,” Feminist Killjoys; 11/10/17. 
https://feministkilljoys.com/ 
 225 
distills and illuminates what is compelling about the particular way that lesbian theorists 
grappled with this challenge of coalition-building through the practices of listening, 
accounting, and repairing. I do so in three parts. First, I lay out a decades-old debate 
between standpoint theorists and their “third wave” critics, paying special attention to the 
role of the category “experience” in both. While standpoint theorists argue that the lived 
experience of marginality can be transformed into a political consciousness that incites 
radical, structural change, critics of this view argue instead that standpoint theorists fail to 
interrogate how lived experiences are constructed, maintained, and co-opted in power, 
thereby forfeiting any radical change marginal figures might hope to effect. Instead of 
naively reproducing the very concepts and categories that bind them, then, these theorists 
advocate for a politics of resignification, in which hierarchies are not erased, but are 
rather “re-membered.”420 
 Wittig, by contrast, revises the framework of existence developed in Simone de 
Beauvoir’s Second Sex to describe a distinctive operation of power which exceeds both 
standpoint theorists’ and Delphy’s formulations. Like Beauvoir, Wittig insists that seeing 
power from the “oppressed point of view” reveals a unique dimension of power: under 
oppressive conditions, politicizing lived experiences tends not to enable self-constitution 
but to reify oppressive relations by reducing certain subjects’ political claims to claims 
about inclusion into a collective standpoint, on the one hand, or exemplary difference, on 
the other. In effect, this dimension of power describes the perennial challenge of publicity 
that I outlined in Chapter 2; namely, the risk of mistaking a particular point of view for 
 
420 Denise Riley uses the term “re-membering” to denote a “new” feminist theory that 
emerged from the work, among others, of French feminists in general, and Julia Kristeva 
in particular. I will return to Riley’s conception of re-membering below.   
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the interests of “the” public. Working against this tendency, Wittig argues that the 
persistent reduction of lesbian existence to matters of inclusion or difference should not 
prompt theorists and political actors to merely interrogate lesbians’ marginal position, but 
should cause them to demand accountability for their marginal position and repair of their 
reduced subjectivities. Sustained attention to lesbian existence, she argues, can therefore 
help lesbian feminists learn to divest from this operation of power.  
Working against the tendency to displace Wittig and her ideas from the context of 
lesbian feminism and to read her, instead, as an untimely precursor to queer theory, in 
Part II I situate Wittig’s argument about lesbian existence within the political context of 
the French feminist Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF) in particular, and in 
the context of lesbian feminism more broadly. Considered in these contexts, Wittig’s 
attention to lesbian existence was born out of a set of concrete political evaluations that 
bear striking similarities to the ones I argued were hashed out in the American context. In 
particular, Wittig’s experiences in the MLF reveal the degree to which the challenges of 
publicity that I have outlined are problems of coalitions, broadly speaking, rather than 
problems specific to the individuals and groups that made up lesbian feminism in the U.S. 
More than that, though, locating Wittig in her historical and political context also reveal 
how her engagement in lesbian organizing allowed her to theorize the challenges of 
publicity as well as the coalitional resources she thought were lesbian feminists’ best 
options. Finally, I open up the question of what Wittig’s emphasis on lesbian existence 
teaches us in terms of resisting the persistent challenges of publicity that lesbian 
feminism identified. If attention to lesbian existence helped Wittig notice that power 
functions by reducing the terms on which one can exist politically, I argue, then the 
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lesbian feminist conception of coalition as a process in which listening, accounting, and 
repairing suddenly appear all the more appealing.  
 
Problems of ‘Experience’  
The feminist turn to individual experiences as a mode of analysis can hardly be 
understated. Indeed, not only was it the pillar on which key tenets like “the personal is 
political” were built, but the emphasis on lived experience also lies at the heart of 
feminism’s revolutionary ambitions. 421 As a NOW consciousness-raising manual from 
1982 put it, revealing personal experiences of sexist oppression are “the key to taking 
action.” Thought in this light, experience is precisely that which fuels the very 
revolutionary consciousness that a revolutionary counterpublic requires: “The anger, 
pain, and frustration of being a woman,” the manual continues, for example, “must be 
seen as a common experience, an experience which can be transformed into action, action 
which produces change, change which gives hope.”422 Indeed, if the goal of 
consciousness-raising was to transform lived experiences into feminist consciousness and 
consciousness into action, feminist theorists supposed, then this process of moving 
 
421 In her landmark essay “The Personal is Political,” for example, Carol Hanisch argues 
that redefining what is considered “personal” is, in fact, a revolutionary activity. 
Referring to the activity of sharing experiences during consciousness-raising, Hanisch 
writes that “the reason I participate in these meetings is not to solve any personal 
problem. One of the first things we discover in these groups is that personal problems are 
political problems. There are no personal solutions at this time. There is only collective 
action for a collective solution.” Later, she goes on to argue that accounting for as many 
women’s experiences as possible (including “apolitical” women’s) is necessary “not so 
we can do a better job of organizing them but because together we are a mass 
movement.” Notes from the Second Year: Writings of the Radical Feminists (1970), 76-
77. 
422 National Organization for Women, NOW Guidelines for Feminist Consciousness-
Raising (Washington, D.C.: NOW, 1982), 2.  
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outward from experience was to be feminism’s unique contribution to the history of 
political thought and strategy. In Fundamental Feminism, for instance, Judith Grant 
explains that many “second wave” feminists understood the links between experience, 
feminist consciousness, and political action as feminism’s key contribution to Left 
politics.423 Resisting the notion that “class consciousness” must be understood on 
objective terms, as Marxists and New Left theorists did, for feminists oppression came to 
be understood as 
anything that women experienced as oppressive […] The idea of experience was 
necessary because of the need for some kind of evidence that women were 
oppressed. That is, it was necessary to prove that the category Woman existed 
because if women did not have something in common, the full analytic value of 
the major foundational category of feminist theory would disappear. The idea 
behind experience is that it would unite women through what it was assumed 
would be their common feelings about oppression.424  
 
Thus, the turn to experience, in Grant’s telling, was a way of soliciting the viewpoints of 
a variety of women. In so doing, feminists hoped, they could build a revolutionary 
conception of women’s oppression that accounts for their seeming differences across 
class, racial, and other social divisions.  
 
423 According to Grant, “The New Left followed Marxian theory in positing objective 
conditions of oppression and exploitation (such as “class”) that may or may not be 
subjectively felt or realized by the revolutionary agent. Likewise, the Black Power 
movement had an objective standard for oppression, i.e., skin color […] But neither of 
these objectivist definitions of oppression would do for feminism.” Grant argues that, in 
fact, because “the creators of feminist theory, many of whom were neither black nor 
working class, at first could discern no argument that might enable them to create a 
compelling testament to their own structural oppression,” – and because “women were 
present in every oppressed and oppressing group” – they eventually settled on a 
subjectivist theory of oppression. Judith Grant. Fundamental Feminism: Contesting the 
Core Concepts of Feminist Theory (New York: Routledge, 1993), 28-29.  
424 Ibid., 30-31. Emphasis mine.  
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It was this intuition – that despite their differences, there was a common thread 
across all women’s experiences of work, family, and sex – that motivated the rise and fall 
of what is now known as “feminist standpoint theory.” On a basic level, feminist 
standpoint theorists make the case that, as Nancy C.M. Hartsock put it, sexism is a 
system-wide, structuring force that shapes women’s lives in a distinctive way. For 
Hartsock, “patriarchy,” as understood through the lens of the sexual division of labor, 
imposes a set of material, regular, and definable limitations on social relationships 
between men and women. “Female experience,” because structured and defined by these 
dynamics, reveals oppressive gendered dynamics in ways that men consistently fail to 
understand. Women’s experience, for Hartsock, thus “forms a basis on which to expose 
abstract masculinity as both partial and fundamentally perverse, as not only occupying 
only one side of the dualities it has constructed, but reversing the proper valuation of 
human society.”425 Women’s experiences, in other words, give the lie to the universalist 
assumptions baked into “capitalist patriarchy;” moreover, in revealing the limitations of 
current ways of understanding the world, the feminist standpoint not only “[reveals] the 
perverseness and inhumanity of human relations,” but also “forms the basis for moving 
beyond these relations.”426 Because women’s experiences give the lie to (masculine) 
abstract universalism, Hartsock argues,  
women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male 
supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the 
phallocentric institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of 
patriarchy… just as Marx’s understanding of the world from the standpoint of the 
 
425 Nancy C.M. Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a 
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” Discovering Reality: Feminist 
Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Methodology, ed. Sandra Harding and 
Merrill B. Hintinkka (New York: Kluewr, 1983), 299.  
426 Ibid., 303.  
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proletariat enabled him to go beneath bourgeois ideology, so a feminist standpoint 
can allow us to understand patriarchal institutions and ideologies as perverse 
inversions of more human social relations.427  
 
If women’s experiences thus reveal the one-sidedness of previous epistemological 
assumptions (including Marxism’s and the New Left’s), the political task at hand, 
Hartsock would go on to argue, is the paradigmatically feminist practice of 
consciousness-raising. While all females experience the constraints of work, family, 
embodiment, and sex, their standpoint becomes a feminist one when they begin to realize 
the latent revolutionary potential of their common condition. In a word, to occupy a 
feminist standpoint is, for Hartsock, to accept the task of “[exposing] and [clarifying] the 
theoretical bases for political alliance and solidarity” amongst all women.428  Because 
feminism begins from women’s real, lived experiences as the basis of its revolutionary 
class consciousness, she argues, the shared “status of liminality” gives “us” (women) a 
revolutionary political edge.429 
 Feminist standpoint theory, in systematizing the idea that attention to lived 
experience is revolutionary, quickly caught fire amongst feminists in the academy. 
Following Hartsock, a number of prominent feminist theorists throughout the 1980s 
developed the notion that women’s experiences constitute a special and privileged 
vantage point onto social relationships, hierarchies, and structures. Dorothy Smith, a 
sociologist, argued that the major categories of sociological inquiry reflected only the 
distorted vision of “abstract masculinity” and that the field would be better off if it were 
 
427Ibid., 284.  
428 Ibid., 284.  
429 Nancy C.M. Hartsock, “Postmodernism and Political Change: Issues for Feminist 
Theory,” Cultural Critique 14 (1989-90): 28.  
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organized around concepts that reflected lived experiences.430 In the philosophy of 
science, Sandra Harding and Evelyn Fox Keller argued that the notion of scientific 
“objectivity” is strengthened, not weakened, when scientists begin by interrogating the 
situatedness and interestedness lived experiences rather than from specious, one-sided 
assumptions about human nature and social relationships.431 The philosopher Alison 
Jaggar argued that analyzing women’s experiences justified not only the validity of 
feminist philosophy, but underpins a sea change in all theories of knowledge.432 Even 
Black feminists like Patricia Hill Collins and bell hooks used the tools of standpoint 
theory to argue that marginality (especially the double marginalization of Black women) 
was a potential “site of resistance” in that allowed the development of alternative forms 
of relating.433 For all of these thinkers, beginning from experience is necessary for raising 
a feminist consciousness capable of revolutionizing existing social relationships.   
But despite its popularity as an academic approach, problems with the feminist 
standpoint – that is, a privileged location from which one can disclose the truth about 
hierarchy – were apparent from the beginning. As Susan Hekman notes, for one, 
Hartsock’s insistence that “the ruling group’s vision is partial and perverse and that the 
 
430 Dorothy Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1987).  
431 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1986); Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Evelyn Fox Keller, “Feminism and Science,” Signs 7 no. 
3 (1982); 589-602.  
432 Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Oxford: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1983).  
433 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 1991); bell hooks. “marginality as a site 
of resistance,” Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures, ed. Russel 
Ferguson, Martha Gever, Trinh T. Minh-ha, and Cornell West (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1990), 341-343.  
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vision of the oppressed exposes the ‘real’ relations among humans”434 strains deeply 
against the ascendant Foucaultian paradigm, popular amongst many feminist theorists by 
the late 1980s, in which “all visions are ‘partial and perverse’ in the sense that all 
knowledge is necessarily from some perspective.”435 Second, as Collins’ and hooks’ 
appeals to a specifically Black feminist standpoint make clear, “the” feminist standpoint 
as a way of outlining the common liminality of women was neither as universal nor as 
uncontested as it purported to be.436 For many of the writers with whom I have been 
engaging, this issue is the definitive question at work: Must experiences be shared 
amongst all women in order to count as the stuff of a radical feminist consciousness?437 
Can experiences of racism or sexual ‘deviance,’438 for example, properly be considered 
 
434 Susan Hekman, “Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited,” Signs 22 
no. 2 (1997): 345. Hekman contends in this essay that, in fact, Hartsock’s feminist 
epistemology is less at odds with Foucaultian claims about knowledge than is often 
appreciated; however, she does acknowledge how deeply the rift between these two 
epistemological paradigms was felt by feminists during the 1980s.  
435 Ibid., 345.  
436 Indeed, in Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), Patricia Hill Collins describes in detail the process 
by which dominant groups – even when they are marginalized in other contexts, such as 
white women – can come to “[appropriate] the language… associated with other groups’ 
standpoints while rejecting the actual politics associated with those standpoints,” 194. I 
will return to this argument below.  
437 Hartsock, for her part, attempts to deal with this problem by arguing that “differences” 
between women are less ontological fact than effects of the dominant masculine 
epistemology. She urges feminists to dispense of the notion that there are irreducible 
differences between women on the grounds that it occludes the kind of systemic 
knowledge that is essential for revolutionary change. This argument, as we shall see, was 
the target of considerable anger and distrust for “third wave” feminists.  
438 Although space does not permit it here, there is much to be sad about the role of so-
called “deviant” sexualities in this debate; in particular, as Gayle Rubin lays out, were the 
sadomasochists who called feminists to task for having created a discourse of sexual 
conservatism. As Shane Phelan would later go on to note, “the issue of lesbian 
sadomasochism came to expose two problem areas for lesbian feminism” in particular. 
“The first is the problem of difference, particularly sexual difference, and the second is 
the question of speech…When lesbian sadomasochists began to speak… those lesbians 
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an aspect of women’s experience as women?439 Must women put aside their differences 
in favor of the feminist standpoint in order to create radical change?    
Indeed, the turn to experience to facilitate a potentially revolutionary class 
consciousness, however galvanizing in the short term, has long been the subject of deep 
reservations for many “third wave” feminist theorists. In her paradigm-shifting essay 
“The Evidence of Experience,” for example, Joan Scott questions even the most basic 
assumptions of feminist standpoint theory: that lived experiences are reliable and 
transparent indicators of social structures, that macro-level differences between, say, 
women and men are more epistemically important than are racial, classed, and other 
differences between women themselves, and – most importantly – that rendering visible 
one’s marginal status was enough to wholly undo the hierarchical relations that produce 
marginality. For Scott, the turn to experience, on the one hand, “has helped to legitimize 
a critique of the false claims to objectivity of traditional historical accounts” by “pointing 
out the shortcomings, incompleteness, and exclusiveness of mainstream history;” in 
particular, as in the case of feminist standpoint, it has done so by “providing 
documentation about women in the past that calls into question existing interpretations 
 
who did not approve could find no room within feminism for their inclusion. Neither 
could they tell them not to speak without becoming the new oppressors.” Identity 
Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1989), 138.  
439 On this question, Black (and) lesbian feminists differed considerably from other 
standpoint theorists. Where Hartsock encouraged feminists to dispense with 
“differences,” for example, Patricia Hill Collins instead advocates for an approach that 
sees how the intersections between various forms of oppression affect one’s political 
consciousness. “Although most individuals have little difficulty identifying their own 
victimization within some major system of oppression,” Collins writes, “they typically 
fail to see how their thoughts and actions uphold someone else’s subordination.” Black 
Feminist Thought, 229.  
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made without consideration of gender.”440 On the other hand, though, Scott maintains 
that approaches like standpoint theory fail to analyze “how subjects are constituted as 
different in the first place.”441 Moreover, Scott claims that in accepting the notion that 
lived experiences – and individual narrations of those experiences – can accurately 
capture the shape and scope of hierarchies, standpoint theorists naively assume that 
revolutionary change is the obvious and inevitable result of truth-telling and 
consciousness raising. For Scott and other “third wave” critics of experience, however, 
standpoint theories simply leave aside questions about how certain differences become 
more relevant than others, how power sometimes incorporates and corrupts efforts at 
consciousness-raising, and how an uncritical reliance on lived experiences limits 
theorists’ ability to see past individual, voluntaristic forms of political change. In short,  
the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or 
in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than 
contests given ideological systems – those that assume that the facts of history 
speak for themselves and those that rest on notions of a natural or established 
opposition between, say, sexual practices and social conventions, or between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality.442  
 
In light of arguments like Scott’s,443 then, the questions that were raised by standpoint 
theorists came to be seen as limited both as an epistemology and as a politics.444 Thus, as 
 
440 Joan Scott. “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry 17 no. 4 (1991): 777. 
441 Ibid., 777.  
442 Ibid., 778.   
443 Scott’s, of course, is not the only critique of experience emerging from the “third 
wave” of feminist theory. Other prominent examples include works by Donna Haraway, 
Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, Linda Nicholson, and many others. An excellent overview of 
the range of these positions can be found in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda J. 
Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990).  
444 In a rejoinder to a spirited critique of her work by Linda Gordon, Scott wrote the 
following in defense of her conceptualization of the relationship between epistemology 
and politics: “Despite endless disagreement, some things are clear: theory is intimately 
related to practice, academic feminism is political, and feminists address and attempt to 
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Kathleen Canning has pointed out, Scott’s landmark essay “constructs the task of 
analyzing the experience and/or identity of difference as oppositional rather than 
complementary to the task of examining how difference was constituted in the first 
place.”445   
 Because standpoint theorists and their critics see the role of “experience” in 
radically different lights, their view onto the possibilities of political change are also 
deeply at odds. On the one hand, feminist standpoint theorists argue that feminism 
represents a revolutionary potential – that in becoming conscious of their privileged 
vantage point onto power, “women” might reveal the real shape and scope of oppression, 
thereby throwing into relief the kinds of material changes that would need to be 
accomplished in order to restore or remake “more human” relationships. On the other, 
critics of experience as a political tool broadly reject the idea that revolutionary change 
can be so easily accomplished. In Am I That Name?, for instance, Denise Riley argues 
that the “indeterminate” nature of women – the fact that “women’s experiences” are 
historically constructed and ever-changing – points towards a politics of “re-membering” 
or resignification rather than revolution. If feminism “cannot escape the torments which 
spring from speaking for a collectivity,” Riley argues, neither can “[these] difficulties… 
be assuaged by appeals to the myriad types and conditions of women on this earth.”446 
 
change the normative meanings of gender in their societies… [Feminists] challenged 
these normative views by critically analyzing how they operated and by offering new 
kinds of knowledge to correct or displace them. Their confrontations with existing power 
structures were necessarily and directly about epistemology and conceptualization.” From 
“Response to Gordon,” Signs 15 no. 4 (1990); 859.  
445 Kathleen Canning, “Feminist Theory after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing 
Discourse and Experience,” Signs 19 no. 2 (1994): 375.  
446 Denise Riley, Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ in History 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 111.  
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Pitched between the twin dangers of collectivity and plurality (that is, the challenges of 
speaking with and for others), Riley suggests that feminists develop a new kind of 
feminism altogether; specifically, one that accepts that “there is… no fluent trajectory 
from feminism to a truly sexually democratic humanism; there is no easy passage from 
‘women’ to ‘humanity.’”447 Riley poses this new feminism over and above “modern” (i.e. 
standpoint) feminism, which “in its sociological aspects is landed with the identity of 
women as an achieved fact of history and epistemology” and “can only swing between 
asserting or refusing the completeness of this given identity.”448 Instead, a new feminism 
would attempt to re-member, as in remake or resignify, the category in unexpected and 
subversive ways:  
That ‘women’ is indeterminate and impossible is no cause for lament. It is what 
makes feminism; which has hardly been an indiscriminate embrace anyway of the 
fragilities and peculiarities of the category. What [new feminisms] do demand is a 
willingness, at times, to shred this ‘women’ to bits – to develop a speed, foxiness, 
versatility. The temporalities of ‘women’ are like the missing middle term of 
Aristotelian logic; while it’s impossible to thoroughly be a woman, it’s also 
impossible never to be one. On such shifting sands feminism must stand and 
sway.449 
 
Thus, by the time feminists showed ‘experience’ to be inadequate to the task of 
producing a revolutionary consciousness, they had already concluded that the political 
lessons of feminists past were so deeply flawed that their promises of radical change were 
foolish.  
Despite being a widespread debate over the category of “experience” across 
disciplinary and political lines, as is true with many of the pitfalls and failures of 
 
447 Ibid., 17.  
448 Ibid., 111.  
449 Ibid., 114.  
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“feminisms past,” the epistemological and political problems of standpoint theory 
enumerated by scholars like Scott and Riley have been attributed with particular gusto to 
lesbian feminism. While Hartsock and many other theorists of experience, for example, 
did not see themselves as lesbian feminists, the critiques levied against standpoint’s use 
of experience was applied in particular to the argument, attributed solely to lesbian 
feminists, that the “Woman-Identified-Woman” was a revolutionary agent for having 
dared to love women in a misogynist world. In Identity Politics, for example, Shane 
Phelan argues that one reason that feminists (even non-lesbian ones) began to search for a 
standpoint based in experiences at all was lesbian feminists’ insistence that they had 
discovered a unique and privileged position from which to critique patriarchy. Lesbian 
feminists, she argues, “[saw] clearly that part of the struggle must be to grasp the means 
of production of truth and to claim the status of truth-speakers.”450 Yet in claiming this 
status – and in demanding that all women must occupy such a position – lesbian 
feminists led feminist theory astray: 
The result…was dismaying. In constructing the new lesbian, lesbian feminists did 
not deal with the problem of difference. Rather, they erased it by valorizing and 
moralizing lesbian sex… Any sense of the plurality of lesbian lives was lost in the 
construction of “the” lesbian – the unified, epistemological and volitional 
agent.451 
 
Like Scott and Riley, Phelan argues here that in seeking to develop a conception of 
lesbianism that privileges lesbians’ macro-level structural position vis a vis straight 
society over intra-group differences, they inadvertently reproduced the very patterns of 
thinking that have long structured traditional political theory; “that same nature,” she 
 
450 Shane Phelan, Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 137.  
451 Ibid., 138.  
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writes, “ensured that the response would be made in another normalizing depth-language 
as insidious as the one they had fought to escape.”452 Thus,  
The political lesson we may learn from [lesbian feminism], then, is that the real 
danger facing us is not one of doctrine nor of behavior, but more fundamentally of 
the impulse to totalization, to power/knowledge, that is endemic to modernity […] 
What we are witnessing in lesbian feminism is a new Enlightenment, another 
attempt to make words mean what we want them to mean and to shed the 
confusion and evil of the past.453 
 
For Phelan, as for other critics of standpoint theories, lesbian feminism’s uncritical 
reliance on lived experience represents and exemplifies the broader tendency in feminist 
theory to reproduce, rather than radically alter or even resignify, traditional structures of 
subordination.  
 Finally, if lesbian feminism has come to represent the lure of relying on lived 
experience to claim revolutionary potential, I would like to suggest that no lesbian 
feminist has been more messily entangled in this narrative than Monique Wittig. As I 
suggested above, Wittig is often heralded as a kind of “prophet” who signals the turn 
towards resignificatory theory, even as she is herself dismissed for having failed to 
adequately grasp the limitations of a revolutionary theory built on the premise of lived 
experience. Let me use just one example of the fraught figure she cuts in this debate.454 In 
A Lure of Knowledge, Judith Roof situates Wittig as the crux in the debate over “the lure 
of consciousness and identity” as “a locus, a place from which one can begin to sort out 
 
452 Ibid., 138.  
453 Ibid., 139.  
454 There are, of course, many other instances in which Wittig is used to “displace” a 
major debate such as the one over experience, only to be herself displaced. While I don’t 
deal with it explicitly here, for instance, many feminist historians and theorists have 
noticed Wittig’s peculiar positioning in Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990).  
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differences and gain a political efficacious consciousness,”455 on the one hand, and the 
acceptance that “both origins and identity are lures, decoys that promise power, 
knowledge, and a challenge to a patriarchal system or a way out altogether.”456 Because 
she seems to show both that lesbians give the lie to presumptive heterosexuality and 
argue that lesbian feminists might possess a special kind of revolutionary knowledge, 
Roof argues, to grapple with Wittig is to grasp the stakes of the debate over experience 
that I outlined above. In a later essay, Roof puts the matter this way. On the one hand, 
Wittig’s readers 
clearly position Wittig in the place of a successful challenge to identity, truth, 
power, and knowledge as those are constructed within a heterosexual system. 
Because she seems to call into question the very categories by which the lesbian 
can be known in the first place, Wittig’s work seems to create a kind of lesbian 
postmodern in the field of lesbian writing characterized by a primary gender 
struggle.457  
 
At the same time as she appears to reject the “fluent trajectory” from ‘women’ to 
‘human’ that standpoint theories suppose, however, Roof argues that Wittig’s writing 
nonetheless fails to escape fully from its dependence on experience as a category of 
analysis:  
Wittig’s deft transition from materiality to a categorical confrontation with gender 
skips over one of her problematic underlying assumptions: that language can 
transparently represent experience and can thus directly transform ideology…. 
This utopian gap in Wittig’s otherwise perceptive critique of the ideology of 
gender exposes her very traditional reliance on the originary existence of a subject 
outside of ideology.458   
 
 
455 Judith Roof, A Lure of Knowledge: Lesbian Sexuality and Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 166.  
456 Ibid., 172-173.  
457 Judith Roof, “Lesbians and Lyotard: Legitimation and the Politics of the Name,” The 
Lesbian Postmodern, ed. Laura Doan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 55.  
458 Ibid., 55.  
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Thus, “though Wittig’s writing looks postmodern,” Roof claims that its “covert reliance” 
upon categories such as experience disqualifies it for entry into the “new” resignificatory 
feminism that emerged from these debates.459 Such a feminism – one that moves beyond 
the failures of lesbian feminism – would have come to terms with the “sustained tension 
of an undefined and unlocated term” like lesbian; it would “[reiterate] a cultural 
paradigm, but as one that plays within and beyond such paradigms – there and not there, 
not working as a name but as a suggestion.”460  
Thus, although the debate over standpoint and its use of the concept experience 
took place nearly three decades ago, it has made an outsized impact on contemporary 
theorists’ frameworks for interpreting lesbian feminism such as Wittig’s during the 
1980s. In fact, worries about standpoint theorists’ tendency to shift easily between lived 
experiences, structural positions, and political change encouraged many contemporary 
theorists to reject all theorists, like Wittig, whose writings appear to echo standpoint 
theory’s revolutionary politics.  
 
 
Existence Beyond Experience: Power and the Straight Mind  
Despite the fact that Wittig’s thought is often conflated with a lesbian 
“standpoint,” then, I would like to suggest that her work takes a distinctive approach that 
pushes apart and remakes the relationships between lived experiences, social structures, 
and political strategy that feminist standpoint theories thread together. At the same time, 
however, I am not petitioning for Wittig’s inclusion in the resignificatory “new 
 
459 Ibid., 55.  
460 Ibid., 64.  
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feminism” advocated by Scott, Riley, Phelan, Roof, and others. Instead, I want to insist 
on Wittig’s proximity to the issues of lesbian feminist publicity that I have been tracing 
throughout this work; namely to transformative practices of listening, accounting, and 
working through. This politics, I will suggest, is distinct from that of both standpoint 
theorists and their critics: it both outlines the limitations of experience for a revolutionary 
politics and refuses to cede revolutionary change to a politics of partial resignification.  
Although I will argue that the political intuition at work in Wittig’s writing 
emerges from the specific context of lesbian feminism, the critical vocabulary that 
distinguishes Wittig from standpoint theorists is rooted in the framework of Beauvoir’s 
Second Sex. Though Wittig departs from Beauvoir’s phenomenological framework and 
her emphasis on existentialist ethics, her description of the constraints of oppression is 
much closer to Beauvoir’s than it is to standpoint theorists like Hartsock’s. Recall that 
Hartsock views hierarchy as emerging from the “partial and perverse” nature of men’s 
point of view. On this view, it is the arbitrariness of hierarchy – its distortion of “real” 
human relationships – that reveals the injustice of oppression. Beauvoir, on the other 
hand, describes oppression as a state in which one’s ability to accomplish oneself – the 
possibility of Being, of existing – is thwarted by some outside force:   
Every subject posits itself as a transcendence concretely, through projects; it 
accomplishes its freedom only by a perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms; 
there is no other justification for present existence than its expansion toward an 
indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there 
is degradation of existence into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into facticity; this fall is a 
moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it 
takes the form of frustration and oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.461 
 
 
461 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Borde and Malovany-Chevallier. (New 
York: Vintage, 2011), 16.  
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In the context of Beauvoir’s thought, one’s existence is dependent on one’s freedom – in 
other words, on the ability to choose transcendence for oneself, on the capacity to exist 
and to be recognized as a subject. Put the other way around, then, oppression is a state in 
which one’s very existence is rendered impossible. Thus, for Beauvoir, it is not the partial 
or situated nature of an abstract, masculine point of view per se that makes sexist 
oppression so unjust, but the fact that it renders the existence of certain subjects 
systematically impossible by distorting and invalidating their points of view.  
 Further, according to Beauvoir, the ‘feminine condition’ is a special kind of 
existential constraint. Like other oppressed subjects, women function as ‘Other,’ meaning 
that although they are a crucial part of the social fabric in which men achieve their own 
existence, they are not treated as subjects deserving of recognition and reciprocity. In this 
regard, the situation of women is akin to all dominated groups. To Beauvoir, however, 
the fact of women’s ‘Otherness’ alone does not explain the “unique problem” of 
femininity. Indeed, unlike other oppressed groups – here, Beauvoir distinguishes women 
from Jews, Black people, Indigenous people, ‘foreigners,’ and the proletariat – women 
“do not posit themselves authentically as Subjects.”462 Why this peculiar lack of political 
subjectivity? Why, for instance, have women not achieved the kinds of revolutionary 
political consciousness for which standpoint theorists, like other feminists, call? Beauvoir 
argues that the answer lies in women’s own complicity in their immanence. If women are 
denied the capacity to posit themselves as subjects, Beauvoir argues, it is only partially 
because that fate is violently imposed on them: indeed, the particular injustice of 
 
462 Ibid., 8.  
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women’s oppression is that it operates by compelling them to choose their own 
oppression.  
 Framed against that question – what are the conditions that make complicity in 
one’s own oppression possible? – The Second Sex takes as its object not the ‘stuff’ of 
hierarchy itself, but rather the bait and switch of oppressive logics. In contrast to 
standpoint theorists, whose framework demands that the oppressed transform their 
everyday experiences into revolutionary consciousness, Beauvoir argues that expecting 
such non-existent subjects to grasp this potential is both unrealistic and, more 
importantly, obscures the ‘trap’ of femininity. The task of feminism, then, is to reveal 
how this trap operates and to mark out the challenges of accomplishing radical 
consciousness. To Beauvoir, fulfilling this task entails two key recognitions. On the one 
hand, experience itself has a profound chilling effects on the female subject insofar as her 
social experience demands that she “renounce her autonomy” in order to please others.463 
On the other hand, the fact that existence is definitionally masculine makes it possible for 
women to accept, believe, and even treasure this constraint.464 Ultimately, argues 
Beauvoir, the drama between existence and experience thus functions as a kind of bait 
 
463 [F]or the woman there is, from the start, a conflict between her autonomous existence 
and her ‘being-other;’ she is taught that to please, she must try to please, must make 
herself object; she must therefore renounce her autonomy. She is treated like a living doll, 
and freedom is denied her; thus a vicious circle is closed; for the less she exercises her 
freedom to understand, grasp, and discover the world around her, the less she will find its 
resources, and the less she will dare to affirm herself as subject…,” 295.  
464 “The fundamental reason for this defeatism is that the adolescent girl does not 
consider herself responsible for her future; she judges it useless to demand much of 
herself since her lot in the end will not depend on her. Far from destining herself to man 
because she thinks she is inferior to him, it is because she is destined for him that, in 
accepting the idea of her inferiority, she constitutes it… In fact, she will gain value in the 
eyes of males not by increasing her human worth but by modeling herself on their 
dreams,” 347.   
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and switch: through their very experiences, subjects in the “feminine condition” are 
compelled to make themselves ‘Other,’ only to find that by doing so they are locked out 
of subjective existence. On this view, the epistemic and political transformations that a 
feminist standpoint is meant to effect will be thwarted until women can, collectively, 
divest from this trap.    
The oppressive logic of femininity, the “you-will-or-you-will-not-be” interdiction 
through which the thought of domination operates, is precisely the framework Wittig 
later picked up to describe the unique political paradox in which lesbian feminists find 
themselves: the Straight Mind. Here, for instance, is Beauvoir’s summation of women’s 
political and critical limitations under patriarchy:   
It is understandable why, from this perspective, woman objects to masculine 
logic. Not only does it have no bearing on her experience, but she also knows that 
in men’s hands reason becomes an insidious form of violence; their peremptory 
affirmations are intended to mystify her. They want to confine her in a dilemma: 
either you agree or you don’t; she has to agree in the name of the whole system of 
accepted principles: in refusing to agree, she rejects the whole system; she cannot 
allow herself such a dramatic move; she does not have the means to create another 
society; yet she does not agree with this one. Halfway between revolt and slavery, 
she unwillingly resigns herself to masculine authority.465 
 
Because a woman’s actual experiences contradict the terms of existence as defined from 
the masculine point of view, she can neither constitute herself as a subject nor divest 
herself from the structures that prevent her existence. From the ‘point of view of the 
oppressed,’ then, the call for self-constitution – that is, the demand for “consciousness 
raising” – is all-too-often a function of the very power that prevents it. Wittig, following 
Beauvoir, similarly argues that the obligation to use the category of one’s domination in 
one’s political struggle against it – to claim ‘women’ as a radical political actor against a 
 
465 Ibid., 651. Emphasis mine.  
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patriarchy which creates the category, for example – is a constitutive feature of the 
straight mind. “The discourses which particularly oppress all of us, lesbians, women, and 
homosexual men,” Wittig writes, “are those which take for granted that what founds 
society, any society, is heterosexuality… These discourses of heterosexuality oppress us 
in the sense that they prevent us from speaking unless we speak in their terms.”466 We 
must notice, Wittig insists, that what the experience of powerlessness actually 
demonstrates is the impossibility of articulating one’s historical and political existence – 
to constitute oneself as the subject of one’s own struggle.  
In her adoption of the category “existence” from Beauvoir’s work, then, Wittig 
distinguishes herself dramatically from the framework of standpoint theory. Where 
standpoint theorists argue that women’s experiences of oppression become the grounds 
on which they develop a revolutionary consciousness, Wittig argues that these same 
experiences are actually a kind of bait and switch. Oppression is not simply a lack of 
revolutionary consciousness; for Wittig, it is a kind of bait and switch that compels 
women to become ‘Other,’ only to learn that this otherness restricts them from claiming 
to be subjects of their own struggle. In other words, it is the experience of being a woman 
itself that “prevent[s] us from speaking unless we speak in their terms.” Moreover, Wittig 
argues, while this bait and switch – the temptation to found one’s politics on the basis of 
an oppressive category like “women” – effects all women, it especially constrains 
lesbians, who can neither claim to be “real” women nor articulate their lived experiences 
on the terms of traditional forms of women’s work (e.g. motherhood) and sexuality (in 
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(Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 25.  
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relation to men). Far from Hartsock’s notion that a feminist standpoint is the key for 
raising a revolutionary women’s consciousness, then, Wittig argues quite the opposite. 
“In order to become a class,” Wittig writes, “we first have to kill the myth of ‘woman’ 
including its most seductive aspects:”467 if standpoint considers “woman” to be a 
standpoint for a revolutionary consciousness, it has failed to do so.  
However, if Wittig rejects the assumption that “women” can easily or inevitably 
come to a revolutionary consciousness, neither does she accept that feminists must cede 
revolutionary politics in favor of a resignificatory framework. Unlike Riley, for instance, 
Wittig refuses to concede that the seeming impossibility of constituting the revolutionary 
agent “women” is a constitutive limitation of collective agency. Doing so, she argues, 
would be to “naturalize history,” that is, to “naturalize the social phenomena which 
express our oppression, making change impossible.”468 Instead, she insists that what 
Riley interprets as a natural “impossibility” is, in fact, a political constraint produced in 
and through power. One of Wittig’s most controversial claims, for example, is that the 
word “woman” itself is less a historically indeterminate category than an “irredeemable” 
political abuse. For her, the usage of the category woman in itself – even when feminists 
attempt to resignify it – constitutes evidence of what she calls the ‘thought of 
domination.’ In ‘One is Not Born a Woman,’ Wittig glosses the issue this way:  
I am sure that an economic and political transformation will not dedramatize these 
categories of language. Can we redeem slave? Can we redeem n****r, negress? 
How is woman different? Will we continue to write white, master, man? The 
transformation of economic relationships will not suffice. We must produce a 
political transformation of the key concepts, that is of the concepts which are 
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strategic for us…And we cannot leave this within the power of the straight mind 
or the thought of domination.”469 
 
Like the racial categories she cites, Wittig rejects the idea that “woman” can be 
resignified, re-membered, or rearticulated in even partially liberatory ways; such a move, 
she argues, would abandon the task of “[producing] a political transformation of the key 
concepts” and would leave feminist politics “within the power of the straight mind or the 
thought of domination.” 
Like revolutionary consciousness-raising, Wittig argues that the project of 
resignification in fact cedes the real political goal: demanding existence as the subject of 
one’s own history. She underlines this point in ‘Homo Sum:’  
There is no need when coming under the parameters of the oppressed to follow 
the Marxian design and to wait until the ‘final victory’ to declare that the 
oppressed are human as well as the dominators, that women are human as well as 
men. Where is the obligation for us to go on bearing with a series of ontological, 
epistemological, and linguistic enterloupettes, under the pretext that we do not 
have the power. It is a part of our fight to unmask them, to say that one out of two 
men is a woman, that the universal belongs to us although we have been robbed 
and despoiled at this level as well as at the political and economic ones.470  
 
Wittig here includes such figural representations as Marx’s proletariat and feminism’s 
‘women’ under the same umbrella; both, she suggests, remain under the thrall of 
Difference by mistakenly presuming that identifying one’s experience of oppression – 
that is, consciousness raising – is the key to accomplishing political change. At the same 
time, however, in this passage she argues that ceding radical change in favor of a politics 
of resignification would demand that the oppressed “go on bearing… under the pretext 
that we do not have the power.” All such a politics would do, she argues, is “lead us back 
 
469 Ibid, 30.  
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to the myth of woman which created by men especially for us, and with it we sink back 
into a natural group.”471 
Like Beauvoir, then, Wittig calls for a turn to the “point of view of the oppressed” 
in order to reveal the bait and switch of oppression and, more importantly, to outline the 
possibilities for thinking outside of it: “When we discover that women are the objects of 
oppression and appropriation,” she writes, the discovery does not only entail “a reaction 
to (fight against) oppression. It is also the whole conceptual reevaluation of the social 
world, its whole reorganization with new concepts, from the point of view of 
oppression.”472 For Wittig, the point of view that most fully exposes the logic of 
oppression for what it is – a bait and switch tactic designed to enclose women within their 
own experiences – is the point of view of the lesbian. Whereas ‘women’ are too easily 
conflated with the concepts that sustain the straight mind, Wittig maintains the very 
existence of lesbians in society “pragmatically reveals” that the barrier to subjective 
existence is political. Lesbians, like other women, are barred from existence and are 
ensnared in the bait and switch of the straight mind. Unlike ‘women’ as a class, however, 
Wittig argues that lesbians are uniquely situated in relation to the straight mind’s 
categories impose on women – they can remember being compelled to ‘become women.’ 
“Lesbians should always remember and acknowledge,” she writes, “how ‘unnatural,’ 
compelling, totally oppressive, and destructive being ‘woman’ was for us in the old days 
before the women’s liberation movement.”473 She continues,  
It was a political constraint, and those who resisted it were accused of not being 
‘real’ women. But then we were proud of it, since in the accusation there was 
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already something like a shadow of victory: the avowal by the oppressor that 
‘woman’ is not something that goes without saying, since to be one, one has to be 
a ‘real’ one.474 
 
The lesbian, because she is at once denied existence as a subject on the basis of her 
femininity and derided for failing to be “really” feminine, thus reveals the logic of the 
straight mind: not just a partial, perverse viewpoint, the straight mind is instead an 
insidious form of power that entices and then constrains, lures and then denies.  
This may seem – as it has seemed to many “third wave” theorists – like a 
standpoint from which to reveal the path to revolutionary consciousness. However, for 
Wittig, despite the “shadow of victory” that lesbians experienced by showing that 
‘woman’ “is not something that goes without saying,” even this acknowledgement could 
not break the spell of the straight mind. A lesbian may refuse to “become” a woman, for 
instance, but she will nonetheless fail to assume the point of view of existence – that is, 
the point of view of a full subject. Like Beauvoir’s argument that femininity is but the 
state of existing “halfway between revolt and slavery,” the lesbian’s experience most 
clearly demonstrates how the category ‘women’ lures individual subjects to become 
complicit in their own oppression. Because the straight mind compels them to articulate 
their oppression in foreign terms (that is, on the terms of “men” and “women”), the 
lesbian’s point of view, like Beauvoir’s female subjects, reveals that the oppressed can 
exist only in oblique relation to subjectivity. “Thus a lesbian,” she insists, “has to be 
something else, a not-woman, a not-man, a product of society, not a product of nature, for 
there is no nature in society.”475 In other words, a lesbian is what shows not only the 
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constructedness of ‘woman,’ but reveals its function as an operation of domination as 
well.  
In Wittig’s hands, I want to suggest, an emphasis on the impossibility of lesbian 
existence under the straight mind complicates and extends the political tasks of feminism 
well beyond the questions posed by the debate over experience. From the point of view of 
existence, the question of political change ceases to be about whether theorists ought to 
accept or critique the epistemological ground of experience, and it dismisses the notion 
that feminists should occupy themselves with choosing between a politics of revolution 
or resignification. Instead, the task of feminism from Wittig’s perspective is to show that 
while the very point of view from which we consider oppressive conditions serves to 
reinforce the categories that sustain them, these points of view can also ensnare us in 
their compulsory logic. That the economic, social, and political limitations of women 
constitute more than just a set of common experiences – that they instead constitute a 
constraint on women’s very existence – is thus a political problem for feminist theory on 
a much broader scale than standpoint theorists and their critics have allowed. “Seeing 
from the oppressed point of view” – the point of view of the lesbian – is, for Wittig, a 
different task altogether. It is an invitation to think “beyond the categories of sex (woman 
and man)” by recognizing that “the designated subject (lesbian) is not a woman, either 
economically, or politically, or ideologically.”476  
Wittig does not answer directly or programmatically what sort of political 
consciousness will emerge from such a perspective, but she does suggest that it will have 
to answer to the very questions that I have raised throughout this work as the central 
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questions of publicity: what are the terms on which a radical counterpublic should divest 
or separate from mainstream society? How will the new public ensure that it remains 
responsible to each member of its audience, and how will it hold accountable those who 
fail to do so? How might a radical counterpublic best manage the tension between 
collective action and difference? “[Once] we have shown that all so-called personal 
problems are in fact class problems,” as Wittig puts it, a politics premised on the lesbian 
point of view “will still be left with the question of the subject of each singular woman – 
not the myth, but each one of us.”477 The question of what accomplishing full subjectivity 
for all women would look like, Wittig suggests, is an open one. But it is also “what 
lesbians say everywhere in this country and in some others, if not with theories at least 




Lesbian Existence in Circulation  
 
Despite the importance of highlighting the conceptual architecture through which 
Wittig developed her critical stance, however, the point of developing this critical stance 
for Wittig was not to claim a philosophical tradition. Indeed, Wittig is notorious for 
declining to situate her work in The Straight Mind within any critical tradition other than 
that of her compatriots in the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF). Having 
taken part in the MLF’s inaugural demonstration479 as well as most of its subsequent 
 
477 Ibid., 19.  
478 Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” 32.  
479 The inaugural demonstration of the MLF, in which Wittig took part, was a march to 
the Tomb of the Unknown Solder at the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, at which she carried a 
sign that read: “There is one who is even more unknown than the Soldier: his wife.” 
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actions and controversies, Wittig was adamant that it was the experience of having 
stepped “out of the tracks of politics, philosophy, anthropology, history, “cultures,” to 
understand what is really happening”480 that had the greatest impact on her critical 
development. The task of reconstructing Wittig’s critical politics is thus, by design, 
inseparable from the task of situating her thought in its historical and political context.  
In this section, then, I put Wittig’s theoretical framework in conversation with the 
political ‘scenes’ in which she hoped to intervene. These scenes, of course, take place in 
the political context of the MLF itself, in which Wittig was an early and integral member. 
The MLF emerged out of the broader context of May ’68, which is often credited with 
having shifted the character of French leftist politics away from reformist, institutional 
struggles to a more diffuse, participatory structure.481 Distinguishing its political 
character from that of the centralized politics of the French Communist Party (PCF) and 
the French educational system, the May movement heralded a moment of democratic 
decentralization and – importantly – offered an inroad for groups like women who had 
been excluded from participation in more formal political structures.482  
But for feminists in France – as in the US contexts that populated the last several 
chapters – these democratic inroads were not without their tensions. In a series of 
personal reflections on the relationship between May ’68 and the MLF, for instance, 
Wittig cites the “motley” character of the early MLF. During this early stage, Wittig 
notes, women affiliated with different approaches to women’s liberation led “provisional 
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482 See Claire Duchen, Feminism in France: From May ’68 to Mitterand. (New York: 
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battles” for free abortion, anti-rape policies, and other women’s issues, while keeping the 
decision-making power of the movement in a diffuse general assembly. Yet while she 
emphasizes that the group drew democratic inspiration from the ‘general’ May movement 
despite its differences, she also casts their analytic and political differences as an 
organizational challenge: 
[C]ertain elements of the front (feminists) were conscious that we had made a 
political structure from the ground up that already represented a danger for the 
collective movement concerning all women. Structures of this kind can easily be 
controlled… And we did not want to become an “organization” that alone spoke 
in the name of women. The political analysis of PCF and leftist groups (very 
different in their functions, the democratic centralization, the party line, etc.). So 
we feminists were conscious of the fact that our political role was to agitate, to 
serve as a catalyst, to stimulate public opinion and so on, so that centralized 
organizations (the elite) would take direction from women’s fights.483  
 
Casting the democratic structure of the MLF as one under threat of being “controlled” by 
a centralized structure, Wittig thus understood the MLF as a provisional, fleeting space in 
which to learn and “take direction from” from women’s on-the-ground fights – in a more 
theoretical vocabulary, it was for her a space in which to take seriously the existence of 
women as subjects of the movement. Rather than imposing an analytic definition of 
‘women’ derived from ontological or rhetorical claims, Wittig insisted that such attempts, 
even when deployed for rhetorical effect (as, for example, in calls for ‘class’ solidarity 
amongst women), were a “danger for the collective movement concerning all women.” 
From the earliest stages of the MLF, then, Wittig’s political approach was attuned to what 
she would later theorize as the “point of view” of the oppressed. 
Wittig’s political intuition – that rhetorical calls for a women’s consciousness 
would work against local, on-the-ground struggles – was soon borne out in several 
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episodes she considered to be indicative of feminism’s co-optation by the straight mind. 
By the late 1970s, for example, a major fault line in the movement was clear: did certain 
members of the MLF have the right or the analytic authority to insist that there was a 
“right” way to achieve liberation? On one side of the debate, a group of lesbian feminists 
(including both Wittig and Christine Delphy) called for the dissolution of the MLF so as 
to promote a democratically inclusive space. “We followed the example of March 22, 
which dissolved itself right after May ’68,” Wittig recalls, “demonstrating that it did not 
have pretensions of ‘leading’ the political battles in France.” Like the March 22 group, 
the move to dissolve the formal structure of the MLF would permit opportunities to learn 
about the perspectives of women on the ground: “We wanted to make the diversity of 
groups apparent, as well as their divergences,” she writes. “We wanted to incite a 
multiplicity of small groups all over where women worked, to end the notion of an inside 
and an outside (as in the MLF), to find other forms of action in relation to our 
responsibility to agitate – but not as leaders of women.” On the other side, a group of 
“Freudian” feminists – later renamed as Psychoanalyse et Politique (‘Psych et Po’) – 
argued for the centralization of the MLF under the auspices a kind of standpoint premised 
on reclaiming “femininity” and “women’s difference.” Though the groups had been able 
to function together in the early years of the movement, acrimony between them grew 
throughout the 1970s, culminating in Psych et Po’s attempt to trademark – to quite 
literally own – the movement.484 
For Wittig, the split with Psych et Po recast the issue of lesbian existence in the 
movement in an urgent – and unflattering – light. Though the schism between lesbian 
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feminists and the members of Psych et Po began as a strategic and political one, Wittig 
and Delphy soon found their critical point of view discredited in the general assembly. 
Accused of wanting to “be like men” (in fact, Wittig recounts that her political 
perspective earned her the disreputable nickname ‘mec,’ a slang term akin to ‘guy’), 
Wittig (and to some extent Delphy) was accused of seeking to splinter women’s feminine 
unity by insisting that the MLF attend to lesbian issues. From Wittig’s perspective, in 
seeking to radically reclaim “femininity” for the purposes of women’s liberation, Psych 
et Po began to consider other political and analytic approaches to critique as threats to the 
movement itself;485 just as importantly, Psych et Po’s attempts to reclaim femininity – 
coupled with their claims that their political opponents were not “real” women – had the 
effect of locally reinforcing the bait and switch logic of the straight mind from within the 
movement itself. If Wittig would later come to theorize the straight mind as a logic in 
which “there remains… a core of nature which resists examination, a relationship 
excluded from the social in the analysis – a relationship whose characteristic is 
ineluctability in culture, as well as in nature, and which is the heterosexual relationship,” 
we might read Psych et Po’s derision of Wittig and Delphy as “mecs” as a local 
reification of the ‘natural’ division of humanity into ‘men and women.’ Whereas ‘real 
 
485 Here is how Duchen put the matter: “Psych et Po present a global analysis in the light 
of which the women involved can engage in a particular kind of struggle for a particular 
kind of women’s liberation: everything can be explained in terms of women’s radical 
alterity, difference. The group’s actions derive closely from their analysis, indeed the 
group’s emphasis on theory was itself never the problem: what became the problem was 
the consequence of the crusade for recovery of the feminine in practical, tangible terms 
for the MLF […] In a sense, the registration of the name and logo of the women’s 
movement was a logical conclusion to an analysis that insists that it is the only real 
challenge to patriarchy and does not accept the validity of any other. They could be seen 
as saving the MLF from ‘feminism.’” Feminism in France, 36-37.   
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women’ were those who understood (and accepted) the unifying power of natural 
femininity, lesbians who resisted this critical stance were labeled separatists, mecs, and 
splinterers. Under Psych et Po’s logic, resisting feminine unity “means [that] one ‘wants 
to dissociate from ‘other women’ […] Therefore… destroying any attempt to autonomy 
by lesbians is not oppressing lesbians, is acting right and politically (from a feminist 
point of view).”486 In reifying the presumed relationship between men and women – and 
in so doing, discounting and mocking the lesbian point of view – Wittig saw in the Psych 
et Po episode a political dynamic that enabled the co-optation of critique by anti-
democratic forces.  
As a local operation of power, the episode with Psych et Po was symbolic of a 
larger point for Wittig: that the straight mind functions by foreclosing the articulation of 
struggles from the point of view of oppression, and by insisting that one either accept the 
terms of critique as given in power or not speak at all. In her personal reflections and 
correspondence on the movement, for instance, Wittig clearly associates this episode with 
a larger ‘malaise’ concerning lesbian organizing in France. If Psych et Po’s attempt to 
trademark the name and logo of the MLF was for Wittig a “stranglehold” on the 
movement which “dispossessed all women of that which defines their political 
approach,”487 this exercise of the straight mind was for her only one iteration of a trend to 
label autonomous lesbian groups as splinterers so as to discount their political claims. 
Consider, for example, Wittig’s description of the attempt to bring the International 
Lesbian Front, a group formed by lesbian activists across Europe in 1974, to France. 
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During their inaugural August meeting, French lesbian activists posed the question of the 
relationship between lesbian groups and the MLF:  
In particular we asked why we were called “revolutionary feminists,” even though we 
were all lesbians (there were one or two heteros per protest). Someone then proposed 
to publicize that fact – that it was a bad idea to hide – that the “revolutionary 
feminists” were all lesbians. There was a great moment of elation… We finally 
understood that the problem was not being told that it was the lesbians who separated 
us feminists from other women but that the problem was being lesbians without 
saying it (c.f. to be in the movement’s closet). At exactly the moment of the 
International Lesbian Front’s creation we felt the great impact of its creation. 
 
For Wittig, the feminist ‘line’ that women were the real subjects of feminism, despite the 
fact that “we were all lesbians,” operated as a way to keep lesbians from constituting 
themselves as subjects of the movement; in other words, it functioned as a kind of 
“closet” in which lesbian existence was systematically denied.  
 More to the point, however, was Wittig’s split with Delphy over the issue of 
lesbianism in debates over the future of Questions Féministes. Although Delphy and 
Wittig had worked together in opposition to the Psych et Po episode (and despite 
Delphy’s own homosexuality), the strain over whether lesbianism constituted a valid 
“point of view” – or whether, as so many MLF members had claimed, it was simply a 
way to splinter ‘women’ – soon wore on the members of QF. Delphy, whose own work 
had led her to develop the interpellative claims that Disch so admires, began to publicly 
narrate the schism along the same rhetorical lines as had Psych et Po. Wittig, for her part, 
strongly disagreed with what she saw as yet another attempt to reduce lesbian existence 
to an issue of women’s solidarity. In an interview with Wittig in the feminist magazine 
off our backs, for instance, Wittig and Delphy narrate the divide in this way:  
WITTIG: In Revolutionary Feminists, some women said, we are all lesbian, why 
not announce that we are all lesbians, but then the resistance of some persons 
 258 
within the group made it impossible for us. The pretext was that we would cut off 
other women. But anyway we were cut. This was not a good reason for me.  
DELPHY: The problem seemed to be decided because a lot of women became 
lesbians. But also there developed – but in a very informal, subtle way that was 
never made explicit – a lesbian ideology within the group. Women in that group 
were supposed to be lesbians, or they were expected not to have relationships with 
men. So what happened was that heterosexual women did not talk anymore about 
their heterosexual problems. So since they didn’t talk about it, it was as if they 
didn’t have relationships with men. But they dropped out, which is not necessarily 
a good thing. The conflict was not solved. But nobody talked about it, there was 
no discussion, it was through a very subtle imposition of the idea that there was 
no problem, there were no heterosexuals, heterosexuals didn’t have a space, they 
didn’t have a space as heterosexuals anymore.  
WITTIG: What are you saying? I think that many lesbians in Paris are being 
oppressed by this process, which came down from the general leaders of the 
movement.488 
 
While it is certainly possible to cast their divergent interpretations of the MLF’s ills as 
products of their distinctive critical stances, Wittig clearly associated Delphy’s claim that 
it was the lesbians who represented a political constraint on the movement with the same 
anti-democratic bait and switch that she had begun to theorize as the straight mind. In a 
letter to Simone de Beauvoir about the schism within QF, for instance, she writes that 
Delphy’s position was akin to the experiences lesbians had faced for a decade in the 
MLF:  
For a long time in the movement in Paris there have been those lesbians who 
purge other lesbians – as feminists – while giving themselves credit for being 
feminists, lesbians, or homosexuals (homosexuals in the closet of feminism). And 
one tries to politically form a lesbian front, and here they are, crying foul: “It is 
excessive.” “This has already been settled.” (surely since the Red Dykes). “You 
try to cut feminists off from “other” women”… And finally: “There isn’t need for 
a lesbian front in France because all feminists are lesbians.” Which means: we’ll 
do all we can do to prevent you from existing. And they do it – witness this affair 
at QF. And to finish, among feminists in Paris they are the legitimate ones and 
we, we are the crazy ones.489  
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If Psych et Po had capitulated to the bait and switch of the straight mind by reifying ‘men 
and women’ as natural categories, then, in Wittig’s view Delphy’s insistence on 
rhetorical solidarity fell victim to the same co-optative logic.  
Most telling for Wittig – and, I would argue, most formative of her insistence that 
critique ought to intervene in and divest from this insidious logic – was the fact that this 
tendency caused Delphy to begin framing the problem as one in which oppression can be 
experienced multi-directionally, on two sides of a debate. In the off our backs interview, 
for instance, Delphy and Wittig clash over whether the dissolution of the MLF was an 
example of oppressive power constraining the existence of certain subjects, or whether it 
represented a situation in which “both sides” had been wronged:  
Delphy: We have to get to the other side of the story too. We have to hear both 
sides.  
Wittig: Oh, Christine. You don’t want to listen. She said, “I felt oppressed.” We 
have to listen to this oppression. 490 
 
Delphy’s refusal to fully acknowledge lesbians as a political force within the movement – 
and her accusations that lesbians like Wittig “split” an otherwise coherent class of women 
– demonstrated for Wittig the ways that the bait and switch of oppressive logic can even 
take hold of those who seek to show femininity to be political. For Wittig, the political 
point is that when one attempts to hear “both sides,” one will only hear in it the dominant 
logic. If even Christine Delphy – the very intellectual who had shown men and women to 
be political categories – could fall victim to this logic, Wittig would later theorize that the 
only way to grasp the operations of the straight mind is to “listen to this oppression” from 
the point of view of the oppressed.  
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In both the MLF and QF, then, Wittig railed against attempts to resignify or 
rhetorically transform the terms on which women experience oppression. Both episodes, 
for Wittig, represented the political pressure to reduce the lesbian point of view to a more 
general identification with the class ‘women.’ The result, she argues, is a near-constant 
capitulation to the oppressive logic of the straight mind. In the case of Psych et Po, Wittig 
argued that the “feminine but not feminist” attempt to reclaim women’s power played 
into the hands of the straight mind: once Psych et Po “imposed an official discourse about 
women” that distanced feminism from democratic politics, “All of the Parisian 
intelligentsia on the right and the left gave sighs of relief. Feminism was dead: long live 
the feminine, femininity, and feminine pleasure.”491 And when the issue of lesbianism 
was rehashed in the QF collective, Wittig insisted that the imperative to “reduce” the 
analysis of lesbianism to the larger class struggle of “women” condemns lesbians to be 
“unique, outside of the political context.” The issue, in both cases, is very much the 
question of lesbian existence: how can critique avoid reducing the analysis of particular 
oppressions to problems defined in a language foreign to those who experience it? In a 
word, how do we engage in a critique that does mistake oppression for grievances ‘on 
both sides’? After her experiences with the MLF in the ‘70s and QF in the ‘80s, Wittig 
was adamant that it was the impossibility of lesbian existence as political subjects of the 
movement – not the experience of women as a class – that best illuminated this tendency 









 Finally, then, let me conclude by making the case that Wittig’s framework, which 
is distinct from both standpoint theorists’ and their “third wave” critics, is more closely 
aligned with the concerns of feminist publicity that I have previously argued 
characterizes lesbian feminism more broadly. Like Marilyn Frye, who I argued in 
Chapter 2 is concerned with what forms of divestment would be required to establish 
political relationships on radically different terms, Wittig’s lesbian feminism seeks not 
only to identify or outline the shape of lesbian experiences so as to bring them to 
consciousness, but rather to call into question the necessity of all the economic, political, 
and cultural relationships – such as those that create categories like “men and women” – 
that sustain politics as usual. Moreover, though, she does so not by advocating for a 
straightforward form of separatism, but by suggesting an open-ended – I would say 
coalitional – process in which each individual member of the group “lesbians” must 
recognize the “real necessity for everyone to exist as an individual, as well as a member 
of a class.”492  
 It is easy, as I have suggested, to read Wittig as a kind of prophet – that is, a 
figure who heralded the coming of “third wave” feminist and queer theories even as she 
remains trapped by discredited frameworks like standpoint theory. However, to read her 
this way would be to displace her from the historical and political context in which she 
was writing, thereby evacuating the real substance of her work. Resisting this framework 
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would, instead, reveal Wittig’s close relationship with the three key lessons of coalition 
building that I outlined in Chapter 3. First, Wittig consistently declines to define 
“lesbian” as an identity category. What it means to be a lesbian, she argues, is not at all 
the issue; instead, Wittig asks what sort of relationships would need to be established in 
order for lesbians, of all people, to achieve political existence. As I will outline in more 
detail in the next chapter, these relationships would, at minimum, need to be premised on 
a kind of mutual recognition, in which no subject is made to translate her experiences into 
foreign terms. Like the lesbian feminists of color in Chapter 3, then, Wittig insists that 
any transformative lesbianism must be premised not in identity, but in the promise of 
mutual recognition. Second, as her experiences with Psych et Po and Delphy make clear, 
Wittig saw this promise as having been radically breached in her own feminist context. 
For Wittig, even radical feminists are susceptible to the operations of the straight mind; to 
the extent that they are willing to obscure or erase certain feminists’ claims in the name 
of political expediency, she argues, these feminists fail to take the lesson of seeing from 
the “point of view of the oppressed” to heart. Wittig argues that while failing to practice 
mutual accountability is a constant risk of political engagement, these moments are far 
from tolerable trade-offs in the movement towards a collective future. Instead, they 
constitute a radical breach in the very promise that feminism makes. Finally, Wittig 
suggests that the solution to these breaches is neither more unity – the insistence on a 
revolutionary consciousness – nor a turn towards resignification. Instead, she advocates a 
practice of what I would call repair. It is a practice of listening (“We must listen to this 
oppression”), of accounting (acknowledging that the challenge to lesbian existence is not 
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a problem “on both sides”), and working through (discovering the conditions that would 
enable feminists to face “the question of the subject of each singular woman.”)  
Thus, Wittig shares with the lesbian feminist writers that have populated this 
work a key argument: that the goal of a lesbian feminist public is not simply to include or 
speak for all kinds of women. It’s more than that: the goal is to create a kind of public in 
which marginalized people are no longer required to translate themselves in order to be 
heard by the powerful and can, instead, be heard in their own terms. Wittig, like the other 
lesbian feminists I have foregrounded here, suggests that until and unless this form of 
reciprocity is established, feminists will have no idea what the marginalized really need, 
because in a significant sense, they have never been able to adequately call the social 
body to account. For lesbian feminists, then, we might say that the capacity to speak in 
their own terms is a condition of the new public they want to inaugurate. 
What does this mean, in practice? Recall, first, that failures of accountability 
cannot be reduced to the kinds of injuries that we normally think of as constituting 
oppression or injustice. For example, the problem facing lesbian feminists are not simply 
that racism and homophobia exclude these subjects from fully participating in the 
economy by denying them jobs, or that they are barred from gaining the full rights of 
citizenship, however much these injustices may also be true. The specific problem that 
lesbian feminists identified throughout the 1980s was an additional injury: it is that no 
matter what they say, their claims will be minimized, misrecognized, or ignored because 
the responsibility to listen isn’t baked into the system itself. It is to this practice that I turn 





“Our reality is the fictional:” 
Wittig, Lorde, and the Lesbian Body Politic 
 
“But there are no new ideas still waiting in the wings to save us as 
women, as humans... we must constantly encourage ourselves and 
each other to attempt the heretical actions that our dreams imply, 
and so many of our old ideas disparage. In the forefront of our 
move toward change, there is only poetry to hint at possibility 
made real.” 
 – Audre Lorde, “Poetry is Not a Luxury”  
 
“Our reality is the fictional as it is socially accepted, our symbols 
deny the traditional symbols and are fictional for traditional male 
culture, and we possess an entire fiction into which we project 
ourselves and which is already a possible reality. It is our fiction 
that validates us.”             – Monique Wittig, “Introduction to 






  At the beginning of this work, I invoked the scene at the “Second Sex: Thirty 
Years Later” Conference to describe the ways that Black (and) lesbian feminisms in the 
1980s are variously invoked in a meta-theoretical battle over the “correct” solutions to 
exclusion. There, I argued that contemporary theorists employ scenes such as the chaotic 
open mic session following Audre Lorde’s “Master’s Tools” remarks as evidence of the 
flawed ways that feminists during the 1980s proposed to deal with differences between 
women. At the same time, contemporary theorists suggest, these purported flaws of 
1980s feminisms evidence the urgent need to attend to intra-group power and privilege – 
a need that they figure as ground zero for the methodological innovations of 1990s queer 
theory. However, as I have been arguing, the narrative about the 1980s as the “eruption of 
difference” that evidences the exclusionary failures of second wave feminism and, 
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therefore, the need for poststructural critique is, in fact, a myth imposed back onto the 
period. I have shown, for example, that closer attention to largely forgotten lesbian 
political archives such as the magazine Sinister Wisdom reveal a deep concern about 
developing relational, reparative practices that address racial and other intra-group 
inequalities. In keeping with these claims, this work has asked: How does the advent of 
queer theory – and the just-so story it tells about itself – obscure this concern with repair, 
and to what political effect has it done so?  
However much these questions require granular attention to the complex histories 
of feminism, reconstructing the lesbian feminist archive also suggests political and 
conceptual questions that are broader in scope. In what ways, for example, do the 
relational and reparative frames that lesbians developed exceed the critiques of “identity” 
that have characterized their misreading? How, if at all, do lesbian political thinkers of 
the 1980s – those who were expressly concerned with theorizing the democratic 
possibilities of a reparative politics – resist incorporation into the narratives of identity, 
fracture, and wounded attachments that legitimize queer critique and politics today? And 
what resources do these resistances offer for a more robust intersectional politics in the 
contemporary moment? This chapter explores these questions by probing the interlocking 
investments in the work of two writers deeply involved in the scene at NYU and, indeed, 
throughout the 1980s: Monique Wittig and Audre Lorde. In contrast to those frameworks 
that pose “identity” as the primary political frame of the 1980s, I will argue that these two 
thinkers are in fact engaged in a politics of repair that far exceeds post-hoc assessments 
of identity politics, and that grappling more deeply with the substance of their work 
displaces and decenters several paradigmatic debates in political theory today.  
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Contemporary theorists, following the commonplace misreading of the 1980s, for 
instance, tend to think of Lorde and Wittig as having lingering attachments to the politics 
of identity in spite of their sophisticated theories of language and social construction. As 
such, they are claimed by queer theorists as imperfect antecedents; they prefigure and 
legitimize queer theory’s methodological maneuvers, even as they provide evidence of 
the political and conceptual failures of 1980s feminisms. However, I will argue in what 
follows that this (mis)reading of Lorde and Wittig is limited for two reasons. First, it 
narrows the value of these two writers’ work to what is useful for queer theory, and 
dismisses the rest as contradictory or confounding. But as I will argue below, reading 
Lorde’s and Wittig’s lingering attachments to Black and lesbian identities as simply 
incongruous with their better impulses has meant that the thematic of the speaking 
subject – and therefore the substantive politics of repair – that they develop is seldom 
fully appreciated. Second, however, because this misreading has been taken up as an 
established fact in broader contemporary debates over concepts like identity, agency, and 
recognition, political theory as a field has failed to grapple with the substantive political 
resources that a lesbian politics of repair offer. To take stock of the ways in which 
Wittig’s and Lorde’s writing exceeds debates over identity, agency, and recognition by 
placing them in conversation with the larger lesbian feminist writing community, I argue, 
is to uncover a fuller, more robust politics – a politics that far exceeds frameworks that 
interpret these thinkers as imperfect antecedents to queer critique. In this chapter, then, I 
will insist on the historical and conceptual resonances of Wittig’s and Lorde’s reparative 
framework beyond their presence in queer theory. Doing so, I will suggest, illuminates 
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the shared political investments of lesbian feminists as they sought to articulate a 
transformational politics based on “a world of possibility for us all.”493  
Specifically, I will argue for reading the entanglements between these two 
thinkers – and the politics of Black (and) lesbian identity they articulate – by pointing out 
their shared investments in three key grounds. First, both writers exemplify an investment 
in theorizing inequality in terms of what I call “relations of moral vulnerability.” Such 
relations, for both thinkers, are born of structured asymmetries in the ability to call others 
to account; they are characterized, as Lorde puts it, by the compulsory use of language 
“which has been made to work against us.”494 Both Lorde and Wittig respond to this 
problem by suggesting that under conditions of moral vulnerability, one of the first real 
needs of the oppressed is the need to speak oneself in one’s own terms. The lived need to 
speak that appears in both Wittig’s and Lorde’s work cannot be reduced (as it often is) to 
the discredited idea that using identity categories or making claims on existing authorities 
can displace structures of oppression. Second, both thinkers share an investment in 
rectifying the structured patterns of misrecognition that symptomatize power. Such an 
accounting for moral vulnerability requires not “more thorough” critical lenses, but rather 
reparative practices such as reclaiming the “utopian dimensions” of the social contract. 
This reclamation requires attention to another common conceptual target of contemporary 
queer theorists: recognition. I will argue that Wittig’s and Lorde’s use of the term 
suggests that a fuller attention to the self-determination required by recognition is 
 
493 Audre Lorde, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House,” 
reprinted in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde. (Berkeley: Crossing 
Press, 2007), 112.  
494 Lorde, “The Transformation of Silence into Speech and Action,” in Sister Outsider, 
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irreducible to the kinds of debates that have preoccupied critics and advocates of the term 
for the last thirty years. Finally, both thinkers share an investment in the power of 
language to repair – even remake – the body politic in which moral vulnerabilities occur. 
I conclude the chapter by reflecting briefly on how these undervalued entanglements 
illuminate the ongoing and unresolved project of intersectionality in political theory. I 
argue that a renewed commitment to intersectionality in political theory ought to take 
place alongside concerns about the “lesbian body politic” found in Wittig and Lorde.  
 
Wittig and Lorde: Misfits, Disruptors, Vanishing Mediators 
The central argument of this chapter is that the “lesbian body politic” articulated 
by Wittig and Lorde, although it hangs on the concepts “identity,” “agency,” and 
“recognition,” is not reducible to the debates over these terms that have become 
commonplace in political theory. Nevertheless, as I have suggested throughout this work, 
the commonplace narrative about the 1980s – that its ascendant identitarian framework 
undercut the radical political purchase of feminism – depends on the assumption that all 
claims about identity and recognition fit predictably into the kinds of regressive politics 
that have become standard targets of critical theory since the 1990s. Claims like those 
made by Wittig, Lorde, and many other Black (and) lesbian theorists, therefore, are seen 
by many academics concerned with the paradoxes of freedom as bearing the regrettable 
imprints of failed feminisms past. While in the next several sections I will argue that this 
interpretation is both inaccurate and reductive, it is worth first understanding why and 
how Wittig and Lorde are seen as “problems” in queer theory, even as queer theorists 
claim a debt to their work.  
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Wittig and Lorde are figures akin to what Kathi Weeks has described as 
“vanishing mediators” in queer theory, having inaugurated a conversation about 
difference within feminism only to be dismissed for having failed to solve the very 
problem they pose. Weeks, borrowing the term herself from Jameson’s analysis of the 
Protestant work ethic, describes the vanishing mediator not only as an intellectual 
predecessor whose ideas are taken up and developed over time, but as a figure who 
“serves the more dramatic function of a bearer of change that sows the seeds of [her] own 
extinction.”495 Weeks argues that the vanishing mediator is one compelling lens through 
which to interpret “feminist time,” in which certain works and ideas are repeatedly cited 
as causal forces even as their content and substance is “excised” from the politics of the 
present. Throughout this work, I have argued that lesbian feminists in general – and here, 
that Wittig and Lorde in particular – serve just such a purpose; they are (mis)interpreted 
in queer theory as having posed the problem of difference for feminism only to render 
themselves irrelevant, remaining ensnared by the lure of stable identities and agents.  
As Lisa Disch has persuasively detailed, for example, Wittig cuts an imposing 
figure in queer theory’s just-so story, even as thinkers like Judith Butler cast their “debt” 
to her as a kind of partial disavowal. “There may be intimations of a theory of 
performative subjectivity in her work,” Disch ventriloquizes the common wisdom, but 
she “needs a Butler to point them out to her.”496 Although Wittig notices the power of 
language to shape (and reshape) the social field, the problems with Wittig’s approach in 
 
495 Kathi Weeks, “The Vanishing Dialectic: Shulamith Firestone and the Future of the 
Feminist 1970s,” in South Atlantic Quarterly 114(4), October 2015; 740.  
496 Lisa Disch, “’French Theory’ Goes to France: Trouble dans le Genre and ‘Materialist’ 
Feminism – A Conversation Manqué,” Judith Butler’s Precarious Politics: Critical 
Encounters, ed. Carver and Chambers. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 53.  
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both Butler’s and Disch’s accounts arise in Wittig’s failure to fully deconstruct the 
“agent” as the basis of political action:   
Left to her own devices, Wittig defines ‘the feminine’ as ‘an “attribute” of a 
gender,’ subscribes to a voluntarist and instrumental view of language, and 
succumbs to an ‘existential-materialist’ predisposition to ‘presume the subject, the 
person, to have a prosocial and pregendered integrity.’”497  
 
In other words, if Butler’s Wittig fails to fully appreciate the radically constructed (i.e. 
“performative”) nature of identity, it is because she clings to the outmoded notion that 
politics requires the recognition – not the transgression – of the very notion of the 
agential subject. In effect, because she fails to disentangle the relationship between 
identity and the agent, the Wittig that appears in Butler’s work fails to understand how 
her account of lesbian “identity” becomes implicated in regressive, normative, or 
disciplinary politics that recapitulate the very exclusions that render “the lesbian” 
unthinkable in the first place. Thus, what is accepted as queer theory’s “debt” to Wittig is 
her insistence on the capacity of language to shape the real. At the same time, though, the 
substance of her politics – its insistence on embodying the agent who speaks – is cast 
away as a regrettable and excisable holdover.   
The substance of Audre Lorde’s politics has suffered a similar fate in the pages of 
queer theory’s foundational works, although Lorde as a figure has been more fully 
absorbed into queer theorists’ narratives of their own work. Indeed, much ink has been 
spilled in appropriating Audre Lorde as a “postmodern,” a precursor to queer theory 
despite her dogged, and apparently inconsistent, insistence on lesbian feminism. Indeed, 
although Lorde consistently spoke of her own identities “as a Black lesbian feminist 
 
497 Ibid., 53.  
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warrior poet mother,” queer theorists have nonetheless gone about the business of 
discrediting this dimension of her work as a regrettable and dismissible relic of the times. 
As Linda Garber notes on the one hand, “Queer critics who turn to Audre Lorde’s work 
use her multiple positioning, the moral/political force invoked by the particular locations 
she inhabits, and her widespread influence on lesbian and feminist politics and theory to 
shore up their constructivist position and to oppose what they see as lesbian feminism’s 
naïve essentialism.”498 At the same time, however, much of the substance of Lorde’s 
writing is understood to be “at odds” with this more innately post-structural core: as 
Harriet Malinowitz puts it, Lorde’s constant rhetorical appeals to her own stable identity 
seem to undercut her more post-structural moments:  
Absolutely central to post-structuralist theory is the notion that thought and action 
are the products of language, and that the only “self” is one which is discursively 
produced… Lorde, on the other hand, seems to be positing… an inner self which 
precedes language, and which can decide independently of it whether or not to 
enter its domain and employ it as a transparent medium of expression. In this 
sense, Lorde’s entire conceptualization of speech, silence, and truth – the latter of 
which she seems to consider knowable and articulable – are at complete odds with 
postmodern conceptions of the same.499  
 
Like readings of Wittig as being only partially assimilable into the idiom of queer theory 
– a quality that leads many theorists following Judith Butler to conclude that her work is, 
simply, imperfect – Lorde’s work is often simultaneously claimed as an imperfect, and 
somewhat confounding, antecedent to poststructural theories.  
 
498 Linda Garber, Identity Poetics: Race, Class, and the Lesbian-Feminist Roots of Queer 
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York: Feminist Press, 1996); 266-267.  
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If both Wittig and Lorde pose a problem for queer theory, it is because they seem 
at once to signal a methodological affinity with post-structuralism while hewing strongly 
to a political commitment to identity, recognition, and the speaking subject. How should 
we interpret these apparent contradictions? Are Wittig and Lorde simply disruptors and 
misfits? Are they imperfect antecedents, “vanishing mediators” who inaugurated a 
profoundly new discourse only to be retroactively excised from it? Or have we simply 
failed to see their innate post-structuralism for what it really is? For many observers of 
this apparent contradiction, responding to these questions requires putting these 
paradigmatic thinkers of the 1980s back “into contact” with the queer theories that have 
partially claimed them. It is no coincidence, then, that both Disch and Malinowitz advise 
theorists “in the twenty-first century,” as Malinowitz puts it, to “find ways of alchemizing 
[these] apparent contradictions into new funds of knowledge… to put disparate 
interpretive systems into contact with one another to discover, if not common ground, 
then at least new kinds of conversations whose tensions can recharge our work and offer 
it fresh direction.”500 For Disch, finding the points of contact between, say, a Wittig and a 
Butler reveals a shared political truth despite all of their differences: quoting Karen 
Barad, Disch argues that while Wittig and Butler disagree on the status of the “agent” in 
language, their theories can both be productively put to work towards the “contestation of 
the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real.”501 The best we can 
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offer, then, would seem to be a “fusing of horizons” that promises a fuller account of the 
continuities and disjunctures that characterize the passage of feminist time.   
However much contemporary political theorists may wish to allay the problems of 
Wittig’s and Lorde’s appeals to identity, agency, and recognition by reconciling them 
with queer theory’s full-throated post-structuralism, though, such ways of “alchemizing” 
this encounter cannot explain away what are, in fact, incredibly consistent elements of 
Lorde’s and Wittig’s work. Rather than seeking points of contact that enable the fusing of 
these two horizons, then, in the pages that follow I will argue strongly against the desire 
to allow Wittig and Lorde to remain queer theory’s vanishing mediators. I do so in part 
because I think such an interpretation of their role in feminist theory fundamentally 
misreads several key dimensions of their respective theorizations of injustice, and in part 
because by participating in this misreading today, political theorists fail to appreciate how 
their work radically alters the terms of debate in which injustice and redress are typically 
understood. In order to understand Wittig and Lorde without appeal to their “unresolved” 
relationship to queer theory, then, we will not only have to disarticulate their theories 
from the usual frameworks for interpreting the 1980s, as previous chapters have 
proposed, but we will also have to disentangle their work from the debates that have 
emerged in the wake of this particular misreading of the 1980s as an imperfect antecedent 
to post-structuralism. In particular, this chapter will focus on the ways that debates 
around “identity,” “agency,” and “recognition” have linked any usage of these terms to 
regressive, conservative, or exclusionary politics. In so doing, participants in these 
debates have unnecessarily ignored how turning to identity and recognition mobilizes a 
transformation in the social body in both Wittig’s and Lorde’s writings.  
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Injustice as the Reduction of Language  
Let me now add another wrinkle to the familiar trope of 1980s lesbian feminism 
as queer theory’s imperfect antecedent. In addition to having failed to adequately 
deconstruct the “agent,” the familiar narrative within feminist and queer theory goes 
something like this: because identity entails claiming a stable agent, an “I” or “we” that 
does not and cannot exist, these kinds of claims obscure “how feminist theory has 
confused the condition of one group of [white, middle class, straight] women with the 
condition of all.”502 In other words: feminists ought to be incredibly wary of claims about 
women’s identity as an oppressed class, because such claims require structured patterns 
of misrecognition – that is, those articulations of an agential “we” that systematically 
erase or obscure the perspectives of certain women. Indeed, it is precisely this suspicion 
of identity as masking a fundamental asymmetry that underwrites queer criticism’s 
concern about Wittig and Lorde’s lingering attachments to the agent who speaks. 
However, a concern about the conflation of “the condition of one group of women with 
the condition of all” need not negate, invalidate, or render suspect Wittig and Lorde’s 
emphasis on identity, agency, and recognition. Quite the opposite: I will argue that this 
insight about the asymmetry of address is fundamentally true, and that on a basic level it 
accurately describes what thinkers like Lorde and Wittig share with the larger Black 
(and) lesbian writing community. However, I will also suggest that problems emerge 
when debates over how feminist and queer theorists ought to respond to this insight 
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politically become narrowly associated with disciplinary debates in political theory, such 
as those over recognition.  
Like many lesbian writers during the 1980s, both Lorde and Wittig saw their 
primary task as articulating the difficulties of speaking about Blackness and lesbianism at 
all. Lorde, for example, frequently describes the imposition of silence about one’s 
experiences as a primary tool of power, in which “enforced silence, the inability to speak, 
the refusal to speak is a very violent silence, where you know there is a great deal 
happening but it’s not spoken.”503 Such “enforced silences,” for Lorde, are at the root of 
injustice. Nowhere does Lorde articulate the effects of such impositions on the oppressed 
more eloquently than in her essay “The Transformation of Silence into Language and 
Action:”  
And of course I am afraid, because the transformation of silence into language 
and action is an act of self-revelation, and that always seems fraught with danger. 
But my daughter, when I told her of our topic and my difficulty with it, said, ‘Tell 
them about how you’re never really a whole person if you remain silent, because 
there’s always that one little piece inside you that wants to be spoken out’ […] In 
the cause of silence, each of us draws the face of her own fear – fear of contempt, 
of censure, or some judgment, or recognition, of challenge, of annihilation…Even 
within the women’s movement, we have had to fight, and still do, for that very 
visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our Blackness. For to survive in 
the mouth of this dragon we call america, we have had to learn this first and most 
vital lesson – that we were never meant to survive. Not as human beings.504 
 
Here, Lorde suggests that silence is an imposition – it is a “constant, if unspoken, 
distortion of vision”505 born out of fear of recrimination, judgment, and misrecognition. 
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Moreover, however, such silences are impositions that prevent only certain people – 
“Because I am woman, because I am Black, because I am a lesbian, because I am 
myself”506 – from being or becoming “a whole person.” In short, the imposition of silence 
is a fundamental condition of power, in that it renders the powerless unable to articulate 
“that one little piece inside of you that wants to be spoken out,” and in so doing 
legitimizes “that language” – racism, heterosexism, homophobia – “which has been made 
to work against us.”507  
Lorde thus argues that despite the silences imposed on the oppressed, the ability 
to articulate oneself “is an act of self-revelation” that combats the fact that “we were 
never meant to survive.” Articulating identity – “that little piece inside you that wants to 
be spoken out” – is not simply a matter of an attachment to epistemological stability; it is 
“a survival situation.” “If we don’t name ourselves, we are nothing,” Lorde once 
explained. “As a Black woman I have to deal with identity or I don’t exist at all. I can’t 
depend on the world to name me kindly, because it never will… So either I’m going to be 
defined by myself or not at all. In that sense it becomes a survival situation.”508 Identity 
claims, then, are not a relic of the times; they are precisely the mode in which Lorde 
imagines the oppressed will struggle against the silences that are imposed on them.  
It is no coincidence, I think, that in teaching her own work to students at the 
University of Arizona, Wittig assigned her own essay “The Mark of Gender” alongside 
Lorde’s essay on silence.509 Indeed, reading the pieces alongside one another suggests 
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that both writers were deeply concerned with the kinds of hierarchies that impose 
structured silences on certain women, making it impossible for Black (and) lesbian 
women to speak themselves “as human beings.” In the opening sentences of The Straight 
Mind collection, for example, Wittig describes the “category of sex” as a form of 
“censorship” and “concealment” that obscures both the real and discursive existence of 
lesbians. Like Lorde’s claims about imposed silences, the “censorship” that Wittig 
describes functions by denying lesbians the “authority of speech” in several interlocking 
ways. Like Lorde’s suggestion that “we were never meant to survive… as human 
beings,” Wittig argues that categories like “gender,” “sex,” and “race” operate to “wrest 
from women what belongs to them by right: conceiving of oneself as a total subject 
through the exercise of language.”510 In other words, because gender, sex, and race force 
Black (and) lesbian women from speaking only in relation to the universal straight, 
white, male subject, these categories “force them to make their entrance [into language] 
in a crablike way, particularizing themselves and apologizing profusely.”511 Elsewhere, 
Wittig notes that such “crablike” gestures make it impossible for women, let alone Black 
(and) lesbian women, to appear in language as full subjects: “newspapers still today,” she 
writes, “report that ‘two students and a woman,’ ‘two lawyers and a woman,’ ‘three 
travelers and a woman’ were seen doing this or that.”512 To be denied the capacity to 
articulate oneself as a subject in language, then, is to be denied the very condition of 
being recognized as a full participant in the social body.  
 
510 Wittig, “The Mark of Gender,” The Straight Mind and Other Essays, 81.  
511 Ibid., 81.  
512 Wittig, “The Category of Sex,” The Straight Mind and Other Essays, 8.  
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Second, like Lorde, Wittig describes this impossibility of speaking as a human 
being – a subject – as the basic condition of power: “Sex, under the name of gender,” she 
writes,  
permeates the whole body of language and forces every locutor, if she belongs to 
the oppressed sex, to proclaim it in her speech, that is, to appear in language under 
her proper physical form and not under the abstract form, which every male 
locutor has the unquestioned right to use… One must understand that men are not 
born with a faculty for the universal and that women are not reduced at birth to 
the particular. The universal has been, and is continually, at every moment, 
appropriated by men…. It is an act, a criminal act, perpetrated by one class 
against another.513  
 
To “appropriate” the ability to speak – to reserve the capacity to be or become “a whole 
person” – for oneself, is for both Lorde and Wittig a foundational violence that cannot be 
explained away by the epistemological instability of the agent. It is a political act that, as 
Lorde puts it, denies “the decision to define ourselves, name ourselves, and speak for 
ourselves, instead of being defined and spoken for by others.”514 The result of this 
criminal, political act, writes Wittig, “is to deny [us] any claim to the abstract, 
philosophical, political discourses that give shape to the social body.”515 If the condition 
of power is to prevent Black (and) lesbian women from articulating themselves as full 
participants in the social body, then an adequate political response will, at minimum, 
require the restoration of this capacity to become a subject to Black (and) lesbian women. 
Lesbian feminist theory in the 1980s, then, is “left with the question of the subject of each 
singular woman – not the myth, but each one of us.”516 
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Because debates over the merits of post-structuralism have turned on complex 
questions about the relation of the cultural and the economic, the symbolic and the real, 
or the significatory and the material,517 contemporary theorists tend to misread these 
stated concerns in Wittig and Lorde, as we saw in the section above, as questions about 
whether we can or should consider identity to “exist” prior to language. But such 
questions obscure more than they reveal about these thinkers. Such debates do not, for 
instance, explain how Wittig could hold both that “lesbians are not women” and that 
“Nevertheless, and rather than despairing of ever understanding, we must recognize the 
need to reach subjectivity in the abandonment by many of us to the myth ‘woman.’”518 
They cannot explain what Lorde meant in her poem “A Litany for Survival” when she 
wrote that despite the overwhelming fear that accompanies speech, “but when we are 
silent / we are still afraid / So it is better to speak / remembering / we were never meant to 
survive.”519 These articulations of a need in Lorde and Wittig to express oneself in 
language far exceeds methodological debates over the temporal relationship between 
language and the material, or indeed over how identity is constituted at all; it bespeaks an 
active politics born of the practice of reaching for subjectivity. Debates such as those 
concerned with Wittig and Lorde as imperfect antecedents to queer post-structuralism not 
only fail to adequately grapple with this need, they actively reject it as an ancillary or 
excisable attachment to identity politics. But I would argue that, on a closer reading of 
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these two thinkers, this need – this reaching – for subjectivity is far from an ancillary or 
excisable attachment; it is in fact a central thematic.  
If debates over the relationship between language and the material cannot capture 
this need, then that the framework of moral vulnerability that I argued in Chapter 3 was 
central to the larger lesbian feminist writing community can better explain these elements 
of Wittig’s and Lorde’s writing. On this view, the problems of feminist theory – problems 
that arose in the pages of Sinister Wisdom, at the “Second Sex at 30” conference, and 
indeed, ones that still plague feminist coalitions today – are born not of “difference” or 
“exclusion,” but of asymmetries of address that produce a real, embodied need for speech 
itself. As Lester Olson put it in his assessment of Audre Lorde’s intervention in the 
Second Sex conference, for example, Lorde consistently writes that the problem of 
oppression is not only economic or political in nature, but is also one of “rhetorical 
forms” that obfuscate asymmetrical “communicative practices across social 
differences.”520 “Examples of such practices,” Olson writes,  
include silencing others, excluding others from public forums and rendering them 
invisible in the process, devaluing others’ remarks when they do speak, speaking 
for or about others, misnaming others’ practices in order to dominate them, 
appropriating others by treating them as tokens, using others for legitimation, or 
blaming others for their under-representation.”521  
 
Such asymmetries, as Wittig would later go on to argue, are not so much problems of 
difference solved by making stronger appeals to Western humanism (as Butler misreads 
her), but are instead problems that inhere in the structured patterns of misrecognition that 
symptomize hierarchy. Such asymmetries of address, as I suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, 
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are instances of moral vulnerabilities, where “the vulnerability in question is the potential 
for being exposed to the insult and additional injury, when we perceive ourselves 
wronged, of having our standing to call others to account denied, dismissed, or ignored in 
ways that call our very status as full participants into question.”522 Thus, when we 
consider only the epistemological problems of identity or agency, we only see part of the 
problem. Such debates over the “correct” relationship between discourse, speech acts, 
and subjects in fact abandon the granular, intersubjective questions that appear when we 
consider who is capable of speech, when, and in what terms. This analysis, which 
underwrites both Wittig’s and Lorde’s concern with speaking subjects, suggest that 
relations of vulnerability operate through asymmetries of address. These asymmetries, in 
turn, produce structured pattern of misrecognition which Lorde and Wittig theorize as 
taking place through the systematic reduction of political grammar to certain concepts 
(sex, gender, race) while foreclosing others.  
 To be sure, defenders of both Wittig and Lorde have realized that this aspect of 
their writing – the emphasis on using language to “appropriate” subjectivity for oneself – 
cannot be easily dismissed as a historical accident. Wittig critics such as Teresa de 
Lauretis, Linda Zerilli, and Lisa Disch523 have pointed out that her insistence on building 
lesbian subjectivity is a project of freedom – “a political phenomenon… that is 
inconceivable outside the realm of action and speech.”524 Similarly, Linda Garber argues 
 
522 Margaret Urban Walker, “Moral Vulnerability and the Task of Reparations,” 112.  
523 See Teresa de Lauretis. “Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical 
Consciousness,” Feminist Studies, 16 no. 1 (1990): 115-150; Linda Zerilli. “A New 
Grammar of Difference: Monique Wittig’s Poetic Revolution,” On Monique Wittig: 
Theoretical, Political, and Literary Essays, ed. Shaktini. (Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 2005); 87-114; Disch, “’French Theory’ Goes to France.”  
524 Linda Zerilli, “A New Grammar of Difference,” 90.  
 282 
of Lorde that her “identity poetics” suggest the need to consider identity not as a stable 
category in which one articulates an “I-will,” but as a kind of discursive “stance:”  
Like lesbian, the word warrior began to appear on equal semantic and 
grammatical footing with Black, feminist, woman, and other markers of Lorde’s 
identity in various permutations of her oft-quoted litany in the late 1970s… 
Obviously, warrior is not a traditionally recognized category of identity or 
oppression. The term functions as a stance, a battle position(ality). Its prominence 
in Lorde’s identity poetics litany makes it clear that the other more conventional 
identity markers function as stances as well.525  
 
But while theorists such as Zerilli and Garber argue that the practice of deploying identity 
as a poetic “stance” suggest that this use of subjectivity is primarily a rhetorical or 
conceptual exercise that the opens space for “new [grammars] of difference,”526 I would 
go further. Both Wittig and Lorde intend the use of language for appropriating 
subjectivity to be a political practice in its own right.  
For Lorde, for example, the silences born of moral vulnerabilities are not only 
conceptual or poetic, but in fact have deeply damaging consequences for any feminist 
politics that declines to address them. In her famous “Open Letter to Mary Daly,” Lorde 
writes that racism within the feminist movement has had the effect of reducing Black 
women’s point of view to trivialities or tokens; in essence, of reducing the language 
through which Black women can speak. Lorde writes that while “I am used to having my 
archetypal experience distorted and trivialized” in the dominant culture, such 
misrecognitions come at a particularly steep political price when they explicitly breach 
the promise of reciprocity that inheres in terms like “sisterhood.” Writing of the 
misrecognition she experienced in reading Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology, she writes, “[It] is 
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terribly painful to feel it being done by a woman whose knowledge so much touches 
mine […] I felt that you had in fact misused my words, utilized them only to testify 
against myself as a woman of Color.”527 The structured misrecognition that takes place in 
the misuse or breach of “sisterhood,” for Lorde, is not just an epistemological problem, 
but a deeply political one: it “stands as a real block to communication between us,” she 
writes, and “makes it far easier to turn away from you completely than to attempt to 
understand the thinking behind your choices. Should the next step be war between us, or 
separation? Assimilation within a solely western european herstory is not acceptable.”528 
Lorde thus theorizes the structured patterns of misrecognition that make up moral 
vulnerabilities as both the cause and the symptom of hierarchy between women; 
however, she also points out that until Black (and) lesbian feminists confront this reality, 
no amount of epistemological maneuvering will resolve the problem.  
 Finally, if Lorde thematizes the structured patterns of misrecognition as political 
problems, Wittig takes this argument a step further still in her essay “On the Social 
Contract.” There, she argues that the structured patterns of misrecognition of the sort of 
politics that Lorde mourns in her “Open Letter” are at the heart of the very condition of 
the modern body politic: the egalitarian social contract. Indeed, in her reading of 
Rousseau in The Straight Mind, she suggests the social contract in Rousseau’s thought is 
so perfectly reciprocal that each individual is essentially interchangeable with all the 
others. It is a promise in which all individuals, groups, or classes are able to call others to 
account, to bear responsibility for the agreed-upon rules and norms of the society. Yet 
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although all modern subjects are born into a social contract in which “enjoying a 
reciprocal commitment… would be a necessary condition of our freedom,”529 she argues 
that in reality this condition “[has] been appropriated for so long by the dominant group 
(men over women) [because] they have been used to mean both abstractly and concretely 
humanity as male.”530 The social contract as it has existed historically, for Wittig, is thus 
both “a philosophical and political abuse.”531 Moving beyond Lorde’s conception of the 
breach of reciprocity as a problem internal to feminism, Wittig thus argues that the 
asymmetry of address, structured patterns of misrecognition, and inability for Black (and) 
lesbian women to constitute themselves as subjects are in fact paradigmatic political 
problems.  
Asymmetries of address – the inability to use language reciprocally – are thus the 
vehicle by which the very conditions of the body politic can be breached. However, while 
this breach occurs through the “appropriation” of the use of language itself, the structured 
patterns of misrecognition that the breach effects is not simply an epistemological 
problem, nor can it be resolved by pointing out the inherent instability of categories like 
“the agent” or “the subject.” For both Lorde and Wittig, then, this breach threatens the 
very notion of freedom itself:  
The black unicorn was mistaken  
 for a shadow 
 or a symbol 
 and taken  
 through a cold country 
 where mist painted mockeries  
 of my fury […]  
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 The black unicorn is restless 
 the black unicorn is unrelenting 




Recognition and The Social Contract  
Moral vulnerabilities, as theorized by Wittig and Lorde, are thus breaches in the 
very underpinnings of the body politic; they entail breaches in the promise of mutual 
recognition that underwrites the social contract. For both Wittig and Lorde, such breaches 
cause problems far deeper than the epistemological ones associated with the critiques of 
agency and identity: they threaten the very possibility of speech, and therefore the crucial 
moment of recognition, that a body politic requires. The need for recognition, they argue, 
is a fundamental political need; without it, political relationships cannot move forward. 
As Lorde puts it in her “Open Letter,” the political betrayal occasioned by breaches in the 
social contract raise questions about the very possibility of relationships, political and 
otherwise: “This is not a rhetorical question,” she writes, “in order to come together, we 
must recognize each other. Yet I feel that since you have so completely un-recognized 
me, perhaps I have been in error concerning you and no longer recognize you.”533 As I 
will argue for the remainder of this chapter, Wittig’s and Lorde’s use of the social 
contract to describe the harms done to the body politic by relations of moral vulnerability 
requires attention to the dynamics of misrecognition; equally, they require a fuller 
account of how reciprocal recognition would both repair and remake the body politic 
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itself. However, their emphasis on misrecognition – and therefore the political need for a 
more adequate recognition of the speaking subject – adds yet another fold to the ways in 
which their work has been misread and narrowed by debates in political theory since the 
1990s. Indeed, in addition to the idea that appeals to agency and identity serve only to 
police the boundaries of community membership, appeals to recognition have been 
roundly rejected by theorists writing in the wake of queer critique.  
Like the concepts “identity” and “agency,” “recognition” is regularly associated 
in political theory with regressive politics that reify the very relations that they purport to 
subvert. In fact, for many contemporary theorists, the critique of recognition is tightly 
entangled with the problems of agency and identity themselves. If all articulations of an 
“I” or a “we” entail the exclusion or discursive erasure of some “Other,” the thinking 
goes, then any social body premised on claims about what we share will, inevitably, 
succumb to the dynamics that Sina Kramer describes as the “constitutive exclusion” of 
the social body. While certain figures like Black (and) lesbian women are necessary 
“Others” against which the body politic is defined, they are neither totally excluded from 
the scene nor intelligible within it. Such figures, Kramer writes, are “unintelligible,” yet 
they “lie ambiguously both within and without that space, paradoxically both grounding 
and troubling the distinctions that structure political bodies and the terms of political 
agency. They are excluded within.”534 
This claim is not an abstract one, but in fact emerges from a longstanding 
examination of the ways that social bodies such as those founded by the social contract 
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have functioned historically. As thinkers like Carole Pateman and Charles Mills remind 
us, the social contract has historically been used to deny that sexual or racial domination 
have ever occurred at all, thus preventing women and people of color from making 
claims for justice on society, even as they require the “constitutive exclusion” of those 
“unintelligible” subjects. “The social contract tradition that has been central to Western 
political theory,” writes Mills, “is not a contract between everybody (“we the people”), 
but between just the people who count, the people who really are people (“we the white 
people”).”535 For most critics of the social contract – including Pateman and Mills – the 
breaches in the social contract that Lorde and Wittig detail are thus not so much 
violations of a good-faith promise of reciprocal recognition as they are its very unspoken 
conditions. Again, as Mills points out,  
Racism, racial self-identification, and race thinking are then not in the least 
“surprising, “anomalous,” “puzzling,” incongruent with Enlightenment European 
humanism, but required by the Racial contract as part of the terms for the 
European appropriation of the world.536 
 
Similarly, Pateman suggests succinctly that “Contract is far from being opposed 
to patriarchy; contract is the means through which modern patriarchy is constituted.”537 
In this commonplace reading of the contract the very promise of equality depends on the 
unacknowledged but necessary relationship between “personhood and 
subpersonhood.”538 In stark contrast to Wittig’s claims that the promise of recognition 
under the social contract has been breached (and can therefore be remade or repaired), 
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Pateman’s and Mills’ readings of the social contract instead suggest that, historically 
speaking, recognition was never intended to be reciprocal in the first place. In short, the 
constitutive exclusion of certain (non-white, non-male) subjects cannot be resolved by 
appealing to the mutual recognition guaranteed in the social contract, for it is precisely 
the act of excluding them from recognition through which the contractors constitute 
themselves as a body politic.  
How does one repair a promise that was never proffered in good faith? In 
response to this paradox, queer and feminist theorists following the broadly 
poststructuralist rubric have concluded that gendered, raced, and sexual hierarchies can 
be resolved by appealing to the promise of reciprocal recognition no more than they can 
be achieved by “realizing” the unfinished ideals of some originary contractors. Instead, 
appeals to recognition in the wake of the 1990s misreadings of lesbian feminism are 
commonly understood as “wounded attachments,” those political impulses which Wendy 
Brown explains are “tethered to a formulation of justice that reinscribes a bourgeois 
(masculinist) ideal as its measure.”539 Wounded attachments, according to Brown, 
emerge when historically oppressed groups (say, Black (and) lesbian women) claim these 
purportedly stable identity categories in order to make political claims as injured 
“minority” groups. Because these identity categories, as we have seen, are presumed to 
rely on essentialist understandings of the agent and to assume that the experiences of 
certain perspectives and positions within the group can stand for the whole, they deprive 
themselves of the capacity to articulate their injuries on terms other than those given in 
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liberal, statist, or capitalist terms. Such invocations of “politicized identity,” writes 
Brown, do not and cannot articulate justice in terms of democracy, but rather “demand… 
recognition as identity.”540 Yet however much these identities seek recognition for the 
harms they have endured from the state, from the body politic, or from the unmarked 
relations of capital, such recognition can do nothing more than reify the status quo:  
In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past – a past of injury, a 
past as a hurt will – and locating a “reason” for the “unendurable pain” of social 
powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics, 
a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, 
discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims 
for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in 
politics; it can hold out no future – for itself or others – that triumphs over this 
pain.541   
 
For Brown, then, the presumed failures of “identity” as a locus for political action renders 
suspect the very agential action of seeking recognition – of reaching for subjectivity – 
under the faulty premise of the social contract.  
Finally, then, we can see fully how thinkers like Wittig and Lorde are captured in 
a tight network of association between several concepts. First, identity is inherently 
unstable; second, because of this instability, any form of action that begins with identity 
is doomed to seek a form of recognition will fail to achieve the agential transformation of 
the social field that Lorde and Wittig seek; finally, the desire for agency articulated 
through identity actually reinscribes the very impossibility of speech that these actors 
seek to undermine. In the wake of critiques of the social contract offered by feminist and 
critical race scholars, contemporary political theorists like Brown have concluded that all 
uses of the “utopian dimensions” of the egalitarian social contract will enact similar 
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relations of authority and subordination. This critique of recognition can be found in the 
work of several prominent contemporary theorists – so much so that the turn to the social 
contract as a way of theorizing the asymmetry of address (an explicit turn in Wittig’s 
work and one implicit in Lorde’s) seems completely anachronistic, at best, and highly 
problematic, at worst. If the social contract relies fundamentally on exclusionary and 
regressive concepts like agency and identity – concepts that inaugurate the very 
“constitutive exclusions” that oppressed groups would contest – why continue to invoke 
it at all? 
 
Finding the “Utopian Dimension” 
Contemporary readers of Wittig and Lorde in the wake of this spirited debate 
about recognition might be forgiven, then, for dismissing, minimizing, or even excising 
those elements of their work that appear to be entangled in debates over what Charles 
Taylor calls “judgments about equal worth.”542 If claims about recognition are ensnared 
between a faulty universalism, on the one hand, and “wounded” pleas for recognition, on 
the other, then many critics have followed thinkers like Butler and Brown in arguing that 
the turn to concepts such as the social contract are relics of a less avowedly poststructural 
time. As I suggested in Chapter 3, however, what are often glossed as “identitarian” 
claims about recognition from the 1980s cannot be so easily dismissed when we consider 
them in the context of the larger writing community of lesbian feminism, in which the 
primary goal was not realizing the promise of liberal equality nor dictating the “correct” 
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revolutionary position, but remaking relations of inequality into relations of 
accountability. I have been arguing throughout this chapter that we should see Lorde’s 
and Wittig’s reliance on concepts like identity and agency as central to this reparative 
practice, not because they have failed to fully divest themselves of their complicity in 
power, but precisely because they offer the radical possibility of remaking the very 
relationships that make up the body politic.  
In light of this context, we might return to the question: How does one go about 
repairing or remaking promises that have been as totally breached as the promise of 
reciprocal recognition? For Wittig, this is precisely the reason to turn to the social 
contract. Repairing the social contract, she argues, is eminently possible because the very 
concept of the “contract” relies on the continual articulation and rearticulation of its terms 
in the present moment. Whereas the body politic presumed by theorists of “covenant, 
compact, agreement” had assumed “an initial covenant establishing once and for all the 
binding of people together,” Wittig argues that in fact a body politic must be remade as 
real in every present moment: “whatever its origin,” she writes, a body politic under the 
social contract “exists here and now, and as such it is apt to be understood and acted 
upon. Each contractor has to reaffirm the contract in new terms for the contract to be in 
existence.”543 To the extent that the social is a kind of invitation to establish the terms of 
recognition, Wittig explains, it “[becomes] an instrumental notion in the sense that the 
contractors are reminded by the term itself that they should reexamine their conditions. 
Society was not made once and for all. The social contract will yield to our action, to our 
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words.”544 In other words, Wittig argues that the breaches in the social contract are not 
due to the fact of having defined a public, however exclusively, but rather to the fact that 
these publics enable an asymmetry of address that requires the marginalized to choose 
between speaking in terms foreign to them or not speaking at all. What if, Wittig seems 
to suggest, we were instead to build publics in which bearing a responsibility for 
reciprocal address was the condition of membership?  
If Wittig raises the question of a new body politic inaugurated by the repair of the 
social contract, Lorde pushes this question directly to the center of any feminist politics. 
Indeed, in “The Master’s Tools,” Lorde argues that  
In a world of possibility for us all, our personal visions help lay the groundwork 
for political action. The failure of academic feminists to recognize difference as a 
crucial strength is a failure to reach beyond the first patriarchal lesson. In our 
world, divide and conquer must become define and empower.545 
 
For Lorde, the “personal visions” that “lay the groundwork for political action” are made 
possible only when Black (and) lesbian feminists reach for full subjectivity; as she notes 
earlier in the remarks, the reciprocal recognition – the “interdependency” – between 
women that such subjectivity would require “is the way to a freedom which allows the I 
to be, not in order to be used, but in order to be creative.”546 While her argument that 
“divide and conquer must become define and empower” seems to evoke the kind of 
lingering attachment to identity and agency that underpin queer critiques of the 1980s, 
Lorde’s use of the verbs “define and empower,” read in this context, become actively and 
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strongly associated with the very possibility of a new social contract. Indeed, she 
continues:  
Advocating the mere tolerance of difference between women is the grossest 
reformism. It is a total denial of the creative function of difference in our lives. 
Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund necessary polarities 
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the 
necessity for interdependency become unthreatening. Only within that 
interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and equal, can the power to 
seek new ways of being in the world generate, as well as the courage and 
sustenance to act where there are no charters.547 
 
In other words, Lorde here advocates for an explicit practice of interdependency, in 
which the “freedom which allows the I to be” is the condition of “new ways of being in 
the world.” Without such a practice, any politics is but “the grossest reformism,” 
incapable of repairing, let alone remaking, social or political relationships. Here, then, 
Lorde explicitly links the substantive concepts identity, agency, and recognition that I 
have been arguing are central to 1980s feminism to the notion of a new “lesbian body 
politic,” a social body born of the capacity for speech, sustained by mutual recognition, 
and generative of new practices even “where there are no charters.”    
If the transformation of the social contract into a new body politic is the condition 
of freedom and self-determination for Black (and) lesbian feminists, what kind of 
practices does this rearticulation, term by term, entail? Given that the breach in the social 
contract functions by reducing the use of language to certain terms, to undertake a 
practice of repair is to realize, as Wittig puts it, that “the fascination for writing the never 
previously written and the fascination for the unattained body proceed from the same 
desire.”548 In other words, it is true that the reduction of language to the “thought of 
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domination” makes the articulation of Black (and) lesbian subjectivity impossible in the 
terms given in power. But if such subjects have “no real existence” in the body politic – if 
“lesbians, for their part, are silent – just as all women are as women at all levels”549 – 
then the possibility of repairing and remaking the social contract will require the 
articulation of that which is “illusionary for traditional male culture.”550 In short, it will 
require the articulation of those ways of being which are not yet written, those realities 
that remain “fictional” in language, despite having a real presence in the world:  
Our reality is the fictional as it is socially accepted, our symbols deny the 
traditional symbols and are fictional for traditional male culture, and we possess 
an entire fiction into which we project ourselves and which is already a possible 
reality. It is our fiction that validates us.551 
 
Lesbians, in other words, are precisely those people who cannot exist under the current 
terms of the social contract. But because their existence is as-yet unwritten, their point of 
view is an optic through which to imagine how radically the terms of the body politic 
would need to change in order for Black (and) lesbian subjects to attain a “real” existence 
– that is, to be recognized as subjects in the body politic.  
The practice of writing the “not yet written,” which appears in Wittig’s work as 
the transformation of literary forms through the linguistic “war machine”552 appears as an 
even stronger claim to  in Lorde’s writing. The notion that repair will require a forward-
looking activity of writing the never previously written is, indeed, the central theme of 
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Lorde’s work throughout the 1980s. Although she does not address the social contract 
directly, she does consistently argues throughout her career that language has the capacity 
to inaugurate a new body politic; it is what replaces “old patterns of relating” with “a 
commitment to language and to the power of language, and to the reclaiming of that 
language which has been made to work against us.”553 Like Wittig, who took the task of 
“writing the never previously written” to mean that the lesbian body politic would 
emerge only through the activity of writing oneself into subjectivity, Lorde approaches 
the task of rewriting the social contract through the activity of poetry. “This is poetry as 
illumination,” Lorde writes of the activity of naming “those untamed longings for 
something different and beyond what is now called possible,” – “for it is through poetry 
that we give name to those ideas which are – until the poem – nameless and formless, 
about to be birthed, but already felt.”554 For Lorde, writing the self not only requires one 
to carefully consider one’s own knowledge and experiences, but also requires questions 
about how such knowledge is shaped in relation to and with others: “To whom do I owe 
the power behind my voice,” she writes in the opening sentences of her 
“biomythography” Zami: A New Spelling of My Name. “To whom do I owe the symbols 
of my survival?”555 The text answers this question plainly: Lorde owes her voice not only 
to her own capacity for language, but to her interdependencies with the women who have 
shaped her every experience. Indeed, Zami concludes with the acknowledgment that the 
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lesbian body politic inaugurated by mutual recognition will be a community 
achievement:  
We carry our traditions with us. Buying boxes of Red Cross Salt and a 
fresh corn straw broom for my new apartment in Westchester: new job, new 
house, new living the old in a new way. Recreating in words the women who 
helped give me substance.  
Ma-Liz, DeLois, Louise Briscoe, Aunt Anni, Linda, and Genevieve; 
MawuLisa, thunder, sky, sun, the great mother of us all; and Afrekete, her 
youngest daughter, the mischievious linguist, trickster, best-beloved, whom we 
must all become.  
Their names, selves, faces feed me like corn before labor. I live each of 
them as a piece of me, and I choose these words with the same grave concern with 
which I choose to push speech into poetry, the mattering core, the forward visions 
of all our lives.556  
 
Both Wittig and Lorde, then, use their work to imagine what such a transformative 
recognition might look like, and both conclude that it would entail thinking beyond the 
reduced language available to Black (and) lesbian feminists in order to reclaim the 
“utopian dimension” of the social contract. If such reciprocal relationships remain a 
fiction, they are a fiction that Black (and) lesbian feminists can and must write.  
We might pause to note, at this point, how far Wittig’s and Lorde’s arguments 
about remaking the social contract is from the critical assessment of recognition in much 
contemporary political theory. Whereas many contemporary theorists argue that demands 
for recognition are doomed to reify the very hierarchies of intelligibility that they seek to 
contest, Wittig and Lorde have shifted the terrain not only to suggest new, alternative 
uses of identity and agency, but also to argue that they are in fact the very conditions of a 
new social body. Claims about moral vulnerability – about the failures of reciprocity that 
for Wittig constitute the breach in the social contract – are thus less invocations of 
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excluded “others” demanding inclusion in existing structures of recognition than they are 
attacks on the reduced language in which the marginalized are compelled to speak. To be 
recognized as a subject, a “whole person,” requires more than a “gift” that assumes and 
strengthens existing material and discursive hierarchies, as Brown suggests. It also 
requires far more than the validation of quasi-sovereign identity claims. Instead, to 
demand accountability for relations of moral vulnerability is to demand that one is 
recognized in ways that, by definition, exceed traditional channels for extending 
recognition. Just as their work exceeded commonplace debates over identity and agency, 
then, fuller attention to the politics of repair that Wittig and Lorde develop in their 
writing demonstrates the limitations of these contemporary debates, both in grappling 
with the politics of the 1980s and in imagining new forms of recognition.  
 
The Lesbian Body Politic: Some Resonances 
So far, I have argued that far from being regrettable and excisable vestiges of a 
reactionary lesbian feminism, Lorde’s and Wittig’s emphasis on the practice of reaching 
for subjectivity is in fact a central thematic in their work. Moreover, this thematic points 
us directly to how they understand language – the ability to speak oneself – as a condition 
of freedom in the lesbian body politic they hope to inaugurate. As we have seen, both 
writers argue that the primary function of power is to reduce language – and therefore the 
capacity of the oppressed to speak – in terms other than those that reinforce and recodify 
existing relations. Yet because the social contract – and, with it, the very possibility of a 
body politic – depends on language, this reduction of language need not be true. The 
ability to speak, they suggest, “can be either radically egalitarian, permitting anyone to 
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appropriate and deploy its communicative power, or it can preempt whole categories of 
people from engaging in equal exchanges…”557 Reclaiming the “utopian dimension” of 
the social contract, then, becomes the mode and measure by which Wittig and Lorde 
argue that the social body might be repaired.  
Many contemporary theorists writing in the wake of queer theorists’ 
(mis)readings of Lorde and Wittig are unlikely to be persuaded, at first glance, that 
claiming the “utopian dimension” of the social contract will be enough to overcome the 
paradoxes of freedom that inhere in analyses like Butler’s or Brown’s. However, when 
we distance Lorde and Wittig from their position as the “vanishing mediators” of these 
frameworks, we can see how their attempts to remake the body politic through practices 
of writing and reaching for subjectivity intersect with several increasingly prominent 
strains of political theory that contemporary theorists do take quite seriously. Two 
conversations in particular stand out to me as points of intersection between Wittig’s and 
Lorde’s politics of repair and contemporary theories of justice: a conversation around the 
capacity of Indigenous self-determination to exceed and transform settler-colonial 
hierarchies and a conversation around the historical task of racial reparations.  
I want to suggest, then, that understanding identity, agency, and recognition in 
lesbian feminism of the 1980s as exceeding their (mis)readings both calls attention to the 
substantive political tasks they delineate and contributes to a larger shift in political 
theory towards rethinking the assumptions that we make about the nature of political 
community, injustice, and redress. Recall, first, that moral vulnerabilities cannot be 
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reduced to the kinds of injuries that we normally think of as constituting oppression or 
injustice. For example, the problem facing Black (and) lesbian feminists are not simply 
that racism and homophobia exclude these subjects from fully participating in the 
economy by denying them jobs, or that these relations of power bar them from gaining 
the full rights of citizenship, however much these injustices may also be true. The 
specific problem that Black (and) lesbian feminists identified throughout the 1980s was 
an additional injury: it is the inability to even speak about these injustices in terms that do 
not reduce and misrecognize them as problems of unequal protection under the law, on 
the one hand, or as cultural challenges to a pluralist multiculturalism, on the other.  
If moral vulnerabilities must be recognized in ways that exceed the normal 
channels for interpreting injury, the rehabilitation of the social contract that Wittig and 
Lorde articulate thus requires that we imagine a fundamentally transformed social body – 
one in which the promise of reciprocal accountability is attended by the full capacity of 
subjectivity for all before presuming to proffer political solutions. It is the promise of a 
“lesbian body politic,” in which the task of politics is neither to adjudicate good and bad 
subjects, nor to conclude that “old patterns of relating” have irreparably weakened the 
social body. In keeping with their understanding of injustice as a reduction of language 
that prevents certain subjects from being or becoming speaking subjects, both Lorde and 
Wittig argue that the task is to lend a granular attention to the terms on which debate 
takes place, as well as the names in which the body politic is articulated.  
 Attention to the usage of identity and recognition in the work of Lorde and Wittig, 
then, exceeds and transforms commonplace debates in political theory. Thinking with 
Wittig and Lorde suggests not that the project of responsibility and repair should lie in 
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discerning the implicit equality of the social contract as it was founded historically, but 
rather that we need radically new ways of thinking about and working towards equality, 
reciprocity, and the capacity for self-determination. The path they chart, I want to 
suggest, is undoubtedly intersectional: it requires not only recognition, but a care for the 
very terms on which recognition is proffered. Such a shift in the valences of recognition 
and responsibility are intersectional because, at heart, they respond directly to both the 
critiques of dominant logics by intersectional thinkers and attempt to work through the 
moments of refusal that so often accompany the extension of recognition to oppressed 
groups.  
This final point underwrites what lesbian feminism, which I have here read 
through the optic of Audre Lorde and Monique Wittig, share with contemporary bodies 
of theory that seek to move beyond the critique of exclusions and hierarchies in 
modernity. Far from allowing Wittig and Lorde to remain the “vanishing mediators” of 
queer theory simply because they wrote about the political subjectivity of lesbian women, 
their work shares its substantive political concerns with a wider range of political 
concepts and practices emerging in struggles of race and Indigeneity. I would like to 
conclude, then, by pointing out two areas of political theory with which lesbian feminism 
shares its concern for reaching for subjectivity.  
First, Wittig’s and Lorde’s share an emphasis on the capacity of self-
determination to fundamentally transform the ways that we understand and respond to 
hierarchies with Indigenous activists and scholars, who have continually suggested that 
any form of mutual recognition must occur on terms that take seriously the grounded 
practices – and not just the “rights” of property and citizenship – of Indigenous peoples 
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and communities. Glen Coulthard and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson write, for 
example, on the limitations of any form of recognition that fails to grapple with both the 
“dispossession of Indigenous bodies from Indigenous lands” and the ways that settler-
colonial hierarchies sustain relations of vulnerability by limiting the possibility of 
Indigenous self-determination. Settler-colonial relationships, they write,  
systematically [regulate] the generative relationships and practices that create and 
maintain Indigenous nationhoods, political practices, sovereignties, and 
solidarities. The state-sanctioned murdering, assimilating, and disappearing of 
Indigenous bodies (asymmetrically distributed across genders) are, as Mohawk 
scholar Audra Simpson says, a direct attack on Indigenous political orders 
because these bodies generate knowledge, political systems, and ways of being 
that contest the broader governmentality and thus make dispossession all the more 
difficult to achieve.558  
 
Coulthard and Simpson suggest that settler-colonial relationships function not only by 
enacting material violences, but by regulating the very language in which these injustices 
can be registered. Resistance to this economic, cultural, and linguistic regime – a 
resistance they name “grounded normativity” – might look something like Lorde’s and 
Wittig’s approach to transforming the social body through a rigorous and unflinching 
appeal to one’s positionality, and through a rewriting of the very terms of the social body:  
What we are calling ‘grounded normativity’ refers to the ethical frameworks 
provided by these Indigenous place-based practices and associated forms of 
knowledge. Grounded normativity houses and reproduces the practices and 
procedures, based on deep reciprocity, that are inherently informed by an intimate 
relationship to place. Grounded normativity teaches us how to live our lives in 
relation to other people and nonhuman life forms in a profoundly 
nonauthoritarian, nondominating, nonexploitative manner. Grounded normativity 
teaches us how to be in respectful diplomatic relationships with other Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous nations with whom we might share territorial responsibilities 
or common political or economic interests. Our relationship to the land itself 
 
558 Glen Coulthard and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, “Grounded Normativity/Place-
Based Solidarity,” American Quarterly 68 no. 2 (2016): 254.  
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generates the processes, practices, and knowledges that inform our political 
systems, and through which we practice solidarity.559  
 
Elsewhere, Coulthard describes the practice of “self-recognition” required by such a 
“grounded normativity” in ways that strengthen the association between an anti-colonial 
Indigenous politics and the lesbian body politic I have drawn out here. Like the lesbian 
body politic, Coulthard’s expectation for anti-colonial politics figures the practice of self-
recognition as the condition for the emergence of new political relationships. Citing bell 
hooks, Coulthard argues that an anti-colonial practice of grounded normativity will 
“minimally require that we stop being so preoccupied with looking ‘to that Other for 
recognition;’ instead we should be ‘recognizing ourselves and [then seeking to] make 
contact with all who would engage us in a constructive manner.’”560 To write a new 
body, anti-colonial body politic, he suggests, would require us to imagine ways to exceed 
the paradoxes of agency and recognition under settler-colonial regimes; it would require a 
politics that is “about critically reevaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and 
tradition in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar ethical 
commitments, a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-affective facets of 
colonial domination.”561  
If the language of repair that I have argued is central to lesbian feminism of the 
1980s can be usefully put into dialogue with a prominent strain of anti-colonial 
Indigenous politics, it is also useful for understanding the accelerating discussions of 
racial reparations in the United States. Following Lawrie Balfour’s careful analyses of 
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discourses around reparations in the United States, I would argue that the repair Wittig 
and Lorde advocate is less a form of legal or cultural recognition, but rather an effort to 
rectify the “memory suppression” that has accompanied the use of reductive language. As 
Balfour puts it,  
Properly conceived, a program of reparations for slavery and segregation could 
help to stretch the bounds of the thinkable by reorienting Americans to see their 
history from the perspective of the former slaves and their descendants.562  
 
In other words, like Wittig and Lorde, Balfour suggests that the project of reparations 
cannot be reduced to narrow identity claims or appeals to state recognition; instead, they 
require a shift in the very lens through which we see and understand history – that is, they 
require us to see from the “point of view of the oppressed.” Moreover, however, while 
racial reparations may still exist outside of “the bounds of the thinkable” by many 
Americans, theorists need not conclude that the kinds of redress they would require are 
foreclosed entirely by the reduction of the thinkable. Such a conclusion, Balfour suggests,  
elides those reparations claims that go beyond good and evil, that contest the 
assumptions of liberal legal discourse and imagine how to evoke the complex 
haunting of the American present, that aspire to obtain redress without requiring 
that African Americans present themselves as helpless victims or as super-
Americans, and that attempt to harness state power and criticize it 
simultaneously… If the political energy and purpose generated in the pursuit of 
reparations does not represent a promising example of democratic politics, then 
what does?563 
 
Balfour’s claims echo Ta-Nehisi Coates’ popular articulation of “the case for 
reparations,” in which he argues that “the popular mocking of reparations” – its very 
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‘unthinkability’ – “is fear masquerading as laughter.”564 For Coates, to work towards 
making fiction of racial reparations a reality would be to confront “something 
unmentionable about America that integrationists dare not acknowledge – that white 
supremacy is not merely the work of hotheaded demagogues, or a matter of false 
consciousness, but a force so fundamental to America that it is difficult to imagine the 
country without it.” Coates continues,  
And so we must imagine a new country. Reparations – by which I mean the full 
acceptance of our collective biography and its consequences – is the price we 
must pay to see ourselves squarely […] What I’m talking about is more than the 
recompense for past injustice – more than a handout, a payoff, hush money, or a 
reluctant bribe. What I’m talking about is a national reckoning that would lead to 
spiritual renewal… Reparations would mean a revolution of the American 
consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer with the 
facts of our history.565 
 
A reparative approach to redress, for Coates and Balfour as for Coulthard, Simpson, and 
Betasamosake, is not a “wounded attachment,” a foolhardy appeal to state power, or a 
failure to “queer” identity or agency. Quite the opposite: repair insists on writing the full 
subjectivity of the oppressed not in spite of histories of reduction, erasure, and 
vulnerability, but precisely because of them.  
In “Poetry is not a Luxury,” Lorde writes that “we must constantly encourage 
ourselves and each other to attempt the heretical actions that our dreams imply, and so 
many of our old ideas disparage.”566 Asked what she meant by such heretical actions in 
an interview in 1980, she answered:  
Loving women, for one. Being free. Those things that have never been done 
before – whether or not it was actually done – that were kept hidden from us, held 
away from us. Those lies concerning what was not possible. All the rumors that 
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are circulated by City Hall to destroy us. The strength to run against those, when 
you believe no one has ever done it before, is derived from dreams.567  
 
Loving women, being free; these are, for Lorde and Wittig, the activities “not yet 
written” in the terms of the body politic under the historical social contract. But they are 
also the activities that lesbian feminism in the 1980s tasked itself with writing into 
existence. The result, a “lesbian body politic” in which recognition requires a care for the 
very terms in which political relationships and responsibilities are founded, may still 
operate at the level of fiction; however, the basic promise of reciprocal self-determination 
that it offers is shares considerable resources with a growing field of inquiry around 
questions of anti-colonialism, repair, and political change. Perhaps it is time to recognize 
the capacities of those who reach for subjectivity; to admit that they may, finally, make 
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Conclusion 
Turning the Century: 
Lesbian Feminism and Coalition 
 
In 1981, the musician and scholar Bernice Johnson Reagon took to the stage to 
address the West Coast Women’s Music Festival. The topic of the day was coalition – 
and not only because the organizers had planned it that way. The 1981 festival, in 
response to complaints about a lack of diversity in the previous year’s program, included 
not only a wide range of Third World and Black women performers, including Reagon’s 
band Sweet Honey in the Rock, but also a “Solidarity Day” program to raise awareness 
about political struggles in Latin America. Prior to Johnson’s speech, considerable 
tensions around the Solidary Day events had already roiled the festival; organizers, for 
example, had failed to make up written contracts for the kitchen staff and other festival 
workers, raising questions of race and class before the festival even began.568 But it was 
the Solidarity Day events that brought the issue of coalition to the fore: as one (white) 
attendee of the weekend later wrote,  
Let me describe the setting. The stage on which the events of solidarity day were 
scheduled was located right next to the lake. It was situated in the play area, beer 
sold to the left, craftspeople set up nearby. Women attempting to speak of the 
very real struggles of people in Nicaragua, Chile, El Salvador and Argentina were 
drowned out by splashing, frisbee-throwing and yelling of playing women 
throughout the play area in front of the stage.569 
 
The attendee, angered at the “irony of hearing about people dying in struggle while white 
women played” and at the fact that two of the three Solidarity Day speakers were white 
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(“to protect the emotional security of white women”), goes on to describe a near-
forgotten drama. A group of about four hundred, multi-racial (of about four thousand 
total) attendees staged a protest of the handling of Solidarity Day, storming the same 
stage that Reagon would later occupy and speaking about anti-racism within the women’s 
movement. The statements, given by three women (“Black, Latina, and white”), “were 
pulling us together, to dialog about racism” and made the case “that as women we could 
make a difference.”570 However, the protesters were quickly pulled off stage and charged, 
as one participant put it, with having “invalidated the work that had been done, and with 
trying to destroy the festival […] Some white women yelled for us to go home and stop 
‘ruining their good time.’”571 Dispirited, the protesters retreated from the festival, unsure 
how to proceed.  
It was in this context in which Reagon began her speech, which is by far the most 
famous document emerging from the festival (due, in large part, to its inclusion in 
Barbara Smith’s Home Girls anthology). “I’ve never been this high before,” Reagon 
began:  
I’m talking about the altitude. There is a lesson in bringing people together 
where they can’t get enough oxygen, then having them try to figure out what 
they’re going to do when they can’t think properly. I’m serious about that. There 
probably are some people here who can breathe, because you were born in high 
altitudes and you have big lung cavities. But when you bring people in who have 
not had the environmental conditioning, you got one group of people who are in a 
strain – and the group of people who are feeling fine are trying to figure out why 
you’re staggering around […]  
I wish there had been another way to graphically make me feel it because I 
belong to the group of people who are having a very difficult time being here. I 
feel as if I’m gonna keel over any minute and die. That is often what it feels like if 
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you’re really doing coalition work. Most of the time you feel threatened to the 
core and if you don’t you’re not really doing no coalescing.572 
 
Given the events of the weekend, Reagon might have been forgiven for anger, for a 
refusal to engage, for a full retreat from the stage. Instead, however, in these opening 
lines she describes the context of the festival as an incitement and an indication that the 
coalition-building that feminists desired was really happening. Coalition, she argues, is a 
kind of discomfort; it’s messy, unsettled, contentious, emotional, and taxing. Thought in 
this light, she goes on to argue, the dramatic outcome of raising questions of racism and 
marginalization at the festival weren’t symptoms of feminism’s imminent failure, as 
many post-hoc observers of the tumultuous events of the 1980s have come to conclude. 
Rather, Reagon insists that these seeming fractures were necessary growing pains: by the 
1980s, having been called to account by women from around the world, from 
marginalized communities within the United States and within the movement itself, 
feminists were engaging in politics in new and uncharted ways. “We’ve pretty much 
come to the end of a time when you can have a space that is ‘yours only’ – just for the 
people you want to be there,” she argues:  
Even when we have our ‘women only’ festivals, there is no such thing. The fault 
is not necessarily with the organizers of the gathering. To a large extent it’s 
because we have just finished with that kind of isolating. There is no hiding place. 
There is nowhere you can go and only be with people who are like you. It’s over. 
Give it up.573 
 
For Reagon, the only alternative to “hiding” is “to take the next step” and recognize that 
“we’ve got to do [coalition] with some folk we don’t care too much about. And we’ve got 
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to vomit over that for a little while. We must just keep going” by holding others 
accountable for the persistent hierarchies and breaches of trust that characterize political 
work. Faced with issues of internal racism and homophobia, feminists would need to 
carry on the difficult work of speaking with others. “You’ll have to challenge them about 
it,” Reagon argues; real coalition work will require finding ways of articulating 
vulnerability, holding others accountable, and working through the differences that make 
reciprocity a political achievement.  
 The lesson Reagon hoped to impart, then, was neither that feminists should settle 
for nothing less than a harmonious coalition, nor that they should give up the hope of 
collective action in favor of “getting the L out” or simply “speaking for oneself.” Rather, 
she defends a conception of coalition that I have argued was at the very heart of feminist, 
and particularly lesbian feminist, politics throughout the 1980s: one premised not on 
harmony but on a confrontation with persistent issues of inequality and broken trust, not 
on exemplarity but on accountability, not on inclusion but on repair. It is a conception 
that I have argued requires attention to relationships of accountability and vulnerability, 
discomfort and working through. “Coalition work,” as Reagon puts it, “is not work done 
in your home:”  
Coalition work has to be done in the streets. And it is some of the most dangerous 
work you can do. And you shouldn’t look for comfort. Some people will come to 
a coalition and they rate the success of the coalition on whether or not they feel 
good when they get there. They’re not looking for a coalition; they’re looking for 
a home!574  
 
If coalition work is something that cannot be done at home – something that must be 
done in the streets – then, as I have suggested throughout this dissertation, it is something 
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that requires committing to the challenges of publicity rather than the comforts of 
identity.  
*** 
 The subtitle of Reagon’s 1981 speech is “Turning the Century;” in it, she asks 
how, and how well, feminists will continue the work of coalition-building into the 
twenty-first century. Yet if we take seriously the conception of coalition-building that I 
have outlined here, there is reason to believe that Reagon, along with thinkers like Rich, 
Frye, Lugones, Moraga, Smith, Wittig, and Lorde, would be alarmed. In the 
contemporary moment, two decades into the twenty-first century, mainstream feminist 
and queer activists seem to have largely occupied themselves with splitting hairs over 
“identities” and “identifications,”575 advocating for inclusion in basic institutions such as 
the nuclear family and the military,576 evaluating the “queer” credentials of the first gay 
presidential candidate, and debating the merits of corporate “pinkwashing” at Pride 
events and in state policies.577 Yet if the narrow scope of these projects threatens to 
 
575 As disputes over the acronym “LGBTQIA+” suggest, a huge amount of political 
energy has been spent on defining, revising, and disarticulating an ever-expanding list of 
sub-identities. As part of its celebration of the fifty-year anniversary of Stonewall, for 
example, The New York Times ran an interactive feature soliciting individualized 
identities alongside a “guide” outlining the basic definitions of sixteen sub-categories of 
“queer.” Michael Gold. “The ABCs of LGBTQIA+” The New York Times (June 21, 2018 
[revised June 7, 2019]), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-
language.html 
576 One example of the case for inclusion into the institutions of marriage and the military 
is Andrew Sullivan’s Virtually Normal: An Argument about Homosexuality (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1996), which argues that inclusion of “homosexuals” in these institutions 
is, in fact, useful for conservative politics insofar as it would deal neatly with issues of 
sexuality and identity while declining to alter any longstanding liberal values or social 
arrangements.    
577 The term “pinkwashing” denotes the practice of embracing LGBTQ people in a 
superficial way – for example, designing marketing campaigns or state benefits that 
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undermine the liberatory goals of the feminist and queer projects, queer theorists have 
reacted by veering in no small way from the coalitional approach that the thinkers 
populating these pages advocate.  
Aware of the deep limitations of mainstream political queer politics, many 
feminist and queer theorists have rightly made appeals to broaden the scope of political 
struggle. Lisa Duggan describes mainstream inclusionary efforts, for example, as projects 
of “homonormativity,” which, in her view, represents “a linchpin for [a] broader political 
vision” premised on “[constructing] a new public/private distinction that mobilizes gay 
equality rhetoric on behalf of a miniaturized state and constricted public life, confined to 
a very few policy decisions, coupled with a vast zone of ‘private’ life dominated by 
‘voluntary’ economic and civic transactions, however conglomerated, oligarchic, and 
unaccountable.”578 In other words, homonormativity not only describes the paradox of 
“mainstreaming” queer issues, but also captures the cooptation of a transformative queer 
project by neoliberal and conservative forces. Thus hamstrung by a restriction of political 
vision, Duggan bemoans the fate of queer politics in a neoliberal world: “There is no 
vision of a collective, democratic public culture or of an ongoing engagement with 
contentious, cantankerous queer politics. Instead we have been administered a kind of 
political sedative – we get marriage and the military then we go home and cook dinner, 
forever.”579 
 
target LGBTQ people – while simultaneously supporting, either financially or politically, 
anti-LGBTQ policies and practices.   
578 Lisa Duggan, “The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism,” 
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Having lost the “critical edge” of the liberation projects of an earlier era – yet 
unwilling to revisit them for fear of their “inherent” essentialism – feminist and queer 
theorists have reacted not by confronting directly the broken promises and painful 
inequalities at the heart of the queer coalitional project, but by doubling down on their 
break with an older, purportedly more retrograde lesbian feminist framework. As Jasbir 
Puar puts it in Terrorist Assemblages, queerness resists “intersectional and identitarian 
paradigms” premised on “an unrelenting epistemological will to truth.”580 Instead, 
“[q]ueer times require even queerer modalities of thought, analysis, creativity, and 
expression in order to elaborate upon nationalist, patriotic, and terrorist formations and 
their imbricated forms of racialized perverse sexualities and gender dysphorias.”581 In 
other words, if queer theory has failed to make the inroads in disrupting homonormativity 
that its proponents hoped, it’s because it wasn’t queer enough. Arguing for a move away 
from an analytical framework of identification and (dis)identification, Puar thus suggests 
that we consider queerness in its capacity as “assemblage.” “As opposed to an 
intersectional model of identity” that “demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing 
of identity across space and time,”582 queerness as assemblage is “a series of dispersed 
but mutually implicated and messy networks, [drawing] together enunciation and 
dissolution, causality and effect, organic and nonorganic forces.”583 
At the same time that thorny questions of responsibility and accountability are 
regularly left out of the picture in mainstream queer politics, then, what is taken to be 
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radical queer and feminist theory is, increasingly, premised on confronting these issues in 
highly abstract ways that seem to revolve, curiously and somewhat troublingly, on the 
question of whether all marginalized subjects produced in and through such “affective 
conglomeration[s]”584 ought to be theorized as “queer.” Building on Puar’s account of 
“homonationalism,” for instance, C. Heike Schotten puts queerness not only at the heart 
of “sexual politics,” narrowly defined, but at the historical intersection of sexual 
normativity and the global logic of settler colonialism. For Schotten, if settler colonialism 
is the defining political assemblage of our era, it is also a conceptual problem for which 
queer theory has paradigmatically useful answers. “Puar’s account of queerness,” 
Schotten argues,  
veers from any simple conflation with gay and lesbian subjects. For her, 
queerness functions as a biopolitical determination regarding which populations 
are sifted out and accorded recognition, regulation, benefits, and rights, while 
leaving others to degenerate, die off, or be killed.585 
 
 While for Puar the “queer” therefore represents not an identity but a “regulation of life,” 
Schotten takes a step further, arguing that the construction of queerness as a paradigmatic 
form of regulation ought to push queer theorists to consider queerness a “structural 
categorization.” If queerness, for Schotten, designates a structural relationship to power 
that underpins settler colonial society, then queer theory is “essential to formulating a 
resistant, liberatory politics that opposes it.”586 Indeed, “Anyone outside of or opposed to 
the logic of [settler colonial moralism],” Schotten argues,  
is by definition queer, a determination that escapes identitarian categories and yet 
is inescapably determinist. On this account, queerness is indeed exceptional… 
because it is the name of what must be abjected from the social order in order for 
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it to coherently constitute itself as a social order. Queerness, that is, cannot but be 
dissident… [queer people] are, in their very existence, a threat to the social order 
in themselves and ultimately unintelligible to it.587 
 
Thus, for Schotten, a queer theory up to the task of radicalizing and transforming the 
contemporary political landscape is not a naively identitarian one, but must be one 
capable of that makes it possible “to apply [queerness] to a broader logic of American 
nationalism that also stigmatizes or queers black and brown people.”588 
 As I argued in Chapter 1, such attempts to deploy feminist and queer critique as 
exemplary political positions could not be farther from the coalitional politics of lesbian 
feminism. The distance between Reagon’s 1981 festival appearance and Schotten’s book, 
for example, is incredibly stark. On the one hand, Schotten proposes that queer theorists 
smooth over the frictions that have long characterized the relationships between Black, 
Indigenous, feminist, and queer movements by theorizing these marginal positions as 
structurally indistinct, at least in relation to the overarching logic of settler society. On the 
other hand, Reagon argues that the central task of coalition is to resist at all costs the 
temptation to theorize away the real political, historical, and conceptual conflicts between 
and among members of a coalition. Doing so, she maintains, would be to create a “little 
barred room” where “you act out community. You pretend that your room is a world… 
It’s like, ‘If I was really running it, this is the way it would be.’”589 She continues,  
Of course the problem with the experiment is that there ain’t nobody in there but 
folk like you, which by implication means you wouldn’t know what to do if you 
were running it with all of the other people who are out there in the world. Now 
that’s nationalism. I mean it’s nurturing, but it is also nationalism… Nationalism 
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at another point becomes reactionary because it is totally inadequate for surviving 
in the world with many peoples.590 
 
Reagon thus points out that “acting out community” in the way that Schotten describes – 
that is, theorizing a community into being where none existed before and insisting on its 
conceptual coherence – misses the fundamental purpose of coalition building: to develop 
the resources to grapple with the fact that “no matter what, there will be one or two of us 
who have not bothered to be like you.”591 Ironically, reading from Reagon’s point of 
view, Schotten’s attempt to theorize the queer as an inherently and capaciously resistant 
figure strangely evades the work of imagining a politics premised on something other 
than abstract, structural, and homogenizing categories.  
Certainly many queer theorists would resist Reagon’s claim that a politics of 
exemplarity might be, at heart, a form of “nationalism,” by which she means a broad 
pattern of thinking that extends beyond (settler) colonial nation-building but also, among 
other things, texts like Jill Johnston’s Lesbian Nation.592 Still, even as alarm about 
homonormativity and homonationalism grows, critics of the queer status quo struggle to 
articulate their failures on terms other than those at the heart of many “nationalist” 
projects – namely, abstract inclusion, harmony, and internal coherence. In a recent report 
 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid., 359.  
592 Johnston famously makes the case in Lesbian Nation that lesbianism is a necessary 
political position to inhabit in order to achieve structural change: “Proceeding from the 
premise that women are oppressed by the heterosexual institution, that women are an 
oppressed class, that from this point of view the man has become (if he was not always) 
the natural enemy of women, it follows that the continued collusion of any woman with 
any man is an event that retards the progress of woman supremacy.” Lesbian Nation: The 
Feminist Solution (New York: Touchstone, 1973), 276. It is in response to arguments like 
Johnston’s that Reagon insists in “Coalition Politics” that a really radical women’s 
coalition will require grappling with non-lesbian women and, indeed, confronting their 
homophobia head-on.  
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from the 2019 New York City Pride parade, for example, two New York Times reporters 
grapple with the fact that, fifty years after Stonewall, two divergent Pride parades seem to 
be tearing the movement asunder. At issue, in particular, were the issues of corporate 
sponsorship and police presence. On the one side, organizers in the Heritage of Pride 
(HOP) argue that all queers (including LGBT members of the police force) deserve 
visibility, and that corporate sponsorship of Pride is an effective way of raising awareness 
in the broader culture and incrementally changing the working lives of millions of LGBT 
individuals for the better. On the other, organizers of the Reclaim Pride counter-march 
argue that making space for police and corporate interests excludes and threatens poor 
and/or undocumented queers, queers of color, and other marginalized members of the 
community.  
Absent a robust framework in which to evaluate these divergent claims against 
one another, a contemporary queer coalition that imagines itself as a structural 
categorization rather than a diverse, relational, and contestatory public will have a 
difficult time conceiving of these debates as political problems; that is, as disputes over 
how to move forward between groups whose powers, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities 
are distributed in unequal ways, both in relation to each other and to the mainstream 
institutions of our current political society. Indeed, rather than asking questions about 
vulnerability, accountability, and repair that I have suggested ought to be at the heart of 
coalition-building, these issues at Pride have largely been understood as philosophical 
disputes over the right way to conceptualize what counts as queer.593 “These are big 
 
593 In a wildly controversial article on presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg, for instance, 
the journalist Christina Cauterucci lays out a debate that began on Twitter, but soon blew 
up to a full-fledged press frenzy over whether “Mayor Pete” is “gay enough.” “Is 
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questions, and there aren’t easy answers,” the reporter concludes in the report, for 
example: “There isn’t a solution that is going to make everyone equally happy, and that’s 
both a simple and profound fact. I think if we knew the best way to protect everyone in 
the LGBT community, we would do it.”594 The notion that the most desirable outcome of 
this division is finding a solution -  simply knowing the best way to protect everyone – is 
a symptom of a feminist and queer scene that has ceded the ground of transformative 
counterpublicity and instead begins from abstract claims about structural exemplarity. 
Thought as questions of categorization rather than accountability, the issues of corporate 
sponsorship and police presence are reduced to a narrow debate over “representation” 
that, at worst, cast LGBT members of the police force and corporate sponsors as equally 
vulnerable – and therefore deserving of space and attention – to those queer people whose 
daily lives are disrupted and threatened by the activities of these agencies.  
Yet claims of vulnerability and betrayal raised by queers of color in relation to the 
police and corporations are not equivalent to appeals to broad-net inclusivity. Nor are 
they conceptual matters that challenge us to more accurately identify “the queer’s” 
 
Buttigeg a run-of-the-mill white male candidate,” she asks, “or does his sexuality set him 
apart?... Has Buttigieg faced setbacks or barriers to success because he’s gay? Does he 
have an identity-specific worldview that would inform his work as much as, say, 
[Kamala] Harris’ experience as a black woman would inform hers? Would a win for 
Buttigieg be as historically significant and culturally meaningful as a win for a member 
of an underrepresented race or gender?” Cauterucci hypothesizes that these questions can 
be traced back to the fact that “Buttigieg isn’t just gay – he’s also white, male, upper-
class, Midwestern, married, Ivy League-educated, and a man of faith.” Christina 
Cauterucci. “In a Diverse Candidate Field, Is Pete Buttigieg’s Sexuality Factoring Into 
His Appeal?” Slate (March 28, 2019); https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/pete-
buttigieg-gay-diversity-white-male-candidate.html 
594 Natalie Kitroeff and Shane O’Neill, “The Daily Podcast: A Clash Over Inclusion at 
Pride,” The New York Times (June 29, 2019); 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/podcasts/the-daily/pride-parade-stonewall.html.  
 318 
relationship to power par excellence. As I argued in Chapter 4, when movement politics 
are flattened to matters of categorization rather than accountability and repair, it becomes 
impossible to hear the point of view of the marginalized on their own terms. As the 
debate over what “counts” as queer continues to founder on arguments about the 
visibility of queer cops and corporate marketing, for example, little attention is paid to the 
increasingly urgent calls for accountability and repair from the most marginalized queer 
women and lesbians. As movements like #SayHerName595 and Missing and Murdered 
Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG)596 make clear, far too little attention is paid to 
the vulnerability of the most marginalized women, including lesbians and queer people. 
Worse still, when attention is paid to these issues, they tend to be collapsed into abstract 
questions of representation rather than as demands for accountability and repair. 
Nonetheless, the leaders of these movements, like the lesbian feminists I have discussed 
in this work, insist that the path towards justice requires not more coherent “structural 
 
595 See, for example, #SayHerName’s recent report, written by intersectional scholars 
Kimberlé Crenshaw and Andrea J. Ritchie, which makes sense of the various ways that 
the intersection of gender, race, and class make Black women particularly susceptible to 
police violence and neglect. In it, the authors call for “Expanding the analysis of police 
violence beyond lethal and excessive force to include sexual harassment and assault, 
policing of gender and sexuality, and profiling and targeted enforcement” in order to 
remedy the marginalization of Black women from the work of movements like Black 
Lives Matter. “Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women,” 
African American Policy Forum (2015), 23.  
596 In June, 2019, a massive final report on the findings of the National Inquiry into 
MMIWG was released in Canada. The report makes the case that systemic violence 
against Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people is a “crisis:” “In this report,” 
the Commissioner states in the report’s preface, “we use hard words to address hard 
truths like genocide, colonization, murder and rape. To deny these hard words is to deny 
the truths of the families and survivors, front-line workers, and grassroots organizers. We 
used hard words because the violence against Indigenous women, girls, and 
2SLGBTQQIA people is a difficult, critically important crisis to address and in which we 
all have a role.” Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry 
into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019), 6.  
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categorizations, but “self-determined solutions” – in other words, to take these 
movements seriously is to understand that addressing these violences, at minimum, 
“requires new solutions as conceived, driven, and managed by those affected.”597 As one 
Indigenous organizer argued in the Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and 
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, “self-determination is really a starting 
point...”598 It is only when self-determination – the capacity to make political claims in 
one’s own terms – rather than internal coherence becomes a condition of our coalitions 
that they will begin to be held accountable for the breaches, silences, marginalizations, 
and hierarchies that persist in them.  
Taking these lessons seriously will require that queer coalitions continue to 
confront the sexual politics at the heart of (settler) colonialism and racial exploitation if 
they are to get anywhere. At the same time, however, they push feminist and queer 
scholars, in particular, to acknowledge the dangers in collapsing specific struggles into 
one another – of arguing that because of the intersecting nature of oppression, all 
marginal subjects share a structural relationship to power that can smooth over the 
disjunctive, sometimes contradictory, needs of different political movements. Rather than 
ask whether Indigenous or Black subjects are structurally queer, that is, grappling with 
the issue of self-determination as a condition of coalition-building would have us ask 
what kinds of non-settler institutions, relationships, and practices a transformative 
counterpublic would need to build, as well as how these institutions, relationships, and 
practices would need to be disarticulated from the conceptual scaffolding of nationalism 
 
597 Ibid., 221.  
598 Ibid., 221.  
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and sovereignty. Lesbian feminism, as I have suggested throughout this work, offers a 
compelling account of what such a project might look like in practice.  
*** 
 
To be sure, though, while I have argued that these queer maneuvers excise the 
dynamic and compelling political resources of lesbian feminism in the name of anti-
essentialism (whether or not the politics they reject are actually essentialist), some 
readers may still question whether it is really necessary or desirable to ‘go back to go 
forward.’ That is, does lesbian feminism really hold adequate resources for confronting 
these problems? Doesn’t this era of political theorizing simply have too much baggage to 
furnish a more intersectional or coalitional politics in the present? Certainly, the broader 
political landscape in which feminists and queers must act looks radically different today 
than it did in the 1970s and 80s; in fact, some might argue, the political winds of 
neoliberalism, Trumpism, populism, and alt-rightism have made it necessary to step 
outside of the tracks of old ways of thinking that impotently replay debates over a liberal 
world order that is rapidly becoming a thing of the past.  
In Why Stories Matter, Clare Hemmings has spelled out in particular detail the 
dangers of “going back” to feminisms past only to bemoan the inadequacy or 
“depoliticization of [current] feminist commitments.”599 Such backward-looking gestures, 
Hemmings writes, might look something like this:  
We have lost our way but we can get it back, if we apply a little common sense to 
our current situation. We may have been convinced by the turn to language, a 
poststructuralist capacity to deconstruct power and value difference, but we know 
better now. We know now that critique does not alter power relations and indeed 
that these have endured and strengthened…Perhaps earlier feminist theories might 
 
599 Clare Hemmings, Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 4.  
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still have something to teach us about what we have in common as women, 
despite the valuable critiques of essentialism that have come since.600 
 
Hemmings’ sketch of “return narratives” does strike a familiar chord in much feminist 
political theory, as I suggested in my introduction. In this project, though, I have tried to 
reconstruct lesbian feminism as a radical counterpublic not to suggest that lesbian 
feminist conceptions of shared oppression, common interests, and unified revolutionary 
consciousness remain salient today despite the valuable lessons of anti-essentialism. 
Instead, I have tried to argue quite the opposite: lesbian feminism, I have insisted, was 
never as unified, homogenous, or essentialist as these narratives tend to suggest. In fact, if 
lesbian feminism ought to be characterized at all, it should be for its proponents’ 
persistent and rigorous attention to the breaches, asymmetries, and injustices within their 
movement.  
Lesbian feminism, then, is not something to which to return; it is a way of raising 
questions that, at the end of the day, are the stuff of politics: What kinds of politics 
emerge when we observe a situation like the disarray over Solidarity Day at the West 
Coast Women’s Music Festival – or, for that matter, at the 1979 Second Sex: Thirty 
Years Later conference – and to decide, nevertheless, to carry on with the project 
together? How can we avoid dismissing such disputes simply as problems of “identity 
politics” which require a more exemplary political stance? How might a diverse, 
imperfect coalition confront and negotiate its internal inequalities not in the service of 
transcending them, but in order to better understand the challenges that arise when we 
engage in politics with and among others?   
 
600 Ibid., 4.  
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These questions, more than any one answer to them, I have argued, are the 
political lessons of lesbian feminism that are worth understanding, if not because lesbian 
feminists have some unique wisdom to impart then simply because these questions will 
persist whether or not we theorize new categories of marginality in more exemplary or 
accurate ways. But the sheer degree to which these questions were at the fore during the 
1980s is also the very feature of this era of theorizing that most often contributes to 
contemporary theorists’ assessment of it as fractious, exclusionary, and flawed. Part of 
what it means to return to lesbian feminism or to recognize its mode of theorizing as 
transformative, then, is not simply to push contemporary theorists towards “better” 
methods or more enduring truths, but to recognize that the seeming contestability – its 
demands, its discomforts, its attempts to negotiate through rather than around issues of 
political intractability –is lesbian feminism’s political contribution. At the same time, it 
alerts us to the fragility of this insight: that, looking back, we see not a demand for 
accountability but an inherently doomed contest over identity is a good indicator of just 
how difficult it is to keep a politics of publicity, accountability, and repair in view. 
Finally, then, in taking to heart these political and historical fragilities, it is worth 
remembering the words of Adrienne Rich with which I began Chapter 1:  
With whom do you believe your lot is cast? 
     From where does your strength come?  
 
     I think somehow, somewhere  
     every poem of mine must repeat those questions 
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